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MEMORIES OF A TURKISH
STATESMAN—1913-1919

*Memories of a Turkish
Statesman—1913-1919 :: By
Djemal Pasha :: Formerly Governor
of Constantinople, Imperial Ottoman Naval Minister, and
Commander of the Fourth Army in Sinai, Palestine and Syria*

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INTRODUCTION

My personal participation in general politics in the Ottoman Empire begins with the *coup d'état* of January 23, 1913.

On the evening of that day I left the headquarters of the Lines of Communication Inspectorate* and went to the Sublime Porte, to which a great crowd was flocking at the time.

At that moment Mahmud Shefket Pasha, who had been appointed Grand Vizier a few hours before, returned from the Imperial Palace and met me at the entrance to the Grand Vizier's palace.

He had hardly seen me before he called out: "Djemal Bey, I want you to take over the Military Governorship of Constantinople at once and you must not lose a minute in taking all measures you think necessary for the preservation of order and confidence in the capital."

As I have said, my assumption of the highly important and equally responsible office of Military Governor of Constantinople meant my direct participation in general politics in my Fatherland. I thus find myself compelled to start my memoirs at that point.

* At that time I was General Inspector of the Chataldja Lines of Communication.

MILITARY GOVERNOR OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1913

CHAPTER I.

MILITARY GOVERNOR OF CONSTANTINOPLE, 1913.

I ENTER UPON MY OFFICE.

WHEN I was commissioned by Mahmud Shefket Pasha to take over the direction of the Military Government of Constantinople, the corpse of Nazim Pasha was still lying in the room of the First Aide-de-Camp of the Grand Vizier and the Ex-Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha, as well as the Sheik-ul-Islam, Djemaleddin, the Minister of the Interior, Reschid Bey, and the Finance Minister, Abdurrahman Bey, were lodged for safety in one of the rooms of the Minister-President's quarters.

After a short conversation with Talaat Bey, who had been entrusted provisionally with the administration of the Ministry of the Interior, we decided that Nazim Pasha's corpse should be taken to the hospital at Gulhane, Kiamil Pasha and Djemaleddin Effendi should be sent home, and that we should keep Reschid Bey and Abdurrahman Bey a few days in the Military Government building, in order to protect them against the rage the revolutionaries were displaying against them.

At that moment Lieutenant-Colonel Nadji Bey, Kiamil Pasha's son-in-law, and a friend of mine since school days, was in the Grand Vizierate building. I received him with the words: "You needn't have any anxiety. Your father-in-law is safe. You can take him home, but if he does not want to be molested by some excited fellow it would be advisable for him to leave Constantinople for a time and go to Europe."

Nadji Pasha thanked me very warmly, and Kiamil Pasha and Djemaleddin Effendi reached their homes without mishap. Reschid and Abdurrahman were brought to the Military Government building, and Nazim Pasha's body was removed to the hospital at

Gulhane. I myself went to the Military Government and spent the night there engaged in taking such measures for the preservation of order as the situation required. Lest I burden my story with immaterial details I will not describe them more fully.

I made the doctors at Gulhane give me a report on Nazim Pasha, and also had a detailed report of the affair prepared.

THE BURIAL OF NAZIM PASHA.

On the next day the burial of Nazim Pasha was carried out in accordance with my instructions.

I had attached importance to the obsequies being carried out with every mark of distinction, and therefore insisted that the high military dignitaries, ministers and civil officials, as well as the military attachés of foreign Powers, should take part.

The weather was bad that day. I was a prey to profound melancholy. The Bulgarians stood before the Chataldja lines, the Greek Fleet blockaded the Dardanelles, the warships of the Great Powers were anchored off the Bechiktach, prepared to occupy Constantinople at any moment. But we ourselves, who unfortunately had not been in a position to wrest the reins of government from weak and nerveless hands by lawful means, had seen ourselves compelled to resort to a *coup d'état*, in which the former War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of our army had unhappily lost their lives. And in spite of all our efforts and such great sacrifices the future of our country was still in the greatest jeopardy. Such was the gloomy vision that passed before the eyes of my mind, as by the side of Major Maucorps, the French Military Attaché, I accompanied the earthly remains of Nazim Pasha to the grave. As we were crossing St. Sophia Square I turned involuntarily to Maucorps and said: "Look here, my friend, the Europeans alone are responsible for this victim, for by your perpetual injustices you have enticed the Turkish nation into the arena and compelled it to fight to be able to live in freedom and escape thralldom and misery. Who knows how many more obsequies you will attend? It will be no surprise if you have to follow my coffin to-morrow."

He made as if he did not understand me, and asked me to

make my meaning clearer. Passing over the French intrigues, out of courtesy, I spoke of the machinations of the English and Italians, and especially those of Russia, and referred to the spirit of revolt they aroused in the country. I explained to him how the Balkan peoples had been compelled to form an alliance by these intrigues and added that now, when the slightest support from England or France could still save us, they not only refused us such support, but did not hesitate to speak evil of us through the heads of their Governments, so that the poor Turks, after so many blows of adversity, had ended up by tearing each other to pieces. The English Military Attaché, Tyrrel, followed our conversation with interest, though he took no part in it. Maucorps, however, replied: "You're right"! He spoke in a tone which left me in no doubt as to his genuineness. We ultimately lapsed into silence and accompanied Nazim Pasha to his last resting-place.

THE GENERAL AMNESTY.

On the evening of the *coup d'état* the President of Police took the precautionary measure of arresting the most prominent members of the Opposition and bringing them to headquarters. A decision with regard to them had to be taken quickly, particularly as Reschid and Abdurrahman were detained at the Military Government building.

After discussing with a few friends, and particularly Talaat, we decided not only to take no repressive measures against them, but rather to strive to come to some understanding with them. Mahmud Shefket Pasha entirely approved this decision.

Thereupon I sent for Abdurrahman Bey, who wished to speak to me. I gave him an assurance that he and his friends were in no danger, that their detention was only temporary, and merely for the purpose of protecting them against attempts at assassination, and that they could go home in a day or two. I added, however, that in my opinion they would be wise to leave Constantinople and live abroad for a time. I gave them permission to have bedding and food fetched from their houses. Two days later I had them taken back to their homes under safe escort. A day or so later they left Constantinople, as did Kiamil Pasha and Djemaledin Effendi.

On the second day after my entry into office I went to the garrison headquarters, and visited Ali Kemal Bey as well as Riza Nur and Ismael Bey of Gumuldjina, the deputies for Sinope, who were interned there. I gave them the same assurance that they were in no danger if they abandoned all idea of untimely opposition. I remarked that in these unhappy times the country needed the help of all reasonable and well-disposed men, and that if they believed in my good intentions I could give them an honourable field of labour.

Ali Kemal Bey wanted some post in Europe. Dr. Riza Nur asked for the money necessary to prosecute his medical studies in Paris. Ismael Pasha gave me his word of honour that if he were allowed to remain in the country he would refrain from any opposition to the Government until normal conditions were restored.

I sent Dr. Riza Nur to Paris after I had obtained the necessary approval of the grant of money he had requested. Kemal Bey I sent to Vienna, compensating him in the same way for his removal. I had several letters from him there.

Four or five days after these negotiations with the leaders of the Opposition, the political atmosphere cleared, and Mahmud Shefkets Pasha's Ministry could settle down to devote itself to its great task.

As Military Governor of Constantinople I had also to hold the post of General Officer Commanding the operations base of the army at Chataldja, and in carrying out the double functions of these offices I made it my principal business to preserve order in the city and at any cost prevent the repetition of a *coup d'état* against Mahmud Shefkets Pasha's Ministry.

I must not omit to refer here to two measures which I found it necessary to take:

1. There were in Constantinople a number of smugglers who were offering smuggled tobacco (in Government packets) in the streets of the city, Sultan Hamam, Sirkedji, and on Mahmud Pasha Hill and Bayazid Square.

I detected an open proclamation of the bankruptcy of state authority in the cry, "Two piastres' worth for one," to the accom-

paniment of which these people had the audacity to offer their wares in packets under the tops of which the strands of light yellow tobacco could be seen, even if indistinctly. To bring the strength of the Government home to the civil population I therefore resorted to the powers conferred on the Military Government by martial law, and announced to all those concerned that anyone who indulged in illicit trading, whether wholesale or retail, would be arrested and banished from Constantinople.

In the next week I had four or five at most of these individuals deported, and the court martial passed sentence on a few smugglers who were caught in a kiosk not far from the Seraglio. The result was that the common swindling which had become an everyday occurrence was soon exceptional, and the people of Constantinople and its suburbs could henceforth enjoy perfect security.

2. There were many people in Constantinople who indulged in the vicious habit of making amorous remarks to Mohammedan ladies as they passed them out walking, on the boats and bridges, or in the streets and bazaars. Among them were even old women, who made indecent suggestions and even laid hands on elegant and well-dressed women.

I had always had a violent hatred of this abuse, and I had never been able to understand the neglect to take strong measures against it before. Indeed, the evil was always more or less noticeable in proportion as the Government was strong or weak. When I became Military Governor many fathers of families who had reason to complain applied to me with a request to take steps to change this condition of things. As our criminal code provided but little with which to combat it, I found myself once more compelled to resort to the powers which martial law conferred upon the Military Governor.

I issued a warning that men who used insulting language and women who accosted ladies should be transported to the interior. After four or five examples had been made our women were able to walk in the streets without further molestation. For the first time a definite step had been taken to place the personal freedom of Turkish women on a secure basis.

During my period of office as Military Governor I have proved that I am one of the most zealous advocates of the emancipation

of women, or, to put it more accurately, I believe firmly in the important part which woman is called upon to play not only in social life, but also in public affairs. It is true that for that reason I was subsequently made the object of numerous calumnies on the part of certain persons. Nevertheless the Women's Movement which began with my term of office not only did not die out as time went on, but extended and developed continuously and rendered the greatest service during the war. I am absolutely convinced that the civilising agencies of a country can best and soonest be promoted with the help of woman, and that those nations which keep their womankind in a state of slavery are on the high road to inevitable decay.

AN ATTEMPT TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENT.

After my appointment as Military Governor of Constantinople I invited the editors of the principal newspapers of the capital to call upon me, and told them that their papers would be subjected to a very mild censorship only if they would undertake to publish no articles of a kind to imperil public order. I asked them to write articles of a general and helpful nature, to enlighten public opinion and rouse the new forces which the Fatherland needed for its salvation. I desired to allow even the most violent organs of the Opposition to continue publication, organs which dated from the time of the previous Ministry. The latter certainly exceeded on occasion the instructions given them, but I confined myself to making representations to their editors or responsible directors.

The Government worked with the greatest energy to arouse the martial spirit of the nation and create an army capable at any rate of beating the Bulgarians facing the Chataldja lines during the second war against the Allies. On the one hand they founded the Committee of National Defence, and endeavoured to accumulate all possible material and military resources, and on the other they tried to raise the *moral* of the army and did everything in their power to create opinion favourable to Turkish interests among the Great Powers.

At that moment the English, French and Russian diplomatists who had been sent to Constantinople were doing their utmost to induce us to make peace with the Balkan States on the terms that

we should accept the Enos-Midia line and abandon the islands of the Archipelago.

When I called one day at the French Embassy the Ambassador, Monsieur Bompard, with whom I had been on friendly terms since the days when I was Governor in Adana, chose this topic as the subject of conversation.

"My dear Djemal Bey," he said, "why are you so obstinate about keeping Adrianople and the islands? You've effected a *coup d'état*. You're in power. We know that your party represents the strongest factor in the country and that, unlike the old Ministry, you wouldn't hesitate to take and carry out decisions such as even we ourself regard as in the best interests of Turkey. You must make it your business now more than ever to secure peace and order at home. Don't you think it wiser to devote the moral and material resources you mean to squander on the retention of Adrianople to the reforms you intend to introduce? Broadly speaking, all you possess in the city is a few historically notable mosques, and as for the islands, they've always been inhabited solely by Greeks."

By way of answer I took the Ambassador up to a map of the Ottoman Empire which was hanging on a wall. I pointed out that for the defence of Constantinople a *hinterland* was required which must at any rate stretch to Adrianople, and that if Anatolia was to be protected against the attack of Greek robber bands the possession of the islands off our coasts was absolutely essential.

"My dear Monsieur Bompard," I ended up, "we regard this question of Adrianople and the islands as a life and death matter for our future. We should be eternally grateful to any European Government which supported us in this affair, and it would always find us at its side. It would be a great *coup*, and France could thereby win a position of moral supremacy in the East."

While the Government was thus endeavouring to save Adrianople I was getting news every day which seemed to indicate that the Opposition were planning a *coup d'état*. The reports were ultimately so numerous and became so urgent that I found myself compelled to come to some decision in the matter.

One day fate delivered into our hands a certain Serdar Sidki Effendi from Erzerum. This man was caught with another individual in the act of having proclamations printed at a printing

establishment in Pera. The ringleaders of this group were working under the moral protection of Prince Sabaheddin Bey and taking direct orders from his Private Secretary, the Bosniac Saffet Lutfi Bey. Their aim was a *coup d'état* with the intention of making Prince Sabaheddin Bey Grand Vizier.

We arrested them all. We did not get hold of Saffet Lutfi for a time until we ultimately found him in the house of Herr Lazare, interpreter to the Austro-Hungarian Consulate. I had him arrested and imprisoned. As these measures were contrary to the capitulations, I found myself compelled to get orders from Mahmud Schefket Pasha and, as supreme responsible representative of the executive authority, call at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in full dress and present my apologies to Count Pallavicini.

This attempt at a *coup d'état* is described as an "attempt to overthrow the Government" in the record relating to this affair. These documents, which were most carefully drawn up, are preserved in the Military Government, the Prefecture of Police and the War Court. The prisoners were condemned to various penalties. Prince Sabaheddin I left alone for the time being, as Talaat Bey, who was then performing the functions of Secretary-General of the Committee and endeavouring to arrive at some understanding with the Prince, had asked me to postpone his arrest until we secured some obvious and irrefutable proof of his guilt.

In spite of the arrest and punishment of Saffet Lutfi and his accomplices Sabaheddin Bey continued his machinations. This time he entrusted the conduct of the business to his close friend, Dr. Nihad Reschad Bey. Nihad Reschad Bey now got into touch with Talaat Bey with a view to finding a basis for compromise between our party and Prince Sabaheddin's, and simultaneously started a plot, the object of which was the murder of Talaat Bey, Mahomed Shefket Pasha, and other persons. But I was daily kept informed of his intrigues, and, so to speak, followed him step by side. The Doctor's double game was so well concealed by his elegant exterior that Talaat Pasha, who was in negotiation with him, would not believe in the machinations of this gentleman, though I exposed them in all their details to him. He accused my intelligence service of wishing to deceive me until

I ultimately convinced him entirely by a shattering piece of evidence.

One day there was to be another conference between Talaat and the Doctor. This conference was, however, preceded by another meeting which the Doctor had arranged with his accomplices. Highly satisfied with the course of the discussion with his friends, the Doctor took leave of them, remarking with a Machiavellian smile: "Now we'll talk to Talaat about an understanding." I had taken good care that someone in whom Talaat Bey had perfect confidence should witness this scene. From that moment on Talaat Bey doubted no longer. Doctor Nihad, who had obviously got wind of the affair, succeeded in escaping when I tried to have him arrested also. Several of his friends were put under lock and key, and formed the second group which was brought before a court martial.

Prince Sabaheddin disappeared from the scene. I learned subsequently that under the protection of Mr. FitzMaurice, the first interpreter at the English Embassy, and Major Tyrrel, the Military Attaché, he had fled to a house in English occupation, so that our hands were, of course, tied.

I could not understand how the Prince, who had planned the conspiracy with extreme boldness, could suddenly abandon his scheme and take to flight. When Talaat Pasha was later on returning from our journey from Constantinople to Berlin and came to speak of this matter he remarked with a smile: "When you gave me palpable proof of the intrigues of the doctor and the Prince and I realised that you were determined to have them arrested I had the Prince warned through one of his confidants to disappear as quickly as possible. That is how he got away."

Curiously enough, it was I who had set the Prince free at the time of the events of April 13th (March 31st) after he had been taken prisoner by the Army of Operations and brought to the Ministry of War. I had hardly heard of his arrest before I went to Mahmud Shefkets Pasha and represented to him that these measures against the Prince were not permissible. I told him that inasmuch as we had come to Constantinople to remove the mischief makers and fight the nefarious activities of the street politician, it would not be right to behave in the same way towards the Prince and certain individuals whose political opinions and convictions

differed from our own. The Pasha at once ordered his release. I thereupon went to the great drawing-room in which the Prince was waiting with his mother, the Sultana, and told him with polite apologies that he was free. But while the enquiries into the activities of Saffet Lutfi and his friends were in progress and Doctor Nihad's accomplices were being searched for I was informed that the Prince was one of the many authors of the events of April 13th. This time he was enabled to escape through the protection of Talaat Pasha, although there could be no doubt about his participation in the preparations for a *coup d'état*.

One day at the time when I was taking proceedings against the Prince and his fellow-conspirators (it was before his flight) his brother, Prince Lutfullah Bey, came to the Military Government to ask for my help in a personal matter. In the course of our conversation I began to speak about Sabaheddin Bey, and said: "I want you to do me a little favour, I mean take your brother Sabaheddin Bey a message. In his appeals, both here and in Europe, he asserts that the leaders of 'Unity and Progress' are assassins whose hands are red with blood. Although this allegation is in direct contrast to the evidence, I will assume for the moment that it is true. I myself maintain, on the other hand, that all the members of the Opposition, Prince Sabaheddin included, have blood on their hands as well as we ourselves.

"To begin with, it was they who organised the events of April 13th; theirs is the guilt for all the blood which was then shed as well as for that which flowed when the Army of Operations entered Constantinople. Further, the Prince took an active part in the formation of the group of 'Band of Deliverers' Officers, and was not unconnected with the rising in Albania. His Highness thus cannot evade partial responsibility for the blood that has flowed. On the other hand, he is trying to brand *us* as murderers. I must therefore ask the Prince to recognise these facts and be good enough to admit that those whom he called murderers only proceeded to take counter-measures in an absolute emergency. He should also admit that the sharper measures were taken by his party and should be prepared for a compromise which allowed both parties to remain true to their different political convictions and yet to work for the common welfare of the Fatherland, each in its own way."

Lutfullah Bey naturally defended his brother most vigorously, and vowed that he was incapable of dipping his hands in blood and had nothing to do with all these affairs. Thereupon I said to him: "I can't discuss these matters with you, as you know nothing about them, but please tell me whether you will repeat my words to your brother. That will satisfy me."

He promised, and added: "Perhaps I can do some good this way."

Two or three days later Prince Lutfullah Bey called on me again and told me that he had repeated my words to his brother, and that the latter had replied that my accusations conflicted wholly with the truth and that I either desired to slander him or must unquestionably have been falsely informed. I recognised but one political principle which he regarded as his ideal, and fought for its realisation by the methods of peace. He shrank with horror from all bloodshed, and he could not understand how anyone could regard him as the advocate of a bloody revolution, much less as its organiser. He was bound to assume, merely from my remark as communicated to him, that there was a cloud of hatred and enmity about him, and he therefore considered he must withdraw for some time to some safer place.

"I will make Sabaheddin a proposal," I replied. "We will choose the three best-known English lawyers. I will show this committee of judges the proofs and evidence against the Prince which I can produce and they shall decide whether the Prince was or was not one of the organisers of the various insurrections and revolutionary movements. If their decision is against him the Prince would have to face the Ottoman Courts."

A few days later Prince Lutfullah Bey returned and assured me that he had no chance of seeing his brother and putting my proposal before him. As a matter of fact Prince Sabaheddin had disappeared the night before.

ABUK AHMED PASHA.

At the time of my enquiries into the *coup d'état* planned by our enemies my attention was urgently called by my intelligence service to the fact that Abuk Ahmed Pasha, who was then commanding the Chataldja Army, was not unconcerned in the affair, and had instructed his nephew, Prince Sabaheddin, and their

friends to promise his help. I have always considered Abuk Ahmed Pasha a man of honour, and do not think any different of him now, and I am convinced that the greatness and prosperity of his country has always been his dearest wish, and that he has genuinely devoted himself to it. For that reason I could put no faith in the numerous reports which I received from my agents, and I remained of that opinion even when he resigned after Enver Pasha was appointed War Minister, and he was asked to reside in Damascus. Even now I adhere firmly to that view although I see that Abuk Pasha has become a Minister in the Cabinet, which includes individuals like Marshal Shakir Pasha Hadra Sabri and others who, as the most prominent and influential members of the Liberal-Union, were the authors of the attack on Mahmud Shefket Pasha.

DAMAD SALIH PASHA.

My agents displayed the greatest zeal. They continuously brought me news of a conspiracy which aimed at the overthrow of the Ministry, and in particular contemplated the assassination of Mahmud Shefket Pasha and the deaths of Talaat Bey and myself. This time the conspirators had the protection and direction of the first interpreter at the English Embassy, FitzMaurice, and Major Tyrrel, the Military Attaché. I was also informed that Muhib Bey, the director of the Political Section of the Police in the time of Kiamil Pasha's Ministry, Captain Cherkess Kiazim, Ex-Captain Shefket Ismael of Gumuldjina, and several other individuals were concerned in the conspiracy; I had these people very closely shadowed by my secret agents. I received a report which gave me the most positive indications that Damad Salih Pasha and Reshid Bey, the former Minister of the Interior, were at the head of the conspiracy. As I knew that Damad Salih Pasha was a member of the committee of Liberal-Union I could not believe that he would participate in such a crime. In any case I was very much concerned to protect an individual closely related to the Imperial Family, and prevent him from taking any part in a plot.

I therefore sent one of my aides-de-camp to him and asked him to give me an appointment, and the Military Government. He was there at the hour agreed. After I had given him a very respectful reception I said to him: "Would Your Excellency allow

me to tell you quite straight what is on my mind? Certain people who wish to make use of the material and moral advantages of your great name and person and your relationship with the Imperial Family are secretly engaged in underhand intrigues and misusing your name. A secret committee is said to have been formed under your chairmanship and to be seeking adherence in civil and military circles with the intention of removing the heads of the present Government in the near future and starting a revolutionary movement. I must assume that your Excellency knows nothing of all this, but please be good enough to believe that the individuals in question are actually doing as I have said, and thereby saddling Your Excellency with the heaviest responsibility. Please believe that I regard it as my sacred duty to protect you against their activities, especially having regard to your relationship to the Imperial Family, to which I am in the highest degree devoted. I therefore beg you very respectfully to leave Constantinople for a time and reside somewhere in Europe, so that if the Government has to take strong measures against the leaders of the conspiracy very shortly you will not be drawn into the affair. Besides, such a step would also mean that these people were deprived of the strongest support on which they could build."

To these words, which were perfectly honestly meant, he replied in a manner and tone which were utterly incompatible with the rules of good breeding and courtesy.

"Look here, Bey Effendi," he said, "I'll speak to you quite frankly. Thanks to Her Highness the Sultana, I'm leading an extraordinarily pleasant life here, a life which suits me so well that I shouldn't like to miss a moment of it. I must therefore decline your suggestion of going to Europe. Besides, if I took your advice and went to Europe people might regard it as an admission and start accusing me. So here I am, and here I remain; don't you hesitate to do whatever you think right. My only regret is that you had me fetched to frighten me with threats."

While asking the Pasha not entirely to forget the rules of courtesy, I said to him: "I can see Pasha that you have great confidence in the strength of your organisation, which is known to me, and are convinced that your hopes will be realised very shortly. You think that you can wait here for their realisation

without danger, but I can assure you that I have a magnificent intelligence service at my disposal, and there is nothing doing with conspiracies. It may be that a few attacks on individuals will succeed, but the Government will never be overthrown. I must therefore advise your Excellency to accept my proposal. Her Imperial Highness the Sultana could also accompany you to Europe if she thought it necessary. It would not be difficult to get His Highness the Grand Vizier to obtain the approval of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and to obtain the assurance of all requirements. In case you were absolutely determined to reject my well-meant advice, I should regard it as my duty to have you strictly watched from this day on. But in that case please do not complain and say that the 'Military Governor has us shadowed by his spies!'" He sprang up angrily. "Don't hesitate for a minute to do what you think good," he replied. "I am not the sort of man to be sent away easily." Thereupon I rushed away. From that day I had Salih Pasha continuously watched, so that nothing he did was unknown to me.

Four or five days later the Director-General of the Regie, M. Weyl, called upon me. He greeted me with the remark that he had returned from Athens the previous evening and that his first call had been on me. After a few polite nothings he said: "Djemal Pasha, I am really very angry with you to-day. You have insulted one of my friends who is as much to me as you yourself and treated him in a way not in keeping with his position. I mean Damad Salih Pasha. You have accused him of being the leader of a conspiracy and advised him to go to Europe. Why have you done that? I know Salih Pasha as well as I know myself, and I am convinced that he would never take part in so horrible a business."

After I had listened to him very quietly I replied: "My dear M. Weyl, please don't get excited! I know I have said hard things to Damad Salih Pasha, but I did so only after mature consideration, and I am interesting myself in him not on his own account, but solely out of regard for his relations with the Imperial Family, whose honour I have to preserve. Unfortunately the Pasha seems to have great confidence in the success of his friends, as he would not listen to my honest advice. Henceforth I shall find myself compelled to have Salih Pasha watched even more

closely. To show you how effectively he is shadowed I'll tell you just one thing: Just ask him whether an anonymous letter has not just reached him, and whether in that letter he was not requested to go to Pera. Of course, the Pasha did not go. But why? Because he realised he was under close observation and did not wish to betray to me his accomplices' haunts. If the Pasha will not leave Constantinople, I must grant myself licence to take such measures as I think necessary to deal with him. And *you* will have no ground of complaint against me on that account."

M. Weyl, who had heard me out attentively, took leave of me and departed. Next day he came back. He told me that the Pasha had certainly received an anonymous letter containing the proposal I had mentioned, but as he knew neither the place nor who had sent the letter, and was afraid that it was a trap, he had not accepted the invitation. Yet he was as determined as ever to remain in Constantinople. "I don't wish to be mixed up in any way in this ticklish business," added M. Weyl. "It is only my friendship for the Pasha which has moved me to put in a word for him with another friend. Now that he refuses so obstinately to take your advice, I shall intercede for him no longer. All I ask is that you won't let him become the victim to calumny and intrigue. Of course, I've boundless confidence in your probity and conscientiousness."

The house to which Salih Pasha was invited belonged to Captain Cherkess Kiazim, who had arrived in Constantinople about a week before the assassination, and been enabled to land by the protection of FitzMaurice and Major Tyrrel. The Pasha, of course, knew this, but as he saw that he was being watched he did not go to the rendezvous that evening.

I was really anxious to save Salih Pasha, but he rejected my advice with that obstinacy characteristic of those who are certain of their success. His obduracy ultimately led to his death. I regret this tragedy most fervently, particularly as I am entirely devoted to the Ottoman Imperial Family, and must involuntarily have contributed to cause a royal princess so terrible a sorrow. But what could I do? His crime was too great to be forgiven, and if he had been pardoned after his conviction order and peace in the country would have been shaken for ever.

ISMAİL HAKKI BEY OF GUMULDJINA.

At that time my agents were also watching one of the leaders of the Opposition, Ismail Hakki Bey of Gumuldjina. I was firmly convinced that this most audacious individual was a very doubtful character, and positive that the country must expect great trouble from him. But the scheme of my plan of action required that I should make skilful use of him and have him arrested only when I had incontrovertible evidence against him in my hands. I assumed that my agents must have got him in a corner, for one day he came to me at Military Headquarters in great excitement (it was about a week before the assassination of Shefket Pasha), and said:

“In view of the fact that I am under observation by your agents, I must assume that the Government suspects me. Look here, Djemal Bey! I’m talking to you as a man of honour, and can assure you that I shall keep the promise I made to you when I was in prison at headquarters. Not a word passes my lips which has any wrong intention. Neither publicly nor privately am I concerned in any movement against the Government. As your men are now spreading untrue reports about me, and may be deceiving you, I think it better to speak to you personally. I give you my word of honour that I am not engaged in any sort of enterprise against the Government and have nothing to do with those who are working against the Government.”

As I knew that this individual was one of the chief organisers of the conspiracy which was being definitely hatched against Mahmud Shefket Pasha, I was surprised and felt extremely disgusted at his perjuring himself in this way. Even at the time when he was released from prison by my intervention after the *coup d’état* of January he had sworn on his honour and conscience that he would refrain from opposition until peace was concluded and order restored. Hardly a month had passed before he was working with all his might to arrange an abominable crime. When I heard him thus repeat this false oath I could not refrain from showing my disgust:

“Enough of oaths, Ismail Bey!” I said. “You may be certain that I condemn no one without incontrovertible proof. Otherwise I should never have released you from prison as I did. But I advise you really to have nothing to do with certain

people who are hatching plots, as otherwise my Intelligence Service may not feel exactly well-disposed towards you. For this time you may withdraw."

He thanked me and went. But I had made a great mistake, for if I had been more prudent and given an order for his arrest at that moment it would not have been possible for him to make good his escape after the murder of Mahmud Shefket Pasha. He would also undoubtedly have been convicted on the facts disclosed at the enquiry into the assassination, and the country would have been freed for ever from a man who had been bribed by Greek money to betray his country.

As I write these lines I read in the papers that Ismail Bey of Gumuldjina has become Minister of the Interior in Damad Ferid Pasha's Ministry, and even been appointed president of an extraordinary court, which is sitting in judgment on the leaders of "Unity and Progress." All I need say here is that we shall probably see in a very short time what a fatal thing for his country his appointment means.

In spite of the greatest efforts on my part, Ismail of Gumuldjina succeeded in escaping after Mahmud Pasha's death.

KIAMIL PASHA.

Early one morning, a week or ten days before the murder of Mahmud Shefket Pasha, the Prefect of Police, Azmi Bey, told me that Kiamil Pasha was on board a ship of the *Messageries Maritimes*. It had arrived at the quay during the night, but he had not yet gone ashore. He asked me to issue the necessary order for his arrest. I ordered him to send the Director of the Political Department to the Pasha at once and request His Highness not to set foot on land, but return to Egypt by the same ship. Half an hour later Azmi Bey informed me that Kiamil Pasha had landed during the night and gone to his house in Stambul. I knew that the conspirators had decided on the Pasha's return to Constantinople, but I did not think Kiamil Pasha would have the courage to respond to their invitation. The arrival of the Pasha in Constantinople was the surest sign that the insurrection was immediate. The situation demanded very speedy and strong measures. I summoned Azmi Bey to me and asked him to proceed as follows:—

“ I shall send an officer from Military Headquarters with some military police to Kiamil Pasha’s house. They will have a commissary and an adequate number of civil police under their orders. The officer and the commissary with their party must go to Kiamil Pasha’s house. They must distribute their men and watch the entrances so that not a soul, whether a native or a foreigner, can communicate with the occupants. The officer and the commissary will ask the Pasha to see them and convey the following decision of the Government: ‘ The presence of His Highness Kiamil Pasha is a danger to the internal tranquillity of the country at the moment. The Government requests the Pasha to be good enough to return to Egypt by the ship in which he came. Even if the ship lies at anchor here for three days His Highness is requested to go on board within twelve hours at the latest. Otherwise the Government would find itself compelled to take precautionary measures which His Highness might find very uncomfortable.’ The officer and the commissary will then bring us back the Pasha’s answer. You yourself must remain in the house and prevent anyone from entering.”

These orders were immediately carried out. The Pasha replied that he was very tired and could not stand the discomforts of a second sea voyage within so short a time. He did not consider it necessary to comply with the Government’s illegal request. In view of this reply I gave orders that his house should be guarded so closely that no one could go out or in until the Pasha left Constantinople.

While these orders were in force the First Dragoman of the English Embassy, FitzMaurice, came to the Pasha’s house to welcome the Pasha in the name of the Embassy. The police, however, refused to admit him. This gentleman immediately decided to take counter-measures to prevent the deportation of Kiamil Pasha from Constantinople, and at once went to Mahmud Shefket Pasha in the name of the Ambassador. He said that he did not understand how he could be prevented from calling on Kiamil Pasha, an old friend of the Embassy, and it would have a very bad effect on public opinion in England. In this and other ways he revealed his animosity towards us. About mid-day Mahmud Shefket Pasha rang me up and asked me to go to him at once.

He was sitting in the Grand Vizier's room with the Naval Minister, Churuk Sulu Mahmud Pasha. Halil Bey was also to be received by the Grand Vizier. We entered together. The Grand Vizier said, looking extremely gloomy:

"Here's a pretty state of things! Apparently you're holding Kiamil Pasha prisoner in his own house. You mean to compel him to leave Constantinople?"

"Certainly, Your Highness. I consider it necessary to take the precautionary measure you mention."

"I order you to stop guarding his house at once and leave him alone. The Pasha can please himself whether he lives here or abroad."

"In my opinion, Your Highness," I replied, "it would be extremely dangerous to cancel the measures we have taken, and . . ."

He bellowed at me: "You're a soldier, aren't you? I give you orders! Carry out my orders at once, or I shall deal with you very severely. Do you want to make the English my enemies? If you'd heard what the First Dragoman told me you'd see that you're wrong."

It was impossible for me to ask the Pasha what right the representative of a foreign Power had to intervene in the action of the Government against X. or Y., for the Pasha was in such a state that he was not open to reason. I felt extremely bitter at the severe and unjust condemnation of the measures I had taken against Kiamil Pasha in view of his secret machinations. With tears in my eyes I replied: "It shall be done, Your Highness!" and left the room.

Churuk Sulu Mahmud Pasha, who understood how hurt I was, followed me out and took me into the Ambassador's drawing-room. We stood by the window in silence for five minutes. At last I said:

"Did you see how I was treated? Can anyone stand things like that without loving his country?"

"You're right," replied Mahmud Pasha, "but don't be impatient."

After I had recovered my composure somewhat I thanked the Pasha, took my leave, and returned to Headquarters. I summoned Azmi Bey, and said:

“On the order of His Highness the Grand Vizier the police guarding Kiamil Pasha’s house are to be withdrawn and he is to be allowed unhindered communication with anyone, but I consider it necessary to take the following measure: One military policeman and one civil detective must remain near the house and observe everyone coming out or going in.”

Then I wrote two letters to Mahmud Shefket Pasha. In the first I informed him that his orders as regards Kiamil Pasha had been carried out. In the second I asked to be relieved of my post as Military Governor of Constantinople in view of the fact that my health had given way under the strain of my work. I was perfectly conscious that this request was not in the interests of the country, but I had no option but to decide as I did, as without freedom to take all necessary measures, it was impossible for me to secure the safety of the capital.

The Pasha, who very soon regretted the violent way in which he had spoken to me, called me up on the telephone and asked me to see him even before he got my letters. As I did not wish to see him again before he received my resignation I excused myself for the moment on the ground of urgent business, and told him that I could not be at his disposal until the evening at some hour convenient to him. He ordered me to go to the Grand Vizier’s palace at 9 p.m.

That day my resignation was laid before the Council of Ministers, and the Pasha asked the Ministers what he was to do. The latter frankly advised him to insist that I should remain at the head of the Military Government. The Pasha said that this was his opinion also, but that there was bound to be a difficult situation if I insisted on the deportation of Kiamil Pasha, and, in any case, he wished to speak to me first. That evening I met Ibrahim Bey, who greeted me with the words: “I’m told you want to resign. How on earth is that? We shall all resign.” My other friends also opposed my intention. But to me there were two alternatives only: to be absolutely independent and assume all responsibility for my orders, or to resign. For the delicate situation and my responsibility for public safety demanded nothing less than entire freedom of action.

At 9 p.m. I went to see the Pasha at the Grand Vizier’s palace. He gave me a very friendly reception.

“ Why did you take my remarks this morning to heart so ? ” he said. “ Don’t you know I love you like a son. When a father is upset he can’t treat his children quite as he would like. Please regard the incident as a little altercation between father and son and don’t be angry with me any more.”

“ Pasha,” I replied, “ please don’t doubt that I take your behaviour to-day only as it was meant. I always regard myself as your son and, as I know your worth only too well, I can stand even the hardest treatment from you. Thus it is not your violence towards me which has compelled me to ask for permission to resign, but simply the impossibility of working under such circumstances. Your Highness is not aware of what is brewing and not *au courant* of the secret revolutionary conspiracies. I did not wish to trouble Your Excellency with police matters, and would prefer not to do so even now. But I can assure Your Excellency that Kiamil Pasha has been brought to Constantinople in order to be made Grand Vizier over your corpse. The arrival of the Pasha is the surest sign that a revolution is imminent. To compel him to leave Constantinople is to clip the wings of the plot. Your Highness knows well enough that those whose duty it is to take measures against secret menaces and attempts at assassination do not always have a free hand in the selection of their means. When you appointed me to my post you promised me the freest possible hand, and now, when faced with totally unjustifiable interference by the English Embassy, you prevent me from taking the most urgent steps. In these circumstances I am quite unable to carry on my work.”

After long consideration he replied: “ All right, I give you an entirely free hand, but don’t take any stronger measures against Kiamil than are absolutely necessary and allow him to stay here three days.”

On that I withdrew my request to resign. When I got back to Headquarters I immediately asked Abdullah Bey, Kiamil Pasha’s son, and a member of the State Council, to call upon me next day. He accepted the invitation, and I told him that in any case the Pasha must leave Constantinople, that it was impossible to withdraw the orders given, and that he need expect no support from the English Embassy or any other foreign representatives. I added that if he had not left the city by Friday at the latest I

should have to have him arrested and probably sent to somewhere in Anatolia.

After considerable discussion Abdullah Bey entirely approved my decisions, and went away after promising that he would try and induce his father to abandon his futile opposition. He returned in the evening to tell me that the Pasha would leave by sea next day. And, true enough, the following day, a Friday, Kiamil Pasha left his house, accompanied by Sir Gerald Lowther, the English Ambassador, drove past the Sublime Porte, and went on board ship at Galata. The same evening the vessel, gay with lights, left Constantinople bearing Kiamil Pasha with her.

THE ASSASSINATION OF MAHMUD SHEFKET PASHA.

Many signs, not to mention the reports of my agents, seemed to show that the conspirators had made their preparations and that a general onslaught would be made in the next few days.

On the day of the murder, Wednesday, June 15, 1913, I went to the War Office early in the morning to get the Pasha's orders and to impress on his aides-de-camp the necessity of guarding him with special care on his visits to the Sublime Porte. I talked to the Pasha for about half an hour, and he was particularly jovial that morning and felt quite safe as the result of the measures which had been taken. As I did not want to make him unduly anxious, I told him casually that attempts at assassination were to be expected at that time, and for that reason it would perhaps be necessary to make a few arrests the next day or the day following. I added that, with all our precautions, it was impossible to prevent individual attacks, and it was therefore advisable for him to be very careful when he was in the streets. I had therefore told his aides-de-camp to keep a particularly sharp watch over him.

"I know," he said, "it's in God's hands!"

I left him and went up to the next floor to speak to Major Saadullah and Major Keival Bey in the 3rd Section of the Headquarters Staff. We discussed a regulation. It was perhaps a quarter of an hour later that a sound was heard coming from the War Office Square—five regular taps as if someone was knocking a large drum with a hammer. As I was expecting an attempt at

assassination any moment, I asked Kemal Bey whether they were not revolver shots.

"I don't think so," he said. "It's someone beating carpets or knocking nails in somewhere."

But I was anything but satisfied with that answer, and expected bad news at any moment. Five minutes later my faithful servant Ramazan rushed into the room and screamed out: "The Pasha has just been killed!" I was in the vestibule at a bound. "Which Pasha? Who killed him? Where?" I shouted. "In the Bayazid Square, on his way to the Sublime Porte. I don't know who killed him."

As I was rushing up to the first floor Mahmud Shefket Pasha, streaming with blood, was brought up to the steps to his room. I can still hear his husky death-rattle. I stopped for a moment in the corridor and looked into the Pasha's pallid face. Then I reflected, where does duty call me? I made up my mind at once. My first task was to pursue and catch the assassins and hasten to Military Headquarters to preserve order in the capital. My aide-de-camp Hilmi came up to me. "Come along," I said, and sped away to the Ministry of War. I called at the Garrison Headquarters to get the first reports. Just as I was turning the corner I was met by a lieutenant in the Military Police. "Have the assassins been caught?" I cried. "I don't know, Effendi," he answered, "I'm just looking for a patrol." "What do you want a patrol for?" I shouted, "turn back at once and arrest the murderers before they have time to get away or find a hiding place." The officer, amazed at the violence of my order, was on his feet in a moment, and ran to the scene of the crime.

When I reached the place a few minutes later in my car he told me that he had just arrested a certain Topal Tewfik who was unquestionably one of the assassins, but the others, according to report, had made good their escape in a motor car. Of course I had to remain satisfied with this first report. I then went to Headquarters and had military measures taken in Pera, Skutari, and Stambul.

Hardly half an hour had passed since the crime when military patrols, mounted and on foot, appeared in the streets of the capital, and an hour later a proclamation was issued in which the public was informed of the crime and the intensification of the state of

siege was announced. The patrols would take the strongest measures against anyone who caused the slightest disturbance.

As I thought it possible that the conspirators might go to the Imperial Palace and trouble His Majesty I rang up the First Secretary of the Palace; gave him certain instructions and asked him to inform His Majesty at once that all necessary measures had been taken.

At the same time I got into telephone communication with the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Izzet Pasha, in Hadem Koj, and gave him a general summary of the situation. I told him of the steps for the preservation of order which had already been taken and asked him temporarily to place at my disposal two cavalry regiments which were quartered in the Daud Pasha Barracks, and also to send two infantry regiments from Hadem Koj to Kuchuk Chekmedje to help in preserving public order. Simultaneously I rang up Said Halim Pasha and the other Ministers to tell them what had happened, and asked them to come to the Ministry of War as soon as possible to take the necessary decisions.

SOME PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES.

Anticipating some such occurrence, I had previously made the officials at the Police Prefecture draw up a list of all persons of every class who might be expected to attempt to exploit the situation and start riots in the different quarters of the city. I had given instructions to the Prefect of Police, Azmi Bey, to arrest offhand every one on this list at the first serious attempt at a rising. Azmi Bey reported to me that this order, given long before, had just been carried out, and asked where the persons arrested were to be taken to. Said Halim Pasha, the interim Grand Vizier, Hadji Adil Bey, the Minister for the Interior, and I decided that in order to keep the capital quiet it was necessary to send the prisoners to Sinope and supply them with sufficient money.

I asked the Shipping Administration to fit out a ship to take them, and asked Azmi Bey to have all the arrests carried out in the course of the night so that they could be put on board and sent away by the next evening. I also had Damad Salih Pasha and others whom I knew to be involved in the plot arrested and examined by the police.

THE BURIAL OF MAHMUD SHEFKET PASHA.

I wanted Mahmud Shefkets Pasha's obsequies to be as sumptuous an affair as possible in order to show that peace and order were being maintained in the capital, notwithstanding the assassination of the Grand Vizier. I asked the appropriate authorities to send out the notices of his death and invitations to the funeral to all leading people, high officials of state and staff officers who were in the capital. A large escort of troops was to follow the funeral cortège. The ambassadors of foreign Powers and the captains and officers of the foreign warships in the harbour were also invited to be present at the ceremony. Invitations were issued to the military and naval attachés, and so forth. More than five thousand people took part in the procession. The weather was splendid, and the streets were thronged. Under the impression of this great ceremony, many women were seen weeping bitterly, and the general effect was thus all the greater. The large scale on which the obsequies were planned had the desired effect. Personally I should have preferred to pass through the streets of Stambul at the head of a mounted patrol, but as I wanted to get a general view of the cortège I entered my car on the Pera side, and going by a roundabout way through Pankaldi, I joined the procession at the School of Nôtre Dame de Sion. The general impression was more or less exactly what I had hoped, but the moment I beheld the coffin of the dead statesman, on whom I had placed so many hopes, I was plunged into the deepest distress.

After the funeral the French Commandant of Gendarmerie, Saron, came up to congratulate me on the perfect order which reigned in the city. He told me of a conversation between the Commander of the Italian Fleet and General Baumann (who had been sent to reorganise the gendarmerie), which he had overheard when standing on the Hill of Freedom waiting for the funeral procession to pass. The Admiral had said to Baumann: "This Djemal Bey is extraordinarily bold. It needs great courage and equally great confidence in the efficiency of one's precautions to arrange a funeral procession on this scale in a limited area on the very day after the crime, and with the criminals still at large, and then to assemble the ambassadors of foreign Powers, and even the commanders of their men-of-war. If some revolutionary were to throw a bomb and injured one or more of us the Turkish capital

would be immediately occupied by contingents from our warships. As a matter of fact that contingency has been under discussion, and the necessary measures have been taken. But here we are and nothing has happened! If the criminals and their accomplices are caught within a day or two Djemal Bey will have rendered his country a great service and he won't fail to utilise that result to demand the withdrawal of the fleets from the capital and the Bosphorus. In my opinion we are totally superfluous here."

The murder had taken place on a Wednesday. The funeral was on Thursday, and on the Friday I was able—at the price of my aide-de-camp Hilmi's life—to hunt out and arrest the ringleaders of the conspiracy, Kiazim, the Circassian, and some of his confederates, and bring them before the Committee of Enquiry of the Court Martial.

The examination and enquiry revealed that the party as a whole and individual members of it were working for the same end, to deprive the country of its government, get the leaders of "Unity and Progress" out of the way by assassination, and by putting pressure on His Majesty the Sultan to get Marshal Shakir Pasha temporarily appointed Grand Vizier. Under his presidency a Provisional Cabinet was to be formed, and in three days and nights all adherents of the Committee of "Unity and Progress" were to be massacred. At a later stage a new Cabinet was to be formed, with Kiamil Pasha or Prince Sabaheddin at its head.

I need not fear that anyone will dispute the accuracy of these facts. My assertions will be confirmed if the report of the examination and the results of the enquiry are published. If men read the confession of Salih Bey, interpreter to the Tramway Company, who took part in the doings of very highly-placed individuals who were involved in the plot, further proofs will be unnecessary.

Salih Bey is still alive. I consider him a man of honour. Even after the punishment of Mahmud Shefkhet Pasha's assassins and their confederates I was inspired by a desire to secure the cause of peace and order in the country once and for all, and therefore sent Salih Bey to Europe to make overtures to several individuals who had been sentenced to death *in contumaciam*. My proposals were very simple. If these persons would write to me personally in their own hand and tell me in what way they had participated in the various revolutionary movements and assassinations since the

proclamation of the constitution, I would at once procure a general amnesty in their favour. Of course my purpose was to enlighten public opinion both at home and abroad and to prove that there was nothing in the slanders on "Unity and Progress." When Salih Bey, who knew how far each of them was involved, laid these proposals before the individuals concerned, they openly expressed their astonishment, and, of course, rejected them, obviously accusing Salih Bey of having received money from the Government. I repeat once more that I have not given Salih Bey a penny. His confession shows that Marshal Shakir Pasha had accepted the interim Grand Viziership with full knowledge of the end in view, and that among those who were to influence His Majesty the Sultan in favour of his selection there were individuals who held very high positions in the State. Legal actions against these highly-placed persons would only have complicated the situation still more and to no purpose.

SAID HALIM PASHA'S CABINET.

After the death of Mahmud Shefket Pasha it was decided to propose Prince Said Halim Pasha as the party's candidate for the office of Grand Vizier. For reasons which I cannot judge His Majesty had appointed Said Halim Pasha as Grand Vizier for the interim, and ordered that the other Ministers should also carry on their work for the time being. After a few days Said Halim Pasha's Cabinet was reformed, the only change being that Talaat Bey took over the Ministry of the Interior.

A DIGRESSION.

I must ask to be allowed a short digression at this point so that I can lay a foundation for certain political remarks to which I shall return later on in my memoirs.

There was great agitation over the fact that Damad Salih Pasha was condemned to death. The trial was over, but the judgment had not yet received Imperial consent. One day I was asked by the French Councillor of Embassy, Monsieur Boppe, who was deputising for the Ambassador, then on leave, to call at the Embassy on an important matter.

"My dear Djemal Bey," he said, "I've just had a telegram

from Monsieur Pichon, the Foreign Minister. You know what a good friend to Turkey Pichon is. I am convinced of your friendly feelings for France, and I wanted to have your opinion on the attitude I am to adopt."

The telegram which he handed to me read as follows: "According to news just received, Salih Pasha, the son of Haireddin Pasha of Tunis, has been arrested and condemned to death. This news has caused great excitement in Tunis where Salih Pasha is held in high esteem. The French Government is certain that the conviction of one of its protégés may lead to great unrest in Tunis, and feels compelled to intervene on behalf of Salih Pasha. Speak to the Grand Vizier at once and insist that Salih Pasha shall be released and allowed to return without hindrance to Tunis."

After I had read the telegram I said nothing for a time. I now understood why Salih Pasha had not abandoned the organisation of the plot in spite of my pleading. The nearer I arrived to the truth, the more I pitied our unhappy country. At length I said to Monsieur Boppe: "You know my great sympathy for France, and notwithstanding the adverse comment of the French Government in recent times, I have, as you know, not abandoned my efforts to revive our French friendship. If you want to alienate public opinion in Constantinople and throughout the East you will certainly proceed with your intervention. I must tell you beforehand, however, that that step will have no success. Salih Pasha has been condemned on the strength of much incontrovertible evidence. The execution of the sentence on him and his confederates awaits His Majesty's confirmation. We've had enough of seeing the Government perpetually weakened by such crimes. This time we have made up our minds to exact the extreme penalty, however high their rank may be. We hope that by so doing we shall check similar attempts in the future. The influence you propose to bring to bear on the Grand Vizier will not save Salih Pasha, but public opinion will accuse the French Embassy of favouring *coups d'état* in Constantinople, and that may lead to permanent estrangement. In my opinion, your better course is to ask Monsieur Pichon to give up his idea."

Monsieur Boppe agreed with me, and, in fact, did not call on the Grand Vizier at all.

Two days after the judgment had received the Imperial approval it was decided that the sentence should be carried out next day. At eleven o'clock at night I was rung up by the French Embassy, and Monsieur Boppe asked me personally to go to him at once. I was hardly in his presence when he handed me in great excitement a second telegram from Monsieur Pichon. The latter had been very angry at the reply of the Chargé d'Affaires, who had advised against intervention, and instructed him most definitely to speak to the Grand Vizier without a moment's delay and save Salih Pasha at any cost. As I didn't want to increase Monsieur Boppe's agitation, I said: "It's too late, my friend. The sentence has been confirmed by His Majesty and will be carried out at daybreak. It's too late for you to speak to the Grand Vizier to-night. The sentence will have been executed before it is possible to issue a counter-order. But I cannot understand why Monsieur Pichon is so obstinate and what are his motives in blaming you instead of thanking you for your wise advice." Monsieur Boppe took the whole responsibility on his own shoulders, again refused what he knew would be a futile intervention, and next morning learned that the sentence had been carried out. A few days before Salih Pasha's execution I had had his brothers, Tahir and Mahmet Haireddin Bey, put under arrest. I had not the slightest doubt that Tahir Haireddin Bey was still a bolder and more dangerous person than Salih Pasha. The French Embassy wanted to intervene in favour of these two. We understood that this intervention was of a semi-official character, and stipulated as the basis of our consent that these two men should for the future take no part whatever in the affairs of the Turkish Government, and that they would renounce their Turkish nationality entirely, adopt French nationality, and go to France. The necessary formalities were completed on that basis.

These were the last services which the sons of Haireddin rendered to the Turkish nation. I hoped that we should never hear of them again.*

-As these gentlemen hail from Tunis, they would be better employed in trying to free their Fatherland from the French yoke.

* I heard subsequently that Tahir Haireddin had returned to Constantinople and been appointed Minister of Agriculture with the title "Mirmiran" (What a marvel!).

We should then see whether Monsieur Pichon would intervene to save their heads from the guillotine.

Before I close this digression I should like to add one more word. The malicious rumour that I and Talaat Bey went to the Imperial Palace to put pressure on His Majesty, who did not wish to confirm the sentence, is utterly false. The Grand Vizier's report and appendices were sent to the Sublime Porte the same day, together with the Imperial confirmation.

**THE OUTBREAK AND END OF THE
SECOND BALKAN WAR**

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTBREAK AND END OF THE SECOND BALKAN WAR.

THE RECOVERY OF ADRIANOPLE.

It was at the beginning of his term of office as Grand Vizier and after the failure of the Sharkoj offensive, the fall of the fortress of Adrianople, as well as Janina and Scutari in Albania, that Mahmud Shefket Pasha had to sign the preliminary peace and accept the Enos-Midia line. A short time after the Pasha's death the second Balkan war broke out, and the Serbs, Greeks and Rumanians marched against the Bulgarians.

The situation demanded that we should utilise this state of affairs and attack the Bulgarians ourselves in order to recover Adrianople. All the members of the party thought that the Government had come to a decision in that sense, and hoped with good reason that the army would be set in motion. The English Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, aware of the state of public feeling on this matter in Constantinople, worked with all his might and the intervention of the English Embassy to persuade the Sublime Porte to abandon this plan. He even used threatening language in his speeches in the House of Commons. In the Ministry opinions were divided.

I shall never forget the following occurrence. One Friday evening I went to Said Halim Pasha's Palace in Jenikoj. All the Ministers were present, as a Ministerial Council was in progress. Before my arrival they had been discussing various questions, and at the moment were enjoying an interlude on the marble balcony overlooking the sea. Osman Nizami Pasha remarked to his neighbour, Mahmud Pasha, the Naval Minister: "If I now succeed in persuading everyone here to abandon the idea of recovering

Adrianople, I believe I shall have rendered the country the greatest service."

The madness of his intentions, which were utterly opposed to the interests of the country, made me gasp.

In one of the rooms I found Said Halim Pasha and Talaat Bey feeling very depressed. Said Halim Pasha turned to me and said: "We've quite failed to bring the majority round in favour of intervention, and we simply don't know what to do."

Talaat Bey informed me that he would be able to settle the money question next day in a conference with M. Weyl, the Director-General of the Régie. He actually discussed the matter with M. Weyl next day, and I was present. M. Weyl promised the Government a loan of a million and a half on condition that the Régie's concession was extended for fifteen years. Acting on the decision of the Council of Ministers, the Finance Minister, Rifat Bey, and Talaat Bey, the Minister of the Interior accepted these conditions. Such is the explanation of the Régie business, which for the last two or three years has been denounced in the Chamber of Deputies as a crime of Djavid Bey's.

I am convinced that a Government which has accepted these conditions at such a moment cannot undo what has been done.

The same day Talaat Bey motored to Headquarters at Hadem Kōj to take the opinion of Izzet Pasha, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, at the War Ministry.

Izzet Pasha considered that two questions were particularly important, but was prepared to give the army the order to advance if he could be given satisfactory assurances on these two points:

1. Would not the political complications which might arise out of the advance of the army bring the country into very great danger?

2. Have we the necessary money to secure the supplies for the army?

Talaat Bey was commissioned to explain the standpoint of the minority among the Ministers as regards the first point, and to add that, as a result of the extension of the concession to the Régie, the financial problem was solved. He returned the next day and brought us Izzet Pasha's approval. Yet, in spite of all, the majority of the Ministers was convinced that the advance would have disastrous results for us.

Next morning I and Midhat Shukri Bey called on the Ministers who were still wavering. We explained to them that we should lose our moral right to guide the State and must send in our resignations if we allowed this opportunity of recovering Adrianople to pass unutilised, for this has been the object which had necessitated our *coup d'état* and for which our Deputy Commander-in-Chief and War Minister had had to give his life.

Some of them were convinced, but others announced their intention of resigning. We told them that it was their duty to show their devotion to the cause by not retiring. At long last a majority was secured before the Council of Ministers assembled. In this part of my memoirs I have no authority to give names.

I was concerned in this affair solely in my capacity as leading member of our party, and because I was in the friendliest and closest relations with the Ministers of that party. It was not, as one journal asserted subsequently, because I wanted to bring pressure or force to bear. As I have never allowed others to intervene in matters, whether great or small, pertaining to my Department, I have never myself interfered in matters which do not concern me, and always confined myself to expressing my wishes or giving friendly advice to my colleagues. Thus, I have never failed to avoid hurting their feelings or any suspicion of encroaching on their spheres. I am able to refute all statements to the contrary at any time, and will give the following example.

The smiling faces with which the Ministers returned from the sitting of the Supreme Porte they had so much dreaded filled us with happy confidence. When the order to advance and re-occupy Adrianople was given to the army the Foreign Minister informed the Powers in a Note communicated through our Embassies that the object of the army was to free Adrianople; that when that object had been attained the advance would cease, and under no circumstances would the right bank of the Maritza be crossed. In my opinion this Note was a political mistake. In the first place we could not rest satisfied with the recovery of Adrianople. It was essential that the Maritza should remain a Turkish river, and absolutely vital that Dedeagatch should be returned to us, as it forms the natural boundary on the Ægean side. Secondly, it was necessary that Dimotska, Saffanti and all the adjoining territory should be left in our possession if the safety of Adrianople

was to be secured. And when it is remembered that 85 per cent. of the population of Gumuldjina, Isketsche and their neighbourhood is Mussulman, it was a sacred duty to make an attempt to get back those places. Of course, it was difficult to be certain of the success of this enterprise, but the issue of this Note, which bound the Government by a formal promise from the outset, was certainly anything but evidence of political foresight.

Subsequently I shall show how, at the time of the Constantinople Conference, the Ottoman delegates, in their efforts to bring over their opponents, attempted to rest their case on the existing situation, as they could not find any logical ground for refusal in view of the very clear promise.

THE POLICY OF ENGLAND.

The moment the Ottoman Government decided to free Adrianople and issued the order to the army to advance, English policy threw off the mask and showed its true face. Through the English Embassy energetic representations were made to the Sublime Porte to prevent the Turkish army from crossing the Enos-Midia line. Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, announced in a speech in the House of Commons that if the Turks exploited the defeat of the Serbs by the Bulgarians to make an attempt to recover Adrianople, in defiance of the Treaty of London, they would be heavily punished for it afterwards, and would lose not only all their possessions in Europe, but even Constantinople itself.

It was clear from the note addressed to the Sublime Porte and the speeches of Sir Edward Grey that the policy pursued by England was utterly hostile to the Turkish Government, and that she was taking every opportunity of making things difficult for the Turks, and had made it her object to make full use of the obstacles in the way of the internal consolidation of Turkey.

It must seem very curious that at the time of our reoccupation of Adrianople the Russians were entirely favourable to us. I spent much time in considering what were the motives which then inspired the Russians to work against the interests of the Bulgarian Government in this way. When I was commissioned to establish a basis for negotiations for a Turco-Bulgarian understanding and

was talking one day with the Bulgarian envoy, Tocheff, I referred to this matter and asked him for his opinion. "The Russians," he replied, "consider Constantinople their natural inheritance. Their main concern is that when Constantinople falls into their hands it shall have the largest possible *hinterland*. If Adrianople is then in the possession of the Turks they will get it too, and in case of an invasion of Bulgaria they will have plenty of room in which to manœuvre their armies."

This explanation seemed to me thoroughly sound and convincing.

Among the opponents of our reoccupation of Adrianople was France, and French policy was in no way behind England's. The French Ambassador issued a verbal note to the Sublime Porte to the effect that the French Government was against the advance of the army, and simultaneously the French Press indulged in a heated denunciation of the enterprise. But, thank God, we occupied Adrianople, notwithstanding all these obstacles, and ultimately the Bulgarians had to recognise the *fait accompli* in the Treaty of Constantinople.

THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IN WESTERN THRACE.

When the army advanced on Adrianople the Government had issued a note in which clear assurances were given that the Maritza would not be crossed. But, notwithstanding this fact, a few individuals who were the leading spirits in the army succeeded in convincing the Government and the General Staff that this promise was untimely, and compelling them to shut their eyes to the activities of an unofficial "special organisation" (Techkilat-i-Mahsussa) which had been formed. In this way this organisation has a free field on the far side of the river. This "special organisation" was successful in occupying the whole of Western Thrace as far as the valley of the Kara-Su in a rapid and very skilfully conducted advance.

Western Thrace, consisting of the *kazas* of Orta Koj and Kirdja Ali and the *sandjaks* of Dedeagatch and Gumuldjina and comprising the vilayet of Adrianople, is a considerable region with a population of which 85 per cent. is Mussulman. The leader of the "special organisation" which occupied the district was

Suleiman Askeri Bey, who has died since. Captain Cherkess Reschid, Jzmirli Echref and his brother Sami, Fehmi Bey (now dead), and a few others formed its general staff.

Suleiman Askeri Bey summoned the Mussulman notables to a congress, and through this congress the formation of a "Mussulman Provisional Government of Western Thrace," with headquarters at Gumuldjina, was proclaimed. The president of the communal council of Gumuldjina was appointed President of the Provisional Government. The armed forces were placed under the command of Suleiman Askeri Bey. The divisions into *kazas* which had prevailed in the days of Turkish domination was retained, and each of them was given a president and commander of the forces. The presidents of the *kazas* were under the orders of the President of the "Provisional Government," and the local commanders took their orders from Suleiman Askeri Bey. The latter was an energetic and extremely good administrator, though somewhat headstrong and too optimistic. This West-Thrace enterprise, for which we have to thank the extraordinary man whose high intelligence, invincible courage and proved devotion gave those about him confidence and a sense of security, brought us substantial political advantages at the Constantinople Conference later on, and subsequently when the basis in the Turco-Bulgarian alliance was being discussed.

This Provisional Government, which existed from the middle of July to the middle of September, came to an end in the latter month as a result of the decisions of the Constantinople Conference. But not without previous difficulties.

Notwithstanding the obligations undertaken by the Government, some of Suleiman Askeri Bey's companions wanted the "Provisional Government" to remain in existence, and contemplated armed resistance to occupation by the Bulgarians. The Turkish Government, on the other hand, had undertaken to intervene energetically to secure that the region of Western Thrace should be occupied by the Bulgarian forces without resistance. The Bulgarians in return had granted the Mussulman population of Western Thrace very considerable legal privileges and guaranteed that they should not be subjected to barbarities or reprisals. An immediate general amnesty was also promised.

Armed resistance to the Bulgarian occupation by the Mussulman

population would not only have brought them no advantage, but would have meant the loss of the many political and economic concessions which we had won for them.

Suleiman Bey, who had failed to overcome the resistance of his comrades, sent a letter to Constantinople in which he wrote: "If Djemal Bey, the Military Governor of Constantinople, in whom my companions have great confidence and who can exercise such great moral influence upon them, cannot come here at once to explain the attitude and obligations of the Government, the Bulgarian troops which cross the frontier and advance into Western Thrace will meet with armed resistance, and it will be impossible to avoid bloodshed."

Four or five hours after this letter arrived in Constantinople Suleiman Askeri Bey turned up in Constantinople himself. After a conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the War Minister and the Minister of the Interior, it was decided that I should go to Gumuldjina and Isketché and attempt to bring the officers there round to the views of the Government. At the same time the Bulgarian Government was informed of the situation through Tocheff, who had just been appointed envoy and was in Constantinople at the moment. Tocheff was asked to have an order sent to the commander of the division which was to occupy Western Thrace not to start operations before all methods of persuasion had been tried on the "Provisional Government," and with that end in view to wait till he heard from me.

I left Constantinople and travelled through Adrianople, Dimotika and Dedeagatch to Gumuldjina and Isketché. The next day I met Suleiman Askeri Bey and had a conversation with the commanders of the national forces. We settled all the conditions on which the Bulgarian occupation was to proceed. I sent all these conditions direct to the Bulgarian general. After they had been accepted *in toto* the occupation began, and a week later I returned to Constantinople.

THE CONSTANTINOPLE CONFERENCE.

After the recovery of Adrianople by us, the Bulgarians, who found themselves deserted all round, sent M. Nachivitch to Constantinople to ascertain semi-officially the Peace conditions which

we should be inclined to grant. This venerable old man, who was an old Stambuloffist, was also one of the oldest and warmest advocates of a Turco-Bulgarian *rapprochement*. After some semi-official discussions it was ascertained that this gentleman Nachivitch was not possessed of the necessary plenary powers to initiate peace negotiations. Shortly afterwards a Bulgarian delegation came to Constantinople to negotiate the terms of a Treaty of Peace between Turkey and Bulgaria. This delegation was lead by General Savoff, and Tocheff and Nachivitch were also members of it. The Turkish delegation, under Talaat Bey, consisted of Tchuruk Sulu, Mahmud Pasha, and Halil Bey. An advisory committee, consisting of military, financial and legal experts, was attached to the Bulgarian delegation, and in the same way a committee with the same duties was associated with the Ottoman delegates. I and Ismet Bey, Major of the General Staff, were appointed military advisers. The delegations, whose task it was to fix the frontier, deputed to us the business of settling details. I may say that I made the greatest effort to keep Demotica with a substantial slice of territory for Turkey, and to secure a number of special rights for the Mussulman population of West Thrace, and particularly the Turks settled in Bulgaria.

THE TURCO-BULGARIAN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE.

The members of the Bulgarian Government displayed a noteworthy spirit of conciliation. We were at the beginning of the third conference and I was just discussing various matters with Talaat Bey, who was presiding. "Let's finish our work quickly, gentlemen," said General Savoff, "so that we can get on to the discussion of far more important affairs. I haven't come here to haggle over a couple of yards of territory, or whether they are to remain Turkish or Bulgarian. My mission is connected with a project the realisation of which has been my dearest wish for many years, I mean a Turco-Bulgarian alliance. I am here to see this plan carried through."

The two other Bulgarian delegates nodded approvingly. As we knew that the general was fond of throwing a sop to Cerberus we attached no other meaning to these words, and in drawing up the terms of peace we endeavoured to insert as many advantages as possible in the text. Ultimately we attained our end.

Towards the end of the conferences General Savoff returned in a more concrete fashion to the alliance and the substantial mutual advantages which it would bring with it. When the work of the Peace Conference was concluded, Said Halim Pasha, Talaat and Halil Bey agreed that I should go with General Savoff to Prinkipo and that we should there decide upon the material provisions of a Turco-Bulgarian offensive and defensive alliance.

Lest remark should be excited it was decided to announce publicly that the General, who had worn himself out in the Balkan War, had asked the Turkish Government for permission to recuperate for a few days on the Prince Islands, and that he would subsequently reside in one of the hotels in Prinkipo as the guest of the Government. I was to go to the island one day and give a luncheon to the General in the House of Nedjineddin Mollah. We were to withdraw to one of the rooms after lunch and discuss the basis of a treaty of alliance.

These matters were duly carried out and we began to draw up with General Savoff the skeleton of a defensive and offensive alliance between Turkey and Bulgaria.

A few days later we went to my house in Schischli one evening to discuss the various articles of the draft treaty, make the necessary changes, and affix its final form. Of the Bulgarians, General Savoff and M. Tocheff were present, while Talaat Bey, Halil Bey and I represented Turkey.

The defensive alliance decided in principle that "in case one of the contracting parties were attacked by one or two Balkan States the other contracting party engaged unconditionally to assist it with all its resources." In the offensive alliance it was agreed that "if one of the contracting parties with the approval of the other attacked one of the Balkan States, and in the course of the hostilities were itself attacked by another State, the other contracting party would render it every assistance. If either of the two contracting parties found itself compelled to make war upon one only of the Balkan States the other would observe a benevolent neutrality towards it."

As regards territorial advantages to be obtained in a war waged jointly, the following provisions were to have effect: "If Bulgaria obtained possession of Cavalla and Drama the port of Dedeagatch would be assigned to us. If the Bulgarians extended their frontier

to the Struma, Monastir and Ochrida on one side, and to Uskub on the other, we should receive Western Thrace as far as the Kara Su. Lastly, if Bulgaria obtained Salonika with Karaferia and Vodena we should receive the line of the Struma, and our frontier, which ran up stream and reached the defile of Kresna, would run between Nevrokop and Razlik, and leaving the former Kaza of Ropdjoz in our possession, reach the old Turco-Bulgarian frontier at Dospat." This text was signed by both parties with the reservation that it had no sort of binding force.

General Savoff returned to Sofia to discuss the different clauses of the Treaty with the Minister-President Radoslavoff and the Foreign Minister Genadieff, and to obtain the sanction of the King. General Savoff assured us that he would return to Constantinople within eight to ten days at the latest with the Bulgarian counter proposals which he would get M. Tocheff (who had just been appointed Envoy in Constantinople) to hand over, to avoid public excitement. Weeks passed, however, and we received no news from Sofia, and Tocheff did not say a word.

After the ratification of the peace treaty by both sides diplomatic relations with Bulgaria were resumed, and the Secretary-General of the Committee, Fethi Bey, was appointed Minister at Sofia. Fethi Bey knew about the project for a Turco-Bulgarian alliance, and was a supporter of it. After his arrival at Sofia he asked the Bulgarian Government what was the position as regards the treaty of alliance which had been agreed upon with General Savoff at Constantinople. In spite of repeated attempts Fethi Bey could get no satisfactory answer. Indeed, no explanation whatever could be given for the delay caused by the Bulgarians in this matter, seeing that in the peace conferences they had displayed such zeal in getting this alliance concluded.

On the other hand, contrary to the text of the peace treaty and the many verbal promises the Bulgarians had made, they began to practise cruelties against the Mussulman population of West Thrace; they had tried to proselytise the Pomaki by force. Fethi Bey informed us that, disgusted at this two-faced behaviour of the Bulgarians, it was impossible for him to retain his post at Sofia any longer, and with a view to facilitating negotiations over this matter and save the Mussulman population of West Thrace from any more Bulgarian illegalities, and with the further idea of

discussing the alliance question and getting it settled, a meeting between Talaat and Halil Bey on one side and Radoslavoff and Genadieff on the other was arranged in a Bulgarian town. At this conference the two Bulgarian Ministers promised to treat the Mussulman population better and to send a special delegate with the Bulgarian Government's proposal to Constantinople at a very early date.

In due course Colonel Jekoff, Deputy Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff, came to Constantinople during November, 1913. The Colonel was an exceptionally intelligent man, thoroughly conscientious, and endowed with a very intuitive mind and solid education. And when Toscheff announced his arrival he added that he enjoyed the conference of Radoslavoff and his party associates. At that time I was Minister of Public Works, but, as before, I participated with Talaat and Halil Bey in the conferences on the Turco-Bulgarian alliance. At the hour appointed for the meeting we went to the Bulgarian Legation, which was in the Taxim quarter of the city. Here we were presented with an astonishing proposal of the Bulgarians, so far as territorial concessions were concerned.

So long as that part of Macedonia which extends to the Struma, Monastir and Ochrida was not incorporated in Bulgaria, the Bulgarians could not agree to cede to us the port of Dedeagatch, and only when they occupied Salonika would they agree that the port of Karaagatch should become Turkish. After four or five meetings with Colonel Jekoff we drew up the preliminary outlines of an alliance the form and sense of which we could accept.

The alliance with Bulgaria was important to us, for it was certain that, sooner or later, we should have war with the Greeks. It was impossible for us to leave to Greece the islands of the Ægean like Lemnos, Mytilene and Chios. It was therefore necessary to take precautions that, in case of a war with Greece, we should not find the Bulgarians once more on the side of our foes. On the other hand, we knew that in the Macedonian matter the Bulgarians would not accept the situation, and for the satisfaction of their national claims would find themselves compelled to seek our help. We wanted to draw every possible advantage from this situation and not run the risk of finding ourselves faced with a second Balkan alliance.

If we succeeded in associating Rumania in the Turco-Bulgarian

alliance by securing her against a Bulgarian attack in the Dobrudja, the whole of which she had occupied, opposing allied groups would be formed in the eastern and western halves of the Balkan Peninsula, and we should at length have been able to look forward to a time in which our peace would no longer have been at the mercy of any little Balkan State at any moment. From this point of view, the realisation of which was one of the objects of the Young Turk party, we attached great importance to the Bulgarian alliance, and for that reason we tried to arrive at a speedy understanding. As, however, it is a characteristic of Bulgarian policy, or, to speak more accurately, one of the distinguishing features of the Bulgarian temperament, to extract every possible benefit and take advantage of even the most honest ally, it was quite obvious to us that the Bulgarians would protract the affair as long as possible in the hope that a time would come when we should find ourselves in a dangerous situation and faced with the necessity of signing a treaty within twenty-four hours, a treaty which would have become incomprehensible as a result of the innumerable alterations which had been made in it. The Bulgarians tried to hold us up continuously right up to the outbreak of the World War. After the essential outlines of the Treaty had been agreed with Colonel Jekoff, I bothered about the matter no longer. I learned subsequently that when the Bulgarians entered into negotiations with us and the Central Powers in the course of the war, with a view to joining us, not one of the originally excepted clauses were taken into account, and they not only refused to sanction an extension of territory in West Thrace for us, but even declined to discuss the other articles until we had accepted the cession of Dimotika, Karaagatch, Mustapha Pasha, and a strip more than a kilometre in width along the left bank of the Maritza. As I shall have occasion to return to our relations with Bulgaria in that part of my memoirs which deals with the beginning of the World War, I will conclude my discussion of this subject for the moment.

THE ALLIANCE WITH THE SYRIANS AND ALL ARABS.

I am convinced that in our country, even among the most enlightened of our youth, there are few men who have really considered the Arab question and the ideal which was before the

eyes of those who were called upon to deal with it. In that part of my memoirs which relates to the time I was Commander of the Fourth Army I will deal with this matter in detail, and for the moment will confine myself to a short discussion of affairs covering the time when I was Military Governor of Constantinople.

As a result of many causes a number of Arabs, under the pretext of obtaining reforms for their country and with the express permission of the Vali, Edhem Bey, had succeeded in convoking a national assembly at Beirut during the period when Kiamil Pasha was Prime Minister. At this conference they indicated the reforms which they desired should be introduced in Syria and throughout all the Arabian vilayets. When Mahmud Shefket Pasha's Ministry took office the Government dissolved this assembly, partly because of the changes which had meanwhile been made in the personnel of the governorships and partly because it considered the National Council illegal. The Government also announced that, as the promulgation of regulations for the provincial administration was exclusively the business of Parliament, the principles laid down by the Congress of Beirut could not be considered.

The agitation for independence in Syria and Beirut had assumed such proportions and the prestige of the Government had thereby suffered such diminution that there were people who carried their audacity to the point of hanging cards bearing the name of the Governor-General (Ebu bekir Hazim) round their dogs' necks. In Damascus Shukri el Asly and Mehemed Kurd Ali had gone to the Vali, Mardini Arif Bey, and demanded that the Secretary-General of the Province should be expelled from the vilayet on the ground that he had not understood a petition in Arabic which had been presented to him, and therefore demanded a Turkish translation. They lost no opportunity of indulging in similar impertinences. All the Syrian papers attacked the Government with the utmost violence, and filled their space with horrible insults against the Turkish race. The Sheik Reschid Riza of Tripolis, in Syria, published in Egypt a journal which was written in so provocative a tone against the heads of the Committee of Unity and Progress that it seemed impossible for anyone who had read it not to be anti-Turkish. When the Government was absorbed in the Balkan War, officers of an Arabian Division in the Gallipoli Peninsula supported the political blackmailing efforts

of the Arabian patriots at Constantinople instead of honourably doing their duty.

Subsequently they wanted to arrange a general congress of the Arabs, though the Government had forbidden it, but, anticipating that the Government would certainly stop them this time and that legal action would be taken against the organisers, they decided, with the approval, or rather on the express initiative, of the French Government, to assemble the Congress in Paris, and issued a proclamation throughout the Arabian world with an invitation to send delegates to the assembly. At the head of the organisation were Abdul Hamid Zehravi, then deputy for Hama, Abdul Ghani el Ureysi, owner of the Beirut paper *El Mufid*, and Abdul Kerim el Haleli, President of the "El Muntedi el Edebi." In this way the Congress, under the patronage of the French Government, changed its form and constitution, and it seemed certain that it would be followed by French intervention in Syria.

At that time I paid very little attention to these Arabian affairs. My wish was only to let it be known that foreign intrigues were sowing discord between two great Islam races, the Turkish and the Arabian. I also desired that we should use some highly placed Arabian individuals, on whose patriotism and religious fervour we could rely, to ascertain which of the Arab demands we could accept without endangering the common interests and unity of the Islam world and ultimately to take the steps necessary to carry through these reforms. Fortunately this view was shared by the Government, and Midhad Shukri Bey and some others were sent to Paris to negotiate with the influential Arabs who had assembled the Congress in the hope of finding a basis for an understanding. The Congress did, in fact, assemble, but as the meeting of Midhad Shukri Bey and his companions with the Mussulman Arabs had given the affair another complexion, the Congress dissolved after communicating to him a few of its dearest desires.

One day Talaat Bey came into the Military Government building and told me that we were invited to visit the Sheik Abdul Asis Shavish on the following Friday with a view to finding some basis for an understanding with the Arabs. We should there meet the President of the secret political committee of the Arabs, and the

Government had decided that, as one of the warmest advocates of that understanding, and in view of the experience I had gained of all Arabian affairs when I was Governor-General of Baghdad, I should take part in the conference.

On the day fixed we went to the place of meeting. There appeared before us an individual of short stature, perhaps twenty-eight or thirty years of age, dark, and with great black, sparkling eyes which betrayed high intelligence and a general air which seemed to indicate an enterprising and bold character. It was Abdul Kerim el Halil, delegate of the Arab secret political committee. The conference began after dinner.

I at once observed that what he desired most of all was that positions of influence in Constantinople should be assigned to certain individuals, and I said to myself gloomily that, judging by the views of these leaders, the Arabian reforms meant nothing more than satisfying the ambitions of a few persons who were hankering after offices and dignities. Yet we proceeded to draw up an agreement which enshrined the following principles: (1) The administrative work to be handed over to the native authorities in accordance with the special law relating to the administration of the vilayets; (2) the secondary school teaching and quite general national school teaching to be in Arabian; (3) the Arabian tongue to be used for certain legal formalities; (4) the Arabian text to be appended to summonses as well as criminal and civil judgments; (5) petitions to the official authorities to be in Arabian; (6) certain Arabians to be appointed to the Senate, the State Council, the Court of Appeal, the staff of the Sheik ul Islam, and the Fetvahane.

We had other meetings with Abdul Kerim el Halil and Sheik Abdul Hamid Zehravi in the Hotel Kroecker in Pera, and thoroughly discussed the above subjects. These reforms were subsequently carried out *in toto* after they had received the approval and confirmation of the Government. Talaat alone was very unwilling to approve the appointment to the Senate of Abdul Hamid Zehravi Effendi, whom many Arabs regarded as unstable. Abdul Kerim el Halil came to me on several occasions to ask me to take the matter up with Talaat Bey and get it put right. Abdul Hamid Zehravi's wish was ultimately fulfilled, but as his heart was set on the office of Sheik ul Islam, he was not satisfied with his seat in the Senate.

From this time on Abdul Kerim el Halil was a gentleman of great importance, and he arrogated to himself the title of an Inspector-General of the "Ella Mirkezie" (Decentralisation Committee) of all Syria. Thanks to the particularly effective measures taken by Talaat Bey, he had little success in the elections for the Chamber of Deputies, in spite of the great activity of his supporters. He was beaten by the Government candidate, or, to speak more accurately, the candidate of the party for the Arabian vilayets.

As I am on the Arabian question I cannot omit to mention a matter which, in my opinion, is of very great importance. Enver Pasha was War Minister and I held the portfolio of Public Works. Asis Ali Bey, an Egyptian who was a major on the General Staff and the most ambitious and vainglorious man the earth has ever seen, could not endure that Abdul Kerim el Halil and Abdul Hamid Zehravi should have exercised a greater influence than himself when the Arabian affair was being settled. He was audacious enough to proclaim openly that the Arabs could not rest satisfied with the clauses of the agreement, that their only desire was for internal independence, with their own army, and certainly could not go further than form a dualistic state with the Turks on the model of the dualistic Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, though, as a matter of fact, the Arabs went further than the Hungarians and demanded that the official language of their army should be Arabian. He added that with such an ideal in view, those who would not work for its realisation, but desired merely to secure a brilliant position for themselves, and therefore remained satisfied with a few insignificant reforms, would be considered traitors to their nation, and must expect to pay heavily for it subsequently.

I knew Asis Ali Bey at the time when he left the Military School with a captain's commission. I think it was somewhere about the year 1320 (1904). He displayed great activity in chasing the Bulgarian bands in the *Kazas* of Petric, Osmanie, and Macedonia. Subsequently he had a good deal of fighting on the Greek frontier with Greek, Bulgarian, and Albanian bands, and before the promulgation of the Constitution he joined the Committee of Union and Progress, on which he did valuable work. When the Army of Operations marched on Constantinople after the reactionary movement of March 31st (April 13th) he was commanding one of

its detachments, and after Galata Bridge had been seized he attacked Tophaus Barracks and displayed great skill in clearing the rebels out of them. Up to that time I did not know that this man had Arabian connections. Whenever I met him he behaved most courteously towards me, and was always a model of discretion in his language.

While I was Governor in Adana I once went to Constantinople, where I met Asis Ali Bey, and we had a few words about the celebrated "letters from Beirut and Syria" which had been published by Achmed Sherif Bey, the correspondent of the newspaper *Ikdam*. When I told him that these letters provoked tendencies dangerous to the maintenance of Ottoman unity and the authority of the Mussulman Caliphate in the Arabian vilayets Asis Ali Bey replied in a haughty tone: "The Arabs are perfectly right. What have you Turks done for us Arabs—except try to exterminate us, insult and despise us—that you should now expect friendly treatment on our part? Are you forgetting that in Constantinople when you want to call a dog you shout 'Arab, Arab, Arab!' When you want to say that anything is obscure and incomprehensible you say it's 'like the hair of an Arab.' One of your pet phrases is 'a fig for the splendours of Damascus if only we needn't see another Arabian face!' Are not the lines of your poet: 'On the evening I left Damascus I said, "Blessed be this holy night,"' one of your favourite expressions? And as if that wasn't enough, didn't you, on the very day after the issue of the Constitution, purposely affront the Arabs by appointing as Marshal of the Army in Syria a descendant of Hulagus, the man who despised Baghdad and all Irak, a Tartar without any morals, an envoy from Hell? You know well enough how the Arabs hate the Tartars, and therefore the only object of appointing Osman Pasha to command the 5th Army can have been to humiliate the Arabs."

I was very astonished to hear such absurdities from the lips of so intelligent a man. I ascribed his aspersions on Osman Pasha to personal hatred, perhaps the result of a previous *contretemps* in Macedonia between the two men. Asis Ali Bey was at that time employed in a military department at Kotchana. During an inspection Osman Pasha, who was then Commandant of the Usküb area, had addressed him in a somewhat offensive tone, and, thanks to his bad habit of always speaking ironically to everyone, he had

received a sharp reply from Asis Ali Bey. Osman Pasha was at first quite taken aback at such an answer in public, and to cover up his own mistake and assert the dignity of his position and authority he took strong measures and ordered that Asis Ali Bey should be put under arrest. Since then the latter had cherished a feeling of hatred against him which nothing could assuage.

I answered Asis Ali Bey that the Turks, and particularly the Anatolian Turks, had a high regard for the Arabs, that it was very wrong to throw doubt upon that sentiment merely on the ground of a few popular expressions, and that if educated people like himself allowed themselves to be inspired by personal aversions the result would be disorders, which would do irremediable harm to the Turkish world.

After this incident Asis Ali Bey was sent at his own request to join Izzet Pasha's staff in the Yemen. I learned subsequently that he there made a great show with his Arab ideals and made all sorts of trouble for poor Izzet Pasha. I also knew that at the time of the Italian attack on Tripoli he went to Cyrenaica, and with Enver and Mustapha Kemal Bey made a wonderful effort at the defence of the town of Benghazi.

As I am convinced that Asis Ali Bey is one of the outstanding personalities among the Arab revolutionaries, I think it advisable to draw particular attention to some of his services and mistakes which are closely related to his past. I was told that when he was in Tripoli he simply could not bear having Enver Bey as his superior officer, and had done everything he could to make him unpopular with the Arab officers. But Enver Bey had more or less disregarded all this, and when, after the peace treaty with Italy had been signed, he returned to Turkey in order to serve in the Balkan War, he handed over the command to Asis Ali Bey and advised him to form an Arab government. But very soon Asis Ali Bey had estranged first the Sheik Achmed Sherif Senussi and then the Arab officers, and he therefore decided not to remain in Cyrenaica, and returned to Turkey. At that time he had only one object in life, to show himself a bitter enemy of Enver Pasha when he was in the company of Turkish officers and his erstwhile friends, and to agitate against the Turks when he was in the company of Arab officers.

When Enver Pasha ultimately became Minister of War Asis

Ali Bey was literally beside himself. He could not bear the thought that he, who had been Enver's contemporary at the military school and had done such good work and displayed such a high degree of patriotism, should have been left a simple major on the General Staff while his rival became Minister of War, and he came to the conclusion that co-operation with the Turks brought him neither profit nor glory. "Long live the Arab Revolution!"

The intrigues of Asis Ali Bey assumed such proportions that Enver Pasha's patience was at length exhausted. He had him arrested and brought before a court martial on the charge of not having accounted for the twenty or thirty thousand which he had handed over to him as Government funds when he left Cyrenaica, and also embezzling that sum.

On the news of Asis Ali Bey's arrest there was tremendous excitement among all the Arab youth of Constantinople. I was then Minister of Labour. The members of the "El Muntidi el Arabi" never ceased making representations to Ministers and influential people. Among others a deputation of five young men from Beirut and Damascus, headed by Dr. Ezad Haikar of Baalbek, came to me to beg me to procure a pardon for the Egyptian Asis. They said it would make an excellent impression on the young Arab intellectuals. The Ministry of War sent the sentence to the Sublime Porte with a request that the Sultan would be pleased to commute the death penalty into penal servitude for life. On the same evening on which this revised sentence was accordingly to be submitted for Imperial approval there was a great banquet at the French Embassy to which almost all the Ministers, several foreign ambassadors and many French notables were invited. Enver Pasha and I myself were also among the guests. When we adjourned to the drawing-room after dinner there were whispered conversations about the conviction of Asis Ali Bey. Georges Rémond, the war correspondent of the *Illustration*, came up to me. "Monsieur le Général," he said, "if Asis Ali Bey is condemned to death on the ground of the differences of opinions and quarrels between him and Enver Pasha in Tripoli, the only conclusion I can draw is that in this country the law takes second place to arbitrary and capricious action. As I am informed, the charge against Asis Ali Bey is that he has embezzled money entrusted to him for the defence of the country. Asis Ali Bey is

possibly an Arab revolutionary, his political opinions may differ from those of Enver Pasha, but he is certainly no thief. I'm positive you know as well as I do, and equally positive that you can save Asis Ali Bey from an unmerited punishment by your intervention."

After Georges Rémond many of my Turkish and French friends, both civilians and soldiers, came and implored me to intervene in Asis Ali Bey's favour, and in the looks cast at Enver Pasha (he was present in the room) that evening it was easy to read the thought: "There's the man who does not shrink from satisfying his thirst for revenge by destroying a splendid officer who defended Cyrenaica at his side!"

I realised at once that public opinion condemned Enver Pasha more severely than Asis Ali Bey. It was therefore necessary to have it out with him. Besides, I considered Asis Ali Bey one of the bravest and most honest of the Arab revolutionaries. I thought it would be illogical to proclaim a general amnesty in favour of all other revolutionaries and except Asis Ali Bey from its operation. For this reason I was extremely and sincerely anxious to save him. I therefore wrote a few lines to Enver Pasha when I got back home that evening. My letter ran as follows:

My dear Enver,

Notwithstanding all the evidence which the court martial has accumulated against Asis Ali Bey, and the fact that sentence has been passed upon him, it is you whom public opinion condemns. Your condemnation in this way will do you a thousand times more harm than anything Asis Ali Bey will suffer from a few years in prison. Please try and get him the Imperial pardon and I will take good care that he leaves Constantinople, and never returns to Constantinople.

The next day Enver Pasha rang me up to say that His Majesty had pardoned Asis Ali Bey. His brother, who had already heard the news, came with Georges Rémond to call on me and thank me. I told him that Asis Ali Bey must leave for Egypt at once, and for the future leave Turkish politics severely alone, but must never tell anyone that he owed his pardon to my intervention.

I heard subsequently that although Asis Ali Bey had given me his word of honour at the time, he placed himself at the service of Sherif Hussein during the World War when the latter, a monster of ingratitude, rose in arms against the Caliphate and deliberately drove the world of Islam into the deplorable condition in which it finds itself to-day. To-day it is I who cannot forgive him.

THE GERMAN MILITARY MISSION.

I doubt whether there is a single man in Europe or America who really knows the circumstances under which the German Military Mission came to Constantinople to reorganise the Turkish Army.

The numerous accounts published by our enemies always aver that this Mission arrived during Enver Pasha's term of office as War Minister and impute it as a crime against him. My revelations will show how the affair really came about.

When Mahmud Shefket Pasha had convinced himself that it was impossible to beat the Bulgarians, and signed the Peace preliminaries of London which gave us the Enos-Midia line as our frontier with Bulgaria, and the Islands of Imbros and Kenedos, he decided that the whole national energies must be husbanded for domestic reforms if the country, which was already very exhausted, was not to be weakened yet further. In accordance with this resolve he authorised our delegates to affix their signatures to the Preliminary Peace.

In his opinion what we needed most was money, and he was contemplating raising a substantial loan from one of the European Powers. First he applied to the Germans, but they pointed out that the Berlin money market was in no position to arrange a new Turkish loan, and they frankly advised us never to count on Germany in financial matters, but always to apply to France in that respect. Thereupon the Government decided to follow that advice and sent Djavid Bey to Paris. Djavid was not indeed a member of the Ministry, but he was regarded as the soul of the efforts being made by the party of "Unity and Progress" in the direction of organisation in the politico-financial sphere. He was commissioned to lead the Turkish financial delegation which was to negotiate the financial clauses of the peace preliminaries.

But Mahmud Shefket Pasha also considered that the system of loans was unlikely of itself to restore the financial position of the state, and he was very anxious for the abolition of the financial capitulations, the only measure which could re-establish our Budget once more. Djavid Bey was instructed in that sense.

Mahmud Shefket Pasha next proceeded to settle certain questions which had already formed subjects for differences of opinion

between ourselves and certain foreign Governments, particularly the Russian and English Governments. One of the most important at that time was that of the Persian frontier, a question upon which Russia and England sought to put a very peculiar interpretation. The Pasha went into this problem personally. He had asked both Governments to appoint missions to determine the frontier and send them to the locality as the Turkish Government had done.

Last but not least he took up the question of the re-organisation of the army and navy. A British Naval Mission was already at work. He got into personal touch with the head of that Mission and asked him to accelerate the reorganisation of the Navy. As regards the organisation of the Army I will now relate the facts, the details of which were given to me by Mahmud Shefkhet Pasha personally, so that their accuracy cannot be doubted.

During the Pasha's term of office as Grand Vizier he usually spent the night and slept at the Sublime Porte, and as I slept at the Military Governor's Headquarters he called me to the telephone after dinner on several evenings when he felt very tired after heavy work during the day and asked me to go round and see him. On these occasions he often told me of his ideas and plans and asked my opinion.

On one of these evenings he remarked:

"I believe that everything we have done hitherto with regard to the reorganisation of our army has been only half measures, if not bad measures. All the organisers whom we have had here, both during the reign of Sultan Abdul Hamid and since the promulgation of the constitution, have been selected quite casually, and on no definite principle. We have never thought of inviting a serious mission with an adequate and well-thought-out programme and personnel, whose selection must be determined exclusively with reference to that programme.

"Look at the Greeks, for example. They were much cleverer than ourselves. They have entrusted the reorganisation of their navy to the English, and that of their army to the French. Venizelos has reserved the offices of War Minister and Naval Minister to himself. He has ruthlessly crushed all who dared to put the slightest obstacle in the way of the missions. He has not paid the slightest attention to the criticisms of his political opponents. He

is always in the closest touch with the Directors of the French and English Missions, and done everything they asked of him. The result was the creation of the Greek Army which we learned to respect during the Balkan War, and of a fleet with which the old fleet of the Turco-Greek War cannot be compared.

“In my view the greatest service Venizelos has rendered his country was in organising the armed forces of the nation and thus presenting the diplomatists with an effective argument—I might say the only effective argument—for the realisation of the national ideal. I want to perform the same service for my country. There is already an English Mission for our fleet. I will get into touch with the head of that mission and ask him what he requires to make a complete success of it, and I intend to comply with all his wishes.

“As regards our army, I don't think we must hesitate any longer to adopt the methods of the Germans. For more than thirty years we have had German instructors in our army, our Corps of Officers is trained entirely on German lines, and our army is absolutely familiar with the spirit of German training and military education. It is quite impossible to change all that now. I therefore intend to send for a German military mission on the grand scale and, if necessary, I shall even appoint a German general to command a Turkish army corps, place German staff and regimental officers in command of every unit comprising it, and in this way form a model army corps. The staff and regimental officers of the other corps would have to be posted to this corps for a definite period in order to expand and complete their training. I will also have this mission accompanied by many specialists whose task it will be to reorganise the various departments of the War Office, the General Staff and the military schools and factories. I think that we shall have no occasion for a war for a long time, and I will therefore reduce the *cadres* as much as possible and restore the peace establishment, so that we can effect economies which will enable me to meet the expenses of the reorganisation mission. I will give the Turkish world an army which will certainly be small but, on the other hand, well organised and trained. In time of war it will not be difficult to bring this army up to maximum strength by expanding the *cadres*. I am now inquiring of the Germans on what terms they would be prepared to send us some

such mission, and consider it advisable to leave the question of their conditions entirely to them."

Such are the circumstances under which General Liman von Sanders' mission for the reorganisation of our army was invited to Constantinople. Enver Pasha had nothing to do with this affair and played no part whatever in it.

After Mahmud Shefket Pasha's death his successor at the War Office, Izzet Pasha, had the same idea, and took up the same line as his predecessor. During his period of office the agreement with reference to the mission was drawn up and concluded. On the day of the arrival in Constantinople of Liman von Sanders and his officers they were met at the station by Izzet Pasha and, in fact, it was a month or six weeks after the arrival of the mission that Enver Pasha became War Minister.

It was Enver Pasha who first pointed out the obstacles to be overcome if the command of the First Army Corps was to be entrusted to Liman von Sanders Pasha. He thought that it would be better to employ the head of the mission in the capacity of an Inspector-General rather than give him the command of an army corps. It was wholly and solely as a result of his suggestion, not under pressure from the Russians, French and English, that this change was made.

On the day the military mission arrived in Constantinople I was commanding the First Army Corps, and in that capacity Supreme Military Authority during the state of siege. Two days later I had to hand over my command to Liman von Sanders, but as a German general could not, of course, be commandant during the state of siege, we decided to proceed by a different method. Faik Pasha was then Commandant. He was to be appointed Governor of the fortress with the powers of a divisional commander, and the supervision of the state of siege was to be entrusted to him. For reasons which I will discuss later I was temporarily to take over the office of Minister of Public Works. The Imperial decree relating to my appointment was issued the day after the arrival of the mission. On the next day I went to the headquarters of the First Army Corps and handed it over officially to General Liman von Sanders.

In these circumstances it is clear that there is an end of slanderous observations and opinions which Ambassador Mor-

genthau sets forth on pages 44 and 45 of his Memoirs on the strength of totally false information.

The arrival of the mission in Constantinople was the signal for the most violent attacks upon us by the Russians, French and English. The fact which the Russians put in the forefront of their grounds of protest was that, if the troops appointed to guard the Straits were commanded by German officers, the defence would be strengthened, and that this step, adopted out of suspicion and specially directed against Russia, would seem to ascribe ambiguous intentions to that Power.

The French and English followed in the footsteps of the Russians. The French and English Ambassadors adopted the arguments of the Russian Ambassador. The Press of both these countries slavishly followed the Russian Press. In this connection I must ask our political opponents one question: was this the way to manifest the good intentions of the English and French of which they boasted to us from morning to night?

We wanted to reorganise our army, and for that reason we had applied to Germany. We made our plans both for the introduction and realisation of the scheme. The German military mission came to Constantinople, and the result was an addition to the defensive resources of the Turkish armies, particularly in the Straits. It was quite natural that the Russians should endeavour to oppose the scheme, because they regarded themselves as the natural heirs to Constantinople, and were convinced that one day they would be engaged in a terrific struggle with the Turks on land and sea in the vicinity of Constantinople. Was their action, which meant intervention in the domestic affairs of a neighbouring State, possible without the support and approval of England and France? Certainly not, I say! Under these circumstances, and remembering that in this affair the French and English shed even more tears than the Russians themselves, must we not assume that even then the Triple Entente had promised Constantinople to the Russians? Great Heavens! When I think of those days I go cold all over. I cannot describe the torments I had to go through in the discussions with the French Military Attaché, Maucorps, the French Ambassador, Bompard, Councillor of Embassy Boppe, the Inspector of Gendarmerie, General Baumann, and Major Sarrou. One day I ended up with the words:

“Just look how unreasonable you are, gentlemen! Don't suggest that you are putting forward these views without fully realising the situation. You know as well as we ourselves that we have the right to call in a German reorganisation mission. The question whether the German officers are or are not competent to organise an army is no doubt open to debate, but it is irrelevant at the moment, as we are now definitely convinced of their efficiency, and our choice has fallen upon them. Every country has armed forces of three kinds—first, the army, then the navy, and, thirdly, the police. We have entrusted the organisation of the first to the Germans, that of the second to the English, that of the third to the French. So where's the quarrel? Do you want us to commit the reorganisation of our army to the Russians? Just remember what it is the Russians are saying: ‘If German officers take command of the First Army Corps, the defensive resources of the Straits will be strengthened.’ That means that if we applied to the French or English for a similar mission on the same terms the Russians would be bound to make the same objection, for I cannot assume that in taking over command of the First Corps the French or English officers would deliberately intend to open the Straits to the Russians when occasion arose. These protests of yours necessarily arouse in us a feeling that you are anything but well-inclined towards us.”

As these gentlemen could not refute the logic of my words and did not know what to answer they admitted that they were wrong by repeating: “What do you expect? In the first place, we are Russia's allies and are thus compelled to support all their claims. Secondly, the Germans are our enemies, and we're compelled to remember the danger to ourselves inherent in everything they do. And even if there were no danger we consider it a patriotic duty to assert that as what is at stake is something to which the Germans make a claim we are bound to oppose it.”

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS, MIDDLE OF DECEMBER, 1913, TO FEBRUARY, 1914.

I TAKE UP MY DUTIES.

Prince Said Halim Pasha's Ministry, which followed that of Mahmud Shefkhet Pasha, had taken over its political programme

in its entirety, *i.e.*, to avoid external complications as much as possible and devote the whole resources of the nation to internal reforms. But that did not mean that he let slip the opportunity of recovering Adrianople, and he also succeeded in concluding the Treaty of Constantinople with the Bulgars, the Treaty of Athens with the Greeks, and subsequently a second Treaty of Constantinople with Serbia, which had become the most ambitious of the Balkan States.

To secure the success of the domestic reforms it was necessary to make an end of the questions which were always cropping up owing to the differences between the nationalities and always giving the small Balkan States an opportunity for loud and vehement protest.

As regards the Bulgarians, after the final loss of Macedonia all that was left to the Turkish Empire was a few scattered villages along the northern boundary of the *sandjak* of Kirk Kilisse in the vilayet of Adrianople. On the other hand, a few Turks remained distributed in certain parts of Bulgarian territory in the vicinity of the Turkish frontier. As an appendix to the Treaty of Constantinople a secret agreement was signed by the Bulgars in which it was provided that any Bulgarians residing on Turkish territory should be removed to Bulgaria and any Turks still left in Bulgarian territory should be removed to Turkey. This exchange was carried out to the satisfaction of both sides.

To us the most important of the racial problems was that presented by the very numerous Greek elements which were scattered about the coast side of the vilayet of Aidin. There was no doubt that the Greeks who, after their easy victories in the Balkan War, had occupied Macedonia as far as Drama on one side and seized the islands off Asia Minor (Mytilene, Chios, and Lemnos) on the other, would now concentrate all their efforts on the acquisition of the vilayet of Aidin. With a view to having no internal difficulties if we sooner or later came to blows with the Greeks (that was inevitable owing to the question of the islands), it was suggested to the Greek Government that there should be an exchange of these Greek nationals for the Mussulman nationals who had been left behind in Greek Macedonia and wished to emigrate to Turkey. Venizelos, however, was not particularly enthusiastic about this proposal, which looked like compromising the evil designs he had

in store for us. Yet at that time the nationalist sentiments of the Turkish clans had begun to assert themselves very actively, and the consequences began to make themselves felt, particularly in the vilayet of Aidin, where hundreds of thousands of Mussulman refugees who had not been able to bear the oppression of the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians any longer, and had taken refuge within the Turkish Empire, often seriously molested the Greeks settled in that region.

The Government was entirely out of sympathy with their action because of the difficulties to which it would presumably give rise. The European Powers, which are in the habit of manifesting their humane sentiments when it is a question of intervention against Turkey, had not a word to say against the abominations of the Greeks, Serbs, and Bulgarians, who had slaughtered in the most bestial manner more than five hundred thousand Turks, most of them women, old people, and children. When Carnegie's Commission of Enquiry had published its special report upon these horrors there was not a single newspaper in the whole of Europe or America—with the exception of a few socialist journals—which had a word to say in favour of the poor Mohammedans who had been killed off like flies.

The American Ambassador, Morgenthau, made the Armenian massacres which took place during the World War an excuse for heaping upon the Turks insults and affronts which are hardly fit to be reproduced. Every line of his Memoirs reveals the deepest hatred and enmity. Mr. Morgenthau should appoint a committee to enquire into the Macedonian massacres and then read through his book again and see if he can justify his charges.

When thousands of Mohammedans, after suffering all manner of oppression and cruelties, fled to their motherland and found not a cottage to shelter them or a yard of ground on which to settle, nay, found themselves daily exposed to the insults of those who were responsible for their misfortunes, they allowed themselves to be carried away by a very natural and human craving for revenge and to commit a few excesses. The Greeks made the fullest use of these occurrences, and, true to their nature, raised a tremendous outcry about them. They said they were being threatened by the Turks, and a few of them accordingly began to take to the mountains. The boldest of these actually set fire to a few Mussulman

villages and murdered a large number of emigrants. This state of affairs contributed to fan the flames of Mohammedan rage still higher. Venizelos began to chant his unending song about the Balkans, and it had its effect all over the world: "The Turks are massacring the Greeks in the vilayet of Aidin with the approval, and, indeed, with the assistance, of the Government!"

Fortunately Talaat Bey, who acted quicker than Venizelos, urged the Ambassadors of England, France, Germany, and Austria to send their First Dragomans to conduct a joint enquiry on the spot. This committee established the true facts, the accuracy of which Mr. Morgenthau must admit, however reluctantly. In other words, the enquiry showed clearly that there had been no kind of oppression of the Greeks and that the sorely-tried emigrants who here and there had been guilty of some crime had been severely punished by the Ottoman Government.

Venizelos stipulated that the emigrants should take with them all movable property, while immovables should be treated as subjects for exchange, but finally adopted the view of Talaat Bey and agreed to enter into negotiations on the footing that the Greek nationals inhabiting the coastal region of the vilayet of Aidin should be sent back to Greece, while the Mohammedans of Macedonia should be allowed to settle in the vilayet in question if they so desired.

After a basis of agreement with the Arabs had been found, as I have already related, we decided to tackle our thorniest domestic problem, the Armenian question.

I think it better to devote a special chapter later on to this extremely important and all-embracing matter.

ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH AND FRENCH.

While Mahmud Shefket Pasha was Grand Vizier, Hakki Pasha, the former Grand Vizier, went to London to settle various current questions relating to the Gulf of Basra and the seven disputed districts between the Yemen and Aden.

Djavid Bey was sent to Paris at the same time. The object of his mission was:

1. To negotiate for a substantial loan.
2. The abolition of the financial capitulations.

As regards the loan, the French imposed conditions which were

utterly impossible for us. I give some of them so far as I can remember :

1. No other lines to be constructed by the management of the Hedjaz Railway in Syria and Palestine.

2. The management of the Hedjaz Railway were immediately to stop the construction (which had already begun) of the branch line from Afuleh via Djenin Naplus to Jerusalem, which belonged to the Haifa-Deraa sector, and had already got as far as Sebastia.

3. The French were to be granted the concession for a broad-gauge line from Afuleh to a point on the Jaffa-Jerusalem line as yet undecided.

4. The French were also to be granted the concession of a broad-gauge line, one terminus of which was to be the station of Rayaak on the Damascus-Hamah line, and the other at Afuleh, the line passing by the shores of Lakes Huleh and Tiberias.

5. The Ottoman Government shall have no right to approve any railway rates on the Haifa-Deraa sector which could compete with the railway rates on the Beirut-Damascus-Hauran line. The Ottoman Government must also indemnify the Damascus-Hamah Railway Company for the Damascus-Hauran sector.

6. The concession for any line to be constructed east of the Damascus-Medina and Rayak-Aleppo must be reserved exclusively for the French.

7. The extension of the Syrian harbours of Jaffa, Haifa and Tripolis must be reserved exclusively for French capitalists.

8. The right of working the Yemen Railway must be bought back by the Government and the Company must be indemnified.

9. The concession of the Samsun-Sivas Railway must be granted to the French.

10. The buildings, real property and estates of all kinds belonging to the very numerous French convent schools, hospitals and other foundations must be exempt from all taxation.

11. The proceeds of the loan granted by France must be used to procure the necessary military armament from France exclusively.

It was only on these and other conditions I no longer remember that Turkey was granted a 9 per cent. loan of a few million francs, payable in two instalments.

As regards the abolition of the financial capitulations, the

French would not even hear of it. Only if we conceded various other demands would they grant us an increase of the *ad valorem* duty from 11 to 14 per cent., a monopoly of alcohol, matches and cigarette paper, increase the royalties payable by foreign merchants, and allow us to introduce a city tariff and enjoy a few other minor advantages.

All these negotiations were carried on not without difficulty, and Djavid Bey, who had been commissioned to conduct them, was ultimately reduced to despair, as he had to cope with the slackness of the Government in Constantinople, which was always delaying its answer, and also with the obstacles placed in his way by the French.

Among the members of the Cabinet at this time was Osman Nizami Pasha, the Minister of Public Works. Although most of these questions concerned his Ministry, he was in the habit of resting content with sending every matter on to the department concerned, and then forwarding to the Sublime Porte the opinions of the departments on both the legal and utilitarian aspects. As the general situation of the country required the Government to make up its mind quickly, Osman Nizami Pasha's bureaucratic methods made him unpopular with the Cabinet and the party. As the party had also decided to accept the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress as soon as possible, it wanted the Government to get rid of this man, who had no following in the party and had opposed the reoccupation of Adrianople, a line of action which revealed a lack of sound judgment.

Since my appointment as Military Governor of Constantinople I had lost no opportunity of bringing about a *rapprochement* between the French and the Turks. In view of the friendly relations which I had established with the French Embassy, and with Frenchmen generally, my friends were convinced that if the examination and solution of the problems of public works were entrusted to me the appointment would strongly recommend itself to the French. They therefore warmly advocated my taking over that Ministry.

As I knew then that I should have to hand over the 1st Corps, which I was commanding, to General Liman von Sanders, and that by entering the Cabinet I could possibly render my country greater service, I complied with the request.

As Osman Nizami Pasha had neglected to get the French affair settled up quickly and the Government had not the time to wait indefinitely, it was suggested to him that he should retire from his office and send in his resignation. He at once adopted the suggestion, and his Ministry was transferred to me for the interim. A month after Osman Nizami Pasha resigned I definitely took over the portfolio of Public Works.

The very first thing I did was to settle within a very short time the various matters which had been put before the Ministry for its examination and opinion and which the French had made a *sine qua non* for the loan. A solution of the difficulty, which even the French would accept, was immediately laid before the Grand Vizier's Department by the Ministry. Thanks to this action, the efforts of Djavid Bey were at length crowned with success, and the loan was granted.

THE ADALIA RAILWAYS.

During my term of office as Minister of Public Works I had a little *contretemps* with the Italian Embassy over the Adalia Railways. It is well known that Italy had been in occupation since the war in Tripoli of several of our islands, Rhodes, Stanköj, etc., and had entered into an obligation to restore them to the Ottoman Government. As the Balkan War intervened, however, the Italians forgot to evacuate the islands, and defended their action with the excuse that they wanted to prevent their occupation by the Greeks. When the First Treaty of London ended the Balkan War and we demanded the restoration of our islands by the Italians they treated us to all sorts of pretexts. They alleged, for instance, that Achmed el Sherif el Senussi was still proving refractory, and, as he still had Turkish officers in his service, we had not fulfilled our obligation. We proved to them by all kinds of argument that their assertions were unfounded, that there was not a single Turkish soldier in Tripolitana, and the Ottoman Government was giving no assistance whatever to Sheik el Seid Achmed el Sherif el Senussi. Therefore the Italians referred to public opinion in Italy, and explained that if they restored these islands to the Turks without getting something in the way of compensation it would make a very bad impression.

This course of action made us very angry. The question cropped up again when I became Minister of Public Works. One day the Marquis Garroni, the Italian Ambassador, came to me and told me that Halladjan Effendi, a Turkish subject, and several other persons acting in the name of a group of Italian capitalists intended to ask me for the concession of a railway northwards from Adalia and from Makri to Mughla. For the moment he asked me to permit preliminary surveys for the railway to be carried out and to grant Government protection to the engineers and workmen to be employed. I told him in sharp terms that for the time being the Government was not contemplating the construction of railways northward from Adalia or between Makri and Mughla.

This peremptory answer was a very great surprise to the skilled diplomat. "Making a survey," he replied, "does not necessarily mean building a railway. The first business is merely to find out whether it is at all possible to construct such a railway. If the result is satisfactory, the Ottoman Government can make up its mind later on. Besides, we have a written undertaking of the Government which empowers the Italians to make surveys. The Ministry refusal is a matter for comment!"

When I replied to the Ambassador that there was no such undertaking in the archives of the Ministry, he showed me a paper bearing the signature of the Foreign Minister, Prince Said Halim Pasha. But this document had no official value at all. I therefore told the Ambassador once and for all that we refused.

Thereupon he said to me: "My dear Djemal Pasha, I don't think it right of you to give me an answer of that kind in this very complicated matter just at the moment when I am making every effort to secure the restoration to Turkey of the islands in Italian occupation. You must know that public opinion in Italy attaches very great importance to the question of the Adalia Railway. If we could announce in our papers that the Italian engineers had started on their surveys, public opinion would cease to make difficulties for the Government in the question of the islands in view of the fact that the Government had secured material advantages as compensation for the sacrifice involved in the restoration of the Dodecanese. In this way you would find yourselves in possession of your islands once more!"

I was now extremely angry, and replied: " You forget, Mr. Ambassador, that a man who is returning the property of another which he has only managed for him is not justified in demanding compensation therefor. The Italian Government has to give us back these islands in accordance with its obligations. I don't understand how a nation can blame its Government and put difficulties in its way because it fulfils an obligation it has expressly entered into. What would Turkish public opinion think of our Government if it saw that unhappy Turkey, after being the victim of countless attacks for three or four years and losing 99 per cent. of her European territory and the whole of her African colonies, had now to give compensation for the recovery of her own islands to which she had a claim by treaty? I am Minister of Public Works, and it is my duty to secure to my country the execution of works necessary to its prosperity in a manner dictated by requirements. As regards enterprises which are to be undertaken by way of political compensation, these have nothing to do with my department, and must be discussed with the Foreign Office or the Grand Vizier. As I entirely disagree with you on this matter, I regret that I cannot give Your Excellency the answer you desire."

Subsequently I reported this conversation to Prince Said Halim Pasha, Enver Pasha, who was then War Minister, and Talaat Pasha, the Minister of the Interior. They all agreed with me. The next day a number of journalists, who had got wind of the affair somehow or other, came to ask me for an interview. I sent for Yonus Nadi, the editor of the *Tasfir-Efkier*, and granted him an interview.

The very decided article which then appeared under the title " Neither Compensation nor Concessions " was received everywhere with enormous pleasure and satisfaction, and my friends congratulated me on my clear and categorical declarations. However, on the very day the article appeared the Marquis Garroni, who was very excited about it, requested an audience of the Grand Vizier. He complained bitterly about me, and said that this article would make a very bad impression in Italy.

There was a Ministerial Council that day. When I entered the Grand Vizier's Palace I saw that the Grand Vizier was very upset. Talaat was present. Prince Said Pasha received me, and said in a

very imperious voice: "Pasha, so you have been talking to journalists about the Adalia Railway?"

"Yes," I answered. "And why not? Have I said anything that is contrary to the truth?"

"No! But I don't think you had any authority to do so."

"Will Your Highness allow me to say that that is a mistake? A Minister has the right to make announcements to the Press when he thinks it advisable about any question which concerns his department, particularly when no State secrets are involved and the general policy of the Government is not imperilled. The question put to me by the editor was this: 'Does the Government intend to give the Italians compensation in the shape of a concession to construct the Adalia Railway in order to secure the restoration of the Ægean Islands?' I replied: 'No!' Is not my statement true? Is the Government of which Your Highness is the head of a contrary opinion? Not so far as I know. That being so, the Ambassador has no right to complain."

To this reply the Prince had not a word more to say. I don't think he has ever forgiven me for making that declaration to the journalists, whom he cannot endure.

A few days after this incident the English Ambassador, Sir Lewis Mallet, came to me at the Ministry and told me he had heard that the Ottoman Government was about to grant the Italians a concession for the Adalia Railway, and that such action would be an encroachment upon the rights of the English Aidin Railway Company.

I had enquiries made and, as a matter of fact, the English company had received, with the right to extend its lines to Burdur and Sparta and start a service of steamers on Lake Beyschir, a formal assurance that no other line to the Mediterranean would be built within a radius of I don't how many kilometres south of that stretch. Its profit-earning power would thus be guaranteed.

When I informed his Highness Said Halim Pasha accordingly he told me that he was very satisfied that I had made no agreement with the Italians.

Ultimately I found another way of arriving at an understanding with the Italian Ambassador. I told him I would send an official technical commission of railway engineers, who should ascertain definitely whether it was possible or impossible to construct rail-

ways from Adalia and Makri into the interior. The Ambassador pretended he was satisfied with that, although, in fact, he was anything but satisfied.

Another affair which I settled during my period of office in the Ministry of Public Works was the composition of the numerous differences which had arisen between the Road Construction Company and the Technical Commission of the Ministry. Instead of getting to work like reasonable beings and thus settling the problem, both parties endeavoured to refute the arguments of the other with an obstinacy which aroused the greatest mistrust on both sides. After getting Burhaneddin Bey, the Director of Railways and Transport, to agree with Monsieur Chublier, the Director of Roads, I went into all the questions myself and secured their speedy settlement.

In February, 1914, I took over the Admiralty by way of exchange with Tchuruk Sulon Mahmud Pasha.

AT THE ADMIRALTY

CHAPTER III.

AT THE ADMIRALTY.

MY APPOINTMENT AS MINISTER.

WHEN Enver Pasha was appointed Minister of War he occupied himself with the reorganisation of the army, and his first act was to make changes in all the higher posts. He transferred all Generals to the Peace Establishment, and also all higher officers, and such other officers as had no military merit beyond wearing the epaulets. He made Colonels, Army Commanders; Lieutenant-Colonels, Divisional Commanders; Majors, Regimental Commanders; and Captains, Battalion Commanders. On the advice of the reorganisation mission he undertook a thorough reform of the different sections of the Ministry of War, and put German officers in charge of most of them; he also began to prepare the mobilisation plans of the army.

No effort was spared. Extraordinary care was taken with the theoretical and practical training of the army, and after a month or two we could already see that a new spirit inspired every part of it.

While these extremely far-reaching changes were being made in the army, no changes could be observed in the internal routine of the navy. The Naval Minister, Tchuruk Sulon Mahmud Pasha, although an extremely honest and able man, did not possess the courage required to press through fundamental reforms, and paid not the slightest attention to those members of the Cabinet who advised him to follow Enver Pasha's example.

There was not the slightest hurry to press on the construction of the dreadnought *Sultan Osman* which had been bought in Brazil; there was delay on delay in the building of the

Reschadieh. The necessary efforts were not made to repair the damage which our ships had suffered in the Balkan War; the proposals of the chief of the English Naval Mission with regard to the organisation of the Ministerial department, as well as the Corps of Officers, were not dealt with, under the excuse that they must be examined by the Naval Council. The Government's view was that, as a war with the Greeks was inevitable within a very short time, it was urgently necessary to proceed with the reorganisation and training of our fleet, in fact even more necessary than in the case of the army. For that reason the Grand Vizier, Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey proposed to Tchuruk Sulon Mahmud Pasha that he should exchange with me. He adopted the suggestion, and as a result of that decision I took over the post of Naval Minister.

THE REORGANISATION OF THE ADMIRALTY DEPARTMENTS.

My first business on taking over the Admiralty was a long conference with Admiral Limpus, the Chief of the English Naval Mission. I asked him to give me a copy of all the proposals he had ever made and to point out the most important of them. I also made the Director of the Archives collect all the reports on the general reorganisation of our Navy which had been sent in by Admirals Limpus, Williams and Gamble, and which were to be found in the Naval Council and the various sections. I made it my personal business to 'go through them. Admiral Limpus' main proposal was that the departments of the Admiralty should be reorganised, and I entirely agreed with him on that point. Both Admiral Limpus and the two other English Admirals who had been his predecessors complained about the Naval Council. They laid stress on the fact that the heads of the departments, who were reluctant to take any sort of responsibility in important departmental affairs, were always shifting it on to the Naval Council, which did not meet for months at a time, and even when it did meet it was so alarmed at the accumulation of matters that it contented itself with examining a few files and then adjourned again and left the most important questions lying in the document box. In that way the departmental heads shelved their responsibility.

I therefore made up my mind to abolish the Naval Council at once.

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The office of which Admiral Limpus complained the most bitterly was that of the Naval Under-Secretary of State. The English Admiral regarded Rustem Pasha, the Under-Secretary of State, as one of the most obstinate opponents of the reorganisation of the Ottoman Navy.

He told me that even when he had won over the various departmental heads to his views they always came to entirely opposite conclusions after speaking to Rustem Pasha, and explained that they could not act contrary to his orders. But the Admiral's greatest grievance was against the Fourth Section, and the directors of the Accounts and Audit Departments. Until these departments, which clung slavishly to the most antiquated bureaucratic traditions, were reformed from top to bottom, there was no chance of getting anything done at the Admiralty.

After this verbal enquiry I made myself thoroughly familiar with the carefully elaborated scheme for the reforms to be introduced into the Ministry which had been drawn up by Admiral Limpus and Admiral Gamble. Acting on the suggestions contained in this scheme, and supplementing it with my own proposals, I began the preparation of reorganisation regulations. The Under-Secretariat, as well as the Naval Council, were to be abolished. The Admiralty was to consist of four departments in addition to a Medical Inspectorate and an Accounts Department. The head of Department 1 was to have the title of a Chief of the Naval General Staff. Each head of a section was to settle all questions relating to his department, and on his own responsibility lay his decisions before the Minister for his approval. In matters which might affect other departments, though primarily concerning one particular department, it was the duty of the departmental head to arrive at a decision in concert with the other departments. All departmental heads were also under a duty to keep the Chief of the Naval General Staff fully informed as to all matters affecting their sections.

The Chief of the Naval General Staff was responsible for the reorganisation of the Fleet, its preparedness for war, the instruction and training of the Corps of Officers, and even the production and management of war material, and he had the right to all necessary information, either verbal or written, from the competent

authorities, and to acquaint them with the views of the Naval General Staff.

When the reorganisation scheme was in draft and took practical shape (having regard to the changes which experience dictated), I considered it advisable to embody it in a temporary ordinance. Lastly, I got rid of the Under-Secretary of State, Rustem Pasha, two other admirals, Faik Pasha, the Medical Inspector, and a few captains, commanders and lieutenant-commanders.

Admiral Limpus was very pleased with these decisive steps and told me he was sure that he would now undoubtedly be able to make swift and satisfactory progress with his work at the Admiralty.

In accordance with the reorganisation ordinance, I divided the harbours, which had hitherto been under the control of the Admiral Commanding Constantinople Harbour, into six zones, and for the first time established Naval Prefectures at Samsun, Stambul, Smyrna and Beirut. I put the Red Sea ports under the command of the Commodore of the Red Sea, and the ports of Basra and the Euphrates and Tigris under the command of the Commodore of the Gulf of Basra. My object in establishing these naval prefectures was to try and put a stop to smuggling on the Ottoman coasts by setting up a coastguard service and to keep the harbour captains under close and continuous control. Hitherto they had had practically no sort of supervision. For that reason I assigned the gunboats we had just received from France, and the older gunboats we already possessed, for service on the coasts of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, Syria and the Red Sea. I put them under the orders of the Naval Prefects.

If the World War had not broken out five months after I went to the Admiralty the authorities administering indirect taxes, State monopolies and the national debt would have derived great profit from these measures and smuggling would have been more or less suppressed.

As my naval prefects I selected the most active of the senior naval officers and impressed on them the necessity of thorough and continuous inspection. Their reports enabled me to decide which of the captains it was advisable to remove from their posts and also revealed to me the deplorable condition of the ships in the provinces.

To take the place of the harbour captains whom I put on the

general list I appointed officers who enjoyed a good name and a reputation for efficiency, but who had not been as successful as was desired in their service with the fleet.

I intended to divide all naval officers into three categories. The first was to consist of officers who could serve in the fleet; the second comprised officers who were to go to ships engaged in coastal protection, and the third was to be composed of officers on harbour duties. The officers were to interchange frequently within their own categories, and those of the first category, for example, who were not fitted to remain in it were transferred to the second, officers of the second to the third. Officers in the third category who proved inefficient were to be retired altogether.

Unfortunately the World War prevented me from carrying out this plan in its entirety.

Let me give a few examples.

The first was during the first weeks of my period of office at the Admiralty. I had ordered the departure of a gunboat and myself fixed the exact date and hour. It was a ship which it had been arranged in Mah'nud Pasha's time should be placed at the disposal of the Commodore of the Red Sea. On the evening before the ship was to leave I went with Admiral Limpus on board the gunboat, which was lying off Tophane roads. I asked the Admiral to conduct the inspection himself and to tell me without hesitation whether everything was really in order in view of the long cruise ahead.

The Admiral told me that, apart from a few details, the ship could be regarded as equipped for the journey.

I asked the commander whether he had sufficient stores on board, whether the men were provided with summer uniforms, and if they had money. My enquiries led me to the conclusion that the clothing and stores needed supplementing to a certain extent. I regarded it as essential that the ship's chest should have a supply of money for three months so that the officers would not have money difficulties on the way. I told the commander to send his second in command and his paymaster to the Ministry so that the deficiencies could be made good during the night and he could start at the appointed time next morning. I returned to the Ministry myself, had the depôts opened in the night, made them disgorge food and summer clothing, and, notwithstanding the objections of the

accounts officials, ordered them to pay out to the ship a sum on account.

Next morning the moment I arrived at the Ministry I enquired whether the gunboat had left. To my intense astonishment I learned that she had not yet lifted anchor. I had the commander fetched at once and asked him why he had not gone.

“Effendim,” he replied, “my second in command and paymaster have not yet returned on board, and I thought I dare not leave without them!”

Without a moment’s hesitation I put that commander on the half-pay list and appointed someone else in his place. I placed the second in command on the general list and compelled the paymaster to go with the ship, though he had promised himself that he would not go to the Red Sea.

ANOTHER EXAMPLE.

It was a festival day before the outbreak of the World War. I desired to review the officers and crews of the Fleet, and had given orders that they were all to be present at a certain hour on the square in front of the Admiralty building. The weather was wet on the morning of the day in question. However, I appeared in full dress on the review ground at the hour fixed. The men were not there.

As I was leaving my car the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, Tahir Bey, and several of his officers came out of the office of the Commodore of the Golden Horn. When I asked him why the fleet was not assembled he answered:

“I thought, Effendim, that in view of the wet weather, you would certainly not come, and so I have not brought the men to save them from getting wet unnecessarily.”

I gave Tahir Bey three days’ arrest for being afraid of getting wet and a week later he was made to retire.

ANOTHER CASE.

During the year 1916 I had to visit Constantinople in connection with various matters affecting the Fourth Army. It had been proved beyond doubt that a naval officer had been guilty of more than one fraud. Unfortunately, it was at this time that the *moral*

of the army, no less than that of the navy, had begun to sink, and I was determined to make an example. I handed the officer over to the court martial with a request that judgment should be given as soon as possible.

In spite of the accumulation of evidence, the court martial acquitted him, although, in my judgment, and in that of all his superiors, there could not be the slightest doubt about his fraudulent dealings. Of course I had to respect the verdict of the court martial, but I put the officer on the retired list all the same.

I put Ismail Bey (the president of the court martial) and some of its members on the half-pay list on the ground that they had revealed a lack of judgment and discrimination in questions of military honour.

ONE LAST EXAMPLE.

I had returned to Constantinople after sending home the commanders of the Fourth Army. The peace with Russia had been signed and shipping had been resumed in the Black Sea. It was considered necessary to prepare for sea the *Reschid Pasha*, which had previously served as a depôt for men undergoing a course of instruction on the *Yavuz*. After difficulties innumerable I managed to get the ship from the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet and have her brought into the inner harbour. Next morning the Under-Secretary of State, Wassif Pasha, came to me with the report that the *Reschid Pasha*, which had only just been thoroughly repaired, was in a deplorable condition, and that if an end was not put to the neglects and omissions of the captains and commanders, the collapse of the navy would be inevitable before long. Thereupon I summoned the President of the Third Department, who confirmed this news. I then ordered Ramzi Pasha, the Commodore of the Golden Horn, to go on board the *Reschid Pasha*, prepare a report on the condition of the ship, and give me the names of those members of the ship's company who were responsible for this state of affairs.

The next day he presented his report, which proved beyond doubt the responsibility of the captain and his second in command. I at once went on board myself, accompanied by Wassif Pasha and Hamid Bey.

I ascertained from my own observation that the men had drawn

and scribbled obscene things upon the doors of the officers' cabins, that the officers had permitted this, and that the ship's beautiful wardroom was in an indescribable state.

I immediately ordered the dismissal from the service of the captain and fourteen days' imprisonment for the second in command, and I circulated the information that if such a thing ever occurred on any ship again the captain and commander would be dismissed the service at once.

Although Captain Hakki, who was expecting the reversion to the post of commander of the *Yavuz*, was a very honest, clever, and educated officer, he was lacking in practical experience at sea. I think he did not fully realise that a commander is responsible for everything and everyone on board his ship.

Among our naval officers the view prevailed, a wholly erroneous view, that the commander alone was responsible for cleanliness, discipline, and so forth on board ship. In a certain sense that view was right. But in any case the commander is responsible only to his captain, and the captain in turn is responsible to the Squadron Commander or the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet. Many of our naval officers had not grasped that if ultimate responsibility is not concentrated in the captain, there is no means of assuring unity of command on board. Several short-sighted people have alleged that the real reason for Captain Hakki's dismissal was that he was on good terms with the German officers. A more ridiculous hypothesis is hard to imagine. To ascribe such a motive to me is absolutely absurd, as I was one of the warmest advocates of discipline and a good understanding between the Turkish and German *personnel*.

I often acted in a similar fashion when I wished to raise the moral standard of our naval officers. I shall deal with this matter fully when I get back home, and shall be able to resort to the archives, so that I can complete my memoirs with special reference to the period of my activities as Naval Minister.

ACCELERATING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE "SULTAN OSMAN" AND THE "RESCHADIEH." RECONSTRUCTION OF THE FACTORIES AND HARBOURS. ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARSENAL AT ISMID. ORDERS FOR WAR VESSELS.

Immediately after I took over my duties at the Admiralty I had our ships like the *Barbaros*, *Turghud*, and *Messadie* thoroughly

overhauled and repairs were put in hand at once so far as our poor resources would allow. I inspected the work of restoration almost daily, and I made it my special business to remove all obstacles from the path. My main purpose was to get the *Sultan Osman*, the construction of which in England was almost finished, into the Sea of Marmora and to fix a definite time for the delivery of the battleship *Reschadieh*, which had been ordered even before the war with Italy and the building of which had suffered one delay after another.

For six months and more the departments concerned had not been able to give satisfactory answers to Wassif Bey and Reuf Bey, who had demanded certain alterations in the *Sultan Osman* and *Reschadieh*. As I wanted to know for myself the true state of affairs I ordered Reuf Bey and Wassif Bey, who were in London, to come to Constantinople. From the departments involved I collected the documents they had sent in. I made all the experts come to the Ministry, and after consultation with Admiral Limpus I gave each of them the instructions they required. I wrote a letter to the yards asking them to give me a final date for the delivery of the *Sultan Osman* and *Reschadieh*.

As Reuf Bey had reported to me that part of the crew of the *Sultan Osman* ought to go on board at once in order to familiarise themselves with the complicated technique of the instruments, I immediately made a selection of certain petty officers and men and sent them to England on the *Reschid Pasha*, under the command of Captain Ismail, the Commodore of the Golden Horn.

I asked Reuf Bey and Wassif Bey to refrain from demanding further changes in these ships every day, so that the yards could at last deliver them on the date appointed, and then sent both officers back to London.

During Mahmud Pasha's term of office negotiations had been opened with the firms of Armstrong and Vickers for the modernising of the arsenal at the Golden Horn and the establishment of an arsenal (on the most modern lines) and floating docks in the Gulf of Ismid. The plans for these had already been prepared.

In view of the high importance of this matter I decided to get the question definitely settled, and asked the two companies to send their representatives to London. Thus Mr. Vincent Caillard,

member of the Administrative Board, and two directors of Armstrong and Vickers came to the capital. The Stambul lawyer, Count Ostrorog, was appointed legal adviser to the companies, and Deputy Halladjian Effendi legal adviser to the Naval Ministry.

After numerous meetings, at which our legal advisers were also present, the terms of the contract were definitely drawn up. Though I must admit that this contract had its drawbacks, I had at any rate the great pleasure of knowing that within a short time we should find ourselves in possession of an arsenal, building yards, harbours and factories of the latest pattern.

From my earliest days I have had one principle—when the Government had once come to a final decision in a matter I made it my business to see that it was carried out without dilatoriness or delay.

After the conclusion of the agreement with Armstrong and Vickers the development of the Golden Horn Arsenal was to be entrusted to a committee consisting of representatives of the Naval Ministry and the companies, and an English Director-General was put in charge of it. People may say what they like, but, personally, I am entirely convinced that it would have been of the greatest advantage to the country if this scheme had been thoroughly and carefully carried out. The probity of the Director-General who was appointed, the ability and efficiency he always displayed filled me with a great sense of satisfaction. We were entirely in agreement as regards the provisional plans (for the improvement of the factories and docks) which he drew up a short time after his arrival in Constantinople. I will give one example of his integrity.

According to the contract with the companies the Government was bound to produce the capital which was required for the construction of the new arsenal in the Gulf of Ismid.

After two months' investigation the Director-General said to me:

“ The position of the arsenal at the Golden Horn is so exceptionally good that I see no reason whatever to transfer the arsenals of the Ottoman Navy to Ismid. If the existing buildings are converted into modern works and certain improvements made in the docks it will be possible to build even the largest dreadnoughts in the Golden Horn arsenal within four years at the latest. I there-

fore think it would be advisable to abandon the establishment of the Ismid arsenal and concentrate all our efforts on the transformation of the Golden Horn arsenal. We can do that with a relatively small outlay. I promise you I'll bring the companies round to this point of view."

Unfortunately, at the beginning of the World War our papers published a lying report taken from the German Press. The report was to the effect that at the time the repairs to our ships were carried out the Director-General, acting on the orders of the English Naval Mission, had removed the most important parts, and thus rendered our ships unseaworthy. When this report appeared I was at the 4th Army Headquarters. As it was absolutely contrary to the truth (for the English Naval Mission and the engineers of the company who had undertaken to organise and modernise our arsenals had applied themselves to their work with the greatest devotion up to the day they left our service), I asked Enver Pasha to issue a *démenti* in the name of the Ministry, as he was temporarily in charge of naval affairs at the time.

I do not yet know whether this *démenti* has been published or not. Unhappily the lying report spread with amazing rapidity, and from my perusal of many papers I saw that it had given rise to a whole series of attacks on ourselves and the Germans.

I think I am under a moral obligation to affirm here once more that the officers of the English Naval Mission, under Admiral Limpus' command, and the English engineers and workmen to whom was entrusted the reorganisation of the Golden Horn arsenal, did their duty with absolute honesty. I had such confidence in their honesty that I had commissioned them to fix the torpedo lines in the Dardanelles and the Red Sea, and entrusted them with the task of ascertaining the best minefields and the best method of mine-laying. I had attached a torpedo-boat officer *à la suite* of Admiral Limpus and a Turkish officer.

The first torpedo lines in the Dardanelles were actually laid in accordance with that plan.

As I desire that this book shall contribute in every way to make known the truth, I think I ought to relate the following incident.

At a time when it was becoming more and more probable that the Straits would be closed, Admiral Limpus came to me one day and said:

“ If you think you’ll have to close the Straits with mines, I’ve a proposal to make to you. You can lay as many mines as you like in the Dardanelles, but you should leave the Bosphorus open. What you want to do is to distribute buoys to make it look as if mines had been laid and inform all shipping that, owing to the Bosphorus being closed by mines, it is forbidden to attempt to pass through it without a pilot. Not knowing that in fact no mines have been laid, the Russians will certainly not venture to force the Straits. The Germans adopted that course in the year 1870. They announced that they had laid mines along the North Sea coast, though in fact they hadn’t laid a single one. The announcement made the French fleet afraid and kept them away from the coast. But if you strew mines in the narrows of the Black Sea, one of them may break from its moorings in the very strong current and come down into the Golden Horn, and if it is unlucky enough to hit a trading or passenger vessel and there is a catastrophe, you will have incurred an enormous responsibility in the eyes of public opinion throughout Europe.”

I thanked the Admiral for his warning, but told him that one could not always rely on the success of such a stratagem, and the Bosphorus was not to be compared with the North Sea coast, for, if the enemy fleet ever got wind of the real situation and forced the Straits, the result would be irremediable harm to us.

I will not discuss here whether the Admiral’s proposal was inspired by any consideration of the political situation at the moment or whether he was giving his real professional opinion, but in view of my confidence in the Admiral’s probity and the fact that he did not make the same suggestion with regard to the Dardanelles (where the English fleet was in particularly great strength), I am inclined to believe that the advice was dictated solely by technical considerations.

The order for a dreadnought of the latest design and two light cruisers, six destroyers and two submarines formed the second part of our negotiations with the directors of Armstrong and Vickers, who had come to Constantinople.

The agreements containing all the requirements of our technical experts and those of Admiral Limpus were drawn up by the

companies. They were now signed by both parties, and the contracts distributed accordingly. The ammunition for our older units, troop manœuvres and exercises, and war itself was also ordered. The dreadnought was given the name of *Fatih*, and Commander Hamdy Bey was commissioned to supervise its construction. The dates for the high-speed trials and gunnery tests of the *Sultan Osman* had been finally fixed.

In view of all this activity, it will at once be admitted that our one object in life was to make our fleet superior to the Greek fleet at the first possible moment. I did everything conceivable to remove all obstacles and prevent any delay in the realisation of this project.

About this time the French manifested a desire to build ships for us. After discussion with the representatives of the Mediterranean Ironworks and Dock Company, whom I had invited to Constantinople, six destroyers were ordered from their yards. A contract for two submarines was also placed with Creusot.

The battleship *Fatih* was to be ready in twenty-two months, and the other units which had been ordered in England and France were to be constructed in approximately the same period. The dreadnought *Sultan Osman* was to be delivered by the end of July, 1914, and the *Reschadiéh* by the beginning of 1915. In 1916 we should thus have been in possession of a new fleet of three dreadnoughts, two light cruisers, twelve destroyers and four submarines, as well as a second fleet consisting of our old units, and the combined fleets would have been superior to the Greek fleet.

In close co-operation with Admiral Limpus we had drawn up a very comprehensive programme of training and exercises for the education of the crews who were to man the ships, but our main concern was to proceed with the improvement of our old units in order to prepare them for sea as soon as possible.

This was the first business of the English Director-General, who had just taken up his duties. At last, on July 22nd, 1914, I saw our fleet, comprising the *Messudieh*, *Barbaros*, *Turghud*, and our old destroyers and torpedo-boats, leave the quays of the Golden Horn. I sent them out to the islands where they were to begin their fleet exercises under the command of Admiral Limpus.

Our tireless activities gave the Greeks food for thought. They set about strengthening their fleet, and ordered from France a dreadnought, which was to be delivered within two years, six torpedo-boats, and also six new torpedo-boats from German yards. The construction of these ships meant no danger to us, for the reason that the *Sultan Osman* arrived in Constantinople at the end of August, so that we had already secured superiority over the Greek fleet. Five or six months later the arrival of the *Reschadiéh* would increase that superiority, and we were all the more sure of our advantage, because the *Fatih* would balance the Greek dreadnought ordered in France. The Greeks themselves realised the situation only too well, and did everything they possibly could to prevent the arrival of the *Sultan Osman* in Stambul.

After the *Goeben* came in the middle of May, 1914, the English sent the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean fleet, Admiral de Robeck, to present his respects to His Majesty. He came on the *Invincible*. Either during his official visit to the Admiralty or in one of the various conferences we had together the Admiral asked me what steps we had taken to secure the safe arrival of the *Sultan Osman* in Constantinople.

"The Greeks are terribly frightened of the arrival of the *Sultan Osman* in Turkish waters," he told me, "and they are doing everything they possibly can to protect themselves against this danger. According to my information, if their agent failed to destroy the ship before its last trials in England they are determined to send a submarine to sink it on its way through the Straits of Gibraltar, and if this last method fails they will attack it with their whole fleet immediately it reaches Greek waters. You can't be careful enough if you want to get your ship."

To-day I think I must assume that the object of the Admiral in pressing this advice upon me was to frighten me into giving up the idea of allowing the *Sultan Osman* to come to Constantinople before the *Reschadiéh* was ready, but at the time I thought that the Admiral gave me this advice out of friendliness, and was pointing out the greatness of the peril so that I could take all necessary measures to avert it.

According to the reports which I received from my agents in England and Greece, apart from the Admiral's advice, it certainly seemed necessary to take the most elaborate precautionary

measures to secure the safety of the *Sultan Osman* during her voyage from England to Constantinople.

After I had discussed this matter with Admiral Limpus it was decided that at the beginning of August our fleet should cruise into the Mediterranean and meet the *Sultan Osman* on the latitude of Crete.

During my visit to France for the French naval manœuvres I summoned Reuf Bey, who was in England, to Paris, and gave him personally secret orders which the Admiral had drawn up in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. These orders described the route to be taken by the *Sultan Osman* on its way through the Straits of Gibraltar and the rendezvous where it was to meet our fleet.

Unfortunately the English Government laid hands on our dreadnought on July 21, and fate willed that our flag should never fly on that magnificent vessel.

THE ATTEMPT AT A FRANCO-TURKISH RAPPROCHEMENT.

I have already briefly explained that as a result of the Balkan War the Committee of Unity and Progress adopted the principle that the old passive policy must be abandoned in favour of an active foreign and domestic policy. Their reason was that it had become clear that this was the only way of saving Turkey from the complications which threatened on every side, building up her strength and giving her her true place among the nations.

It seems to me necessary to enumerate once more the essential features of that active policy which drove the Government into the World War.

From the point of view of domestic politics, the most important question was to determine the rights of the minority, to use a current phrase, and to bring about an amicable understanding between them and the majority. As I have already carefully explained, a *modus vivendi* with the Arabs had already been found, and if it did not completely satisfy all the Arabian politicians, there was no doubt that the great mass of Arab Mohammedans, who were heart and soul in the cause of Islam, regarded it as adequate.

The racial problem had been finally settled so far as the

Bulgarians were concerned, and not a single Bulgarian was to be found within the frontiers of the Turkish Empire.

On the other hand, the Greeks, who had childishly given their King the name of Constantine XIII., and hoped to revive the Byzantine Empire, left us in no kind of doubt that a final reckoning with them was a matter of the immediate future. It therefore seems necessary to take precautionary measures at once, so that in that eventuality we should not be at the mercy of Greek treachery within our own borders.

We therefore began to proceed with the exchange of the Greek population of the vilayet of Idin for the Mohammedans of Macedonia and other regions, and to take in hand the organisation and increase of our army and navy. We also tried to make agreements with foreign Powers.

But the most important domestic problem was the Armenian. I wish I could convince my readers by all the proofs available to me that it was the Armenian question, above all others, which the Committee of Unity and Progress desired to solve in a way which would satisfy and benefit the Armenians. I can produce those proofs, and also recount the causes which prevented our success, but it seems to me better to deal with this extremely important matter in a special chapter.

Whenever an Armenian question cropped up in Turkey there was always a Russian question behind it. At the meeting of the Jenikoi Commission (which was composed of the First Dragomans of the Great Powers), which had to decide on the form and nature of the reform to be introduced in Armenia, the Russian First Dragoman always put forward a maximum programme, while the German First Dragoman advocated a minimum programme. The First Dragomans of England and France, on the one side, and Austria and Italy on the other, played the mediator. After several meetings the commission failed to reach a final decision, and laid a minimum and maximum programme before their Embassies. Subsequently the discussion was continued at the Sublime Porte between the German and Russian Ambassadors and the Grand Vizier, while the other Ambassadors withdrew from active participation in the affair, explaining that they would accept any decision ultimately reached by the two Ambassadors representing the extreme points of view.

This business proves quite clearly that if we were to be safe against Russia we had no other resource but to win the sympathy of France and England, and particularly of public opinion in those two countries. We never dreamed of a general European war, and still less that Germany would declare war on Russia on our behalf. What we said to ourselves was this: "What has Germany been doing to allow our closest ally to rob us of all our illusions by annexing Bosnia and Herzegovina a few days after the promulgation of our constitution? Is not Italy, which has suddenly attacked Tripoli, an ally of Germany, though apparently none too loyal an ally? Did not Italy declare that she was only acting as Austria-Hungary had acted? The Germans want to exploit us economically, and will stop at nothing to prevent their interests being menaced. The only purpose of their intervention in the matter of the Armenian reforms is to prevent Russian influence extending beyond the Bagdad railway. Otherwise it would never occur to the Germans to aid us if danger threatened."

Such were the ideas in our minds. Besides, at the time when we were devoting our attention to getting the money needed for Turkey's development and progress, had not Germany roundly declared that they could not help us in this matter, and that our only chance was to remain on good terms with France and keep open the door through which we could get money from the Paris Bourse?

In these circumstances we were determined to cultivate the best relations, primarily with the French, but also with the English, and to convince them beyond any possible doubt that our only desire was to introduce serious reforms at home and assure ourselves of their protection against a Russian attack.

We were extremely anxious that the negotiations of the Foreign Ministry and Hakki Pasha should lead to a final solution of the various questions at issue between the English and ourselves. We had delimited the Turkish and English zones of influence in the Gulf of Basra and in the southern part of the Arabian peninsula, and we had also solved the problem of Aden in a way which satisfied the English.

We had not opposed the English demands in the question of the extension of the Bagdad Railway to Basra, nor in the matter of shipping routes on the Euphrates and Tigris. We gave English

companies the concessions for petroleum in Mesopotamia, for the extension of the Aidin Railway, the construction of several new sections and the development of the harbours of Trebizond and Samsun. As I have said before, we had called in an English Inspector-General and several English inspectors to reform the Ministry of the Interior and the organisation of the Civil Service. Mr. Graves, who had been in Turkey for a long time, was selected for the post of Inspector-General. The reorganisation of our customs system was entrusted to Sir Richard Crawford, and we had decided to appoint a number of English inspectors for our customs offices.

We had considerably enlarged the powers of the English naval mission which we had called in for the reorganisation of our navy, and we now began to enjoy the fruits of its labours. Sir Louis Mallet, the English ambassador, with whom I was on the best of terms, told me how grateful the Admiral was to me, and that he was rapidly coming to the conclusion that the Turkish navy had a future.

We had handed over the reorganisation of our arsenals to English companies, the administrative committee of which was under the chairmanship of gentlemen like Sir Adam Block, long known as an advocate of Anglo-Turkish friendship. Sir Adam Block often told me how grateful he was that the agreement between the companies and the Turkish Admiralty had been observed so meticulously, and that the matter was now on a really sound footing.

Unfortunately, owing to Russian opposition, England declined our proposal that we should call in English officials to administer the vilayets inhabited by Armenians.

As we attributed the unpopularity of our political party in England to the intrigues of the First Dragoman, FitzMaurice, and the Military Attaché, Tyrrel, in the days of Ambassador Sir Gerald Lowther, Prince Said Pasha at once asked the new English Ambassador, Sir Louis Mallet, to transfer these gentlemen from Constantinople. The Ambassador promised that it should be done immediately, and both of them left our country a month or so later. Henceforth we had most active and amicable relations with Sir Louis Mallet, who was a particularly fine man, thoroughly honest, and very kind.

We strengthened all our private ties and endeavoured to remove English prejudices with regard to the Turks in the hope of finding some means of bringing England back to her former views, England, which had always shown herself disposed to support and strengthen Turkey, but had revolutionised her traditional policy as a result of her understanding with Russia. Apart from our efforts in Constantinople to get on friendly terms with the Ambassador, the staff of the Embassy and a number of other Englishmen, we neglected no opportunity of trying to establish good relations with gentlemen like Sir Thomas Barclay, one of the strongest opponents of the Anglo-Russian understanding, and an advocate of an Anglo-Turkish association, and other important Englishmen.

The Government in general and its individual members worked tirelessly, both officially and in private, to strengthen the bonds of friendship with the English, and also let no opportunity slip of bringing about a *rapprochement* with France.

The reorganisation of our gendarmerie had long been committed to the French General Baumann. His powers were continually being extended, and with a view to pleasing the French he was also asked to reorganise the gendarmerie of the Lebanon, which had hitherto held a special position.

As the construction of the roads of the Ottoman Empire had been entrusted to a French company, the Ministry of Public Works engaged a number of French engineers. Their pay was to be increased.

For the purpose of putting our financial house in order, we conferred wide powers on the financial reform committee we had accepted a short time before, and did everything in our power to ensure that no finance bill should be laid before the Chamber of Deputies until it had been approved by this commission.

With a view to keeping our finance officials under continuous control and encouraging their sense of duty and responsibility we appointed a Frenchman, Monsieur Joly, Inspector-General of Finance, and gave him a number of French officials to assist him.

At that time the desire to win the friendship of England and France was so strong that we should not have hesitated even to entrust the organisation of our army to a French mission if

that had been in any way possible. But it was, in fact, impossible. In the first place a large number of our officers had completed their training in Germany, and the rest of them had been trained and educated according to German military methods. It is a fact recognised by all experts that when the organisation and training of an army have proceeded on certain principles it is impossible to revolutionise that organisation offhand, and particularly to force new methods upon it, without great confusion. In the second place Germany had been asked by us, in Mahmud Shefketh Pasha's time, to send a military mission to reorganise our army, and the request had been put into writing. It was not open to us to retrace our steps after we had once taken that course.

Besides, it would have been very foolish to offend a State which had no evil designs upon us in order to please other governments which, very probably, contemplated doing us a bad turn. For these reasons we had no intention of reversing our decision so far as the army was concerned, and we paid no attention whatever to the noisy agitation which followed on the arrival of Liman von Sanders' military mission.

While we were thus giving the French all the material advantages they demanded of us in the negotiations for the loan, we endeavoured to influence public opinion in France in our favour.

From the technical point of view, serious objections could be urged against having warships of different types, but notwithstanding this drawback, we did not hesitate to order six destroyers from the Havre yards and two submarines from Creusot in order to please the French.

We also ordered from France a number of mountain guns as soon as the superiority of the French mountain gun to that of Krupp had been ascertained by our leading artillery expert, General Hassan Riza Pasha. We entrusted the establishment of our naval flying school to French experts, and a contract for twelve seaplanes was given to a French company.

Lastly, I founded—with great success—a Franco-Turkish friendship committee, which was to meet alternately in Constantinople and Paris. In Constantinople I was to be president of this committee, while in Paris the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Cruppi, was to be chairman.

The statutes for the organisation of this committee were drawn up in Constantinople by a commission which I called the "Foundation Committee." Many well-known Frenchmen and Turks were members of it. After the principles had been worked out and the committee had informed the Ministry of the Interior of its convocation, the inauguration took place in the club rooms of the *Union Française* in Pera, and the election of the sub-committees then took place. The programme contemplated by the committee was so comprehensive that, if it had been followed up and carried into execution, it would have proved the most effective agent for improving Franco-Turkish relations in the next year or two.

One day, about the middle of June, 1914, when I was calling at the French Embassy, Monsieur Bompard said to me:

"The French Government have observed the different efforts you have been making to improve Franco-Turkish relations, and want to invite you to France to make your personal acquaintance and introduce you to the French nation. Would the Turkish Government like an invitation to be present at the great French naval manœuvres which are to be held in the middle of July? Before I ask the Grand Vizier, I should like to be certain of your approval."

I replied that if the Grand Vizier agreed and His Majesty the Sultan gave me his permission, I should accept the invitation with the greatest pleasure.

A few days later Monsieur Bompard communicated the French Government's invitation officially to the Sublime Porte.

It was at this very moment that the Serajevo murder took place. I asked His Highness, the Grand Vizier, for instructions as to what line I was to take in Paris, particularly in my conferences with the Foreign Minister.

"As you are quite familiar with our political views," he replied, "you will emphasise at every suitable opportunity how much importance we attach to the friendship of France and the advantages we hope to derive from French policy in connection with the approaching settlement of the question of the islands, a question of vital importance to us. You must do everything in your power to draw the attention of the Foreign Minister to this ticklish question."

I left Constantinople, accompanied by two naval officers, in

the last days of June and went straight to Paris, where I arrived early in July.

In Paris I found Wassif and Reuf Bey, whom I had asked to meet me. When I gave Reuf Bey his instructions to arrange for the gunnery and speed trials of the *Sultan Osman* at the earliest possible moment he told me that he had observed that the English were in a very peculiar frame of mind. They seemed to be always searching for some new excuse for delaying the completion and delivery of the warship. I replied that we, too, must keep all our wits about us in this matter, for it was essential that we should get possession of the ship as soon as possible.

The constructing company now informed us that they could not fix two of the fourteen guns of which the ship's armament was to consist by the time previously agreed upon. I gave Reuf Bey a crowd of instructions, and also my answer to the company in which I declared my readiness to allow the trials to proceed without the two guns, which could then be fitted in Constantinople. I sent the Bey back to England and kept Wassif Bey alone with me.

After staying two days in Paris I went to Toulon, where I met Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, the Commander-in-Chief of the French Fleet. Together we went on board the dreadnought *Courbet*, his flag-ship. I shall never forget those three days and nights of fleet manœuvres on the coast of the beautiful Riviera. I could not speak too highly of the hospitality shown me by the Admiral, a real old sailor.

There was a review of the Marines, and after three days I bade farewell to the Admiral and returned by rail. After passing three or four days visiting gun and rifle establishments and submarine construction yards, I went back to Paris. Nor did I omit to visit the yards at Le Havre before the 14th July.

During my visit to Paris, I several times called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Viviani. On my second call he suddenly said with a look full of meaning :

“ Your Excellency, though I am very anxious to discuss several extremely important matters with you, the debates now taking place in the Chamber are absorbing my attention to such a degree that I cannot attend to anything else. It is very important that I should go to Russia with the President of the Republic. The

Socialists will oppose the idea and refuse to vote the necessary credits for the voyage. I've given Monsieur de Margerie, the Director of Political Affairs in the Ministry, the necessary instructions, and asked him to discuss everything with Your Excellency. I'll be grateful if you will grant his request to see you."

I thought my hopes and desires were drawing nearer to realisation, and was very happy at the idea. The meeting took place shortly afterwards at the Foreign Office.

The first thing M. de Margerie told me was how gratefully all my efforts for a Turco-French *rapprochement* had been received both by the Government and by public opinion, and that the misunderstandings which had arisen between the two peoples might now be considered as removed.

I interrupted him with the remark: "If you don't mind, Monsieur le Directeur, let's get straight to business. You know that the Turkish Empire has been greatly weakened by the numerous attacks to which it has been subjected. It has not only emerged quite helpless out of the Balkan War, but has had to sacrifice almost the whole of its European territory and most of the islands. We are now devoting all our efforts to heal its wounds and breathe new life into our nation. But the present state of affairs condemns all these efforts to failure. The result is that we are under an imperious duty to recover from this precarious position.

"I want to speak first of the question of the islands, which is a subject of dissension between us and our Greek friends. You consider it a wise policy always to back the Greeks and give them your sympathy in the hope that they may prove of use to you in the future. But if you will be good enough to look at a map you will see that one day we shall be in a position to be more useful to you than the Greeks. The Ottoman Government says to itself: 'The object of the policy of France and England is to forge an iron ring around the Central Powers.' That ring is closed except in the south-west. If Turkey associated herself with the plans of the Entente, Bulgaria, which would then be left entirely isolated in the Balkans, would necessarily be compelled to come in too.

"If you want to close your iron ring once and for all, you must try to find some solution of this question of the islands between

us and the Greeks. You must take us into your Entente and at the same time protect us against the terrible perils threatening us from Russia. If you support us in our upward strivings, you will soon have a very faithful ally in the East! It seems to me that the Serajevo crime may lead to a world war. At such a moment it is of the very highest importance that decisions of this kind should be taken quickly."

The proposal was straight and unambiguous; in the question of the islands a solution must be found acceptable to Greeks and Turks alike, then an Alliance with Turkey, and Germany is completely cut off from the road to the East.

After a moment's reflection, M. de Margerie asked me what was the solution of the islands question which we desired. I replied that the archipelago, including the Dodecanese (which must be restored to us by Italy), could be granted autonomy under the suzerainty of Turkey, and its revenues could be applied solely to its own needs. Exemption from military service and a number of other privileges might also be conceded.

Ultimately M. de Margerie replied:

"I consider the proposal you have made with regard to the question of the islands as worthy of the most serious consideration. It seems to me quite possible that the problem should finally be solved on that basis. You have a very accurate idea of the iron ring we are thinking of forging round the Central Powers. But before we can conclude an alliance with you we must have the approval of our allies, and that approval seems to me very doubtful. The Turkish Government's proposal is certainly frank and clear. I will communicate your observations to our Allies before I go with the President of the Republic and the Minister-President on their voyage to Russia. We will give our Ambassador the necessary instructions when we and our Allies have made our joint decision. For the moment, unfortunately, the French Government cannot take any initiative on its own."

It was obvious enough that this answer was only a veiled refusal. I understood perfectly that France was convinced that it was quite impossible for us to escape the iron claws of Russia, and that under no circumstances would she vouchsafe us her help.

That evening my friend, Georges Rémond, who went with me everywhere during my visit in France, asked me whether I was

satisfied with the result of my conference. I simply replied: "I could never have believed I was in for so gross a disappointment!"

When I left Paris on my return journey on July 18th, Georges Rémond gave me a pamphlet on the station; the French editor of this document, whose name I cannot remember, wrote under a pseudonym somewhat in the following strain:

"Djemal Pasha has been in Paris. He has attended the manœuvres of the Mediterranean Fleet. The official and semi-official authorities have given him the warmest of welcomes, and he has been decorated with the order of the Legion of Honour. All this is very nice! But what are the actual promises which Djemal Pasha, who loves his country above anything else, can take home with him from the French Government? From all we hear Djemal Pasha is one of the greatest Turkish patriots. All the marks of favour showered upon him personally cannot make him forget the advantages in hope of securing which he has come to us. If Djemal Pasha now goes home without having done anything for his country we shall have no right to be angry if he finds himself compelled to take steps which may not be to the taste of France."

What remarkably sound judgment that French editor had!

After my return I gave His Highness the Grand Vizier and my friends a detailed report of my conversation with M. de Margerie and the conclusions it had brought me to.

THE TURCO-GERMAN ALLIANCE.

The Turco-German alliance was not concluded during the war, as people have believed hitherto. It was certainly signed on August 2nd, 1914, but negotiations had been in progress long before the war.

A few days after my return to Constantinople Talaat Bey said to me:

"What would you say, Pasha, if Germany proposed an alliance with us on such and such terms? Would you accept it? You can see for yourself that we have nothing to hope for from France. As France has declined, would you decline Germany's suggestion too?"

I immediately answered:

"I should not hesitate to accept any alliance which rescued Turkey from her present position of isolation."

During the great military review on July 23rd, which took place on the Levend Tchiflik on the occasion of the national festival, the German Ambassador, Baron von Wangenheim, came up to me.

"Djemal Pasha," he said, "just look at the amazing results achieved by German officers in quite a short time. You have now a Turkish army which can be compared with the best organised armies in the world! All German officers are at one in praising the moral strength of the Turkish soldier, and indeed it has proved itself beyond all expectation. We can claim we have won a great victory if we could call ourselves the ally of a Government which has such an army at its disposal!"

In thanking the Ambassador for this compliment I had not the slightest suspicion of the negotiations which had been in progress for a Turco-German alliance.

A few days later, just as I was entering my car at the door of my house in Schichli, I saw another car in which Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and Halil Bey were seated, turning the corner of Osman Bey's garden into the street leading to Enver Pasha's house. The car was coming from the Maslok direction. I wondered what on earth could bring them there at that time of day, and almost certainly from the Grand Vizier's palace in Yenikoi. I at once suspected that my friends might be engaged in the discussion of affairs which they did not want me to know.

Up to that time nothing had happened which could have started such a suspicion. When I got home I rang up Enver Pasha on the telephone. I asked where he had been going at so late an hour. He replied that he had been whiling away the time by paying a visit to the Grand Vizier, and as he had met Talaat Bey and Halil Bey they had driven home together. The way in which he gave me this answer only confirmed my suspicions.

Next afternoon I was summoned to a Council of Ministers which was in progress at the Grand Vizier's palace. When I reached Aya Pasha's kiosk it was raining and blowing so hard that it was impossible for me to proceed in my car. Constantinople had not known such a storm for a very long time. I returned to the Ministry and went to Yenikoi in my motor launch.

"Where have you been, Djemal Pasha?" said the Grand Vizier. "We waited for you a long time and the Ministers have gone now. As we were told by the Ministry that you were on your way we feared that you had met with some accident in the storm. I'm going to tell you something new which will certainly be a pleasant surprise to you. Can you think what it is?"

"I suspect," I replied after some consideration, "that it relates to what you, Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and Halil Bey have just decided upon when I was absent, though I haven't the slightest idea what it is."

"The German Government has offered us an alliance," he said, "and as the proposal seems to us in the interests of the country we have signed the compact with Ambassador von Wangenheim to-day! Now, are you satisfied?"

The importance of the news, for which I was not prepared, moved me to the depths.

"If the terms of the treaty are really in accordance with the interests of the country it may be considered an outstanding political success," I replied.

"It is an agreement which had due regard for the interests of both parties, and secures their rights in a manner which no other Government has yet done," he said.

He went into his cabinet and drew from a drawer in his writing-table the treaty, which comprised several articles. I read it, and saw that it was an excellent compact between two independent Governments on the basis of equality of rights.

"What about Austria?" I asked.

"A few minutes after my colleagues went away, and about half an hour before you came, I received a letter from Ambassador Pallavicini in which he told me that his Government agreed with every point of the compact we had made with Germany. Here's the letter!"

He showed it to me.

"And Italy?" I could not help enquiring.

"As Germany has not yet informed Italy of our entry into the Triple Alliance I have no news for the moment on that point. Germany will first prepare the ground, and we have no doubt that Italy will accept our alliance in the same way that Austria has done."

I could not help asking for what reason it had been thought necessary to keep me out of the negotiations, which must certainly have been in progress for some considerable time to have led to such a conclusion.

The Grand Vizier passed lightly over my question with the remark that he had conducted the negotiations personally, had told his colleagues nothing whatever about them until the affair took definite shape, and that they had only learned of the matter that very day. "Djavid Bey," he added, "still knows nothing about it. I have asked him to come here. He is on his way, and when he arrives I shall show him the treaty."

I asked him whether all the Ministers now knew about the affair.

"As there are individual members of the Ministry who are frightened of a scheme of such importance and might divulge this state secret—a matter which is highly undesirable at the present moment—I thought it my duty to inform only His Highness the Sheik ul Islam, Halil, Talaat and Djavid Bey, Enver Pasha, and yourself. The other Ministers have not yet been initiated. Ibrahim Bey and Shukri Bey will be told by Talaat Bey, and the secret is to be kept from the others. You will appreciate that in so delicate a matter we shall have to proceed with the greatest caution. Now you know everything, and you have not even given me your own opinion!" he said by way of conclusion.

"May God make this of real use to the country! *El Hair fi ma vag'a*,"* I replied. And that was all I said.

I was not slow to congratulate the Grand Vizier on his success in concluding such an alliance, which undoubtedly represented a fact of the highest historical significance.

The importance of this occurrence gave me much to think about. I may say that I did not sleep a wink that night. I kept the general political situation before my eyes, and asked myself what had been the real motives of the Government, for I saw myself faced with a situation I had never even imagined hitherto.

Judging by all the signs, a terrible conflict at a very early date between the countries of the Alliance and those of the Entente seemed inevitable. If at such a time we were not bound to either side, it would always be possible for us to throw in our lot with

* An Arab expression, meaning that a *fait accompli* is of good augury.

the party which offered us the greater advantages. And now we had taken our decision beforehand and chosen our partner. The result was we had deprived ourselves of our freedom of choice. Was the party in whose favour we had decided such as our national aspirations dictated? If we had waited, would not its opponent have made us better, more profitable proposals? By accepting those proposals should we not have rendered our country a greater service?

In spite of every possible outward expression of sympathy, Germany had never actually come to our help, and was always recommending us to maintain the best possible relations with France. Why was she now endeavouring to form an alliance with us? And why an alliance which assigned the same status to the Ottoman Government as to Germany and Austria? What had moved the two Powers to such a sacrifice? All these questions passed through my mind and I found no answer to them.

At length I came to the following conclusion. There is one fact that no one in the world can deny—that Russia is the hereditary enemy of the Ottoman Empire, and that her greatest desire is the possession of Constantinople. It is absolutely impossible to make her abandon that ideal. After the Treaty of Berlin, and Czarism had fully realised that it would be impossible for Russia to get Constantinople, her ambitions had been turned towards India. As the artful policy of England had then blocked her path in that quarter, she turned her eyes to the Far East. But the hand which she stretched out to Port Arthur received a hard knock from the Japanese, and she had to withdraw the bleeding member. Thus her only course was to return to the object of her century-old ambition, and was making her preparations to begin her last mighty onslaught on poor Turkey, the booty for which she had been yearning for hundreds of years. Her allies, so far from opposing her design, were now entirely in agreement with that design. The circumstances prevailing at the time of the Crimean War and the Treaty of Berlin had now wholly changed. England, mistress of Egypt, looked with far more jealous eyes at Germany's economic plans in the Gulf of Basra than at Russia's ambitions with regard to Constantinople and the whole of Anatolia. Russia was to have Constantinople as compensation for Mesopotamia. As for France, she was not of those who would oppose the

partition of Turkey so long as she was given a free hand in Syria.

The fundamental plan to be pursued by Russia, which saw the realisation of her schemes at hand, was to isolate Turkey and always do everything which would keep her weak.

That had been the only reason and motive for M. de Margerie's refusal, or rather the refusal which Viviani had communicated through him. If England and France desired to please Russia they could not act otherwise. That was why I, who, indeed, expected no advantages of any kind from Germany, had received a categorical refusal from France, to which I had turned in order to have some security against Russia. In declining to send the officials for which we had asked for the eastern provinces of Asia Minor, England had declared that she could not go against the wishes of Russia. Besides, one of England's most fervent desires was that the title "Khalif of Islam" held by the Ottoman sovereign should be transferred to some insignificant individual in one of the countries under her influence. The power of the Turkish Sultan had thoroughly worried her in the last few years.

In view of all these considerations, I had turned to France in order to secure her support and that of England in case we found ourselves exposed to attack by Russia. While I was in the grip of these phantoms my colleagues had found themselves presented with extremely plain and important proposals—an association with the Powers of the Triple Alliance, or, to speak more accurately, an alliance with Germany.

A mighty Empire like Germany was offering us an alliance based on equality of status, we who five or six months before had tried to escape from our isolation and associate ourselves with a group of Powers by making an attempt—a vain attempt—to form an alliance with Bulgaria, from which we promised ourselves great profit.

I myself had followed a policy favourable to the Entente group, but had I found myself personally faced with such an offer would I have discovered the moral force to refuse it? Would such a refusal have been reasonable?

Let us consider the matter frankly and calmly.

What was the position of the two groups of Powers so far as Turkey was concerned?

Among the Entente Powers, England had got Egypt completely in her power, and would undoubtedly strive to possess Mesopotamia, possibly Palestine also, and secure her exclusive influence over the whole of the Arabian Peninsula.

Russia was so utterly anti-Turkish that it was quite unnecessary to look round for proofs.

All this did not exactly suggest benevolent intentions towards Turkey!

As regards the Triple Alliance group, Austria and Italy had nothing more to ask from Turkey. They had already done that country all the harm they possibly could. Thus they coveted no more. The most that could be said was that Italy might be indulging in visions which were in conflict with those of the Entente Governments. (With regard to the coasts of Adalia and Phœnicia, for example.)

Germany, whatever else might be said, was the *only* power which desired to see Turkey strong. Germany's interests could be secured by the strengthening of Turkey, and that alone. Germany could not lay hands on Turkey as if she were a colony, for neither the geographical position nor her resources made that possible. The result was that Germany regarded Turkey as a link in the commercial and trading chain, and thus became her stoutest champion against the Entente Governments which wanted to dismember her, particularly as the elimination of Turkey would mean the final "encirclement" of Germany. Her south-western front remained open thanks to Turkey alone. The only way in which she could escape the pressure of the iron ring was to prevent the dismemberment of Turkey.

Thus we had two groups of Powers before us, the ideal of one of which was to get us in its power, while the aim of the other was to make friendly approaches to us in view of certain prospective advantages, and to conclude an alliance with us based on equal rights and obligations.

Could this offer be rejected?

In the first place, none of the small Balkan States would dare to assert itself with a view to intervening in the domestic affairs of a government which was a member of so powerful an alliance, so that we should, at any rate, be left in peace.

In the second place, no member of the Entente group would

venture to lay hands on us for fear of starting a general European war. Above all, Germany's savants, her art and commercial experts would place their services at the disposal of Turkey in the way she desired. Thus, within a short time we should be able to obtain our release from the bonds of the capitulations.

Although this alliance made us the enemy of the Entente Powers in case of a European war, as long as the conflict was postponed for between five and ten years we should have brought up the fortifications of the Straits and our different coasts to such a standard, made our army so strong, and developed our country to such a degree that we need not hesitate to take our part in such a war.

But if the great war were to break out in a week or two, or a month or two, in view of our weakened condition at the moment should we not find ourselves in a terrible position if we were involved in a war with France, England, and Russia?

Had not Germany made up her mind so quickly to conclude an alliance with us just because she suspected that war would break out in the immediate future?

There can be no doubt about that! To compel Germany to enter into an alliance with us, based upon equality of rights and each and every term of the Triple Alliance compact, she must have been alarmed at the preparations being made by her opponents. She must have been feeling the necessity of strengthening her position in every possible way. Otherwise it was inconceivable that a rationally-minded state should take upon its shoulders such a burden as Turkey merely for the *beaux yeux* of the Turks and from a desire to oblige the Turkish sovereign.

The outbreak of a general European War in the very near future must be regarded as a great misfortune for us.

Yet when the *pros* and *cons* were considered, it would undoubtedly be more profitable for the country not to abandon the scheme. If I had been in my friends' shoes I should have taken that course and done exactly what they did—*i.e.*, accept this alliance without hesitation. At the same time I should have taken good care to insert certain reservations in the treaty. For example, I should have preferred that one stipulation for our acceptance should be that if the European War broke out within

two years of the day of signature and the exchange of documents Turkey should merely observe a benevolent neutrality towards the Triple Alliance and enter into an obligation to give it moral support by mobilising her army and closing the Straits to war and trading vessels. If the war lasted more than two years Turkey would intervene in the struggle with the Entente. If a general war were declared more than two years after the signature of the treaty, Turkey would be under an obligation to carry out the terms of the alliance at once.

Of course, I cannot say whether Germany would have accepted these terms or not.

After considering everything very carefully from every point of view I repeated to myself the words I had used to the Grand Vizier: "May God let this alliance turn out profitably for us!" Ultimately I entirely approved the new situation thus created.

As these memoirs of mine have clearly revealed when and how the alliance between the Ottoman Government and Germany was concluded, everyone can judge of the falsity of the versions given to the world by the American Ambassador, Morgenthau, and by Mandelstam, the First Dragoman of the Russian Embassy, and how they are based on nothing but street-corner chatter.

AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD WAR.

THE DECLARATION OF WAR AND THE MOBILISATION OF THE TURKISH ARMIES.

AFTER the reception of the Serbian Note, which she regarded as unsatisfactory, Austria mobilised a portion of her forces, and as Russia replied generally with mobilisation, and thereupon Germany and France proceeded to mobilise also, there was no longer any doubt that we, too, would be involved in a general European War.

After the German declaration of war on Russia, and the war began on August 1st, 1914, we saw ourselves bound by our treaty, the ink of which was not yet dry, to intervene in the struggle at once. The agreement made our intervention independent of the causes of the war. We had to intervene with all our forces in a

war in which Germany and Austria engaged with all theirs. Yet I was extremely anxious to postpone our entry in the conflict for as long as possible. I developed my views in the Council of Ministers which at this time met practically every evening in Prince Said Halim's palace in Yenikoi (Enver Pasha, Talaat, Halil, Djavid Bey, and myself, with the Prince presiding). I said that not only would it be of no benefit to Germany for us to take an active part in the war before our mobilisation was complete, but it would simply mean suicide on our part. If the English, French, and Russians, who knew perfectly well that we had not a single man at the Dardanelles, in Constantinople, or on the Russian frontier, made a sudden attack on the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, simultaneously advanced on Erzerum, and after occupying Constantinople and Erzerum approached the interior of Anatolia through Sivas, our army would be unable to complete its mobilisation during the war, and the downfall of the Ottoman Empire would be decreed at the very outset.

My colleagues admitted the justice of my reasoning, and brought the German Ambassador round to the same point of view. So after discussion in the Council of Ministers, we decided to proclaim the neutrality of Turkey, though the country would commence a general mobilisation of the army in order to enforce that neutrality against either side. We immediately translated words into deeds. Even those of our colleagues in the Ministry who did not know of our alliance with Germany and the obligations it involved approved the general mobilisation of the army as a wise precaution.

Two or three days after the mobilisation decree I took over the command of the Ottoman 2nd Army, while retaining my office at the Admiralty.

On the 1st or 2nd of August, after Turkey had paid the last instalment for the *Sultan Osman*, the English First Lord of the Admiralty prevented the Turkish flag being hoisted on the ship, and commandeered both the *Sultan Osman* and the *Reschadich*. Never, never shall I forget my mental anguish when I heard this frightful news. That day I clearly realised that the apparently friendly advice of Admiral Robeck, Commander of the English Mediterranean Fleet, on his visit to Constantinople, and the thousand and one difficulties raised by Armstrong to delay the

completion of the ship had been nothing but pretexts which, once for all, revealed the design England had long cherished of making these ships her own.

Even if the English Government had a right to commandeer ships under construction in their arsenals *in war*, they were not at war when they took our ships. Indeed, they had not even begun to mobilise their army and fleet. This question was debated for a very long time at this period, but as England's wrongdoing was admitted even by her own diplomatists, I see no reason to open this question again here.

This incident justified the mobilisation of our army, and thus gave us a good reason for returning a *tu quoque* answer to the Entente Ambassadors who found this general mobilisation unnecessary. They justified the Ottoman Government once more when, as I shall now relate, they permitted the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to enter the Sea of Marmora.

THE CRUISE OF THE "GOEBEN" AND "BRESLAU" THROUGH THE DARDANELLES AND THEIR ARRIVAL IN CONSTANTINOPLE.

Several German officers (and in particular the aides-de-camp of Marshal Liman von Sanders), who more or less knew about the Turco-German alliance, but did not know the reason why Turkey had for the time being declared her neutrality, came to me with unreasonable and untimely suggestions, and regarded me with deep dislike and even enmity, as they supposed I belonged to the party which alone was restraining the Government from intervening in the war at once. As, of course, they did not dare to show any want of respect, I went on as if I had not noticed their unfriendly behaviour.

One day we were on the quay by Prince Said Halim Pasha's house. A steamer coming from Russia and full of mobilised men was passing through the Bosphorus, setting a course for the Sea of Marmora. A number of German officers and members of the German Embassy Staff were also on the quay. They were discussing the passage of this steamer. One of Liman von Sanders' aides-de-camp remarked in a fairly audible voice so that I was bound to hear:

"If His Excellency the Ottoman Naval Minister had refused

to allow that ship to pass through the Dardanelles, our comrades on the western front would have at least fourteen thousand fewer French soldiers to cope with. This very profitable initiative lies exclusively in his hands! ”

Of course I acted as if I had heard nothing, and the ship continued its voyage.

On August 8th, 1914, Captain Hamann, Naval Attaché to the German Embassy, came to the Ministry. He informed me that the German Mediterranean squadron, pursued by the English, was withdrawing in the direction of the Dardanelles, and as, to judge by his reports, the *Goeben* had practically no more coal, they were compelled to send some from Constantinople. But as there was no English coal available he asked me to lend him five or six thousand tons from our naval depots. I immediately telephoned to the Grand Vizier, Enver Pasha, and Talaat Bey to ascertain their opinion.

They replied that I should agree. I ordered that the required quantity of coal should be supplied from the Derindji depôts, and also sent a naval labour section to assist with the loading of the vessel. It was loaded within a few hours, and then set out for the Ægean Sea.

As usual, the evening of August 11th found us assembled in council at dinner at the Prince's house. Talaat, Djavid, and I had been the first to arrive. Enver Pasha, who came in later, remarked with that quiet smile which was peculiar to him: “Unto us a son is born!” Of course we did not know what he meant. To put an end to our feverish impatience he continued: “The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* appeared off the Dardanelles this morning, and as they were being followed by the English fleet, they asked that they should be allowed to pass through the Narrows. I granted the permission, as I did not wish to condemn the ships of an allied State to certain destruction, and by now the ships are in the Dardanelles under the protection of the forts of the Narrows. The sequel is that we are faced with a political problem. We shall have to come to a decision about it this evening!”

It was certainly a very ticklish question. Two ships of one of the combatants had fled into Turkish waters.

According to the rules of neutrality, we were bound either to

make them leave our waters within twenty-four hours or to disarm and intern them in one of our harbours.

As Germany's ally we could not for a moment consider the first alternative, as it would have been equivalent to handing the ships over. Besides, such a course conflicted as much with our interests as our duty.

Yet, as regards the second alternative, it was certain that the Germans would never consent. Looked at from that point of view, the Allies were entitled to consider our action a *casus belli* and declare war upon us. Of course that was bound to happen sooner or later, and we should be forced to intervene in the war. Yet the state of our army compelled us to postpone that intervention for as long as possible.

At this point the French and English Ambassadors called on the Grand Vizier in a state of great excitement to protest against the passage of the German warships through the Dardanelles and against the audacity of their commanders in searching a post steamer which had left Constantinople the previous evening with a number of Frenchmen as passengers on board. They alleged that this was an infringement of the neutrality which the Imperial Government had declared.

After a very thorough discussion we decided to ask the German Government to consent to the two ships being disarmed—temporarily and superficially only. Talaat Bey and Halil Bey went to the German Embassy in Therapia to communicate our decision to the Ambassador, von Wangenheim. An hour later they returned with the news that the Ambassador had declared that under no circumstances could he consent. He had consented to the Ottoman Government's refraining from taking part in the war under the form of neutrality, but was convinced that the arrival of the German ships, compelled to withdraw into Turkish waters, had completely changed the situation. If this piece of provocation involved the breaking off of diplomatic relations, or even war between the Entente and the Ottoman Government, we must accept it as the logical consequence of events.

Enver Pasha identified himself with the views of the Ambassador, but I insisted that, come what may, we must arrive at some compromise, so that in view of our position at the moment we could delay our entry into the war as much as possible.

The Grand Vizier and Djavid Bey were of my opinion. Ultimately one of us proposed the following formula: "Could not the Germans have previously sold us these units? Could not their arrival be regarded as delivery under the contract?"

Everyone heaved a sigh of relief. The ground for a friendly settlement of the affair had been discovered! Shortly afterwards we decided to ask Wangenheim to come to the Prince's house to hear what we had agreed to do. One of Enver Pasha's aides-de-camp was sent to the Embassy, and a quarter of an hour later—after midnight—the Ambassador reached the palace.

After an hour of lively discussion between the Grand Vizier, Talaat Bey, and the Ambassador, the latter promised to get into communication with Berlin the same night and get a favourable answer before morning. We then decided to wait at the Grand Vizier's house until the answer arrived. It came about four o'clock in the morning. It empowered us, on condition that we accepted Admiral Souchon in the Ottoman service, to say that the ships had been sold to Turkey. It was not a real, but merely fictitious, sale. We were informed that as the Emperor could not sell a single ship in the navy without a decree of the Reichstag, the real sale could not be carried out until the end of the war and the Reichstag had conveyed its assent. As a solution which saved appearances had now been found, the Ministers separated about five o'clock. All matters of detail were to be left to the Naval Ministry in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

Early next morning I sent to the papers an official *communiqué* referring to the purchase of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* by the Government and the arrival of these two ships in the Dardanelles. I asked the Press to speak enthusiastically of the circumstance that we had obtained possession of the ships as compensation for the *Sultan Osman* and the *Reschadiéh*, of which the English had robbed us.

The most delicate part of the business, however, was to get the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, Admiral Limpus, and all the English officers out of the fleet without causing excitement. The very next day I had a report from the Admiral in question. He congratulated the Ottoman Government on having secured possession of two such vessels, and assured me that as the two

ships came under his direct command, he would have the selected officers and men ready within a month to manœuvre with these most modern units. I asked the Admiral to call on me, and began to discuss the matter with him. I asked him that, in view of the fact that the German Admiral and ships' companies were very exhausted, so that the date on which they would leave the ship was still uncertain, he would occupy himself in making out the list of officers and men who were to be employed on them.

By a stroke of luck it happened that four or five days later I received a short letter from the Admiral in which he told me that he was enclosing a copy of a report in English which he had submitted direct to the Grand Vizier. I had the report translated. In view of the condition of our fleet and army, he recommended the Government to preserve the strictest neutrality, and expressed his opinion that the Turkish officers and men needed at least four or five years' training instruction before they would be efficient enough to handle the recently-acquired units. I immediately replied to the Admiral that he was there solely to reorganise the fleet, that he was directly responsible to the Ministry, and must therefore present his reports to that Ministry alone. As those reports were to concern themselves with the reorganisation of the fleet and nothing else, he had no authority to recommend any political course to the Ottoman Government when dealing with the situation in the navy!

The next day I received a very short reply from the Admiral. "Your letter shows me the true position. For the future I will be extremely careful not to exceed the limits you have imposed for my activities. In any case, I am feeling very tired, and I should be very grateful to you if you would allow me to spend some time with my daughter, who is living in Therapia."

I told him that his wish was granted, but also pointed out that during his absence there might be many misunderstandings in the fleet between the English officers, mechanics, &c., and the Turkish crews, and asked him to prevent such occurrences by sending the officers to the Ministry, so that they could be distributed among the different sections of the arsenal.

The day after this order was carried not a single English officer remained on service with our fleet. Thereupon an Imperial *irade* was issued, wherein Admiral Souchon was appointed to the

service of the Ottoman Government with the title of Commander-in-Chief of the Imperial Fleet. The next day the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, which were now called *Jawus* and *Midilli*, hoisted the Turkish ensign, entered Stambul harbour, and anchored in the roads of Moda.

A few days later His Majesty the Sultan, who had gone on board the yacht *Erthogrul*, reviewed the Turkish Fleet, which now definitely included the *Jawus* and *Midilli*, during the regatta which was in progress at the Princes Islands. It is utterly impossible to describe the enthusiasm and pleasure which seized on the people of Constantinople in those days. Everyone had confidence in the military preparations of the Government, and not a Mussulman was to be found who did not long for the victory of the Germans and Austrians. This revelation of popular sentiment greatly pleased the Germans and Austrians and correspondingly aroused the fury of the English, French, and Russians.

VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS WITH THE ENGLISH, FRENCH, AND RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS.

After the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* in the Sea of Marmora we had, of course, closed the Straits. On the ground that the German crews still remained on board the two German warships, the English and French Ambassadors insisted that a situation had been created inconsistent with neutrality, and on that account made continuous protests, both official and personal. The Entente representatives, who knew nothing of the alliance, maintained that sooner or later the Germans would use the presence of their ships and the large number of German officers to involve us in the war, and that the only way to preserve our neutrality was to get the German crews off these ships and send them back to Germany along with the officers of the Military Mission. If we had been really neutral, of course no other course would have been open to us. But, as a matter of fact, we had declared our neutrality solely with the object of gaining time, and, as far as our participation in the war was concerned, we were simply waiting for the completion of our military mobilisation.

Meanwhile at our regular meetings in the Grand Vizier's palace the Ministers had decided that I should get into close touch with

the English Ambassador (Sir Louis Mallet) and Djavid Bey with the French Ambassador, and that we should devote ourselves to remove any suspicions they might have as to our alliances.

One evening, when I was talking with Sir Louis Mallet in his house in Therapia, he said to me :

“ Djemal Pasha, what concessions would the Ottoman Government require to preserve a real and strict neutrality to the end ? ”

I replied that there could be no doubt about the neutrality of the Ottoman Government, but that I thought it my duty to bring his question to the knowledge of the Grand Vizier.

Thereupon we consulted the Grand Vizier, and in agreement with him drew up the principal conditions on which we might possibly join the Entente. These conditions were :

The complete abolition of the capitulations.

The restoration of the islands taken from us by the Greeks.

A solution of the Egyptian question.

An assurance that for the future Russia would refrain from interfering in our domestic affairs.

Effective English and French protection in case of a Russian attack; and a few other points.

After we entered the war I saw from a number of telegrams published in an English Blue Book that these conditions had been communicated to London by Sir Louis Mallet.

Three or four days later Sir Louis Mallet replied to each of these points in detail :

For the moment there could be no question of abolishing the juridical capitulations. The utmost that England could concede, with the approval of her allies, was the abolition of some of the financial capitulations.

It would be advisable to postpone our dispute with the Greeks over the question of the islands.

It would be better to let the Egyptian question rest until after the war, as it could not be settled at the moment without conjuring up various perils.

The Russians had no idea whatever of attacking Turkey, and besides France and England were among the signatories to the treaty guaranteeing the integrity of Turkey, so that we could feel quite at our ease on that score, particularly as if we wished it

they were prepared to give us a fresh guarantee embodied in a diplomatic record.

As compensation for all these concessions, we were required not to close the Straits against Russian ships on any ground whatever, and we must undertake to give the Russians the necessary assurances on this most important point. They did not desire to see us taking part in the war on the side of the Entente for in their opinion that was contrary to their interests. What they desired of us was strict neutrality, that the German crews and the Military Mission should be sent back to Germany at once, and that the Dardanelles should be opened to shipping and not closed again in future. In return, France, England, and Russia would give the Sublime Porte a diplomatic record guaranteeing our territorial integrity and sanctioning certain modifications in the matter of the financial capitulations.

In my opinion the answer was perfectly clear. The Entente Powers did not desire our participation in the war on their side. What could be the reason for that?

If we came into the war on the side of the Entente, Russia would see her last chance vanish of laying hands on Constantinople, the goal of her future hopes. That she could never admit, and therefore neither could France nor England.

Their object was patently as follows: "For the moment let us prevent Turkey from doing anything to our disadvantage. During the war we will preserve our association with Russia and thereby bring it to a victorious conclusion. Then we can satisfy Russia's ambition by giving her Constantinople, and on the pretext of reforms grant the Arabian provinces autonomy so that they will easily fall under our protection and control."

It is thus quite easy to understand that my second proposal, made to England, was rejected in the same way and for the same reasons as that first offer of an alliance I had made in Paris.

It may be said that it would have been better for us if we had maintained our neutrality! On condition, I think, that we did not prevent shipping passing through the Straits? But in that case Russia would have emerged from the World War so strong that she would certainly not have waited to seize Constantinople and the eastern provinces of Asia Minor.

It may be said that we could have closed the Straits and still preserved our neutrality. The agreement did not allow that, nor would the English and Russians have allowed it either. There would immediately have been pressure on all sides and suggestions of this kind: "Let us occupy Constantinople and the Straits until the end of the war and then we will give them back to you!"

Nor would they have lost any time in translating words into deeds!

In short, we had only two safe courses open to us. We could either ally ourselves with the English and French, declare war on the Central Powers, and in that way secure ourselves against further attack by Russia, or we could join the Central Powers and assist in the destruction of Russia. After declining our alliance, France and England had required us to remain neutral and keep the Straits open for the benefit of our worst enemy. The Central Powers, on the other hand, allowed us to come in with them, though they felt themselves strong enough to destroy Russia, but they bound us to put every possible obstruction in her way. Thanks to that attitude we could hope to see our foe overthrown. There was, of course, a possibility that the Central Powers might be beaten, and in that case a catastrophe for us was a certainty. But it is also an undeniable fact that if we had remained neutral and left the Straits open the inevitable victory of our enemy would have sealed our fate with equal certainty.

Men may say what they like, looking back on events, but in my view, rather than fall miserably under the yoke of the Russians, English, and French, after the Russians had won, it was infinitely better to defend ourselves to the last drop of blood in the hope of freeing ourselves for ever—the only alternative worthy of a brave and great nation—or at any rate to be able to say "*Tout est perdu hors l'honneur!*" and thus bring to a splendid close a national history which was established on honour and courage, and rich in fame and glory.

Not I alone, but the great majority of the Turkish nation cherish the opinion that our four years of war produced amazing episodes worthy of the finest pages in the history of the greatest nations—the defence of the Dardanelles, the Selman Pak, the siege of Kut-el-Amara, the battles of Gaza, and the defence of Medina.

Of course, my observations are addressed only to those who are ready to give their lives to defend their honour. The miserable creatures who are ready to endure anything if only they can prolong their wretched lives for a few days will certainly not appreciate my words. Making an excuse of the tragic situation to which Fate has brought us to-day, they like to assume the mantle of wisdom in saying: "We told you so. If we had remained neutral we should not have lost so many men, nor should we now be in such a horrible state."

To such as these we can only reply: "It is quite impossible for us to agree with men who cannot understand that to go down fighting is one thing, and to go down submitting another."

Our private relations with the Ambassadors of France and England occasionally led to some highly amusing conversations. I was chatting with Sir Louis Mallet one day when he told me he was quite convinced that Enver Pasha had been won over by the Germans, and that they probably wanted to use the German officers, particularly the officers of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, to bring about some incident which would make a declaration of war inevitable. I told him—more or less—that the neutrality idea prevailed in the Cabinet, so that there was no danger.

"No, Djemal Pasha!" he interrupted, "you're wrong! I'm positive that the Germans wouldn't stop even at a *coup d'état* to gain their ends. They might shut you up in gaol, for instance, and who knows what else!"

By way of a less naïve reply to these naïve words, I answered with a smile: "I've been thinking for a long time what I should do if I had any suspicions of that kind. In virtue of my position as Naval Minister I should open the Dardanelles to the English Fleet and leave to you the suppression of the revolt in the fleet!"

It is certainly astounding that this very perspicacious English diplomat actually believed my words, so much so that he communicated this crazy proposal to the Foreign Secretary, as I read in a Blue Book.

In Document No. 40 of the Russian Red Book it is said that I had given Baron von Giers my "word of honour that I should have withdrawn the German crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* a fortnight after our conversation." I assume that if Baron von Giers did not actually desire to say what was untrue, he must have

used those words to please his superiors, for I was under no sort of obligation to give him any personal assurance, and it is not my custom to speak unless circumstances make it necessary.

WE INTERVENE IN THE WAR.

Meanwhile a number of very serious measures were in progress. The Council of Ministers, which met every evening, came to various decisions supplementary to the Turco-German alliance, and asked the Germans to signify their consent.

What we most desired was to secure the intervention of the Bulgarians in the war. We received the following communication from our Ambassador in Berlin, His Excellency Mahmud Mukhtar Pasha: "When the Turco-German alliance, bearing the signature of His Majesty the Sultan, was laid before the German Emperor he laid emphasis on the advantages it would bring to both nations, and said, with a happy smile, 'Now let me give you another piece of good news. Since this morning I've had in my pocket a letter from the King of Bulgaria, in which he writes that he wants to make an alliance with me.'"

This news gave us the very greatest pleasure, for the Bulgarians had not said a word for five or six months about our negotiations for an alliance with them, and we had not the slightest doubt that if they came into the war on the side of the Entente it might prove a perfect catastrophe for us. But as a month or two had passed since the outbreak of war and no action had been taken by the Bulgarians, we thought they must be tricking the Germans just as they had tricked us.

The Bulgarian Envoy, Toscheff, with whom we had close and constant relations, advocated the view that it would be unwise of Bulgaria to intervene in the war before she could see how it was going to end. He was adamant to any other argument.

As I have said, the Germans had agreed that we should remain neutral until the mobilisation of our army was quite complete, and that we should enter the war as late as possible. But when their troops had to retreat somewhat after the Marne defeat, and pass from the offensive to the defensive, while the Russian Armies were engaged in their successful and destructive advance in East Prussia and also overrunning Galicia, their situation was so utterly

changed that they began to urge us to intervene at once with a view to tying down large Russian forces in the Caucasus and a substantial English force in Egypt.

The representations of their Ambassador, who based them both to the Grand Vizier and ourselves on the terms of the alliance, became more and more imperious. In any case our mobilisation was completed about this time, and all our army corps were ready to take the field on the first order of the Commander-in-Chief. The various units were drilled and exercised continuously, and almost every day we had divisional and corps manœuvres round Constantinople and Skutari.

It was seen at once how right Enver Pasha had been in insisting that the reorganisation of the army should begin with the reconstruction of the *cadres*. The result was observable in the mobility of the larger units, the command of which had been entrusted to young officers well trained in strategy and tactics. When the Germans realised these results they considered that as we possessed so well organised an army we could not remain a mere spectator of the calamities overtaking the Austrians and Germans.

I must here ask indulgence for a slight digression. About this time there was a rumour in Constantinople that Enver Pasha was insisting on an alliance with the Germans and a declaration of war on Russia, while I was determined to prevent any departure from our neutrality in any case. It was said that the dispute had reached such a pitch that before the assembled Ministers Enver had threatened me with a revolver, but that I had anticipated him and injured his foot. The really peculiar thing is that this legend has found a place in Mr. Morgenthau's book. I should like to know whether the honest Ambassador who bases his personal observations on such idle chatter will blush if he takes the trouble to re-read his book after reading what I have written.

I owe it to him to let him know that it would never have occurred to Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and all my colleagues even to use a bitter word to each other—much less resort to weapons—either at the time when we were working as revolutionaries for the overthrow of the despotic rule of Sultan Hamid, or during the period when we were together in the Ministry. We have not come

from low and obscure origins, as Mr. Morgenthau believes and desires others to believe. Some among us finished their studies at the Military Academy; several have been to Turkish and European Universities; and Talaat Bey (who was never a postman as the Ambassador alleges) was at a law college in Salonica after leaving school. It is thus ridiculous to suggest that we behaved like Apaches.

We had no longer the excuse for postponing our participation in the war that the mobilisation of our army was not yet complete. The question of money was now raised. We had derived no direct advantage from the fact that the capitulations had been abolished by a provisional law, as the customs revenue had dropped to almost a quarter of what it was in normal times.

The first instalment of the loan raised in France barely covered the current expenses of the Government up to the end of the year. We therefore asked the Germans to settle the financial problem.

On October 11th I received from von Wangenheim an invitation to an intimate lunch in the Embassy at Therapia. When I arrived I found the Grand Vizier present, with Talaat Bey, Halil Bey, and Enver Pasha. Von Kühlmann, recently appointed Councillor of Embassy, was also there. After lunch we all went to the Ambassador's private room. Wangenheim, with a very doleful face, told us that Germany had accepted all our financial conditions, and looked at us as much as to say: "Now don't start thinking of any more objections!"

The legend that we signed an alliance, and so forth, at the Embassy that day is wholly untrue. As I have said above, the compact had been signed at the very outbreak of war, so that there was nothing to sign that day.

The general situation was examined and discussed at a meeting of the inner Cabinet (Endjumen Wükela) which took place the following day. At the outset there were two alternatives before us:

1. Immediate intervention in the World War.
2. To send Halil Bey, accompanied by Hakki Bey and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, to convince the Germans of the necessity of maintaining neutrality for another six months.

The second alternative was advocated by Djavid Bey, but the other Ministers stood by the first. For the first time the Grand Vizier showed himself undecided.

At that moment Enver Pasha told us that in consequence of the numerous and very justified protests of the Admiral, on military grounds he could no longer oppose the cruise of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* into the Black Sea. Yet the excursion of these two warships, accompanied by other Ottoman vessels, would inevitably involve our participation in the war. In the first place, the Entente Governments did not regard the *Goeben* and *Breslau* as Turkish ships, and had made a formal declaration that if they passed through the Straits, even without showing a flag and with Turkish crews, they would be treated as hostile vessels. Thus it was certain that the Russian Fleet would immediately attack the *Goeben* and *Breslau* if they could be taken at a disadvantage. And even if the Russian Fleet for any reason refrained from attacking these two ships, Admiral Souchon, who was extremely anxious that we should participate in hostilities, could bring us into the war by attacking the Russian Fleet or Russian ports on his own initiative.

After a short discussion we decided to send Halil Bey and Hafiz Hakki Bey to Berlin to give full authority to the Deputy Commander-in-Chief to deal with the fleet question, while avoiding everything which might involve us in the war.

As the result of a report from Admiral Souchon, we were compelled to recognise the fact that a well-planned attack of the Russian Fleet had forced him into an action against it, whereupon Russia—and consequently France—declared war on the Ottoman Government.

When the news reached Constantinople that following on the attack by the Russian Fleet in the Black Sea on the Ottoman Fleet the latter had in turn bombarded Odessa, Sebastopol, Theodosia and certain other parts of the coast, we found the Grand Vizier, Said Halim Pasha, in a very peculiar frame of mind. As he was utterly opposed to our participation in the war, he was strongly averse to sharing the responsibility for a war in which the attack of our squadron on the Russian Fleet and the Russian ports was bound to

involve the Government. The Beiram festival was on at this time, so we met every day at the Grand Vizier's Palace. Said Halim Pasha declared that he would at once resign if this attack meant war. We quickly pointed out that after he had himself signed the alliance with Germany, and associated himself only a few days before with the decisions which recognised all Turkish obligations under it, he could not for a moment resign on a pretext of an event which was nothing more than the natural consequence. Faced with such incontrovertible logic, to which he could find no valid answer, the Grand Vizier accepted the situation and abandoned his idea of resigning.

The day Russia, France, and England announced to the Ottoman Government the opening of hostilities, the Council of Ministers met at the Sublime Porte for an extraordinary session.

Referring to the facts as set forth in Admiral Souchon's report Said Halim Pasha related how, as a result of the attack by the Russian Fleet on our warships in the Black Sea, our fleet had taken up the challenge and used their weapons against the Russian war and merchant vessels in Odessa, Sebastopol, and other ports. Thereupon first Russia, and then France and England, had declared war on the Ottoman Government. With a view to maintaining peaceful relations and avoiding hostilities the Turkish Government had proposed a joint enquiry to ascertain which fleet had attacked first, so that the commander of that fleet could be made personally responsible, but the Russian Government had rejected that proposal. In view of their refusal the Turkish Government found itself compelled to consider itself in a state of war with the Russian, French, and English Governments, and accordingly to bring the decree to the knowledge of His Imperial Majesty. The Grand Vizier added that he wanted the Ministers to speak their minds without fear or favour.

The first to speak was Oskan Effendi, the Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, who said that as an invincible opponent of war he could not sign a decree approving of the participation of the Ottoman Government in the war, and must therefore resign. If, however, the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs was reformed as a department only, he would continue to carry on his duties as a Director-General.

Then Suleiman Effendi El Bustani, the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, said that as a member of the "Society for International Peace" he need hardly say he opposed all wars and was therefore compelled to resign.

Churuk Sulon Mahmoud Pasha, after dropping a few remarks about the suspicion with which he was regarded in the Cabinet, asked that his resignation also should be accepted.

Djavid Bey was not present at the Council on this day, but Talaat Bey informed us that he had decided to resign.

The resigning ministers left the Council Chamber. The others, Said Halim Pasha the Grand Vizier, Hairi Effendi the Sheik ul Islam, Emir Pasha the War Minister, Talaat Bey the Minister of the Interior, Ibrahim Bey the Minister of Justice, Halil Bey the President of the Council of State, Shukri Bey, the Minister for Education, and I drew up the decree setting out the necessity for our intervention in the war and laid it before His Majesty.

As the Chamber and the Senate approved the war by huge majorities and expressed their confidence in the Cabinet, it was obvious that the whole nation agreed with the foreign policy of the Government.

The same day that we drew up the decree, and thereby recognised a state of war with the Entente Powers, I held corps manœuvres near Skutari, between Idjadieh, Tchamlidja, and Erenkoi. The units concerned were the 3rd Division, under the command of the German Colonel Nicolai Bey, and the 5th Corps under Colonel Mahmud Kiamil Bey. Never shall I forget the display of patriotic feeling and warlike enthusiasm given by all the officers of the four divisions when I gave them the news of the outbreak of war. As G.O.C. the Corps I had sent for them to come to the top of Ischamlidja Hill to criticise these manœuvres, which lasted a day and a night and ended at daybreak with the attack on the hill, which was defended by the 3rd Division.

The officers and men of these four divisions were also members of the Ottoman nation. Those who did not witness the rejoicing and high spirit of the troops, and now have the audacity to maintain that the Turkish people did not wish to join in the war, are either inspired by base motives or else by pure cowardice or shortsightedness.

The only change in the composition of the Cabinet was that Prince Abbas Halim Pasha took over the Ministry of Public Works and Achmed Nessorri Bey that of Agriculture. Talaat Bay, who was already a member of the Cabinet, took over the Finance Ministry for the interim, and Shukri Bey the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

IN COMMAND OF THE FOURTH ARMY

CHAPTER IV.

IN COMMAND OF THE FOURTH ARMY.

ABOUT ten days after our entry into the war Enver Pasha invited me to his house. He was suffering from an abscess on the foot and had to keep his bed. After a few remarks about the general situation he said to me :

“ Djemal Pasha, I want to start an offensive against the Suez Canal to keep the English tied up in Egypt, and thus not only compel them to leave there a large number of Indian divisions which they are now sending to the Western Front, but prevent them from concentrating a force to land at the Dardanelles.

“ With that end in view I’ve been making preparations in Syria for a month or two. I’ve ear-marked the 8th Army Corps, under the command of Mersinli Djimal Bey, for this business. As the Germans attach the greatest importance to the execution of this operation, I’ve appointed Lieutenant-Colonel von Kress Bey Chief of Staff, and sent him to Damascus as attaché of the German Military Mission. I told him his principal task was to undertake the preparations for the expedition against the Canal. I have also sent my aide-de-camp, Major Merintas Bey, Senator Abdin Rahman Bey, Sheik Essad Shukair, and various other Arab notables to Syria with orders to form a Beduin Auxiliary Corps. Zikki Pasha, of the 1st Division, and now commanding the 4th Army, has orders to look after the defence of Syria and Palestine only, while Djimal Bey, as Commander of the 8th Corps, is to complete the mobilisation of his Army Corps and prepare the operation against the Canal. Now His Excellency Zikki Pasha is not only unwilling to undertake this expedition, but is actually

demanding larger forces in order to protect Syria against a hostile landing. The news from Syria points to general disturbance in the country and great activity on the part of the revolutionary Arabs. In these circumstances I have wondered whether Your Excellency would not give a further proof of your patriotism by taking over the command of the 4th Army. In doing so you would have to prepare (and carry through) the attack on the Canal, and also maintain peace and internal order in Syria. I don't know if I may venture to make this proposal to you ? ”

I immediately replied :

“ I consider it a sacred duty to go wherever you think my capabilities may be of the most service to the country, so I gladly accept the command of the 4th Army which you have offered me, and will leave for my new sphere in a day or two.”

Enver Pasha was very delighted at my answer. In the subsequent conversation I obtained the full freedom of action which the law confers upon an army commander. I retained my former title of Naval Minister, but Enver Pasha took over my portfolio on the terms that he should consult me and obtain my consent to all reforms and improvements in that department.

I immediately went to the Military School, the headquarters of the 4th Army, and as Deputy Commander-in-Chief appointed the Chief of Staff, the heads of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Sections, and a few other officers. I told them of my appointment to command the 4th Army, and gave Colonel von Frankenburg, the Chief of Staff, orders to make preparations for our departure at the earliest possible moment. When everything was ready, four or five days later, I left Haidar Pasha Station for Syria on November 21st.

One of the gentlemen who came to the station to see me off made a very impressive speech, in which he said that the nation expected from me great exploits and speedy news of victory. Of course there had to be a reply to this speech. I said that I was fully conscious of the greatness as of the immense difficulties of the task before me. If our enterprise failed, and my corpse and those of the brave men going with me were left at the Canal, the friends of our country who would then have to take up our work must sweep over us and rescue Egypt, the rightful property of Islam, from the hands of the English usurpers.

Since then I have heard that quite a number of my enemies have made use of my words on this occasion to perpetrate the following sophism: "How could Djemal Pasha have the audacity to come back from Egypt? Wasn't it his business to drive out the English or die? Why did he not die?"

What I have to say in my book will enable them easily to realise that, so far as this expedition is concerned, it is no fault of mine that I am still alive. But no one can kill a man whose death God has not yet decreed. Who knows whether I have not been called on to remain alive to suffer still more sorrow and slander in the conflicts into which I am still prepared to enter for the good of my country!

But what do all these critics really want? Ought I to have turned to the crowd and said: "My friends! I am going to Syria with a commission to drive the English out of Egypt, but the resources at our disposal are inadequate to make the execution of this project possible. I will therefore return to Constantinople, grieved and humbled, without having effected anything at all. Please shed tears now in anticipation of that sad day. Why, it's simply a decree of fate!"

No, indeed! If perhaps I did not succeed in really driving the English out of Egypt, had it not been for the secret betrayal of Sherif Hussein (who thereby committed an unforgivable sin against the Mussulman world) I should, at any rate, as I shall show hereafter, have prevented the usurpers from attempting anything against Palestine and Syria, and in so doing have held the hundreds of men composing the English Army inactive in Egypt.

It was the treachery of Sherif Hussein which made that desirable object unattainable for us. It divided the two (Mussulman) brother nations, Arabs and Turks; he made the former the slaves of the English and French and forced the latter to fight a hopeless fight against the most pitiless foe.

Later on I will give full documentary proof of this statement.

Thirty-six hours after my departure from Constantinople I reached Konia, where the Governor-General, Azmi Bey, and the population gave me a warm reception. I seized the opportunity of visiting the sacred tomb of Merlana Djelal-ed-dine Rumi and made the acquaintance of His Excellency Weled Tchelebi Effendi. As we were separating I asked him if he would not join the Egyptian

Expedition with a volunteer corps. Sure enough, some time after I left Weled Tchelebi came to Syria with an armed force he had gathered together under the name of a "Battalion of Mevlevi Volunteers." I cannot say enough in praise of his patriotism. Although he himself was in very poor health, and had just suffered the sad loss of his wife, with whom he had lived many years, he never even thought of disappointing me, and the young men who formed his battalion rendered the army a magnificent service.

Achmed Rassin Bey, whom I regard as one of the finest of Turkish journalists, left Constantinople with me, and during the Canal Expedition came to Beersheba with the second echelon of Headquarters. Then he resided at Headquarters in Jerusalem and wrote very important articles about my policy in Syria under the heading "The Army's Policy." I cannot omit to mention the name of this gentleman, whose company was always fruitful and valuable to me.

Two other gentlemen came to Headquarters as volunteers. One was Fuad Selim Bey Effendi, who displayed a model patriotism and zeal in taking on the post of Consul-General at Salonica after the Balkan War, and the other was Dr. Fuad Bey, another Egyptian, who was an official in the Ministry of the Interior.

Fuad Selim Bey did his duty in the Egyptian section with great devotion and soldierly loyalty, and the army derived the utmost advantage from his presence. It was a matter of the deepest regret to me when important family affairs called him away and he had to leave Headquarters.

I shall always think with feelings of gratitude of Fuad Selim Bey, who was subsequently appointed to represent the Ottoman Empire in Switzerland (and with great success), and of Dr. Fuad, who rendered the army the greatest service.

After leaving Konia we came to Bozanti, and from there without stopping continued our journey by car to Tarsus, from which we travelled to Adana by rail. I was received with the greatest enthusiasm by the people of this provincial capital, of which I had been Governor-General four or five years before. We spent the night there. The rainstorms, which had not stopped for a week, had converted the Plain of Adana into a sea of mud.

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At that time the Adana-Aleppo railway was only working to the station of Taprak Kaleh. Although the Taprak Kaleh-Alexandretta sector had been finished, the line had been washed away at various points in the neighbourhood of Dort Yol owing to the rains, and communication with Alexandretta was interrupted.

I therefore decided to go by train to Taprak Kaleh or even Mustafa Bey, and if possible to continue my journey from there by car or horse to Alexandretta and Aleppo. Accordingly I left Adana very early next morning. As I had ascertained that the Bozanti-Tarsus sector, the only route which offered secure communication with the army in Anatolia, was in very bad communication in various places, I asked Ismail Hakki Bey, the Governor-General of the province, to have the repair work put in hand as soon as possible.

An hour or so after leaving Adana we reached Mustafa Bey, where the horses and cars were detained. We had barely got a yard or two in our cars before they sank in the mud. As we realised that we should get no further that way, we mounted our horses and I started off, after instructing my aide-de-camp, Captain Selaheddin Effendi, to have the cars towed to Alexandria, whence he was to follow us.

Three or four hours later we came to Dort Yol. This is a large and important village on the shores of the Gulf of Alexandretta, and lies almost equi-distant from five or six other villages, which are inhabited almost exclusively by Armenians, and celebrated for their orange trees.

During the time I was Governor-General of Adana I had had a plan drawn out by German engineers for another colony, to be built on the extensive plot of ground between Dort Yol and the five other villages. But as I had to leave the vilayet this scheme, like so many others, had not been carried out.

In the years 1910 and 1911 I had often visited Dort Yol, and the villagers, whom I had often helped, now came down in crowds to meet me.

As I had heard that I could get from Dort Yol station to Alexandretta by an ordinary trolley in two hours, while it would take me six hours to ride there, I preferred to use this method of locomotion and started off with my Chief of Staff.

Never shall I forget this journey by trolley on the slippery

track. More than once we went in danger of our lives as in pouring rain we passed along the coast, which was watched by enemy ships. After a violent storm, the moon emerged from the clouds and then disappeared again, after lighting up the sea in a wonderful way, so that in the distance we could see the enemy's ships—a sight which intensified the bitterness in my heart.

I did not conceal from myself that our foes were strong and stubborn. But as there was no other way of preserving our existence, we were compelled to resort to arms for weal or woe. I had sworn to leave no stone unturned to break the power of our adversaries.

I remembered my oath, and seeing the difficulties which stood in my path, I realised the terrible weight of the burden which rested upon my shoulders. We reached Alexandretta after a journey during which the trolley passed over rails which, in some places, hung suspended over a void for fifteen to twenty metres, and in others were under water. It was four or five hours before the other General Staff officers turned up. We spent this night at Alexandretta.

According to the information we received, the road between Alexandretta and Aleppo was not passable for cars. The road which had thus been allowed to become unusable for motor traffic was the only road connecting Aleppo and the district around, or, to speak more accurately, the whole of Northern Syria, including the regions of Urfa, Diarbekir and Mosul, with so important a Mediterranean depôt as Alexandretta. When I returned from Bagdad some years before and passed this road in a car, I had ascertained that repair work had been taken in hand at many different points. It had been undertaken by the General Road Construction Company, and since August, 1912—two years back—it would have been perfectly possible to finish it. Thanks to the difficulties innumerable which the Roads Department had met with—a department totally incapable of doing anything on its own initiative—the restoration of the road had been neglected. Until we make up our minds to free our administration from the shackles of bureaucracy, neither a Constitutional Government nor the help of God will enable us to carry anything through to a successful conclusion. The most extraordinary thing of all was that, on the excuse of the repair work, those parts of the road which had previously been in good condition had been allowed to get into

a wretched state. All the stones had been taken from the crown of the highway, and they were piled up in two long heaps on each side. The holes between these heaps had filled with rainwater, and the result was a perfect canal. Such was the condition of the Alexandretta-Aleppo road in November, 1914.

We were compelled to stop one night in Bilan whether we liked it or not. On the following morning we continued our journey on horseback, after arranging that three strong cars should be sent from Aleppo to the nearest village. From here we reached Katma Station by car. This station is the second from Aleppo on the Bagdad line. As it is also the point of junction of the Aleppo-Alexandretta road and the Bagdad railway a lines-of-communication depôt had been established there.

The zeal and industry of those concerned may be well imagined from the fact that, when we were about fifty mètres from the station, it was impossible to get the cars any further, and we had to be carried in by soldiers in the inky darkness.

At that moment I remembered the Kirk Kilisse-Adrianople road and the Kirk Kilisse-Bunarhissar-Wiza-Serai road during the Balkan War. Here again the roads had a pile of stones on each side, and as the rain had filled up the centre they looked exactly like ditches.

What a dismal prospect it was for the march of the army I had been appointed to command! Once more I had before my eyes the unforgettable picture of wretched misery presented by our batteries, ammunition wagons and limbers failing to make any further progress along the roads and being compelled to strike across the fields until they stuck in the mud. "And here is the only road which keeps my army in touch with the home country!" I thought.

Aleppo was the point of concentration of the 13th Army Corps, which had completed its mobilisation in Mosul and neighbourhood. Colonel Fahri Bey, of the General Staff, was in command. The bulk of this corps consisted of Kurds, and the balance of trained Arabs. One division was at Aleppo, the other at Hama. I stayed two or three days at Aleppo and inspected the troops. In spite of Fahri Bey's extraordinarily hard work, the divisions and the formations independent of the corps were not in a very satisfactory condition. The material required for a mobilised army

corps had not been completed, and indeed, we could not hope to complete it, for there was no chance of getting the necessary equipment in and around Mosul, which was the mobilisation zone of this corps.

I asked the Vali of Aleppo to take in hand the repair of the Aleppo-Alexandretta road, and also to construct a new road from Islahic to Katma Station via Radjo. Then I went to Hama to inspect the division in garrison there. It was in exactly the same condition as the division at Aleppo.

It was my intention, before going to Damascus, to visit Northern Syria, to see for myself the condition of that region.

First I went through Horns to Tripolis, returning the same day to Horns, where I spent the night. Next morning I continued my journey and went to Damascus through Rayak. In all the towns through which I passed, the people displayed the greatest patriotism and devotion to the Turkish cause. It gave me enormous pleasure to see and feel that the majority of the Arabs would not hesitate to make any sacrifice in this great war for the liberation of the Mussulman Khalifate. It was my duty to make the best use of that frame of mind and to preserve this region, a region inflammable as powder, from the enticements of traitors who had sold themselves to the enemy.

With a view to making it easier to follow the successive events of the three years (December, 1914, to December, 1917) which I spent in Syria, events concerning the army, the administration, domestic policy in Syria and Arabia, the suppression of revolts, the question of food supplies, and those other questions of material progress, and so forth, with which I had to deal, I have thought it wiser to devote a special chapter to each of these topics, instead of discussing these matters in the form of a chronological diary.

**OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE
EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SUEZ CANAL**

CHAPTER V.

OUR PREPARATIONS FOR THE EXPEDITION AGAINST THE SUEZ CANAL.

As it is not my intention to write a history of the war, I shall avoid entering into unnecessary details of the movements and operations of the army and confine myself to describing the essential facts in broad outline. Some day I shall ask Colonel Fuad Bey, my invaluable Chief of Staff, to compile a special history of the campaigns based on the "War Diary of the 4th Army," handed over to the Great General Staff, and which was drawn up and edited with the greatest care at Headquarters.

On the day of my arrival at Damascus, Mersinli Djemal Pasha, the G.O.C. 8th Corps, came to meet me at Rayak and handed me a bundle of documents. These contained the detailed plan for the operations of his corps, which had been selected for the attack on the Suez Canal, and a copy of all the orders, statistics and plans concerning the work which was to be done, as well as that which had been done already. His Chief of Staff, von Kress, gave Colonel von Frankenberg, my Chief of Staff, a German copy of the same document. My first act on reaching Damascus, where I had made my headquarters in the "Damascus Palace Hotel," was to study these documents in the most thorough fashion.

In a few words, the plan of operations proposed by the 8th Army Corps was as follows: "For the operation against the Canal the 25th Division shall be used, in addition to a regiment composed of officers and men selected from the two other divisions forming the Army Corps.

"The rest of the 8th Corps is to be distributed on the lines of communication for protective duties and to watch the Lebanon and the coast region.

“The 8th and 10th Divisions, which are to be expressly sent from Constantinople for the Egyptian campaign, will be employed as the Army Commander thinks fit, partly for the Suez Canal expedition and partly for guard duties in the interior.

“In any case, no large force is to be engaged in this operation.”

In view of the physical conformation of the Sinai Desert, where the operation was to be carried out, the basis of this plan was entirely sound.

When I arrived in Syria the general situation was as follows:

The detachment of Beduin volunteers under the command of Major Muntaz Bey had seized El-Arish and fortified itself there.

A detachment of volunteers under the command of Ismirli Escref Bey and belonging to the “teaskilat Mahsusa” (Special Organisation) had occupied the Kalaat-ul-Nahl in the centre of the Sinai Desert.

An infantry detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Mussa Kiasim Bey was in Akaba, while a regiment of the 27th Division quartered at Beersheba served as support to all the forces in the desert.

The whole of the 25th Division, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Fuad Bey, of the General Staff, was at Damascus and training most diligently.

In view of the conformation of the Sinai Desert, the 8th Corps had very properly realised that it was necessary to institute a lines-of-communication organisation, proceeding from the rear to the front, before marching orders were given to the army, or rather the Expeditionary Force. Behdjet Bey, Lieutenant-Colonel in the General Staff and Commander of the 23rd Division, was placed in charge of the organisation, which took the name of the “Desert L. of C. Inspectorate.”

I shall always think with affectionate respect of Behdjet Bey, who displayed invaluable industry in the great desert both during the first Suez Canal campaign and in the preparations for the second.

It was the business of his inspector to decide on the L. of C. depots (to be not more than twenty-five to thirty kilometres apart) on a line connecting Beersheba with Ismaila, on the Canal. He had to provide these points with water, to send forward in accordance with orders the supplies which were previously to be stored

at Beersheba, to fix up a hospital at every depot—in short, to undertake everything in the way of preparation which the establishment of a L. of C. organisation on that line required. Kalaat-ul-Nahl and El-Arish were to serve as the two headquarters of the L. of C. Inspectorate. From these two points food and all other things required were to be supplied to the forces, which were to concentrate there and proceed against the Canal.

The 8th Corps proposed to concentrate the bulk of the Expeditionary Force at Beersheba and advance on Ismaila by the line Wadi el Arish-Ibin-Djefdjafe, *i.e.*, as far from the coast as possible. The flanks were to be covered by smaller bodies from El-Arish and Kalaat-ul-Nahl.

This scheme was very sound. Our main line of communication must be so far from the sea that the English could not harass it with their naval guns or destroy it altogether by small-scale landings, of no importance in themselves, to which they might find themselves occasionally compelled.

Accordingly von Kress personally selected as L. of C. depots Beersheba, El Halassa, El-Hafir, Wadi-el-Arish, Ibin, Birindji-el-Hubra, Djefdjafe, and Ikindji-el-Hubra. At each of these places he had artesian wells sunk, dykes constructed, in view of the rain-storms to be expected in December and January, and all other arrangements made for the necessities of a line of communication.

The 8th Corps reported that as the supply of food for officers and men right through the desert to the Canal was impossible, we must adopt a new system and call it the “desert ration.” It was based on a list of comestibles, the weight of which was not to exceed one kilogram per man, and comprised biscuits, dates, and olives. As regards water, no man must carry more than contents of a gourd.

As a result of careful calculation on the basis of these allowances, we came to the conclusion that if we wanted to send the 10th Division and 25th Division and a few volunteer detachments we should require 11,000 camels to carry the food and water, in addition to the light and heavy transport of the troops. But even with the help of this organisation, on crossing the Canal it would be necessary for the Expeditionary Force within four days either to drive the English troops from the far bank and securely dig itself in, or else to retreat, as the fresh water collected at Ikindji-el-

Hubra—fifty kilometres from the Canal—would last scarcely ten days, and after it had been used up the force would be doomed to distress worse than that of the children of Israel.

Nor was there any chance of concentrating the Expeditionary Force at Beersheba and sending it to the Canal in one solid body, for it was quite out of the question to convey water and food for so many men by means of the camels forming the transport columns.

Thus the battalions and batteries would have to march through the desert at one-day intervals, and the corps had to concentrate ultimately at a point twenty to thirty kilometres from the Canal, and from there direct their attack on the point selected.

The 8th Corps proposed that the Expeditionary Force should be composed of the following formations, distributed in two echelons :

FIRST ECHELON.—The 25th Infantry Division, a regiment consisting of men from the 23rd and 27th Divisions, five field gun batteries, two mountain gun batteries, a 15 cm. field howitzer battery, one cavalry regiment, four squadrons of the Camel Corps, a contingent of 1,500 mounted Arab volunteers, enough pontoons to allow three battalions to cross simultaneously, six engineer companies, a telegraph section, field hospitals, medical units, &c., a total of 12,642 men, 968 horses, 12,000 camels, 328 oxen.

SECOND ECHELON.—The 10th Infantry Division with its artillery, cavalry squadron, and other auxiliary units.

When I arrived in Damascus I received from the Deputy Commander-in-Chief a telegram, in which he placed the Hedjaz Division at the disposal of the Commander of the Fourth Army, to be assigned to the Canal Expedition or employed locally, as I thought fit. I therefore wrote to Colonel Wehib Bey, Military Governor and Vali of the Hedjaz, asking him to come to Maan with detachments of regulars and volunteers. These troops, under Wehib Bey, were then to be attached to the second echelon.

As the 11,000 camels mentioned above were assigned exclusively to the 25th and 10th Divisions and the various formations attached to that force, the camels for the Hedjaz Division coming to join the Expeditionary Force had to be brought from the Hedjaz by that division itself.

Although in their official reports the English have estimated the strength of the force engaged in the first Canal expedition at 40,000 men, the fact is that this force, including the contingent from the Hedjaz and the 10th Division, never exceeded a strength of 25,000.

The first echelon was to be under the command of Djemal Pasha, the Commander of the 8th Corps, while the second echelon was attached to Army Headquarters.

Such was the situation of the armies in the desert, Palestine, and the interior of Syria at the time of my arrival in Damascus, and so far had the preparations of the Commander of the 8th Corps for the expedition against the Canal progressed. In view of the difficulties which the L. of C. Inspectorate organised in Damascus had met with in looking after so long a line of communications, the 8th Corps had also proposed, *inter alia*, that an independent L. of C. Inspectorate should be established in Jerusalem, primarily to collect supplies in Palestine and forward them to the army.

With certain quite slight modifications, I adopted all these suggestions.

The Commander of the 8th Corps now came to me in great distress to tell me that he had not yet succeeded in procuring the camels required for the campaign, and did not see any chance of doing so. He drew the special attention of the Army Commander to this point.

True enough, this Corps had found itself beset with difficulties innumerable on all sides, and in three months it had been able to secure only two thousand of the eleven thousand camels required. It must certainly come as a shock to very many people that in regions such as Syria and the Hedjaz ten to fifteen thousand camels could not be obtained, seeing that hundreds of thousands, or rather millions, of these animals are to be found there. But not all camels can carry burdens.

I do not wish to say anything more than is absolutely necessary on a matter which will be discussed in detail when the history of the 4th Army comes to be written. I will merely remark that I alone knew the greatness of the difficulties I had to overcome to procure within a month fourteen thousand camels, including reserves. Yet I ultimately succeeded, and the number of camels provided for in the 8th Corps' plan of campaign was reached by the appointed date.

The troubles I had to face will be realised when I say that at this time Ibn Sunud brought me camels from the far depths of the Nedjed.

The great problem, on which everything hangs in these difficult military operations in the Desert of Sinai, is the question of water.

In any other than the rainy season it would be impossible to attempt to cross this waste with an expeditionary force of approximately 25,000 men. Even a force of only 10,000 men could not be brought through. As the rainy season in this desert comprises the months of December and January only, it was necessary to conclude the operation in these two months or postpone it to the same season in the next year.

General Headquarters was very insistent that the expedition should be carried through this year, and I therefore decided, after hearing the verbal reports of the Commander of the 8th Corps and the Chief of Staff, to press on the preparations and put the scheme into execution. At the end of December I began to concentrate the first echelon of the Expeditionary Force in the neighbourhood of Beersheba.

Meanwhile, the 10th Division had completed its concentration in the town of Zahle in the Lebanon. I inspected it there, and after issuing to its Commander, who was under the direct orders of Army Headquarters, his instructions for its march to Jerusalem and Beersheba, I transferred my headquarters to Jerusalem.

At this time I had begun to correspond with the Sherif of Mecca, Emir Hussein Pasha, and I asked him to send the Commander of the Hedjaz Division an auxiliary force under the command of one of his sons, or to take command in person and join the Army.

The Sherif replied very courteously to my first communication and informed me that he would send his son Ali Bey to accompany the Vali of the Hedjaz, Wehib Bey. Ali Bey did, in fact, leave Mecca with Wehib Bey's troops, but when he reached Medina he declared that in accordance with his father's orders he could accompany Wehib Bey no further. He remained in Medina and began to interfere with the functions of the Commandant, Basri Pasha.

In conformity with the plan of campaign, the first echelon of the

Expeditionary Force began its march to the Canal on January 14th. Army Headquarters left Beersheba on January 15th and pressed on behind the main body.

About the close of the twentieth day after the advance guard had left Beersheba the centre column of the first echelon had reached in full strength a point about eleven kilometers from the Canal. The right wing column, which had marched from El-Arish in the direction of Katia, arrived before Kantara, and the left wing, which had come from Akaba through Kalat-ul-Nahl, was before Suez.

The leading units of the 10th Division, which formed the second echelon, reached the L. of C. depôt at Ikindji-el-Hulbra, and the Hedjaz force, under the command of Wehib Bey, had arrived at Kalat-ul-Nahl after marching from Mecca to Medina and travelling thence by rail to Maan.

The efforts and heroism of the Ottoman troops, both officers and men, who took part in the first Canal Expedition were wonderful and above all praise. I can have no greater duty than to offer a respectful tribute to these heroes who accomplished their march, though subject to privations innumerable, and dragged their guns and, above all, their pontoons (all that was available for crossing the canal) through a sea of sand. In this force, composed of men of Arab and Turkish stock, a fine feeling of brotherly affection prevailed, and not a man hesitated to sacrifice himself for his comrades. This first campaign against the Canal was a brilliant revelation of the fact that the majority of the Arabs stood by the Khalifate with heart and soul.

The Arabs who composed the entire 25th Division and the whole of the L. of C. organisation did their duty with the greatest zeal and devotion. For that reason nothing can assuage my feelings of bitterness and resentment against Sherif Hussein, who subsequently sowed the seeds of discord in that unity of thought and sentiment. During this campaign, while we marched at night and only by moonlight, my heart was filled with a deep melancholy, mingled with a great hope of success, at the sound of the song, "The Red Flag Flies over Cairo," to the accompaniment of which the advancing battalions forged ahead over the endless waste of desert, feebly illuminated by the pale gleam of the waxing moon.

It may well be believed that this army, in which no one from the

Commander-in-Chief down to the humblest private was allowed more than 650 grammes of biscuit and a few dates and olives, and every man had to keep his consumption of water down to bare necessity, was borne along by glowing hopes as it approached its goal. Everyone was absolutely convinced that the Canal would certainly be crossed, that we should dig ourselves in securely on the further bank, and that the Egyptian patriots would then rise and attack the English in the rear.

Although I, personally, was not so sure of the ultimate success of this campaign, for I knew to what a pitch of perfection the English had brought their Canal defences, I used to talk to the troops every night about the victory in store, and what a glorious victory it would be. I wanted to keep the sacred flame alive in the whole force.

After the force had completed its concentration—both as regards the main body and the two detachments forming the right and left wings—in the region above-mentioned, I decided in the night of January 20th/21st (February 2nd/3rd) upon a surprise attack on Ismaila with the centre column. The right column would simultaneously make a demonstration against Kantara, while the left column was to march on Suez.

It was hardly dark before the troops to be employed in the attack began to approach the point from which they were to cross the Canal, and shortly after sunrise the crossing itself commenced. I had staked everything upon surprising the English and being able to hold the stretch of the Canal south of Ismaila with five or six thousand men at the first rush, so that I could bring up the 10th Division and have a force of twelve thousand rifles securely dug in on the far bank. Then Ismaila was to be taken, if possible, and held for four or five days from defensive positions facing west, north, and south.

Meanwhile, the march of the 8th Division was to be accelerated, and within ten days the number of men in Ismaila was to be increased to 20,000.

During this time I hoped that the Egyptian patriots, encouraged by the capture of Ismaila by the Turkish army, would rise *en masse*, and Egypt would be freed in an unexpectedly short time by the employment of quite a small force and insignificant technical resources.

According to the information in the possession of Army Headquarters the enemy had a force of about 35,000 men along the Canal, and another 150,000 and more distributed in Egypt. But as the English could not have these troops available at all the points of the Canal—a line more than two hundred kilometres in length—it was possible to gain a success, always providing that we could cross the Canal by surprise at some point where the enemy was not expecting it.

In any case, I contemplated this attack solely as a demonstration, partly in order to make the English realise that we had no idea of sitting down quietly on the Canal, and partly in accordance with our design of tying down considerable forces in Egypt. Otherwise I should never have seriously pretended to myself that with resources which did not permit of our remaining more than four days on the Canal, *i.e.*, fourteen thousand rifles, a few mountain gun batteries, a single howitzer battery, and nothing but ten pontoons with which to cross the obstacle—we could have crossed a canal at least a hundred metres wide defended by an army so mobile and brave as the English and provided with every conceivable means of defence from the largest warships to armoured trains. Yet notwithstanding my misgivings I managed to inspire my staff and my troops with such confidence that no one knew that this first attack on the Canal was nothing but a demonstration, and not a man hesitated for a moment to make any sacrifice in the cause.

If, by some unanticipated stroke of good fortune, this enterprise, which to me was nothing but a demonstration in force, had brought us success, we should naturally have regarded it as a good omen for the final liberation of Islam and the Ottoman Empire.

Unfortunately there was some slight delay in the approach of the attacking force to the Canal. Morning broke as the pontoons were being put into the water and the crossing began, so that the operation took place under the eyes of the English. The defensive measures they immediately adopted at the crossing points destroyed all our pontoons except three. As it was impossible to send reinforcements to the six hundred heroes we had succeeded in getting on to the opposite bank at the very outset, they were all captured by the English. There now began a lively duel between the English armoured vessels, auxiliary cruisers and armoured

trains, and the light artillery of the Expeditionary Force. By mid-day we had destroyed an English auxiliary cruiser by the fire of our howitzer battery. Meanwhile both regiments of the 10th Division had arrived on the battlefield, and I put them under the orders of the G.O.C. 8th Corps.

At last I was quite clear about the situation. The Expeditionary Force had carried out its purpose of effecting a demonstration, and I was convinced that there was no chance of crossing the Canal and seizing Ismaila. My headquarters was on a hill three and a half kilometres east of the Canal, and the battle took place under my eyes. The enemy, whose aircraft had enabled him to discover the whereabouts of Headquarters, greeted it with a number of 9.2-inch shells from his warships.

About three o'clock I sent for Djemal Pasha, the Commander of the 8th Corps, and his Chief of Staff, von Kress, who were seven or eight hundred metres from the firing line—*i.e.*, the eastern bank of the Canal. My Chief of Staff and the Director of the Operations Section at Headquarters, Major Ali Fuad Bey, were with me. A short time before I had received a report from the G.O.C. 8th Corps informing me that if he could get the upper hand with his artillery fire by the evening he would make an attempt to force a crossing at dawn next morning.

Referring to this report, I asked von Kress, in his capacity as Chief of Staff to the Army Corps, to give me his opinion on the situation.

After explaining the general position to me, he repeated the proposal put forward in the report received from the Corps Commander. Djemal Pasha agreed with him. I said to them:

“The attempt to cross the Canal a second time is dependent upon the resources at our disposal, and according to the reports you have sent in we have not more than three pontoons left. The proposal to swim across the Canal is perfectly hopeless. How, then, do you propose to carry out your scheme?”

Both Djemal Pasha and von Kress admitted the justice of my conclusion, but had not the courage to issue an order to the force to retire. It was easy to see that von Kress, who had been working ceaselessly on the preparations for the expedition for two and a half months without taking a day's rest and regarded

this campaign as his life's purpose, was in utter despair at the apparent failure, and considered death the only remedy.

"Your Excellency!" he replied, "in my view it is now the duty of the Expeditionary Force to die to a man on the Canal!"

I answered him very quietly:

"I didn't call you here to hold a council of war and share the responsibility for my decisions with you. I shall never allow anyone but myself to shoulder the responsibility for the orders I give in my capacity as Commander-in-Chief!

"My object in summoning you was to get information as to the general condition of the troops in the front line and the state of the technical resources at our disposal. I gather from what you say that there is nothing more to be done. If we stay another day by the Canal the Expeditionary Force will be entirely destroyed. This force represents all that is available to the Ottoman Empire in an emergency for the defence of Syria and Palestine. I have no higher duty than to preserve this force from danger, and put it to the best uses until the end of the war. So I think it is preferable to hold our positions until evening, keeping up the artillery duel with the enemy, and then utilise the darkness to withdraw the troops to the lines they left yesterday evening. From there we can march slowly back to Beersheba. I want von Frankenberg Bey to draw up the daily Army Orders on that footing!"

Djemal Pasha, von Kress, and von Frankenberg were entirely convinced that my decision was the only logical one and such as the general situation required. Just at this moment, as if the enemy had suspected that we were engaged in an important discussion, he began to rain shells right and left of our little group, compelling us to change our position. But ultimately I signed the Army Order Ali Fuad Bey had drawn up. Djemal Pasha and von Kress returned to the front line, and we remained at Headquarters until the evening.

It was necessary to take appropriate steps to prevent this failure from having a bad effect on the troops. I therefore issued an Order of the Day, in which I announced that all the troops had done their duty worthily and patriotically. The object of our enterprise had been to carry out an offensive reconnaissance against the Canal with a view to finding out the

resources at the enemy's disposal, and also the resources we ourselves should require to effect a crossing of the Canal. As our purpose had been completely attained, it was now advisable to retire in order to procure better material resources rather than expose ourselves to unnecessary losses. Honour required that the same spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion which had marked the advance should be displayed in the retreat, so that we should not suffer any loss whatever in *matériel*.

Army Headquarters, which had left Beersheba on January 15th, 1915, was back there again exactly a month later, February 15th.

As the telegraph could not be carried beyond the L. of C. dépôt at Ibin (halfway between the Canal and Beersheba) General Headquarters had had no news at all from me for a week, and was in a state of great agitation. I learned subsequently that the Director of Army Telegraphs (engaged in erecting the lines in the desert), to whom some idiot had reported the mendacious news of the capture of Ismaila, had hurried on his job and sent the report on to Constantinople. The result was that when the truth came through it produced the worst possible effect. Happily the statements published broadcast by Headquarters to the effect that the main purpose had been merely an offensive reconnaissance succeeded more or less in effacing that impression.

To tell the truth, when we contemplated this first expedition, not a man knew how the Canal was to be crossed. It was *really* necessary to carry out some such reconnaissance. What material resources would be required to effect the crossing of the Canal, which was safe in every respect against attack? Was it possible to attempt the crossing under observation from the enemy's warships? Was it not possible to destroy the Canal? And even if the crossing itself failed, and it should prove impossible to secure a hold on the Canal, could we not perhaps entrench ourselves firmly on the eastern bank, and from there harass the passage of warships and merchant vessels with long range guns? Might not that be our best plan? These were real problems, the answer to which necessitated a reconnaissance in force.

Thanks to our reconnaissance, we obtained full knowledge of the situation, and it was in expectation of the sequel to our attempt that the English postponed their attack on the Dardanelles, and

found themselves compelled to retain not less than two hundred and fifty thousand men permanently in Egypt.

It is obvious from these remarks that the efforts which the first expedition against the Canal had cost had not been in vain, because we had attained the object we had in view.

During our retreat from the Canal I had given Major Ali Fuad Bey as a basis for his report the number of men and the nature of the artillery and other *matériel* we should require to carry through a successful expedition against the Canal. I told him to draw up a detailed report on that foundation.

During the four or five days I spent at Ibin in witnessing the march past of the troops Ali Fuad Bey finished his report and gave it to me after revising it with the Chief of Staff and obtaining his concurrence. I much regret that I do not now possess this report, which I approved after making a few small changes. I should like to make it known. Could I do so the English General Staff would see what useful knowledge this offensive reconnaissance brought us and it would be overcome by a feeling of shame to think that our heroes in English captivity should have been dragged through the streets of Cairo, and that the English newspapers spoke of our army in anything but good taste.

But when I get back to Constantinople, if God wills, I will make it my business to fill up these gaps in my work.

I give our casualty list in the first Canal Expedition :

	Dead.	Wounded.	Missing.
Officers	14	15	15
Men	178	366	712

In their official reports the English gave our losses as follows :

1,000 Dead. 2,000 Wounded. 650 Prisoners.

Comparing our real losses with the inaccurate figures given by the English, it is easy to realise the exaggeration in their reports.

THE DESERT FORCE

CHAPTER VI.

THE DESERT FORCE.

ON my return from the Canal I had carefully decided upon everything that was to be done in the desert, and had also considered how my plans were to be carried out. The work which a decisive campaign involved was simply and solely the organisation of the lines of communication. However well planned the lines of communication organisation might be, if its depôts were not linked together by a safe road there would be no possibility of keeping it in being for long or leading a considerable army to the Canal. One of the first questions which I took up was the construction of a road connecting Beersheba and all the L. of C. bases in the direction of Ismaila, and thus permitting the transport of all kinds of wagons and cars. I also considered the construction of a railway to run parallel with this road.

It was also necessary to sink wells at each L. of C. base, and erect all kinds of buildings, such as hospitals, depôts, and so forth. To be able to start on the construction of these buildings it was essential to have forty to fifty thousand labour men at work in the desert. But if we left these working posts unguarded they would unquestionably be harassed the whole time by the bold and highly mobile cavalry and camelry of the English. Thus it was necessary effectively to fortify the desert.

I therefore decided to create a "Desert Force Headquarters" which was to be directly responsible to Army Headquarters, and have under its orders all troops which were garrisoning the various desert bases. I proposed von Kress Bey for this post.

Von Kress, who regarded the Canal Expedition as the object of

his life, and the tussle with the difficulties of the desert as compensation, accepted my proposal without hesitation. In this way two quite independent organisations came into being in the desert. One, the "Desert L. of C. Inspectorate," had to arrange for the establishment of bases and connecting roads; the other, the "G.H.Q. Desert Force," had to protect these works from attack by the enemy, and keep *au courant* of his activities by making reconnaissances to the Canal from time to time.

The headquarters of the Desert Force were, for the time being, to be at Ibin, and its main detachments at Ibin, El-Arish and Kalaat-ul-Nahl. Beersheba was decided upon as headquarters for the Desert L. of C. Inspectorate. After issuing the necessary instructions for the establishment of these institutions, I returned to Beersheba and from there to Jerusalem.

Two or three days later, when the 15th and 10th Divisions had assembled at Beersheba, I invited a number of distinguished people from Jerusalem, including the Consuls of neutral and allied Powers, to come and see that my troops had been able to cross the desert and reach the Canal without the slightest accident, fight a battle there, and return in fine fettle to Beersheba, where I held a review.

The Italian Consul was among the guests, as at that time Italy was not yet in the ranks of the combatants.

I can say with pride that the troops returning from this first two months' expedition against the Canal had not left a single straggler behind in the desert. Not a man was missing save those who had fallen in battle at the Canal, or into the hands of the English on the far bank. Not a man showed any signs of having suffered from hunger or thirst. The supply columns did their duty so conscientiously that not a column had reached its destination at other than scheduled time. But the most important point of all was that among the Arabs from Syria and Palestine, of which the supply columns were exclusively composed, not a single case of desertion or treachery had been observed.

After I had organised the Desert Force and L. of C., I distributed the command within the extensive army zone as follows:

I called Palestine, comprising the *Sanjak* of Jerusalem and the *Sanjak* of Akka, the "Jerusalem zone," and entrusted the command to Djemal Pasha, G.O.C. 8th Corps.

The *Kazas* (regions) of Beersheba and Gaza were not part of that zone, and were to be in the sphere of command of the Desert L. of C.

To Fahri Pasha, G.O.C. 13th Corps, I gave the command of the zone composed of the central and northern part of the vilayet of Beirut and the vilayets of Syria, Aleppo and Adana. He received the title of "G.O.C. (interim) 4th Army." Then I transferred my headquarters to Jerusalem and decided to occupy myself solely with the preparations for the second campaign against the Canal.

The 8th and 10th Divisions were incorporated direct in the army. Such was the general situation of the 4th Army at the end of February, 1915.

I gave Von Frankenberg, Chief of Staff of the Army, a careful plan I had drawn up, dealing with the troops—striking force and reserves, the *matériel*, the quantity and natures of the ammunition required for the second Canal Expedition, and sent him to Constantinople. The Turkish General Staff accepted my plan in its entirety, but when I demanded for this important campaign a number of artillery formations and German specialist troops, they sent it on by Frankenberg to the German General Staff with a view to obtaining the sanction of the latter. The then German General Staff did not attach to this matter the importance that it deserved and procrastinated unnecessarily.

After I transferred my headquarters to Jerusalem, I made it my special business to compel the Arab leaders, such as Sherif Hussein Pasha, the Emir of Mecca, Ibn-el-Reschid and Ibn-el-Sunud, to render the armies of the Khalifate some real service. I got into communication with each of them. When I publish the answers I received from Sherif Hussein in the course of this correspondence, the whole world of Islam will see well enough what a double-faced rôle that gentleman played.

The Emir Ibn-el-Sunud could not give us any direct assistance as he was too near the English, who could do him enormous harm. But he made himself very useful to us by sending camels to the army and permitting the export of merchandise from his country to Syria. As for the Emir Ibn-el-Reschid, right to the end of the war he proved that he was a true Mohammedan and intensely devoted to the Khalifate. I shall deal with the plots of Sherif Hussein later on.

It was about this time that I sent Nuri Bey, Enver Pasha's brother who had come from Constantinople, to Tripolis on a smuggler's boat from Beirut.

I should add here that I had sent the force which I had fetched from Mecca, under the command of Dehib Bey, to a point in the immediate vicinity of Suez. When I decided on the retreat, I had withdrawn these troops to Maan, and as Dehib Bey had just been appointed Commander of the 2nd Army and had left for Constantinople, I sent his force back to Mecca under the command of Nedjib Bey.

If I give all these details, it is only because I want to reply to the fools who would like to ascribe Sherif Hussein's rebellion to the fact that I had unnecessarily denuded Mecca of its garrison.

It was about this time that the Allied fleets had been driven off with loss in their attempt to force the Dardanelles. I sent Enver Pasha a letter in which I set forth the reasons why I considered that it was impossible for the hostile fleet to pass through the Straits. I think Talaat Bey also shared my view. My object in sending my friends this communication was to confirm them in their opinion and give them moral support. I am certain that at that time everyone in Constantinople was expecting to see the enemy's fleet off the Seraglio one fine morning. That frame of mind might have had its effect on the confidence and convictions of my colleagues, and as the mischief to be anticipated was simply incalculable, I sent my friends my views as those of a colleague who can see and judge the general situation from afar. Enver Pasha told me afterwards that my communication, which was entirely in agreement with his own views, had had a great moral effect.

As it was possible that after the naval attack the enemy would venture upon a great landing and send troops to the Dardanelles, Enver Pasha realised the necessity of concentrating sufficient infantry in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, and asked me to send him the 8th and 10th Divisions.

I fell in with his views at once. When the enemy had landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula, Enver Pasha asked me to send the 25th Division as well to Constantinople. I sent it. He also asked me to send one of the divisions of the 13th Corps to Bagdad and

the other to Bitlis. I carried out these instructions and also the order to send all the quick-firing guns and machine-guns from my army zone to the Dardanelles. Ultimately I found myself in such a state that the troops in the army zone, the vilayets of Adana, Aleppo, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, and including those in the desert, were reduced to twelve battalions, and in the whole region not a single quick-firing battery nor a single machine-gun company was left.

These twelve battalions consisted exclusively of Arabs from Syria and Palestine. There were no Turkish but the Dervish volunteer battalions and an infantry company of volunteers from the Dobrudja, which I had formed for Army Headquarters. There can be no better proof of my conviction that the Arab would not revolt and turn traitor.

The most important military event up to the end of the year 1915 was the attempted rising of the Armenians in Leitun and Urfa, which was put down by the regulars we sent there. In general the year 1915 could be described as the year of preparation and consolidation.

As I shall show later, numerous roads and railways were constructed both in the desert and in the interior, and L. of C. bases were established and provided with everything they required.

In addition to all this fortification work was carried out at Mersina, Taprakkale, Dört Yol, and on the Alexandretta coast, and four or five lines of defence were provided against a hostile landing at Beirut, Haifa, Jaffa, as well as in the Lebanon, Mount Carmel, and everywhere in the interior of Palestine.

Of course the divisions sent to Constantinople had to be replaced by new divisions raised in the interior of Syria and Palestine, Aleppo, and Adana. Their training was one of the army's chief tasks.

In August, 1915, when the course of the military expedition in Mesopotamia was taking an unfavourable turn for us, Enver Pasha asked me if I would take over the civil and military administration of that region.

I replied that at the very time when the secret intrigues of the Arab revolutionaries in Syria and Palestine had shown that the situation in those provinces had become extremely difficult my absence would most probably have far worse consequences, but

that if he did not agree with me I was prepared to go to Bagdad. Enver Pasha was of the same opinion, however, and proposed Marshal von der Goltz for the post of Commander-in-Chief in Irak. The Marshal accepted and was duly sent there.

As I have said, the year 1915 passed in preparations for the second campaign against the Canal. As I had an idea that the German General Staff did not attribute to these preparations the importance due to them, I travelled to Constantinople in November to draw Enver Pasha's serious attention to the fact. I stayed there a fortnight and then returned to Damascus without having achieved very much.

As the English and French had retired after the evacuation of the Dardanelles, I invited Enver Pasha to come to Syria to see for himself the result of the preparations I had been making in the desert. He came in February, 1916, and after making an extended tour of inspection together in Syria, Palestine, and the Sinai Desert, we went to visit Medina.

Sherif Faisal, who was then at Headquarters, accompanied us on this visit.

Enver Pasha was highly satisfied with the organisation of the desert L. of C. We both came to the conclusion that it was certainly impossible to cross the Canal and drive the English out of Egypt, but that it would be quite feasible to fortify ourselves securely on the eastern bank and prevent the passage of merchant ships with our heavy batteries.

At this time my greatest desire was to do anything and everything to prevent the revolutionary tendencies displayed by Sherif Hussein from developing and to persuade him to send an auxiliary force to Palestine under the command of one of his sons. With that end in view I conferred continuously with Sherif Faisal and conducted a very intimate correspondence with Sherif Hussein. As will be seen later in the chapter devoted to the Arab revolt, I had no success in spite of all my efforts, and at length, on January 2nd, 1916, I was faced with the fact of Sherif Hussein's rebellion. This rising was a serious blow to the campaign against the Canal.

I calculated that if the English wished to try an attack by land on Palestine they would be compelled to establish a line of communication between the Canal and Palestine (as we had had to do

on our part) and to connect them by a railway. During the whole of 1915 not a single English detachment had set foot on the eastern bank of the Canal. From time to time a few Camel Corps patrols had penetrated to points fifty or sixty kilometres from the Canal and returned to their own side a few days later.

The first defence works of the English which we discovered towards the end of January, 1916, were the fortifications of the bridgeheads on the east bank of the Canal opposite Kantara and Ismaila. The date of this work coincides with that of Sherif Hussein's last letter to the English, in which he assured them of his desertion of our cause. It seems obvious from this that it was not until the English were perfectly clear on this point that they decided to cross to the eastern bank of the Canal or, to speak more accurately, start an offensive against Palestine. They knew perfectly well that Sherif Hussein's revolt would compel us to take certain steps for the defence of the Hedjaz and that we should also have to withdraw from that region a portion of the forces earmarked for Syria and Palestine. Apart from this they were certain that the Beduins, to whom they had sent money through Sherif Hussein, would rise against us, and that a Beduin revolt would weaken us enormously.

On April 1st, 1916, the German Air Force Company No. 300, the first real help to reach us, arrived at Beersheba. On April 12th and 15th two Austro-Hungarian 15cm. field howitzer batteries arrived.

The Aeroplane section was of great use to us for reconnoitring all the details of the bridgehead defences, railway and other works on which the English were engaged east of the Canal.

When Sherif Hussein's revolt broke out I appointed Fahri Pasha commander at Medina and I had to organise a force there consisting of fifteen or sixteen infantry battalions and as many mountain batteries.

I had the greatest respect and unbounded admiration for Fahri Pasha, who was assailed by hostile forces and influences on all sides and yet managed to perform miracles with his force. From January, 1916, to December, 1918—that is, for nearly three years—he defended the Sacred Tomb against the troops of the renegade Sherif Hussein and the rebellious Beduins, who were reinforced by

English and French artillery and all kinds of auxiliary formations. Even when this small garrison, which had been reduced to five or six battalions by October or November, 1918, was completely cut off from the interior as the result of the capture of Maan by Sherif Faisal in January, 1918, it persevered in its resistance and succeeded in holding Medina until three months after the Armistice.

Beyond all praise was the courage and persistence of the force, consisting of four or five Turkish battalions, to which was committed the protection of the railway from Medina to Maan and which maintained communication between Medina and the army.

The men whom I consider the soul of the defence of this thousand kilometre line of railway between Medina and Maan were Fahri Pasha and brave officers such as the Governor of Medina, Basri Pasha, General Djemal Pasha, who had distinguished himself in the defence of the Albanian fortress of Skutari (and whom the Arabs called " Djemal Pasha Salis," *i.e.*, Djemal Pasha III.), Colonel Nedjih Bey, and later Lieutenant Kemal Bey and some others.

The courage and fearlessness of this handful of soldiers frustrated all the efforts of Sherif Hussein's sons and drove them off with bloody losses. The proof of their success is that though the Beduin revolt spread from Medina to Maan and the coast was held by the Sherif's troops, which were reinforced by English and French troops, communication between Syria and Medina was maintained from June, 1916, to December, 1917, and traffic was more or less regular. But the sacrifices necessarily involved in feeding the garrison in Medina and supplying the troops echeloned between Medina and Maan with food and ammunition compelled us to halve the supplies provided for Palestine and Sinai and prevented us from reinforcing our Sinai front when and how we liked.

On April 23rd, 1916, von Kress Bey, at the head of two infantry battalions, a mountain battery, and a volunteer camel regiment, succeeded in a surprise attack which resulted in the capture of an English cavalry regiment with its commander and all its officers. This occurrence raised the confidence of our troops to a remarkable degree. About this time the 3rd Infantry Division, some

German machine-gun sections, and two Austro-Hungarian mountain howitzer batteries had joined the Sinai front from Constantinople.

Meanwhile the English had materially strengthened their bridgehead defences opposite Kantara, and, resting their left wing on the sea, had sent out a force of combined arms to Katia and the wells of Romani.

Here they immediately began to construct defences.

Von Kress, who had resumed command of the Expeditionary Force, reported that the troops were tired of the long waiting, and proposed an offensive against Romani.

I informed him in turn that I would give my consent to such an operation on condition that the existence of the Expeditionary Force—the only force on which we could depend for the defence of Palestine—was not endangered.

I will now give the composition of the troops comprising the force engaged in the second expedition against the Canal.

The 3rd Infantry Division (three regiments of three battalions, a cavalry squadron, two mountain batteries, a battalion of engineers).

One machine-gun battalion (eight companies).

Two Austro-Hungarian mountain howitzer batteries.

One German 10cm. battery.

One German 15cm. battery.

Two anti-aircraft gun sections.

A total of 10,000 men.

This enterprise, which opened in the beginning of July, 1916, closed with the failure of the Expeditionary Force at Katia and Romani. The English followed up this force step for step with large bodies of cavalry and camelry, and compelled it to withdraw to El Arish. Ultimately the force had to evacuate El Arish itself on December 16th and retire to the Hans Yonus-El Hafir line on the old Palestine-Sinai frontier.

The English constructed their railway with incredible speed, and laid two kilometres of line almost every day. After conferring with Enver Pasha, who had come to inspect the Palestine front, and von Kress, we decided in the middle of February to make the Gaza-Tel el Sheria-Beersheba line our defensive position, and

instructed von Kress to defend this position with the troops available.

The difficulty of the general situation due to the revolt in the Hedjaz and the necessity of keeping a watchful eye on the Druses and the various Beduin troops compelled me to leave Army Headquarters at Damascus.

THE BATTLES OF GAZA

CHAPTER VII.

THE BATTLES OF GAZA.

THE Turkish troops which had withdrawn to the Gaza-Tel el Sheria-Beersheba line after March 15th, 1917, consisted of the following units:

IN GAZA:

The 79th Infantry Regiment of the 27th Division and the 125th Regiment of the 16th Division.

Two Austro-Hungarian mountain howitzer batteries.

Two Turkish field gun batteries.

One German 10cm. field gun battery.

One Turkish 15cm. howitzer battery.

Two German machine-gun companies and five or six Turkish machine-gun companies.

A total of 3500 rifles.

IN DJENMACH:

The 3rd Infantry Division (nine battalions, six field gun batteries, four machine-gun companies, one 15cm. field howitzer battery).

A total of 5000 rifles.

IN TEL EL SHERIA:

Corps Headquarters of 22nd Corps, with two infantry regiments of the 16th Division and the divisional artillery.

A total of 5000 rifles.

IN BEERSHEBA:

The 3rd Cavalry Division (three regiments).

A total of 1500 sabres.

In addition to these formations two regiments of the 53rd Division had reached Ramleh.

In the official report published by General Murray in November, 1917, he gives the Turkish force employed in the first Battle of Gaza as follows:

IN GAZA:

The 3rd Division and the 2nd Infantry Regiment.

Twenty-four machine-guns.

Two heavy German 150mm. batteries.

Three Austro-Hungarian 105mm. field howitzer batteries.

Five field gun batteries.

A total of 10,000 rifles.

IN TEL EL SHERIA:

The 16th Infantry Division (6000 rifles, sixteen machine-guns, four field batteries).

The 3rd Cavalry Division (four light guns, four howitzers, four machine guns).

IN RAMLEH:

The 53rd Infantry Division.

IN JERUSALEM:

The 54th and 67th Infantry Divisions.

IN HAIFA:

The 27th Infantry Division.

I can give a most categorical assurance that the English saw that force solely in their imagination. If all the figures for the Turkish forces given by the English General were of that kind he must have been badly served by his Intelligence. As I have said before, the Turkish force which drove off the first English attack on Gaza so victoriously consisted of 18,000 men at most.

According to General Murray's report the English Army was composed of the following troops:

In first line (under the command of General Sir Philip Chetwode):

The Anzac Mounted Division

The Imperial Mounted Division, consisting mainly of yeomanry.

The 53rd Infantry Division, several machine-gun sections.

The troops of the second line comprised:

The Camel Corps Division, the 52nd and 54th Infantry Divisions, heavy artillery, and machine-gun companies, with automatic rifle sections.

According to these figures, in this first Battle of Gaza the English had:

Three infantry divisions.

Three cavalry divisions.

A division of the Camel Corps and the naval units participating in the action.

With these troops, commanded by General Sir Charles Dobell, General Murray, the Commander-in-Chief of the English Mediterranean Force, decided to attack the Beersheba-Gaza defences.

The 53rd Division, twelve thousand rifles strong, was to make a direct attack on Gaza, while the Anzac Mounted Division, the yeomanry, and another cavalry division were to hem it in from the east, and thrusting through between Gaza and Djemameh finally isolate it altogether by closing the northern exits.

The troops which were to open the attack took up their positions in the night of March 25-26. At 8 a.m. in the morning of March 26th the cavalry completely surrounded Gaza, and communication with the town was interrupted everywhere.

At 10 a.m. a brigade of the 54th Division and several regiments of the 53rd Division were sent against Gaza. Thus one and a half divisions, with more than two cavalry divisions, were opposed to the small Turkish force of 3500 rifles garrisoning Gaza. Thanks to the heroism of its Turkish and Arab defenders, Gaza held out against the attacks of the enemy for twenty-four hours. These heroes disputed every inch of the ground with the foe, and every hill was lost and regained two or three times.

In the afternoon of the same day the 3rd Division from Djemameh pressed forward against the English advance guard and, next day, as soon as the English began to feel the effect of this movement, they retired in great disorder. The 16th Division which came from Tel el Sheria and the 3rd Cavalry Division from Beersheba increased that disorder.

I have no desire to enter into superfluous detail here, but I cannot omit to state that, contrary to the statements of the English General in his official dispatch (to the effect that reinforcements arrived in the night of March 26-27), not a man reached the town before the morning of the 27th, on which day the English began to retire.

The first Battle of Gaza will have a high place in Turkish military annals. Thanks to the resistance offered that day by a handful of heroes, the English were compelled to remain in that line from March 27th to October, 1917—a period of eight months—and send nine infantry divisions, a number of cavalry divisions, and two divisions of the Camel Corps to this front.

The bravest of the defenders of Gaza was unquestionably Major Hairi Effendi, the commander of the 125th Infantry Regiment. This splendid officer, who preserved his unruffled calm and kept his head in the most difficult circumstances, placed himself at the head of each battalion of his regiment in turn, twice recovered the famous “ Ali Muntar ” hill from the English, and kept it the third time. In this attack the German Lieutenant Cordier, commander of a machine-gun section, displayed the greatest courage, and, like Captain Ritter von Trushkowsky, the Austro-Hungarian battery commander, met a hero's death by his guns.

In his official report the English General estimated our losses at 8000 killed and wounded. Including cooks, stretcher-bearers, &c., who are not fighting troops, our whole force in Gaza never exceeded that figure, and I cannot conceive how General Murray arrived at it. As a matter of fact, our losses were:

Officers, ten killed, twelve wounded, fourteen missing.

Men, 276 killed, 744 wounded, 571 missing.

As the losses of the English were admitted to be 4000, it is to be concluded that each of the defenders of Gaza had killed an English soldier.

I left Damascus in the evening of March 27th, and on the morning of the 28th reached Tel el Sheria and then Gaza. After decorating the officers and men I returned to Jerusalem. Two hours later some portions of the 16th Division arrived at the front. Von Kress, who attributed the disorderly retreat of the English to demoralisation, proposed an attack on their flank with troops of

the 3rd and 16th Divisions. If this attack succeeded it would certainly have been most advantageous to us, but if it failed we should have been left with nothing whatever for the future defence of Palestine and Syria, and the whole affair would have been settled once and for all. As equally bold experiments on the other fronts had resulted in very unhappy experiences, I was personally strongly averse to having such experiences on my own front. Hitherto it had been my object to keep the Expeditionary Force in the desert out of harm's way, but after I had withdrawn to the Gaza-Beersheba lines, which were the natural frontier between the desert and the inhabited regions, I decided to hold that front and prevent the English from breaking through at any cost by concentrating all the Turkish forces there.

The greatest advantage of this position was that it could not be turned, as the right flank rested on the sea and the left on the desert.

Moreover, as long as we were holding these defences the English were compelled to remain in the desert, while we were in a region which could be described as cultivated. In short, so long as we held the Gaza-Beersheba lines the English front could not join up with the Arab front.

In consequence our best policy was to avoid any kind of action which might imperil that front, and in view of these considerations I rejected the proposal for an offensive put forward by von Kress.

There was no doubt that the English would renew their attack in a fortnight or three weeks, and so it was necessary for us to reinforce our front from the interior in order to be able to beat off this second attack. With the troops which had recently come up we had a continuous fortified line (with the exception of a few unimportant gaps) from Gaza to Beersheba.

The English proposed to begin the second attack on Gaza with a *ruse de guerre*. On April 14th our wireless station at Tel el Sheria picked up an English message, which was deciphered by our telegraph officer, Lieutenant Stiller.

This message contained instructions from the commander of the English Armies of the East to the commander of the Palestine Army, informing him that Gaza was to be attacked on April 17th, but while the main attack was to be made on land, an infantry

division landed at Askalon during the night of the 17th was to fall upon Gaza from the rear, and thus support the frontal attack.

We considered that this message, the genuineness of which we at first had no doubt about, had possibly been sent out solely with a view to compelling us to regroup our reserves. I therefore refused to make any change in the general distribution of the front, and contented myself with sending toward Askalon a small force which I had left behind Jaffa.

During the twenty-four days which elapsed between the first and second Battles of Gaza we had reinforced our troops with two regiments of the 53rd Division—barely 2000 rifles.

The English also were reinforced on this front by the 74th Division. They brought up to strength the divisions which had taken part in the first Battle of Gaza, so that they had quite an imposing force of four infantry and four cavalry divisions.

The violent English onslaught which began on the morning of April 17th was again directed against Gaza and the 53rd Division which formed the left wing.

The English employed eight tanks in the attacks, in which they engaged a force six or seven times larger than that with which we held this part of the line. Their fleet intervened in the action and treated Gaza to a rain of steel and fire.

The battle raged with the utmost violence during April 17th, 18th, and 19th, and the English left no stone unturned to break our front.

But once more it was seen that the courage of the Turkish soldier prevailed against the determination of the English, and in the night of April 19th the latter found themselves compelled to return to their old lines, leaving their dead and wounded in numbers (more than 7000) which almost equalled the total Turkish force engaged in that sector.

Three of the eight English tanks which participated in the attack were left before our lines, or, rather, in our trenches. It is impossible to tell in a few lines the story of that glorious three days' defence, which redounds to the highest credit of Ottoman courage. I will postpone the details of this chapter to another occasion and confine myself here to the results of this second Battle of Gaza.

The great blow—the last thing on earth the English expected—had, so to speak, utterly disconcerted them.

They always prided themselves on issuing communiqués that were absolutely accurate, but this time they found themselves compelled to publish a short and vague report which was in no way consistent with the truth.

But, as the English said, and said rightly, that a failure in Palestine coming on the top of the Dardanelles failure would mean the end of English prestige in the East, they decided to employ the spring and summer in completing their preparations for one last, victorious offensive in the autumn and winter of 1917. General Murray had been twice beaten at Gaza and they replaced him by General Allenby, who had gained a reputation on the Western Front for alertness, discretion, and brains.

When General Allenby took up this new post he declared that he would undertake no attack until he had under his command at least four men to every Turk. I did not doubt for a moment that English pride and obstinacy would make that proportion possible, and I adopted every conceivable means of reinforcing and strengthening the Palestine Front to the uttermost. I sent the General Staff a very lengthy report dealing with the strength of the force to be employed on the Palestine Front, the number of divisions required to relieve the front line troops (and where these were to be distributed in the interior), and also the troops which must be concentrated in Aleppo or Syria to meet emergencies.

About the end of May I received a telegram from the Deputy Chief of the General Staff, in which he said:

“I have asked General von Falkenhayn to undertake a tour of inspection via Aleppo to the Euphrates Valley and Mosul in order to ascertain whether it is possible to send enough troops there to recover Bagdad. I have advised him to go to Jerusalem and pay you a visit with the idea of concealing the object of his journey. Please give him a good reception and make things as easy for him as possible.”

The general situation on the Turkish fronts at the end of May, 1917, was as follows:

The Caucasus Front:

The Russian Revolution at the beginning of the year 1917 had ruined the discipline of the Russian armies which had occupied

Erzindjan and Trebizond and overrun our eastern vilayets as far as Bitlis. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the commander of the 2nd Army, had succeeded in recovering from them the province of Bitlis and Mush. It would therefore have been possible to take a few divisions from the 2nd and 3rd Armies and send them to more important fronts.

The Irak Front (Mesopotamia):

After our armies had been beaten on the Kut el Amara front and Bagdad had been finally lost they were compelled to fall back on Kerkuk and Hit respectively. There was no chance of these armies recovering and driving the English out of Mesopotamia, still less of their striking a really serious blow north or north-west of Bagdad.

The Constantinople and Smyrna regions:

A landing of Entente troops at the Dardanelles or in the neighbourhood of Smyrna, which would have created a new front, was equally improbable seeing that the position in Europe was serious, as the Rumanians had been utterly defeated, the English had suffered two reverses at Gaza, and the Russian armies were in the throes of a terrible revolution.

Thus there was a possibility of employing the troops at Constantinople and Smyrna on the other important fronts.

Further, it was high time to withdraw our divisions from Galicia, Rumania, and Bulgaria.

I drew attention to these matters and asked that all available troops should be sent to Palestine and Northern and Central Syria, so that this front might be reinforced so heavily as to be impregnable. It was the weakest and yet the most important point in the Ottoman Empire. As our resources in the East were inadequate to guarantee the supplies of so large a force, I asked that we should be helped by the northern vilayets.

Enver Pasha visited the front in the month of June. He was more than satisfied with the defensive measures we had taken, but was still of opinion that the right flank of the English Army should be attacked in the rear. At last he said to me:

“I have asked several army commanders to come to Aleppo to discuss with me the following plan. I am contemplating an

offensive with a view to the recovery of Bagdad. I intend to form a 7th Army under the command of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the G.O.C. 2nd Army, and by combining this army with Halil Pasha's 6th army to form an army group called the "Yildirim Group," which is to march against Bagdad under an army group commander. I have already decided on the divisions which will have to be taken for this enterprise from the various fronts. Germany is giving us General Falkenhayn as the army group commander. I believe he will carry through this plan to a successful conclusion."

I offered no objection for the time being, but kept my thoughts to myself.

When we returned to Aleppo together a few days later we found Izzet Pasha, the commander of the Caucasus Army Group, and Halil Pasha, G.O.C. 6th Army, already there. Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the G.O.C. 2nd Army, who was already quartered at Damascus, had visited the Palestine Front with us and we had gone to Aleppo together.

The meeting of four army commanders with the Chief of the General Staff to preside was not an everyday affair. Of course I referred to the importance of the Palestine Front and the reasons which should move the Commander-in-Chief to reinforce it first and foremost. I proposed that instead of embarking on the Bagdad campaign we should assemble at Aleppo a large force which could be directed thence wherever its presence turned out to be required. I added:

"If we concentrate such an army at Aleppo it will be able to resist any Russian pressure on the front of the 2nd Army or oppose any advance of the English up the Tigris or Euphrates. Above all, we shall be able to force the Entente Governments to give up the idea of a landing at Adana, an eventuality we greatly fear. If the English knew we had such an army, ready to strike, at Aleppo, perhaps they would be compelled to abandon their attack, although I have not the slightest doubt that they are now preparing an offensive against the Gaza front for next autumn. In short, the Bagdad scheme strikes me as dangerous."

The Commander-in-Chief replied in a serious tone:

"The General Staff has decided upon the campaign against Bagdad and provided the best German General for it. We have

also secured the assistance of a German division consisting of six picked battalions of light infantry with a large number of machine-guns, other units and German batteries. It is not feasible to abandon this operation. Please don't waste time in trying to make me change my mind."

Izzet Pasha now intervened and proposed that at any rate a division should be left at Aleppo to meet any emergency, but his advice also was rejected. It was only after Izzet Pasha and I had objected how disadvantageous it would be—and had been—in view of the advance on Bagdad to send battalions piecemeal from Aleppo down the Euphrates to complete their concentration on a line parallel with Ramadieh that our proposal was accepted to concentrate the troops between Djerablus and Aleppo and then send them forward.

The continuation of my memoirs of the military operations will show how General von Falkenhayn entered the Turkish service and describe the military events that followed. Although those events were of the greatest personal importance to me, various political considerations compel me to keep silent about them for the moment. At present I deem it wise not to publish this portion of my memoirs, though it has already been written.

Never shall I forget that Council of War at Aleppo, and never shall I forgive myself for not putting my views with greater force and persistency that day. If ever there was a time in my career when events dictated my resignation, it was that conference in Aleppo.

I will not say that the idea of resignation did not occur to me at that moment. Izzet Pasha will be my witness on that point. We exchanged our views on this matter in a long conversation I had with him when he came to visit the Palestine Front after the Commander-in-Chief's departure. In view of the extraordinarily great importance of the 4th Army area, both in a military and political sense, Izzet Pasha solemnly urged on me the danger in which I should place the country if I laid down my command at a most critical moment. He strongly advised me not to leave Syria.

Yet I do not know that if I had persisted in my resignation I should have been able to make General Headquarters change their views, and whether they would not have insisted on the execution

of their plan and interpreted my desire to give up my command as a wish to evade responsibility for events to come.

I think my request would undoubtedly have been looked upon in that light.

From that time onwards preparations were pushed forward along the Euphrates, and particularly in the region of Djerablus. A large number of rafts were got ready and a line of communications was established down river from that place. All these preparations, of course, had an injurious effect on the Palestine Front, and reduced the forces indispensable to its maintenance.

The preparations of the English, the progress of which I was following from day to day, had convinced me that the Palestine Front was in imminent danger. When I saw that G.H.Q. did not attach to my warnings the importance they deserved I hoped I might attain my end by applying direct to the Grand Vizier in one or two telegrams in which I gave my reasons in detail.

In one of these telegrams I said:

“At the very moment when we want to try and recover Bagdad I am afraid in the very near future we shall find ourselves compelled to fight for the safety of Jerusalem, perhaps even Damascus.”

The Grand Vizier's answer came in the following telegram:

“The decision to commence an important operation for the recovery of Bagdad was taken at the Council of Ministers. On my last visit to Germany I asked that General von Falkenhayn's services should be placed at the disposal of the Ottoman Empire to conduct the campaign. It is now impossible for me to take steps to have this campaign postponed. As regards the troops you feel called upon to demand for the Palestine Front, this seems to me a fruitless dispute between an army commander and the Commander-in-Chief. I do not think my intervention can do any good at all.”

At length, in the middle of August, I went to Constantinople to make the position clearer and emphasise for the last time the great danger with which the Palestine Front was faced. Once more I insisted on the necessity of concentrating the Yildirim Group between Damascus and Aleppo and even sending part of it to Palestine. In a word, I wanted to have the main reserve of the

Sinai Army ready to meet any eventuality, and by that precaution prevent the breaking of the Palestine Front in case of an English offensive in November and December. On the other hand, I was willing to admit that it would be open to us to carry through a campaign for the recovery of Bagdad in January or February and that until then the line of communications along the Euphrates must be fully prepared.

We then held a Council of War, at which Enver Pasha presided. General von Falkenhayn and his Chief of Staff, my Chief of Staff, and Bronsart Pasha, the Chief of Staff at G.H.Q., were also present.

First of all Colonel Ali Fuad Bey, my Chief of Staff, unfolded in detail the preparations made by the English and the condition of the troops with which we had to meet them. I then explained what we should need in the way of *personnel* and *matériel*, and came to the conclusion that it was in the interests of the Ottoman Empire to abandon the campaign against Bagdad. Thereupon Enver Pasha and von Falkenhayn began a discussion in German. Of course I did not understand a word of what they said, but, judging by their conversation, their reference to the map, and the fact that they frequently pointed to the English front, as well as by certain French military expressions they used, I assumed that they had returned to the plan for an offensive which they had contemplated but which I thought had been abandoned in view of my decided opposition.

At this moment Enver Pasha seemed to be the strongest opponent of that plan, whereas von Falkenhayn seemed to be insisting on the highly advantageous results such a plan would have.

But afterwards, when Enver Pasha translated the conversation for me, I realised that it was von Falkenhayn who had advocated the view that it was impossible to carry through the expedition against Bagdad while the English were on the Palestine Front. He maintained that it was the first task of the Yildirim Army to make a surprise attack on the English and force them back to the Canal. It could *then* be sent against Bagdad. As regards the Palestine Front, it was merely a question of making a wheeling movement and thrusting in between Hafir and the sea to catch the English unawares. Enver Pasha opposed that view and expressed

his opinion that the troops then in Palestine were adequate for defensive purposes. He saw no need to send further troops, and declared that he could not abandon the Bagdad expedition.

I did not agree with either of them. I was utterly hostile to the Bagdad scheme, and considered that it was extremely prejudicial and dangerous to lose any time and not to send the divisions concentrated at Aleppo to Palestine at the earliest possible moment. In the second place, it seemed to me foolish to start an offensive from the Palestine Front against the English right through the desert, as even if we employed the whole Yildirim Army for the purpose I was convinced that we were scarcely in a position to effect anything in view of the scale on which the English had made their preparations.

The English had constructed their defences so excellently that for such an offensive we should have required all kinds of material which we had not the faintest chance of securing—tanks, heavy long-range guns, high explosives, the necessary supply of poison gas, &c.

After the failure of this offensive—and it was twenty to one it would be a failure—the English would have made their counter-attack and could not have failed to capture most of our storm troops. That would affect the *moral* of our force most prejudicially and make it easy for the enemy to assail our defences and break through our Palestine Front completely. The English had concentrated nine infantry divisions, three cavalry divisions, and a large force of special arms on the Palestine Front, and it was absolutely certain that in the middle of August, or, at the latest, during the winter, they would have carried out their last decisive offensive against this front. Nor would they confine themselves to a single onslaught. They would start an offensive which would continue for months, an offensive like those of which we have seen examples on the Western Front. The result of all this was that it was our best course to await the end of the offensive, which would cause the English immense losses, and if we completely succeeded in driving them off we ought to make a counter-attack at short range on the defeated English divisions with fresh forces held ready for the purpose.

This course would perhaps not bring us any great positive benefits, but it was the best and most promising method of pro-

tecting the Palestine Front and averting a great danger from Syria.

On the basis of my proposal the following plan could have been adopted:

Abandon the expedition against Bagdad so far as August or the coming winter was concerned.

Concentrate all the Yildirim divisions in Palestine, Damascus, Hama, and Aleppo.

Send Yildirim divisions to Palestine as and when the English reinforced their front.

Fix the number of divisions to be employed in second line so that all the divisions in the front line could be relieved every fortnight.

Strengthen our third line with a substantial main reserve.

Refrain from exposing to any danger the army awaiting the English offensive in these positions—the only army at the disposal of the Ottoman Government.

To execute these movements it was entirely unnecessary for the Commander of the Yildirim Group and his Headquarters Staff to come to Palestine. Von Kress Pasha, commanding the Palestine Front, who had been on that front for more than three years and conducted the two defences of Gaza, could have taken command of all the divisions in first and second line, while the divisions forming the main reserve would be under my direct orders.

If, on the other hand, the Yildirim Group came to Palestine the Headquarters Staff of the 7th Army relieved by that group would have to follow it, and it would then become necessary to separate the Palestine Front—essentially a single front—into two independent sectors, each with an army.

Yet nothing would have been more ridiculous than to distribute eight or nine and perhaps even ten army corps (and I do not know how many divisions) in two armies, seeing that the whole force from start to finish comprised scarcely fifty thousand bayonets.

It is certain that it would have been far better to employ all the efficient young officers to be found in these armies and army corps to fill up the gaps in the divisions.

But the object which Marshal von Falkenhayn Pasha had in mind was of a different character. After he realised that the expedition against Bagdad—which he had at first considered a very simple matter—was impossible, he felt that his position was very absurd, and desired to find some way out of it. To save his own face he took up a plan which Enver Pasha had contemplated three or four months before, the plan of an offensive against the English in Palestine. Enver Pasha had dropped it in view of my opposition, but von Falkenhayn now said: “ Djemal Pasha says this operation is impossible, but I consider it not merely possible, but profitable.”

Enver Pasha, however, wished neither to send troops to Palestine nor to abandon the expedition against Bagdad, so he brought the Council of War to an end by declaring that he remained of his original opinion.

As a matter of fact, several units of the 7th Army had begun to concentrate at Aleppo a month before, and Mustafa Kemal Pasha, G.O.C. the 7th Army, had transferred his headquarters to that city.

It was intolerable to me to see these troops idling in Aleppo while, in my opinion, they should have been forming an indispensable part of our force on the Palestine Front. So in spite of the categorical declarations of Enver Pasha and the announcement of his intentions at the Council of War, I continued to make representations—but now in writing—that these troops should be sent south without the slightest delay.

At this moment I received from the German Emperor an invitation to visit the Western Front. I do not know the reasons.

Count Waldburg, the German Councillor of Embassy, who was then performing the functions of Chargé d’Affaires, sent the official invitation to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and also communicated it to me personally with the compliments of His Majesty the Emperor. The same day the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador informed me that His Majesty the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary invited me to visit the Austro-Hungarian front.

After obtaining the permission of His Majesty the Sultan I went first to Germany.

I inspected the fleet at Wilhelmshaven and from there went to

Cuxhaven and Kiel on board the *Bayern*. At Kiel I was given a very kind reception by Prince Henry and visited the Arsenal and the Naval Training School at Hensburg. In Prince Henry's company I was present at several naval manœuvres. Travelling via Hamburg and Essen, where I visited Krupp's works, I then went to German G.H.Q. at Kreuznach. On the day of my arrival the news of the capture of Riga by German troops had just come in, and the rejoicing was great and general. His Majesty the Emperor seemed really happy and light-hearted that day. I alone felt depressed, although I forced myself to wear the mask of cheerfulness.

The cause of my sorrow was a telegram I had received from Enver Pasha on my arrival at Kreuznach.

In this telegram Enver Pasha wrote :

“ After several discussions with von Falkenhayn I have decided to take the offensive against the English with the whole of the Yildirim Group and to send von Falkenhayn there to take the necessary steps to carry this project into execution. In the circumstances it is inevitable that he should also be placed in command on the Palestine Front. Will you please inform von Kress Pasha that it will be necessary for him to carry out any orders issued to him by von Falkenhayn ? ”

This telegram was a terrible blow to me. The German Général had got his own way and ensured the adoption of a fatal scheme which was bound to involve my country in an incalculable disaster.

I sent Enver Pasha the following telegram :

“ General von Falkenhayn was the author of the Verdun affair, so disastrous for Germany, and his Palestine offensive will mean an equal disaster for us.”

What a grief it was to me to realise subsequently that I had so accurately foretold the catastrophe that was to render us defenceless !

The very same day I tried to convince Marshal Hindenburg and General Ludendorff of all the disadvantages of the operation von Falkenhayn desired. Marshal Hindenburg replied that from such a distance it was difficult to calculate the disadvantages or advantages of such a plan, but he thought I was right. General Ludendorff said exactly the same, but thought that by attacking the enemy in that way one might occasionally compel him to deliver

his own attacks, not at the point he himself intended, but where his opponent desired. He said he assumed that this was what General von Falkenhayn had in mind when he decided on his offensive. He added further that any intervention by him could only do harm, and that the only way out of the difficulty was for me to come to some understanding with Enver Pasha after my return to Constantinople.

After leaving Kreuznach I visited Bruges, Zeebrügge, Ostend, and then the front of the German 4th Army, which had its headquarters at Cambrai. I returned to Constantinople.

On my arrival I had several further discussions with Enver Pasha, but was compelled to recognise that I should not succeed in making him abandon his plan. I thereupon made up my mind to resign. In view of the fact that the Arab revolt had already reached the neighbourhood of Maan and if I now left Syria would soon extend to Damascus and thereby involve the country in certain disaster, Enver Pasha begged me fervently to abandon the notion. The objections he raised were certainly valid ones. The Druses and Beduins were north of Maan. The refractory Arabs, whose influence had begun to make itself felt in Damascus, but who had not dared to kick over the traces (thanks to my strong rule), might rise at any moment, cut all the communications of the Palestine Army, loot all its supply depôts, and bring about its utter defeat.

I had no alternative but to sacrifice myself once more. I was compelled to put up with a compromise which severely restricted my powers and materially affected my position *vis à vis* General von Falkenhayn. In accordance with this arrangement the General, who had the title of Commander of the Yildirim Army Group, was assigned the task of carrying through an offensive against the English Palestine Front with the 7th Army attached to this Army Group. While this operation was being prepared and carried out the troops on this front under the command of von Kress Pasha (which had hitherto, of course, been under my command) were put under the command of the G.O.C. Yildirim Army Group.

I was instructed to see to the supplies of the armies of the Yildirim Group and the troops of the Palestine Front. General von Falkenhayn was to have nothing to do with the civil authorities

of Syria and Palestine. I alone was to deal with the civil administration.

The detachments which were to operate east of the Jordan were to be under my command, and I was entrusted with the defence of the entire coast north of Jaffa and the military protection of the country.

On these terms I assumed the title of "Commander of the Armies in Syria and Western Arabia," with the privileges of an Army Group Commander.

If General von Falkenhayn had also displayed a certain spirit of conciliation this arrangement would have led to no difficulties in the matter of spheres of command or the administration of Syria and Palestine, and everything would have remained as it was. Even if nothing could excuse the appalling mistake of allowing divisions to idle away two or three months at Aleppo on the excuse of an expedition against Bagdad so that they arrived on the Palestine Front very late, at any rate there need have been no transformation of the internal administration of Syria, which had lasted three years.

When I returned from the German front to Constantinople I had heard that differences of opinion had arisen between Mustafa Kemal Pasha, the Commander of the 7th Army, and von Falkenhayn. I went into the cause of the dispute, and came to the conclusion that Kemal Pasha was entirely in the right.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha respected all the rights of the Army Commander, while von Falkenhayn claimed the right to interfere in the affairs of the 7th Army in a way which was inadmissible even in dealing with a Corps Commander.

For example, when von Falkenhayn wished to intervene directly in Arab affairs which appertained to Mustafa Kemal Pasha's sphere, the latter gave him to understand that these affairs concerned his army alone and von Falkenhayn had no authority whatever in such matters.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha, who knew only too well how much damage might be done by certain orders of von Falkenhayn's which were incompatible with the Beduin constitution, opposed these encroachments of the German general in the most categorical fashion, appealing to the authority given him by his position as Army Commander.

Such was more or less the position in Syria when I returned to Aleppo from Constantinople towards the middle of November.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha saw that it was impossible for him to be under the orders of General von Falkenhayn, and I also was convinced that as long as the German general was in Syria the influence I had been able to exercise for three years would be undermined and irreparable harm would result for the country.

Ultimately, after a long and bitter correspondence, Mustafa Kemal Pasha gave up his army command and returned to Constantinople.

I had told him that I was thinking of following his example, but that, as Enver Pasha had told me he was coming to Syria in the immediate future, I would await his arrival.

I considered my decision irrevocable.

But when Enver Pasha came to Damascus he was so fervent in his entreaties and the Governors-General of Beirut, Syria and Aleppo pressed me so strongly that for the time being I considered myself compelled to abandon my intention of leaving Syria. Mustafa Kemal Pasha disapproved of my attitude, but subsequently I convinced him that the situation at the moment made this last sacrifice inevitable.

For myself, I maintain that if (1) the idea of recovering Bagdad had never been mooted and all available troops had been concentrated on the Palestine front, (2) von Falkenhayn had not been put in command of the army in Palestine, we could have held the Gaza-Beersheba line for years, and on the day of the armistice Syria and Palestine would still have formed part of the Ottoman Empire.

THE ARAB REBELLION

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ARAB REBELLION.

ON the day of my arrival in Damascus Hulussi Bey, the Governor-General of Syria, told me he wanted to confer with me on extremely important matters. We met the same night at Government House. He handed me some very important documents which had been seized at the French Consulate, and told me that most of the documents implicated the most highly-placed and influential Mussulmans of Damascus, Beirut and other cities. He said he had not cared to decide whether immediate legal action against these people was indicated or not, and had therefore awaited my arrival.

Judging by these documents, there was not the slightest doubt that the Arab revolutionaries were working under French protection and, indeed, under the guidance and for the benefit of the French Government.

Yet to take immediate legal action against these traitors might well endanger the success of the Islam unity movement, which was the goal of our endeavour. If we had taken such action at once, Mohammedan countries such as Egypt, India, Algiers and Morocco, which had lost contact with us, would have thought that the Turks were yielding to feelings of vengeance or endeavouring to secure the supremacy of the Turanian nation by taking the lives of the most influential Arabs. In the mighty struggle upon which we had entered to free the Mohammedan world from a foreign yoke it was our principal task to preserve unity of aim and effort in the lands of Islam. For that reason we decided not to breathe a word about this matter for the time being.

Shortly before my arrival in Syria several important documents, implicating Nahle Mutran Pasha of Baalbek, were handed over to a court martial. As the inquiry was already in progress, it was necessary to let justice take its course. The court martial condemned Nahle Mutran Pasha to penal servitude for life.

After my visit to Jerusalem Hulussi Bey told me that the presence of Nahle Pasha in Damascus was open to objection, and he had obtained permission from Constantinople to send him under guard to Diarbekir. During the journey the Pasha had attempted to escape one night when they were near Djerablus, and had been found dead by his guards.

The documents discovered in the French Consulate at Damascus contained sufficiently strong evidence to implicate beyond hope Envir Ali Pasha, the son of Envir Abd-el-Kader, Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, his brother Envir Olmer, ex-Deputy for Damascus, Sheffik el Mueyyed Bey, Senator Abdul Hamid Lehravi Effendi, Yahya el Atrash, Sheik of the Druses, Civil Inspector Wehab el Inglisi, Shukri el Asli, Rushdi Bey el Shema, formerly Deputy for Damascus—i.e., many of the most influential and well-known Arabs.

Yet I felt sure that they would ultimately realise that the general war was a life and death matter for the Mohammedan world and would one day repent of their criminal activities. On that assumption I had come to the honest conclusion to take no action against them. Being not averse in principle to the use of the Arab tongue and the grant of certain privileges in administrative affairs, I sent for the leader of the Arab revolutionary movement, Abdul Kerim el Halil, of whom I spoke in the opening chapter of my memoirs. I overwhelmed him with courtesies and benevolence.

Through his agency I had a meeting with some of the most influential revolutionary leaders, including one of their greatest zealots, Dr. Abdul Rahman Shehbendir, the proprietor of the paper *El Mufid*, Abdul Gani el Arisi, one of the principal organisers of the Arab Congress in Paris, and the proprietor of the well-known paper *El Muktebes*, Mehoned Kivid Ali. I explained to them the views of the Government, and insisted that it would be possible to liberate the Mohammedan world from a foreign yoke if the great war ended with a victory for us. All of them—without exception—agreed with what I said, and swore by their faith

and honour that during the war the Arabs of Syria and Palestine would remain loyal to the Government, place no difficulties in its way, and translate these words into deeds. In the same breath these so-called revolutionaries, starting with Abdul Kerim el Halil, began a doleful tale about their poor financial position and great need of money. I distributed pretty substantial sums between Abdul Kerim el Halil, Melumed Kurd Ali and Abdul Gani el Arisi. From that time onwards these gentlemen were my most humble servants, and assured me that they would lose no time in doing everything in their power to assist me.

Immediately on my arrival in Damascus I started on the preparations for the expedition against the Canal, and also endeavoured to create an atmosphere of religious and patriotic fervour in all the Arab countries.

I had a literary festival arranged through the agency of leaders of the Arab revolutionaries, such as Abdul Kerim el Halil, Dr. Abdul Rahman Shehbender and several others (who were known as "Reformers"). During this festival the best speakers among the Reformers gave several lectures and read poems which sang the praises of the Arabs and glorified the passion for knowledge and progress which animated the Arab race. Songs were sung in which the hopes of Arab unity were proclaimed. The "Nahnu Djundullahu Shubban el Bilad," an Arab patriotic song, nearly brought down the roof of the building in which we were.

After showing by my conduct that I was quite sympathetic to all this and desired to help as much as I could, I mounted the rostrum and made a long speech. I emphasised the fact that we were all devoted to the Arab tongue, the language of our religion, and loved and respected the race, with which we were associated by a common faith. I said they could be assured that the steps we had taken in the previous year to help the Arabs in their ambitions would be repeated, and I added:

"Gentlemen, the programme for the welfare of the Arabs which our party means to carry out in its entirety is more comprehensive than anything you can imagine. I myself am not one of those who think it a harmful or dangerous thing that the two races, Arab and Turkish, should secure their unity while remaining separate nations, subject to the same Khalif.

“ But if we want to achieve our object, much, very much, remains to be done. The impostors in our midst who betray their country and faith must be driven away, and we must make certain that those who are at work with the enemy’s gold find no place among us. Above all, I want you to realise that the pro-Turkish movement which you have noticed in Constantinople and other Mussulman regions inhabited by Turks in no way conflicts with Arab ambitions. You know well that there have been Bulgarian, Greek and Armenian movements in the Ottoman Empire. There is now an Arab movement. The Turks had forgotten their own existence so completely that they hardly dared to mention their own race. The national spirit had gone to sleep and ultimately the race might have completely disappeared.

“ Under the impression of the menace ahead the Young Turks rose with a zeal beyond praise. They took to arms to teach the Turks national spirit and the virtues associated with it. That has been the object of all their endeavours for the last two or three years, and those efforts have brought about the revival of the Ottoman Khalifate. It was they who raised the army you see to-day, and they have not hesitated to enter into an alliance with those whom fate has sent to us and to declare a holy war upon the hereditary enemy of our faith.

“ To-day I am in a position to assure you that the Turkish and Arab ideals do not conflict. They are brothers in their national strivings, and perhaps their efforts are complementary. The aims of the Young Turks are to awaken national feeling in the Turkish nation, train their countrymen to work, free them from the Slav yoke, give them health and national expansion, increase the welfare and prosperity of Turkish countries. In a word, they want to make the Turkish race respected in the eyes of the world and secure its right to exist side by side with the other nations in the twentieth century.

“ The Young Turks have resolved to work tirelessly to achieve these objects. As one of them, I appeal to you in your own tongue that, as the representatives of Young Arabia, you, too, should work for the success of this cause. Do not believe the lies of the hirelings in foreign pay, to whom fraud and cunning are permissible methods of securing control of the Arab countries.

“ I turn to the youth of Turkey and Arabia and say these two

nations will be doomed to destruction the moment they separate. Discord between these two great pillars of the Islam religion will bring with it the downfall of the Mussulman power, and ultimately it will be impossible to avert slavery under the Slavs.

“ Most regrettable would it be, gentlemen, if the devilish contrivings of the foes of our faith and country resulted in dissension among us. Turks and Arabs must love and respect each other, and thus harvest the fruits of their joint labours. I warn you that otherwise you are doomed to slavery and destruction ! ”

This speech made a considerable impression upon my audience. The next day many distinguished people came to Headquarters to thank me. The reformers were very satisfied. During the days following the inhabitants of the city assembled in various groups with their banners, pledged their loyalty to the Government on the Koran, and vowed that they intended to do everything in their power to help in the defence of the rights of Islam against the English and French.

When I contrast the results obtained to-day with the religious demonstrations which took place at that time at Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Beirut and even in the Lebanon, I can only call down the curse of Heaven on Sherif Hussein and his sons, who are wholly and solely responsible.

As I have already said, the policy I desired to see pursued in Syria was a policy of clemency and tolerance. I left no stone unturned to create unity of views and sentiments in all the Arab countries.

I wrote, for example, to the men of standing in Bagdad, Kerbela and the Nedjef, to several of the Sheiks of Irak, with whom I had been on friendly terms in my Bagdad days, and to Ibu Saoud and Ibu Reschid to ask them to help Suleiman Askeri Bey, who had been sent with one or two divisions and the “ Techkilat Mahsusse ” Osmandjik battalion against the English, who were in occupation of Basra and district. I sent a special letter to the Imam Seid Yahya Hamid-ed-dine pointing out the necessity of his making common cause with our detachments in the Yemen.

From all these Arab leaders I received answers in which they assured me of their devotion and loyalty to the Khalifate and the religious enthusiasm which inspired them in common with all the

Arab countries intent on participating in the Holy War against the foes of our faith.

I had letters to the same effect, though expressed somewhat vaguely, from Sherif Hussein, with whom I had been in correspondence.

As I knew that one of the most effective ways of pleasing the Arabs was to avoid requisitioning anything from them and pay for what we wanted cash down, the first order I issued on my arrival was that nothing should be taken by way of requisition from the civil population of Syria and Palestine in the 4th Army area. Prompt cash was to be paid for everything of any description whatever—food, equipment or clothing. In view of the injustice and inequality in insisting that everything must be paid for in Syria and Palestine, while food and other articles were simply requisitioned in other parts of the Empire, I recommended the Government at home to adopt the same course.

I displayed great confidence in the "Reform" party. I did not hesitate to go and see a patriotic demonstration in the neighbourhood of Reis Baalbek, an outlying and lonely station, although I was accompanied only by my aide-de-camp and Hulussi Bey, the Vali of Syria. I had considered it necessary to take part in this ceremony and thus evince the highest confidence in Abdul Kerimel Halil (who had organised this affair), in order to strengthen his position in the eyes of the Mitvalis (Shiites). In fact, whatever I did and wherever I went in the vilayets of Beirut and Syria, I was always accompanied by Reformers, until I went to the Sinai Peninsula to conduct the operations against the Canal.

About this time there was a general idea throughout Syria and Beirut that the Christians of the Lebanon would rise in the near future. I was advised on all sides to suspend the special rights of the Lebanon and issue a proclamation calling upon the civil population to deliver up their arms to the Government. It was said that there were fifty thousand modern rifles in the Lebanon.

I did not credit these rumours in the least, and such action on my part would have aroused suspicion among the Christian inhabitants of Syria and Palestine and provoked them to rebellion, even if they had no such intention hitherto. I was certain that, whoever took in hand the business of disarming them, several illegal acts were bound to occur and many innocent persons would be unneces-

sarily disturbed. Under the pretext of house searching the propertied classes among the inhabitants of the Lebanon were bound to suffer immense material damage.

For these reasons I issued a proclamation to the civil population of the Lebanon assuring them that their old privileges would be respected and no one would do them any harm. Three bishops sent by the Maronite Patriarch, Monsignor Peter Hoyek, visited me and told me that my proclamation had reassured the Maronites; they would never forget this kindness of mine, and I need never expect anything but the most loyal devotion from them in future. The same sentiments were expressed in a letter from the Patriarch himself.

But a few of the Maronites and Druses of the Lebanon were well known to be friendly to the French and English and under strong suspicion of secretly fomenting disorder, and as a matter of precaution I invited them to reside in Jerusalem for the duration of the expedition against Egypt. The expenses of residence there were defrayed from army funds, and they were free to reside exactly where they liked.

The list of the names of these people was given to me by Government officials, but it was drawn up by the reformers of Syria and Beirut with the assistance of some of the leading men of the Lebanon.

The result of the secret inquiries I made showed that these gentlemen were not altogether without reproach, and I can see that I made no mistake in my selection when I read their names in the papers to-day and realise that they are the very men who are now doing their utmost to restore the French protectorate—thus dealing a fatal blow at Arab unity.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Morgenthau, in his well-known book in which he speaks of me in anything but complimentary terms, has not hesitated to allege that I was guilty of many illegal and oppressive acts towards the Christian population of Syria. I could answer this gentleman with a simple "It is not true, sir!" but it seems to me more appropriate to give a few facts in chronological order.

On my arrival in Jerusalem on the 3rd or 4th of January, 1915, the Consuls of Allied and neutral States drew my attention to a certain book, and informed me that its contents had caused the

greatest excitement among the Mussulman inhabitants, and that everyone was expecting a massacre of the Christians by the Mohammedans at any moment. I read the pamphlet and saw that it was a commentary on the Tehad, and set forth that it was the sacred duty of the Mohammedans to declare a holy war on the Christians. As I wanted to undo the evil effect of this pamphlet, I issued a long proclamation to the civil population of Syria. Undoubtedly the pamphlet used language which might easily mislead the ignorant. My proclamation, which was distributed even in the tiniest hamlets and made public everywhere by posters, ran briefly as follows :

“ The Holy War has been declared by the Khalif of Islam *only* against the English, French and Russians, who are the enemies of our faith. It relates to those, and those only, who take up arms against us. For that reason all who cherish any evil design whatever against our non-Mohammedan countrymen, associated with us by the bond of a common fatherland and common interests, will be punished by me with the greatest severity.”

The Russian diplomatist, Mandelstamm, refers in great detail to the pamphlet in question on page 370 of his book, “ The Fate of the Ottoman Empire.” May I ask this gentleman why he did not take the trouble to translate my proclamation also? I can assure Messrs. Morgenthau and Mandelstamm that had I at any time during the war cherished the idea of provoking a massacre of the Syrian Christians by the Mohammedans, nothing could have been easier. The fact that throughout the war the Christians and Jews were never in the slightest degree troubled by the Mohammedans and Druses is to be ascribed solely to my efforts and precautions. Mandelstamm may say in his notorious book that the Christians of Syria were not massacred merely owing to the absence of the Kurds, who had been sent against the Armenians, but I am quite sure that, in his heart of hearts, he does not believe it himself. If I had once let the Beduins and Syrians know that there was a chance of their robbing the Christians of the Lebanon, who are very rich, I need have taken no further trouble.

No, gentlemen! Once more I say that when you maintain in your books that I intentionally allowed the Christians of Syria to die you are stating what is pure fiction. The day will come when honourable men in America, France, and England will tell

the truth and authenticate it with their signatures. Will your cheeks then flame with shame? I doubt it!

After my return from the first expedition against the Canal nothing happened to shake my confidence in the reformers. My policy towards them was so straightforward that I urged Abdul Kerim el Halil and Dr. Abdul Rahman el Shehbender to visit the Turko-Arab troops who were returning from the Canal Expedition and satisfy themselves of their excellent *moral*. I invited them to come to Jerusalem and after giving them a considerable sum to defray the expenses of their journey, I sent them to the troops. Without any sort of supervision they spent three weeks with the army. On their return they spoke in high terms of the discipline and supply arrangements of the troops.

During May, 1915, I read in the Egyptian papers such violent attacks on the Ottoman Government by the Ella Merkezye Committee that I was at a loss to account for this degree of bitter vulgarity.

One day I asked Abdul Kerim el Halil if he could explain the contrast between the loyalty of the reformers of Syria and Beirut and the base allegations made by men like Refik el Azmet and others who were regarded as leaders. In some confusion he tried to give me an answer, but it was perfectly obvious that my question had greatly frightened him.

A few days later he called on me and told me that if I wished he would go to Egypt to explain the policy I was pursuing in Syria to the leaders of the Ella Merkezye. He assured me that he would use every endeavour to make them adopt a different attitude.

At this time the state of Syria was as critical and deplorable as could be. The English and French had landed at the Dardanelles and were renewing their violent attacks every day. At the wish of G.H.Q. I had sent to Constantinople the 8th, 10th, and 25th Divisions, which had been in Syria. They were subsequently followed by all the machine-gun companies and, in short, everything in the way of men and material required for the defence of the Dardanelles. In an area stretching from the Taurus to the Medina I had to maintain internal order and prevent any hostile landing, but there was nothing at my disposal but one or two Arab divisions and the Dervish Mevlevi volunteer battalion. If a revolt

had broken out as the result of foreign intrigues there would have been no way of suppressing it, and the Government would have lost all its Arab territories. If the English and French had secured the assistance of the natives and landed two divisions at any point of the Syrian coast—Beirut or Haifa, for example—we should have found ourselves in a perfectly desperate situation. But as I felt perfectly sure of the civil population, I had no hesitation whatever in committing the safety of the country to the Arab formations and leaving the coastal districts practically without surveillance.

I am certain that if the English had had the slightest doubt about the loyalty of the civil population of Syria and Palestine they would certainly have attempted a landing. But at this time the treasonable activities of Sherif Hussein had scarcely begun, and I knew nothing about them. But notwithstanding all the superficial confidence I displayed in Abdul Kerim el Halil I was sure that he could be easily won over by money, and his proposal to go to Egypt aroused my suspicions. Italy also had declared war on us at this time, and thus all communications between the Syrian coast and the outside world had been broken. I did not understand how Abdul Kerim Halil thought he could get to Egypt. In reply to my question he answered, "I'll find some way." This answer confirmed my suspicions, but I did not betray anything.

About the end of June Sheik Essad Shukair, the "Army Mufti"* came to me to tell me of the beginnings of revolt which were perceptible in Syria. He said that Kiamil el Essad, the deputy for Beirut, who lived in his native village in the *Kaza* of Sidon, could give me more detailed information. I immediately telegraphed to Kiamil Essad Bey, and he came to Jerusalem two days later with another gentleman. What he said was this:

"Effendim! Your Excellency shows great confidence in the reformers and allows them absolute freedom in the country, but I'm afraid that they are abusing your confidence. At the moment Riza Beyel Sulk, the former deputy for Beirut, and Abdul Kerim el Halil are engaged in organising a rebellion in the region of Tyre and Sidon. If Your Excellency will make enquiries you will obtain confirmation of all I tell you."

* Corresponds to Chaplain General [Tr.].

The Arabs have one great weakness. The moment one of them gets more attention or kindness than the others, all the rest are smitten with jealousy and begin to agitate against him. But I could not assign any such motive to the revelations of Kiamil el Essad. I had never treated him as of lower rank than Abdul Kerim el Halil, and so he could have had no personal interest in intriguing against him. Riza Bey el Sulk, on the other hand, I had always regarded as a low intriguer and refused to receive him.

After taking Kiamil el Essad's opinion as to the best method of conducting the enquiry I issued the necessary instructions. The enquiry lasted a fortnight, and showed that Abdul Kerim el Halil and Riza Bey el Sulk were in fact fomenting a revolt in the region of Tyre and Sidon. I immediately ordered their arrest and that of their accomplices, for any loss of time might be dangerous. The conspirators had chosen their locality well, for the district of Tyre and Sidon was guarded less than any other part of the coast region. There was only one company there, and the surveillance force consisted of a few gendarmes.

As the stretch of coast between Beirut and Syria lies on no great highway, neither officers nor administrative officials were in the habit of visiting it. I myself had never thought of making a journey to that region. Thus the revolutionaries could work there quite undisturbed, and after thoroughly preparing and poisoning public opinion, they could have been assisted by a hostile force, landed at night, and have occupied the mountainous district in the interior and put in a state of defence against attack from north east, and west.

As a matter of fact, while Abdul Kerim el Halil and Riza Bey el Sulk were fomenting disorder several not unimportant attempts on Tyre and Sidon were made by the enemy's vessels employed in watching the coast. From time to time and for no apparent reason men were landed from these ships to destroy the telegraph lines, but each time they were driven back to their ships by our gendarmes. The discovery of these traitorous activities showed the aim and purpose of the enemy's operations, and henceforth I, of course, considered it would be simply fatuous on my part to place any further trust in the reformers. I decided to take ruthless action against the traitors.

Just about this time the Intelligence Staff at my Headquarters came into possession of an extremely important document, which I reproduce here :

Circular No. 403.

Cairo,
27 Ramazan, 1322

To the wise and venerable Seyd Effendi Shukri.

Honour and Greeting !

At this moment, when the World War rages in all its fury, the Fatherland expects greater sacrifices from its children than ever before. The world conflagration may shoot sparks into the East, set our country on fire, and consume the innocent with the guilty, the Arabs with the Turks. It is certain that if, contrary to all expectation, the Government were to plunge into the struggle, they would not emerge unscathed, and it would mean their end. If the war ended with the victory of the Entente that end would be all the more certain, and would facilitate the solution of the Eastern question by Russia. The Arab territories would be exposed to the same peril as the Turkish. As the Turks would, in any case, use all the defensive resources available to protect their own Empire and possessions, the danger threatening the Arabs would be all the greater. That is what will certainly happen.

All the more urgent is it for us Arabs to take steps to defend our threatened independence. Our society, which possesses a special organisation, and whose members are known for their patriotism and self-sacrifice, considers it a duty to take immediate measures to secure the welfare of our Fatherland and the lives of its children. For that reason we ask an immediate answer to the following questions :

1. What are the forces at your disposal with which to start a general rising if the necessity arises?
2. Would it be possible to give us pecuniary help or raise money, which you yourselves could use if necessary? What amount could be raised?
3. Is it possible to find a safe place of refuge for the confidential agents who are to lead the rising, and will be supported by us?
4. Is it possible to send us, as representative of your community, a reliable man who can go to some fixed place and receive our instructions?
5. If you can find no reliable man to send, do you think it will be necessary for us to send someone to you to convey our instructions?

Please give us a detailed reply on these points. Every minute lost may cost an Arab his life. The time of self-sacrifice for duty and the Fatherland has arrived.

Greeting,
A.

P.S.—We shall sign as above in future also, but in your answers to me please be careful to give my name on the address. The envelope must be placed in another, addressed as follows :

Cairo,
Shari-ud-Devavine,
Sheik Hakky Halef,
Superintendent of the Mosque of Shamli Hanim
(Opposite the Palace of the late Sherif Pasha).

You must be careful to give the letter to a reliable man, who must give it personally to a foreign post-office on the coast. If that is impossible it will do no great harm if you send the letter through the local post.

As soon as I read this letter I realised the situation at once. It was obvious that the Arab revolutionaries had in no way abandoned the plan of a rising in Syria and Palestine. The only thing I could not understand was why Abdul Kerim el Halil and others had shown so much loyalty to the Government since the war began, seeing that the Ella Merkezeye Committee in Egypt, whose representatives they were, had taken over the leadership of the revolt. Neither at that time, nor after Sherif Hussein's rising, or the total loss of Syria and Palestine, after the defeat of our glorious army, did I succeed in penetrating this secret.

A few months after I began to write my memoirs certain political articles in the *Temps* opened my eyes to their secret aims and objects.

It was in June, 1915, that Abdul Kerim el Halil had begun his work on the organisation of the revolt, and the correspondence between the English and Sherif Hussein with reference to a rising also falls into this time. I give the article which appeared in the *Temps* on September 18th, 1919:

THE ARABS AND THE ENTENTE.

To-day we are in a position to say something fresh about the negotiations during the war between the British authorities and the King of the Hedjaz, father of the Emir Faisal, who is using his influence in Syria at the present moment. The exchange of views between the British Government and Sherif Hussein of Mecca, now King of the Hedjaz, on the subject of the territorial peace terms in the Levant, are contained in eight letters between July, 1915, and January, 1916.

1. In July, 1915, the Sherif offered the British Government military assistance in return for the promise of independence for Arabia in an area including Mersina and Adana in the north and stretching from the 37th degree of latitude to the Persian frontier. The eastern limit is to be the Persian frontier down to the Gulf of Basra, the southern the Indian Ocean, but Aden is excluded. In the west the kingdom is to be bounded by the Red Sea and the Mediterranean as far as Mersina.

2. On August 30th, 1915, Sir Henry MacMahon, British Resident in Cairo, replied evasively with the remark that the moment for deciding on the future frontiers had not yet arrived.

3. In a letter of September 9th, forwarded on October 18th, Sir Henry MacMahon tells the Foreign Office that the Sherif insists on a prompt discussion of the frontier question. At the same time Sir Henry MacMahon sends on the declaration handed him by the Egyptian representative of the Sherif. It runs as follows:

A French occupation of the purely Arab districts of Aleppo, Harna, Horas, and Damascus would meet with armed resistance from the Arabs. But with the exception of these regions, and a few rectifications of the frontier in the north-west, the Arabs accept the frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca.

4. On October 24th, 1915, on the instructions of his Government, Sir Henry MacMahon sends the following letter to the Sherif:

The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the parts of Syria lying west of Damascus, Horns, Harna, and Aleppo cannot be regarded as purely Arab, and must therefore be excluded from the frontier settlement now in contemplation. With this exception, and without insisting on the agreements we have made with the Arab leaders, we accept the frontiers. As regards those areas in which Great Britain has freedom of action without encroaching upon French interests, I am authorised by the British Government to give you the following assurances:

"With the above exceptions, Great Britain is prepared to recognise and support Arab claims to independence in the territories within the frontiers proposed by the Sherif of Mecca."

5. On November 5th the Sherif replied that he was willing to agree to the exclusion of Mersina and Adana, but must insist upon the inclusion of the other regions, especially Beirut.

6. On December 13th Sir Henry MacMahon took notice of the abandonment of Mersina and Adana by the Sherif.

7. On January 1st, 1916, the Sherif explained that, with a view to avoiding any prejudice to the Anglo-French alliance, he will not insist on his claims to the Lebanon for the duration of the war, but would put forward these claims afresh when the war was over.

8. On January 30th Sir Henry MacMahon took notice of the Sherif's intimation that he would avoid anything which might complicate Anglo-French relations, and informed him that the friendship between England and France would continue after the war.

Thereupon the correspondence, discussion, and negotiations

between the Sherif and Great Britain on the territorial conditions of peace came to an end.

These documents reveal the facts that :

1. In the letter of October 24th, 1915, which constitutes the sole binding agreement between Great Britain and the Sherif, the English Government entered into no obligation which conflicted with the Franco-British agreement of May, 1916.

2. After the opening of the negotiations for the agreement of May, 1916, which Monsieur Georges Picot was commissioned to conduct in London, Great Britain entered into no fresh commitment with the Sherif. The first meeting of the negotiators took place on November 23rd, 1915, and the two last letters of January, 1916, added nothing to the obligations undertaken towards King Hussein on October 24th.

This article shows clearly enough that as early as the first months of 1915 Sherif Hussein had decided upon a revolt, and laid before the British Government a proposal for the establishment of an independent Arab State, bounded on the north by a line drawn from Mersina-Adana to Mosul. If England accepted this proposal the Sherif pledged himself to rise against his illustrious sovereign, the Khalif of Islam.

When these facts (which I have ascertained subsequently) are viewed in conjunction with the attempts at revolt which I discovered at the end of June, 1915, it is perfectly clear that Abdul Kerim el Halil and his confederates had then received appropriate instructions from the Sherif of Mecca, and already taken the first steps towards the organisation of the revolt.

Although I had never believed in the honesty of the Sherif of Mecca, I could never have conceived that in a war, upon which the fate of the Khalifate depended, he would ally himself with the States which desired to thrust the Slav yoke upon the whole Mohammedan world, and, indeed, would go so far as to sow the seeds of discord in the whole country to gratify his personal ambitions.

The correspondence, couched in a highly respectful tone, which I had had with him since December, 1914, continued, and he promised to assist the second Canal Expedition, which was due for the winter of 1915, with a corps he proposed to send from the

Hedjaz. Although I was perfectly certain that men like Refik el Azem, Sheik Reshid Riza, and Abdul Kerim el Halil were base enough to sell themselves to the English and French, it never struck me as possible that a man of Sherif Hussein's experience, a greybeard, with one foot in the grave, could be so egoistical and ambitious as to embark upon an enterprise the development of which inevitably involved thralldom for the Arabs and the whole Mohammedan world.

About this time the crew of the *Emden* were attacked by Beduins in the neighbourhood of Yeddah, just after their landing on the coast of the Hedjaz, near Assyr. (After overcoming difficulties innumerable, they were ultimately to make good their return to Germany.) It was obvious to me that this attack by the Beduins had been suggested and ordered by Sherif Hussein; but I thought that his action had been prompted by a desire to make himself popular with the English and to make it appear to the Arabs that all he was doing was preventing infidels from entering the Holy Places.

At this time the English were blockading all the coasts of the Empire, but the coast of the Hedjaz was excepted and they permitted the Arabian *Zambuks* to get as much food and corn as they liked from Egyptian ports. I took no exception to this, because the Beduins of the Hedjaz, the local fixed population, and the inhabitants of the Holy Places were almost starving. In this way Syria, which could hardly feed itself, was relieved of the necessity of sending food supplies to that region.

I believed that the English took that course in order to win the sympathies of the Mohammedans of India and Africa, and that Sherif Hussein was doing everything to avoid estranging the English. I considered that the main object of the attacks on the crew of the *Emden* was solely to avert English ill-will. I can see now that all these ideas were phantoms. Sherif Hussein had betrayed me, the Government and the illustrious Khalifate, and, indeed, in a manner worthy of the commonest of hypocrites. He had not shrunk from allying himself with the foes of the Ottoman Empire, and sowing discord and weaving plots among the Mohammedans.

The trials of Abdul Kerim el Halil and his accomplices took place in the months of June and July. As they proceeded,

the criminal aims of the revolutionaries became abundantly clear.

The wide range of their plottings simply astounded me. At this time the only troops in Syria were Arab regiments, and if these had mutinied I should have had nothing with which to quell the revolt. The battle at the Dardanelles was raging in all its fury, and it was out of the question to take a battalion, let alone a division, away from that front.

As I wished to give a warning to all and sundry who were fomenting any kind of disorder, I considered it necessary, in view of the situation and the powers conferred upon the Army Commander in exceptional circumstances, to confirm the sentence of the court martial and allow it to be carried out at once. Imperial sanction to be obtained subsequently. I had already obtained the sanction of the War Minister and the Minister of the Interior.

After reading the proceedings of the court martial and obtaining the views of the Judge Advocate General, I confirmed the sentence of death, and it was carried out the following day at Beirut. This was the end of August, 1915. These speedy executions produced no small panic among the rebels.

Meanwhile Sherif Hussein was not merely content to enter into negotiations with the English, but had actually had the effrontery to send his son, Sherif Faisal, to me to keep him informed of everything which was happening in Syria.

In September, 1915, Sherif Faisal came to Syria and then went on to Constantinople. When he was received in audience by the Sultan in Stambul, he protested his loyalty and that of his father and family in words of such humble devotion that His Majesty could not have the slightest doubt about his honesty. Sherif Faisal returned to Syria, after giving all the Ministers the same assurances, and was received by me with great honour. During his short visit we arranged that his father should send to Palestine a volunteer corps of fifteen hundred camelry to take part under Faisal's command. Before he left Jerusalem the Emir Faisal made a long speech to my Headquarters Staff, in which he swore by the glorious soul of the Prophet to return at an early date at the head of his warriors and help them to fight the foes of the Faith to the death. It is worth noticing that at the very moment when Sherif Faisal was taking this perjured oath, his father had already

written the letters of September 9th and November 5th to the English and prepared his treacherous blow at the Khalifate. At that time I knew nothing whatever about his infamies.

The trial of Abdul Gani el Vreissi disclosed a large number of important facts, and I thought the moment had come to make appropriate use of the documents seized at the French Consulate at Damascus at the beginning of the war. I had asked the War Minister and the Minister of the Interior for the necessary authority. After a somewhat lengthy correspondence I was given permission. The hesitation they displayed I ascribed to the fact that the persons implicated by the documents held very high positions. In my opinion the punishment of a man who betrays his faith and his country should be in proportion to the social position he enjoys, for the criminal activities of such a man are not to be ascribed to ignorance and folly, and their effects may be infinitely more disastrous. His treachery is the result of malice aforethought.

After the two responsible Ministers had communicated their agreement with me on this matter, I gave the court martial the evidence with which to convict persons who, for years, had been planning all sorts of revolutionary enterprises on the pretext of claiming reforms, self-determination, and independence for the Arabs.

While the second group of Arabs were on their trial for high treason I continued the very amicable correspondence with Sherif Hussein. In January Sherif Faisal at length appeared at Damascus with fifty horsemen from Mecca. He resided at my headquarters to help me in equipping the promised 1500 volunteers and despatching the necessary material to Mecca.

The court martial prepared the case very carefully. In February Enver Pasha came to Syria to visit the 4th Army and inspect the L. of C. organisation in Sinai. I suggested that he should go to Medina also, and we went there accompanied by Sherif Faisal. During this visit we received various presents from Sherif Hussein, and among them a sword of honour, a distinction which the Arabs regard as the greatest proof of friendship. But all the time he was thus demonstrating his loyalty in this way, he was making definitive proposals for the organisation of a rebellion

against the Khalifate in the letter of January 1st, 1916, to which I have referred.

If I give all these details, it is to expose Sherif Hussein's baseness and furnish an adequate reply to certain short-sighted people who have attributed the Sherif's rebellion to my bad administration.

The trial continued even after Enver Pasha's return to Constantinople. It was then that Sherif Hussein showed his true colours. Just after Enver Pasha got back he sent me a telegram in cipher which he had received from Sherif Hussein. Omitting certain introductory sophisms, it ran more or less as follows:

"If you want me to remain quiet, you must recognise my independence in the whole of the Hedjaz—from Tebbuk to Mecca—and create me hereditary prince there. You must also drop the prosecution of the guilty Arabs and proclaim a general amnesty for Syria and Irak."

The meaning of this telegram was so obscure that Enver Pasha told me he could not make head or tail of it and considered it a puzzle.

Simultaneously Sherif Faisal, probably on instructions from his father, begged me to show forbearance and generosity to the prisoners.

On receipt of Enver Pasha's telegram I sent for the Sherif. I asked my Chief of Staff, Ali Fuad Bey, to come as witness to our interview. After a few introductory words, I addressed Sherif Faisal as follows:

"When I heard on my return from Medina that your brother Ali Bey was interfering with the authority of the Governor of Medina and assuming powers on the pretext that they were part of his authority as Imam, I attributed his action to his youth and inexperience. I told the Governor to ask him to discontinue such action for the future. I asked your father also to make similar representations to him.

"In our many previous conversations I have always impressed upon you that I myself would leave nothing undone to safeguard the rights of the Imam, and if any of your rights were illegally encroached upon, I would give you every help in my power, even if, in doing so, I came into conflict with other people, however

highly placed. I have told your father so by letter on several occasions, and received letters of thanks from him in return.

“At the same time I think you yourself will admit that your father has many enemies in his own family. Some of those enemies are in Constantinople and trying every day to rouse the Government’s suspicions against your father. That being so, the best course for you is to avoid doing or saying anything which could give your enemies any ground for calumniating you. If you read this telegram you must admit that your father is on the wrong track and giving his political enemies a weapon to use against him.”

Sherif Faisal feverishly read the telegram and turned pale. At length he said:

“Effendim! You’ve no idea what a grief this is to me. This telegram is certainly the result of some great misunderstanding. I can positively assure you that my father means nothing wrong. You know he does not understand Turkish very well. This telegram must have been written out by some Turkish scribe who did not understand the Arab text and has reproduced it in this inaccurate translation. God forbid that my father should ever contemplate such a notion!”

Sherif Faisal’s discomfort waxed patently. He immediately offered to write to his father to ask him to abandon his intention, and took refuge in every possible excuse.

As a result of this conversation I sent Sherif Hussein the following telegram:

“I have been informed of your telegram to Enver Pasha. You ask that the Imaret should be made hereditary in your family and the Imperial pardon granted to several persons who have proved themselves traitors to the nation and the faith. Your second request cannot be complied with, for it would involve highly injurious action in a matter touching the common weal. A Government which pardoned traitors would be accused of weakness by public opinion. It would be itself encouraging a large number of persons to play the part of traitor and dealing a severe blow at the welfare of the Empire and the Faith. If you were acquainted with the contents of the documents in these trials you would see to what depths of treason the accused descended. But as regards the question of making the Imaret hereditary in your family, my

view is—and you will forgive me for the suggestion—that the moment for putting this demand forward does not seem to me well chosen.

“At a time when, owing to the war, everyone’s mental and physical forces are exposed to the most extreme strain, you must admit that the expression of such a wish by one occupying the position of Imam at the most important point in the Ottoman Empire—and a point more exposed to danger than any other—is bound to make the worst possible impression on the public.

“In my opinion you ought not to put forward such a claim, even if you had the right to do so. The entire resources of the nation should be concentrated for one purpose and one purpose alone to-day—to win the final victory.

“I should also draw your attention to the following aspect of the matter. Let us assume that the Government complied with your demand solely because they wanted to keep you from being troublesome in the difficult times through which we are passing. If the war came to a victorious conclusion, who could prevent the Government from dealing with you with the greatest severity when it is over? The men who form the present Government and dared to rise against Sultan Hamid, whose despotism alarmed you also, would never forgive anyone who had the audacity to hamper them in the war upon which they have entered for the good of the Mohammedan world. On the other hand they would not fail to secure His Majesty the Khalif’s gracious favour for all those who have contributed for love of God towards the attainment of our sacred purpose.”

While these communications were passing, the court martial at Aalye passed sentence. Sherif Faisal moved heaven and earth to secure a pardon for the condemned men. He came to see me every day, and always brought the conversation round to the question of pardon. As I heard from time to time, he blamed the notables who visited him, reproached them with having done nothing to save their countrymen, and insisted that the least they could do was to approach me on their behalf.

One Friday he asked me to lunch with him at the farm of Kabun, an hour’s distance from Damascus. I went there accompanied by several officers. After the meal we got round to the same old subject. I asked him whether he knew how great the guilt of

the prisoners was. He said he had no idea. I replied that when he heard the details he would be extremely sorry that he had ever asked for them to be pardoned.

On the day before the executions, at Sherif Faisal's request, Sheik Bedreddin, for whom I had a profound respect, came to my headquarters to put in a word for the condemned men. Sheik Abdul Kader el Halil, preacher of the Mosque of Ormajade, accompanied him. It would be difficult to find a more dishonest and treacherous individual, not merely in Damascus, but in the whole world. The treachery of the Medina people, who have earned the Prophet's curse, is nothing compared with his low cunning. I thought it wiser to defer his punishment to some later time.

I asked Sheik Essad Shukair, the Mufti of the Army, to act as interpreter.

Sheik Bedreddin put his request in the well-chosen words peculiar to him. Without mentioning the court martial and the prisoners, he made general and pointed observations on criminal intrigues which endangered the welfare of Islam. After referring to various books, he ended up as follows:

"God has three punishments for those responsible for discord and disorder among the believers: death, the loss of both arms, and banishment for life. The punishment must be according to the evils which flow from the crime. We are living at a time when the world of Islam has entered upon a most perilous war. Men who, at such time, are capable of weakening Islam by their intrigues are nothing but a dangerous pest. The Prophet says: 'He who intervenes with a judge on behalf of a traitor is himself a traitor, for consciously or unconsciously he is promoting dissension.'"

When Sheik Kiamil Bedreddin had finished I looked hard at Sheik Essad and Abdul Kader el Halil, and said with a smile:

"You brought the venerable Sheik to me to put a word in for the traitors condemned by the court martial. What he has done is simply to approve the sentence of the court martial and show me by reference to Holy Writ that I have no right to pardon traitors. That is so, isn't it, Bedreddin Effendi?"

He glanced at us all and nodded. "Great Heavens, Sheik!" cried Sheik Essad Shukair. "You've done for us! After what you've said, how is it possible for us to make further representa-

tions to the Pasha. Thanks to your *fetva* he'll treat us as traitors and hang us, too, without hesitation," he said in a joking tone and with that the interview came to an end.

The next day the executions took place at Beirut and Damascus.

Some say I should not have allowed the sentence to be carried out before confirmation by the Sultan.

The reply is (1) that I had legal authority to do so; (2) that the speedy execution of the sentence was the only way in which I could keep traitors in check. In Arabia highly-placed individuals have such influence that quite frequently the presence of a single individual can have a greater effect than that of a whole army corps. If an Army Commander with such small resources at his disposal as I had is to preserve the authority and influence of the Government in a country which has been poisoned by English and French propaganda for years, it is absolutely essential that the civil population should be convinced of his power to reprimand and punish *anyone* without having to refer to Constantinople for permission first.

I am certain that to the executions in April, 1916, alone do we owe the fact that there was no rising in Syria during the two-and-a-half years following Sherif Hussein's declaration of independence.

But, apart from that, Enver Pasha and Talaat Pasha, the War Minister and Minister of the Interior, had agreed that the sentences should be carried out without previous references. Subsequently I sent the report of the proceedings to Constantinople, where they were revised by the appeal court of the Ministry of War and sent to the Sultan for confirmation on a decree of the Council of Ministers. In this way the sentences pronounced and carried out by the army received Imperial sanction, and the proceedings were definitely closed.

There are some also who say that the crimes of those who were condemned and executed in Syria were covered by the general amnesty of 1913, so that their subsequent conviction for the same offences was illegal.

As I have shown in the Red Book, "The Truth About the Syrian Question," these people used the general amnesty to start their criminal activities afresh, and their conviction related solely to their crimes *after* that time. As the documents relating to their

guilt before the amnesty are very strong evidence, the court martial examined and published them to show up how shameless their treason was. If there are some who, even after the publication of the Red Book, still persist in these allegations, it is easy to see that their motive is to prove the Government wrong in any case.

On the day the sentences were carried out the army published a proclamation, embodying some of the documentary evidence, to expose the guilt of the prisoners.

Two or three hours later Sherif Faisal called upon me. "I swear by the memory of my ancestors," he said, "that, had I known how heinous was the offence of those criminals, I should not merely have refused to intervene for them. I should have asked for them to be torn limb from limb to prolong their sufferings. God's curse be upon them!"

The same day Azem Lade Mehmed Pasha, the Deputy for Damascus, came to see me. "I feel absolutely ashamed," he said, "that such people should be members of my family. You have vindicated God's justice. May God and his Prophet take you in His holy care!"

A month after these events I received from Sherif Hussein a reply to my telegram. I gathered from his answer that my communication had made a most unpleasant impression upon him. He first recommended a general amnesty in the interests of the Government, and then complained bitterly of the Governor of Medina. He wrote that he could not suffer rights to be illegally filched from him which had been conferred upon him by the Ottoman Khalif.

At this time the behaviour of Sherif Ali Bey towards Basri Pasha at Medina was simply intolerable. I immediately asked Sherif Faisal to come and see me, showed him his father's reply, and told him severely that if his brother continued to interfere as he had been doing, I should use military force against him. I added:

"I may as well tell you, Faisal Bey Effendi, that I understand neither the language used by your father of late nor the behaviour of your brother at Medina. Our relations with you here have been friendly. How is Ali Bey's conduct in Medina to be explained? On the one hand they are equipping a force of 1,500 volunteers for the Canal Expedition. The Government is helping

them with money and arms. On the other hand, your father is beginning to show separatist inclinations, while your brother, Ali Bey, is pursuing a line of conduct which is in harmony with your father's claims. I want to make you realise that if you want to remain good friends with us you yourself must observe the laws of friendship.

" But if you have other intentions you'd better take up arms and start your rebellion at once. We should at any rate end the present comedy and be open enemies. The sequel will be in God's hands! But if rebellion is not your object, write to your brother, Ali Bey, to tell him to come to me here at once and stop encroaching upon the authority of the Governor for the future! "

Sherif Hussein's last letter made it quite clear to me that this man was only seeking some pretext for a revolt. That was why I used such unambiguous and peremptory language to Sherif Faisal.

Under the effect of my words Sherif Faisal turned deadly pale and every drop of blood left his cheeks. He rose and, putting his hand on his heart, said :

" Forgive me, Your Excellency! How could you accuse us of such things? How could we be traitors, members of a family descended from the Prophet, a family whose greatest honour it is to be most devoted and loyal followers of the Khalif? My father, my brother and I are not traitors to the nation and the Government. We are the faithful servants of the illustrious sovereign who has always heaped favours upon us. You may be certain that I will settle the differences between my brother and Governor Basri Pasha. I'll see that he comes here to kiss your hand! "

Ali Fuad Bey, Chief of Staff of the Army, was present at this interview. Sheik Essad Shukai told me subsequently that Sherif Faisal had gone to the office of my Chief of Staff in extreme agitation, burst into tears, and told him that as I had been in such a rage he feared that I would have his brother arrested and executed at Damascus.

All this happened at the beginning of April, 1916. From the article published in the *Temps* to which I have referred it is clear that since January 1st, 1916, Sherif Hussein had had an understanding with the English and was only waiting for a favourable opportunity of raising the standard of rebellion.

Had I known this at the time, I should have immediately arrested Sherif Faisal in Damascus and his brother in Medina. I should have sent a Turkish division in hot haste to Mecca, seized Sherif Hussein and his sons, and nipped this fateful rebellion in the bud. But in the circumstances what could I do? At that time I had no documentary evidence of the criminal designs of these people.

Sherif Hussein had already had fifty to sixty thousand pounds in gold for the equipment of his auxiliary force of 1500 volunteers for the Canal Expedition. The necessary rifles were sent to Medina at the end of April, and were to be sent on from there to Mecca. Sherif Hussein's changed tone, however, made caution necessary; I pleaded difficulties of transport and wrote that I thought it better to send his volunteers on foot and without arms to Medina, where rifles would be supplied.

One day about the middle of May Sherif Faisal appeared, and told me that his brother had been ordered by his father to join the Sinai Army at the front, and with my permission he himself would like to go to Medina to accompany his brother to Jerusalem. He added that this would make an excellent impression on the Mujahids.

I at once realised that he hoped to outwit me by this device, but as I was quite accustomed to being deceived by Sherif Hussein and his sons I preferred to be top dog. After a moment's consideration I replied:

"All right! I'll give you permission. Receive the volunteers at Medina in my name and bring them on here. I'll give the railway authorities concerned the necessary movement orders for the troops and give you a few ulemas from Damascus as your escort. You can form a special delegation to greet the Mujahids."

At these words Sherif Faisal's eyes simply sparkled with delight, and at that moment I knew the truth and the whole truth. Indeed I said to Ali Fuad Bey, my Chief of Staff: "I'm absolutely certain we shall have a rising in the Hedjaz in the immediate future. Sherif Faisal was so delighted at the prospect of taking me in that he could hardly conceal his delight."

Ali Fuad Bey was of the same opinion, and approved the course I had taken, seeing the impossibility of any other.

At that time a force of two or three thousand men which had been sent to supplement the *cadres* of the corps in the Yemen had arrived at Medina from Constantinople. The Governor had been trying for the last fortnight to raise the camels required for its transport. Basri Pasha informed me that there was a rumour that this force, which was not very well trained and had hardly one reservist officer and fifty armed men per company, was to be enticed into a trap by the Beduins between Mecca and Medina as a result of inflammatory speeches made by Sherif Hussein.

I answered the Governor, giving him strict instructions to keep this detachment back in Medina until further orders, have the men well trained by all officers available, and arm them with the rifles originally destined for the Mecca volunteers. In view of Sherif Ali's suspicious behaviour he must also be prepared for an attack on Medina. I added that Sherif Faisal was on his way to Medina.

After Sherif Faisal had left with the small escort I had given him I decided as a matter of precaution to send Fahri Pasha to Medina. He was of the Divisional Commanders of the Army Corps under my command, and well known for his reliability and patriotism. I explained to him the situation and my views upon it, and told him my suspicions that Sherif Hussein would shortly revolt. I asked him to go to Medina on the pretext of visiting the Prophet's grave, and if occasion required to arrange with Basri Pasha all necessary measures of defence. Basri Pashi, the Governor of Medina, was unquestionably a courageous, honest, and patriotic man who was very familiar with the peculiar psychology of the Arab, but he had no great war experience, and I was afraid he would not act with the necessary strength and resolution in a difficult situation.

Basri Pasha and Fahri Pasha were given the same secret instructions, which provided that on the first sign of a revolt Fahri Pasha was to take over the commands of the Sherif's sons, while Basri Pasha was to undertake the civil administration. I was quite sure that at such a time there would be no differences between those two fine Turks, who placed love of country before anything else.

In order to be armed against any emergency I had two or three battalions and one or two mountain batteries at Damascus ready to march on Medina immediately. These troops did not know

their destination, but were always ready so that they could be entrained within half an hour of receiving the first signal.

After Sherif Faisal's arrival in Medina he wrote to me to say how glad he was his brother Ali was to meet me before long. As Sherif Hussein had asked me to send him I forget how many thousand pounds for the expenses of his Mujahids, who were ready to march, I asked the Governor of Medina to give Sherif Ali the sum required. Sherif Hussein, who had been allied with the English since January 1st, 1916, did not shrink from obtaining money by false pretences from the Government a day or so before his defection towards the end of May, 1916.

On June 2nd, when I was on a visit to Beirut, I was called up on the telephone from Medina by Fahri Pasha. I had an unmistakable foreboding that I was to get bad news. Fahri Pasha reported as follows:

Since I came here I've been on the best of terms with Sherif Ali and Faisal Bey. Only two days ago they invited me to Hezret Hamza, where the camp of the Mujahids is. We lunched together. The volunteers were indulging in all the sports beloved of the Beduins and singing songs about the blows they were going to inflict on the English. Last evening I was asked to Ali and Faisal Bey's house. The first contingents of the Mujahids was to be sent to Deraa in two days' time.

This morning I find myself faced with a situation which has changed in the most remarkable way. One of Sherif Ali Bey's men brought me some letters. One was for me, the second—from Sherif Hussein—for you, and the third—also from Sherif Hussein—was addressed to the Grand Vizier. As the two last were in cipher I had them sent on at once.

In the letter to me Ali Bey writes: "In accordance with my father's orders the transport of the volunteers to Palestine will be suspended. I have therefore decided to return with the Mujahids to Mecca instead of wasting my time here. I regret that I must go without taking leave of you. Please excuse me!"

Of course I could not read the letters in cipher from Sherif Hussein. I immediately sent a detachment to the place occupied by the volunteers yesterday. It was deserted. Ali Bey had written that he was returning to Mecca, but according to the information given me by loyal Beduin Sheiks, he had divided his force into three detachments and sent them in different directions. It seems to me certain that the railway will be attacked to-night or to-morrow morning at the latest, and that Ali Bey will interrupt our communications between Medina and Syria and attempt a surprise attack on Medina with his whole force. In accordance with your instructions I have assumed command of all the troops in Medina and taken all measures of defence necessary to meet emergencies. Please don't leave us without reinforcements!

I told Fahri Pasha that I would immediately give orders that the troops destined for Medina should proceed there at once, and asked him whether he required any further reinforcements.

I had Sherif Hussein's letters to the Grand Vizier and myself deciphered. In the telegram to me Sherif Hussein wrote that unfortunately he could take no part in the expedition against the Canal until the conditions he had laid down in his telegram to the Grand Vizier were complied with and our attitude towards him ceased to be equivocal.

In his letter to the Grand Vizier he said that he did not know whom he was to believe, as one of the two diplomatists with whom he was dealing had always shown him the most distinguished courtesy, while the other had used the most insulting language. He considered himself compelled to break off relations with the Government until the request was acceded to which he had made to Enver Pasha two months before.

I was the courteous diplomat, while Enver Pasha was the man who had been so rude to him. About three weeks before Enver Pasha had sent Sherif Hussein a telegram pointing out the necessity of his son Ali's acting very differently towards the Governor of Medina.

It must be supposed that Sherif Hussein had discovered no other excuse for rebelling and wished to exploit this matter. The letters I had sent him were couched in terms which offered no pretext whatever for disagreement. As a matter of fact, there were no insulting expressions in Enver Pasha's letter, though it was not overburdened with polite formulæ. Thus, the form of this letter was the reason why Sherif Hussein rebelled.

When Sherif Faisal went to Medina I provided him with a cipher key, in case anything unusual occurred of which he might like to inform me.

I duly received a communication from him in cipher. It ran as follows:

My father has given orders to stop the transport of the volunteers to Syria, for reasons I hope to explain personally when I have the pleasure of seeing you before long. The situation which has now arisen has upset me very much and, as it would be painful for me to see you again before matters have been put right, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that I am going to Medina for a time.

Two or three days later the outbreak of the revolt, which began with an attack on the railway north of Medina, confirmed the criminal designs of Sherif Hussein.

As subsequent events relate solely to the fighting between the

rebels and the troops, I do not think it necessary to discuss them in my memoirs. On my return to my country—in God's good time!—I hope to be able to publish the whole of the correspondence (which I have kept) between Sherif Hussein and myself. But as I have read in Mandelstamm's book the French translation of the proclamations Sherif Hussein felt impelled to issue to justify his revolt, it seems to me that the object of my book makes it advisable to examine them more closely.

The causes of the revolution, which are enumerated in the first proclamation of Sherif Hussein on the 25 Chaban, 1334 (June 27th, 1916), may be summarised as follows. In its original text the proclamation furnishes an eloquent example of the literary hypocrisy of the Arabs. It is translated at p. 260 of Mandelstamm's work :

1. Since the day on which the " Committee of Unity and Progress " obtained power (he probably means since July 23, 1908, when the country received a constitution) the country has been governed so badly that the Empire has lost a large part of its territory, with its population, and also its prestige.

2. During the many foreign wars resulting from this bad government the people, particularly the inhabitants of the Hedjaz, have been reduced to such a state of misery that they have had to sell even the roof over their heads.

3. As if that were not enough, the laws of the Mohammedan religion have been disregarded. In Constantinople, for instance, and under the eyes of the Government and the Sheif ul Islam, a newspaper, *El-Ijtihad*, has had the audacity to use language about the Prophet which is incompatible with the traditional reverence due to him.

4. This journal even went so far as to suggest a change in the laws of the Mussulman sherifats relating to inheritance in favour of equal rights between men and women.

5. Using the state of war as a pretext, the Government has issued a decree releasing troops stationed in cities like Damascus, Medina and Mecca from the necessity of observing the fasts.

6. The prerogative granted to the Khalif by the laws of our religion (Sheriat) and the authority of the Khalif have been restricted by depriving His Majesty of the right to choose his own Chief of the Cabinet or the Ministers of his Civil List.

7. Lastly, the veil has fallen, and it is obvious that the Empire is in the hands of Enver Pasha, Djemal Pasha and Talaat Bey, who govern it just as they like.

8. The most striking proof of this is the order recently issued to the Kadi of the Tribunal of Mecca instructing him to base his judgments solely on the evidence taken down by the court in his presence and to ignore the evidence solely recorded by Mohammedans elsewhere. This is a breach of the *sura* (verse of the Koran) " Suret el Baquara."

9. Another proof is that at the same time the following people of rank have been hung : Emir Omar of Algiers, Emir Arif El Shihabi, Sheif Bey el Maayyad, Shukri Bey el Assali, Abdul Wahab (I cannot see why Sherif Hussein does not give the latter the nickname of " El Inglisi " by which he was known), Tefik

Bey el Paset, Abdul Hamid el Zehravi, Abdul Gani el Ureissi and their followers.

10. Even that was not enough, but all their friends and relations have been banished and their property has been confiscated.

11. They have destroyed the tomb of the illustrious brother of the Emir Abd-el-Kadr, el Djezari el Hassani.

These were *all* the excuses for the rebellion which Sherif Hussein for all his pains could produce in the period of twenty-five days between the 2nd of June, the first day of the rebellion, and the 27th of June, the date of his proclamation.

I appeal to the natural justice of the whole Mohammedan world. Is there in the first eight clauses anything whatever, however small, to justify a genuine Mohammedan, much less a man claiming the honour of being a descendant of the Prophet, in rising in revolt against the Mohammedan Khalif? The events to which Sherif Hussein refers in paragraphs 9, 10 and 11 took place *after* July, 1915, when he had already entered into negotiations with the English, and it was in consequence of the suspected defection of Sherif Hussein that the Government found itself compelled to take those precautionary measures in the general interests of the world of Islam. Thus the Sherif has no right whatever to bring them forward as reasons for his revolt.

In one of the 1918 numbers of *El Kible*, a paper appearing in the sacred city of Mecca, I have read a letter of Sherif Hussein's. Unfortunately, I cannot give the whole of this letter, as it is not in my possession at the moment. In it the Sherif wrote as follows to some Arab gentleman, whose name he does not give :

Since we first became Emir our aim has always been the exalted one of freeing the Arabs. We have left nothing undone to achieve that aim and, with that end in view, we have established friendly relations with the highly-placed Arabs. How great have been our efforts appears from the fact of our participation in the Assyrian Expedition, when we sent an armed force, under the command of our son Abdullah, to frustrate the attack which Emir Ibn el Restrid, on Turkish inspiration, had made on Emir Ibn-el-Snud, etc.

That is what may be called an involuntary confession !

The fact is that, as the Sherif himself admits he had contemplated rebelling against his sovereign from the day on which he was appointed Imam, all the *valis* of the Hedjaz had known of his intentions and communicated them to Constantinople. Wehib Pasha proved himself particularly sound and reliable on this matter. He considered it necessary to send at least two divisions

to Mecca to depose the Sherif and set up a successor, but the Government refused to take so strong a step which might result in fresh and futile scandal and provoke disorder. They considered that, in view of their domestic policy, it would be better to come to some friendly arrangement with the Arabs when the Balkan War ended.

When I have an opportunity of publishing the correspondence, which covers a period of more than a year, the public will be able to realise the efforts I made, particularly after our entry into the World War, to give the Sherif no cause and deprive him of any excuse for quarrelling with us.

Sherif Hussein would like to call it a crime in us to have pronounced sentence of death upon a few Arabian notables in Syria. Although I have previously published the documents in a Red Book, entitled *The Truth About the Syrian Question*, documents which prove the guilt of the accused, it seems to be not without value to reproduce some of them here.

I.

THE FRENCH CONSULATE IN DAMASCUS.

January 15, 1913.

Reference the Case of Nahle Mutran Pasha of Baalbek.

The Consul-General to His Excellency Monsieur Bompard.

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that in recent weeks I have had two visits from Nahle Mutran Pasha, a very influential man in Baalbek. Two years ago this gentleman was Secretary of the Turkish Embassy in Paris, and he knows most of our diplomatists. He is a member of the Greek Catholic Church and also of the Unionist Party, though, in his conversation with me, he disavowed the latter by talking about the "collapse of the Committee's policy and the insolence of the Young Turks."

Nahle Mutran Pasha took advantage of a journey he had to make to Damascus to secure the revision of the trial of one of his friends to call upon me and discuss a matter which was bound, so he said, to interest the natural protector of the Lebanon and Syria. He said that the leading statesman of France had expressed himself to the same effect.

The present situation is intolerable (he continued). We have decided to secure the incorporation of Baalbek and the Plain of Bukaa in the Lebanon, with which they are united geographically. We need the help and protection of the French Government. Mohammedans and Christians alike, we are all determined to succeed. We know how we can achieve our object if the Ottoman Government opposes an armed resistance. One section of the people of Baalbek belongs to our party and the town enjoys a special position. It is the key to the heart of Syria and the roads into the interior. The Chief of the Mutevalis (Essad Bey Haydar), the most influential man in the district, Abdul Gani el Rufai, the leader of the Mohammedans, and I are determined that our region shall form part of the Lebanon, and we have decided to go to Beirut to inform

Monsieur Couget of our plans. He has always taken the greatest interest in everything connected with the Lebanon. But as Baalbek is in the area of your consulate, it is my duty to inform you of these matters on behalf of Essad Bey, Abdul Gani, and myself.

I could only accept Nahle Mutran Pasha's assurances with the greatest reserve, though I received him with every courtesy. But the former Embassy secretary paid me a second visit, in which he renewed the assurances of his devotion to France and promised to render me any service in his power in his own country.

II.

BEIRUT,

March 12, 1913.

To Monsieur F. Couget,

Consul-General of France in Syria.

M. Consul-General,—Remembering that France is the protector of the Ottoman Christians and the adopted fatherland of the Christians of Syria, we, the undersigned Christian members of the Executive Committee of the General Assembly, elected by all the communal councils of the province of Beirut to draw up a scheme of reform for this vilayet, wish to lay before the French Consul-General in Syria the following observations on :

(1) The position of the Ottoman Christians;

(2) The reforms proposed by the Executive Committee;

(3) The hopes and desires of the Syrian Christians;

and beg Monsieur the Consul-General to submit these observations to the Government of the French Republic and support them with his authority.

III.

BEIRUT,

March 18, 1913.

M. Birré, the editor of the Arab journal *El Salah*, has just given me on behalf of the signatories a manifesto which I am sending Your Excellency herewith in view of its political interest.

This manifesto has been drawn up with the approval of the leading members of the Committee which is secretly engaged in carrying through reforms in Syria, as I have frequently reported to the Department. It is signed by the most influential of these gentlemen. The lawyer, M. Pierre Tarrad, and M. Tuéni, interpreter at the Consulate, are Greek Catholics, while M. J. Hani is a Maronite, and Dr. Sabit is a Protestant.

In the letter which they send me in the name of their co-religionists they are mostly concerned with putting forward the wishes of the Christians in Syria, and emphasising their friendship for France. This document is a fresh proof of the deep attachment to us felt by the Christian population of this region. It also shows what a great impression French promises have made and what great hopes they have awakened.

1. *The Position of the Ottoman Christians.*

The situation of the Christians in the Ottoman Empire has always been wretched—nay, tragic. As the result of the Balkan War and the Turkish defeats it may well become far worse, for the direct consequences of those defeats are (1) increase of taxation, (2) a revival of Mohammedan fanaticism, (3) a new impulse towards emigration on the part of the Syrian Christians.

As to (1) increase of taxation. As a result of the loss of their European provinces, the Turkish Government will try—and are now trying—to shift the

burden which rested on the lost provinces on to the shoulders of the Asiatic provinces. Those who are familiar with the trickery and injustice displayed by the Turkish administration in assessing and raising taxes cannot doubt for a moment that the new burdens will fall exclusively on the Christian population.

As to (2) the revival of Mohammedan fanaticism. In the hands of Turkish politicians Mohammedan fanaticism has ever been a valuable and infallible weapon. They did not hesitate to use it during recent events in the Balkans. The Balkan War was regarded by the Mohammedans as a religious war, a crusade of the Cross against the Crescent, united Christendom against Islam. Hence it is a simple step further for the Mohammedans to think that the presence of Christians in the Ottoman Empire has been the main cause of their defeats and decay. In Mohammedan eyes the Ottoman Christians are the true authors of all the evils which have overtaken the Empire. They are its natural enemies. They will be made the object of all kinds of insults and oppression—not, of course, such brazen and palpable oppression as might give a foreign Power an excuse for intervening (the Turk is too cunning and cautious for that), but that secret and “slow-torture” oppression in which the Turkish authorities are such masters and have the elasticity of their laws to help them.

As to (3), a new impulse towards immigration on the part of the Syrian Christians. Since the Balkan War began a considerable number of Mohammedans have emigrated from Macedonia and Thrace into Syria. This movement is on the increase, and is openly favoured by the authorities. It means, unfortunately, that the numerical balance between the Christians and Mohammedans in Syria is upset, to the disadvantage of the Christians. The Mohammedans are already despotic enough through their religion, and they will become even more so through the oppressive weight of their numbers.

The Christians of Syria are greatly agitated at this prospect, and in consequence many of them have emigrated to America. Thus the present situation provides an extremely strong impulse to double emigration—of the Mohammedans to Syria and of the Syrian Christians to America. Even if it continues for quite a short time it will mean the destruction of the Christian element in Syria.

Reform Proposals.

Immediately after the speech of Minister-President Poincaré, in which that influential statesman called upon Turkey to bring in reforms in her Asiatic provinces, the Turkish Government announced on their own that they were prepared to concede reforms in their vilayets, and required the valis to draw up schemes of reform for their provinces. Taught by experience, the Ottoman Christians knew what they had to expect in the way of honest intentions from the Government. The sole object of these reform schemes was to prevent Europe from intervening to demand the introduction of definite reforms by Turkey. Turkey was proposing to use these reform schemes—which would look as if they were the work of the inhabitants, whereas in truth they would be drawn up by the Government—as a pretext for refusing the reforms demanded by Europe. They would allege that these were not in accordance with the draft schemes produced by the parties interested themselves.

Yet in spite of all this the Christians of Beirut declared their willingness to work together with the Mohammedans in the carrying out of the reforms, and for the two reasons following: (1) To checkmate the design of the Turkish Government and prevent the draft being drawn up as it desired; (2) to introduce into this draft the principle of European control in every branch of the administration. If this principle were once accepted by all the members of the Committee, both Christian and Mohammedan, it would prove beyond dispute that the whole population considers that without help from Europe reform in Turkey is quite impossible.

The Wishes of the Syrian Christians.

Assuming that reforms could be obtained with the assistance of Europe, this would not satisfy the desires of the Christians in Syria. They are indissolubly allied with France, and can never forget how much admiration they owe her for her high civilisation and how much gratitude for her help in time of trouble.

The heart's desire of the Christians in Syria is the occupation of Syria by France.

For these reasons the undersigned members of the Executive Committee, in the name of the Christians of Beirut, and in order of rank, have put forward the following suggestions, the only suggestions they deem adequate to meet the political situation in Syria :

1. The occupation of Syria by France.
2. The complete independence of the vilayet of Beirut under the protection and supervision of France.
3. The incorporation of the vilayet of Beirut in the Lebanon, which is to be under the actual suzerainty of France.

(Signed) MICHEL TUENI, JOSEF HANI, PIERRE TARRAD, DOCTOR
EYUB SABIT, RIZCULLAH ARCASCH, KHALIL ZEINE.

FRENCH REPUBLIC.

CAIRO,

March 28, 1913.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Political and Trade Department.
Europe, Africa, and the East.
No. 131.

Syria. The Ottoman Decentralisation Committee.

COPY.

M. Defrance, Plenipotentiary of the French Republic
in Cairo, to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

At the moment the Syrians in Cairo are very active, or at any rate spurring each other on to great activity. On the 22nd of this month I informed you in my telegram No. 17 of the sitting of the Decentralisation Committee, at which M. Michel Tuéni, auxiliary interpreter at our consulate in Beirut, was present. From the supplementary information I have been able to gather, it appears that the decisions of the committee were neither so definite nor so unanimous as M. Tuéni thought. The latter, who was acting solely as a private person, a leading man in Syria, and in no official capacity whatever, is displaying an almost exaggerated zeal in the Syrian business in favour of an immediate and radical decision.

It is interesting to note also that the tendencies revealed by the Decentralisation Committee confirm at any rate in one point the information I was given a short time back as to the views on the probable future of their country held by the Syrian Mohammedans. I sent on that information to the Department in my letter of March 23, No. 123.

It appears that the Syrians—both Mohammedans and Christians—or at any rate those living in Egypt—have adapted their demands to the second of the proposals referred to in my letter of the 23rd—*i.e.*, the plan of making Syria an autonomous State under a Mohammedan prince. I heard that Kiamil Pasha—now in Cairo—roused the hopes of the members of the Decentralisation Committee, said that he agreed entirely with the draft reforms, and promised them to satisfy all their desires when he obtained power. But just as all those who received these assurances do not doubt for a moment that the aged

statesman would not hesitate to renew these promises if he were reappointed Grand Vizier, they are equally certain that the promises will not be kept, and that the Syrians will once more be put off with fine words. That is the reason why the first plan of a *régime* with decentralised administration (the so-called administrative decentralisation) appears to be unacceptable.

As regards one point—the protection of a foreign Power under which the Syrians are willing to place their future principality if need be—the views referred to in my letter No. 123 are, judging by Tuéni's report, in conflict with the tendencies displayed in the Committee. According to the reports I have received this week, the Syrians desired English protection, to the exclusion of all other. According to M. Tuéni, the Mohammedans and Christians on the Committee are at one in aiming at a French protectorate alone. I may say that my own informant is an official of the Anglo-Egyptian Government, while M. Tuéni is passionately devoted to France. The truth seems to me to lie between these two extremes. If Syria is to be under foreign protection, some day the Syrian Christians would unanimously—or almost unanimously—desire the protection to be French. Of the Mohammedans, a considerable number of whom prefer England, some would accept the protection of France because they are her real friends, while others would accept an English or French protectorate quite indifferently, whichever was decided for them by outside agencies.

As the Committee has pronounced in favour of the provincial autonomy of Syria, it must naturally set about finding suitable persons to govern the future principality. So far as I know, this question has not been dealt with at any of the sittings of the Committee, but several of its members have already taken it up. In my previous letter, No. 123, I pointed out that the President of the Committee, Refik El-Asm, thinks that the future ruler of Syria could be none other but the head of his family, Shefik-Bey el Mueyed el Asm. Other members of the Committee are of opinion that the Syrians would never recognise one of themselves as their sovereign, as they all think themselves equal to, if not above, each other. They want to elect a prince from the family of the Khedive. This last view is that of M. Tuéni, who came to give me his views, which he said are shared by many Syrians. At the moment the scheme is to advocate the candidature of Prince Yussuf Kemal Pasha, the Khedive's cousin.

This prince is a man of immense wealth, entirely independent, and when he was asked his opinion he let it be understood that he would accept election, but on the formal condition that if Syria was to be under the protection of a foreign Power, that Power should be France. Any other protectorate, particularly an English protectorate, was to be absolutely excluded.

The above explains the excitement and agitation undoubtedly prevailing among the Mohammedan and Christian leaders. But from suggestion to action is a great step, and the Syrians in Cairo seem to me—at any rate at the present time—incapable of taking the step unless they are urged on powerfully from outside.

Anyone who reads through these documents attentively will easily realise that the French Government was doing its utmost to pave the way for the annexation of Syria on the pretext of protecting the Arabs. I should like to know, too, if anyone had any doubts about England's intentions with regard to Irak and Palestine. Those who pretend they knew nothing of these designs must either be weak-minded or have sold their conscience. Let us assume that at the time—July, 1915—when Sherif Hussein was

negotiating with the English he knew nothing of the intentions of France, that he was convinced that the end of the Ottoman Empire was at hand, and had risen to render the Mohammedan world a glorious service, and thereby restore the Arab State, and that he was establishing a great Arab Empire in the Arabian Peninsula in the place of sinking Turkey—an empire which, in accordance with the promises he had received from England, was to comprise all territory south of a line from Mersina to Adana and Mosul. But if the answer given him through Sir Henry MacMahon on October 24, 1916, did not rouse his suspicions, did not the documents I published in Syria after the executions of the conspirators—documents each of which was unanswerable proof of France's designs—open his eyes more effectively than everything I have said here? Were they not sufficiently cogent arguments to show him the measure of the crime he was contemplating? It is easy to see what Sir Henry MacMahon had in mind when—even at that time, in his letter of October 24, 1916—he explained that certain parts of the coasts of Syria and the Lebanon could not be called purely Arab. England had no option but to respect French claims to those parts of Syria.

A man must be smitten with pure political blindness to believe that England has taken Irak from the Turks solely for the purpose of presenting it to the Arabs.

When Sherif Faisal was at the headquarters of the army in Syria I told him all this, and brought it home to him that on the day when the Arabs severed their connection with the Turks they would fall under the yoke of the English and French, and thus be wholly deprived of the protection of the Khalif of Islam.

Now the World War is over, and the English, thanks to Sherif Hussein's revolt, have destroyed the Turkish army in Palestine and completed their occupation of Syria and Palestine, what is the condition of affairs in the Mohammedan territories? The region of Palestine with Jerusalem—the precious gift of the great Khalif Omar to the Mohammedan world—is entirely in the hands of the English, who intend to establish a Jewish State there. They have assigned to the French a region they call "Greater Lebanon," which comprises the former Lebanon, Tripolis, Beirut, the cities of Tyre and Sidon, and the region of Baalbek and the Plain of Bukaa. The English have taken the whole of Irak under

their protection. As they have avoided the annexation of the Hedjaz, which is recognised as an independent State, they wanted to set up under the French protectorate an Arab State, to include the towns of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo. But apparently the French object to this scheme.

To show how well the English know what amazing advantages they derived from the revolt of Sherif Hussein, I give in full the article which Shukri Ganem, the President of the Syrian Central Committee, who was honoured with titles such as "Grand Emir," "Defender of the Arabs," and so on, published in the *Figaro* on October 12, 1919:

SYRIA AND THE RIGHTS OF THE HEDJAZ.

Apparently they are still "hesitating," and refusing the Emir Faisal the rights of the King in his Kingdom of Syria.

If the Emir's statements are to be accepted, these rights are not disputed by the majority of the parties concerned.

Let us examine them!

They are based on the English promises in 1915. It does, indeed, appear from a perusal of the letters between Hussein, the Sherif of Mecca, and Sir Henry MacMahon, that England promised the Hedjaz, if not the whole of Syria, at any rate its most famous part, Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. On this basis, therefore, rest the rights of the Sherif, now King, and his son Faisal! These are the promises (no one uses the word "obligations") on which the Emir takes his stand, and which, he thinks, justify him in having his say in all other agreements or decisions, and even at the Peace Conference itself.

What really are these letters, promises, or obligations? In the twentieth century is it permissible for two private individuals, whoever they may be—and especially if they are foreigners—to dispose of the fate and fortunes of a whole country and nation?

Can a secret correspondence, with supplementary conferences, furnish a ground for any legal or valid claims whatsoever? Did the issue of a bill drawn in this way for so large a sum, and in the name of third parties who knew nothing about it and owed nothing at all, mean that we could become their creditors?

Then why is this claim better founded than other claims of the same kind? The agreements of 1916 between England, France, and Russia, however little may be said in their defence, had at any rate considerable force, owing to the importance of the contracting parties. Moreover, the Powers who were dividing these countries among themselves could excuse themselves on the ground that they intended to bring them peace and prosperity. But what could the weak Hedjaz, with its chronic lack of culture, bring young Syria?

But if Faisal loves our country so much, and wishes to preserve its inviolability, why does he not reject *all* voluntary agreements without distinction? Why does he make an exception where they are in his favour? On the contrary, he says to Reuter's Agency: "We do not recognise the agreement of 1916." He adds: "I do not care what this or that Government thinks."

Is he quite sure? Is he quite indifferent to the views of the Government from which he received those letters he now puts forward as the basis of his claims? Yet this cautious diplomat of the Turkish school—who forty days before the occupation of Syria by the Allies tried to make his peace with Turkey because

he felt the insecurity of his position—says that this first agreement (of 1915) was in accordance with the desires of the people of Syria. Even then! What did he know about it, or the archæologist Lawrence, and Sir Henry MacMahon? They must have known that the reverse was the truth, as the main concern of the Emir and his confidants after their arrival in Syria was to prevent the falsity of their assertions from being shown up. A shower of gold and promises, a display of lavish wealth and military power, propagandist intrigue, which it is well known was directed even against the French ally, threats, murders—nothing was left untried. Examples were made: the murder of the grandson of Abd-el-Kader, the banishment of his brother Said of Damascus and his subsequent arrest, which preceded the arrest of Manjib Bey, Governor of Aleppo, whose crime was that he and the eight hundred thousand members of his party had given their votes to France. (If the space at my disposal were not so limited I should give a detailed account of this occurrence!) The arrest, conviction, and death of the notables of Baalbek, also for voting for France. Even in Damascus, which became the seat of the autocratic and theocratic sovereignty of the Hedjaz after the armistice, this system imposed silence upon some while heaping gold on others in order to loosen their tongues. The son of the Sherif, the bearer of the Holy Standard, who is the sure herald of a religious revival in the eyes of the blind and ignorant section of the populace, cannot afford to neglect any means of symbolising the sovereignty which Faisal is promising to the believers. If Syria really wants him, why has he to resort to illegalities of all kinds, compromises, corruption, terror, and crime?

What remains, then, of the alleged rights of the son of that Mohammedan Pope, whose son was apparently rewarded for his revolt against his Turkish suzerain with the title of King and the grant of temporal power in accordance with the materialist spirit of the age?

What is plain is something that the Emir has not said, and which can only be put in diplomatic phraseology—that the truth, as befits the peculiarities of this country, is treated as a Mohammedan lady who must not be seen unveiled by the uninitiated. Perhaps in France, too, there is a desire to spare the feelings of neighbours and allies, who are terribly shocked when they hear the commonest things called by their true names. And so we decorate and evade with a knowing wink. But all this does not affect the fact that the legal claims of that Emir rest solely upon the wishes of those to whom I have referred. He owes everything to those wishes which have received formal expression since 1915, inspired the agreements of 1916, revealed themselves in the undertaking of September 30, 1918 (on the very next day the Abd-el-Kader's grandson was killed and his brother banished), and are now responsible for the provisional agreement of September 19. The Emir is the tool of a policy which has made him what he is and brought him to Syria; this policy is determined to keep him here, perhaps in order to have him at its disposal when the time arrives.

Of course everything has been done in a perfectly correct manner, and it would be wrong to reproach England or her agents with the slightest breach of etiquette. Superficially nothing has been outraged by this series of enterprises by which the Syrians have been turned into Arabs and geography and history turned upside down. This absolute rectitude in the selection and employment of means is the speciality of skilled diplomacy.

Thus Emir Faisal, who was once simply the commander of a detachment of 2000 men, is now the unchallenged ruler of Syria. We should hardly have the courage to complain of this undeserved misfortune if France—still bleeding from her wounds—had obtained some advantage from the new *régime*. But is it possible to speak of "advantage" when she is robbed of a land which has increased her prestige in the East and the whole world of Islam, quite apart from her considerable material interests? . . .

No, if the Hedjaz bluff succeeds—for Faisal is only a figurehead—if he is left in Syria, or merely with Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo, while England rules over Haifa, Akka, Palestine, Cyprus, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Arabia, and Persia, and all the holy places of Islam, would not French interests in this country, the French tongue, and French ambitions be seriously menaced? Would not Syria, a land she had begun to form after her own pattern, be forever changed and unrecognisable? Who could have thought that this would be the fruit of the victory of civilisation over barbarism? It is inconceivable. We must defend ourselves against such a result. It is a torturing dream, a hallucination. The truth is otherwise. It must be so.

England is an ally who is not only correct in conduct, but judicially minded, and has a liberal constitution. She is wise in counsel, prudent in policy, humane to the highest degree. She cannot allow herself to be led away by selfish desires and to be open to such a reproach, as she would be if Syria was dismembered through her fault and delivered into the hands of the Hedjaz or a man of the Hedjaz. Syria will remain Syria unsullied, a Syria within unchanged frontiers like a pretty picture in its frame.

In the words of the Minister-President to the Central Committee in Syria, upon France alone will fall the duty of securing her future and rendering her brotherly assistance in realising her high national ideals.

SHUKRI GANEM,

President of the Syrian Central Committee.

From this article it is perfectly clear that none of the claims of the King of the Hedjaz, Sherif Hussein, to the cities of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo are regarded with any favour. He and his son Faisal have been treated as catspaws. The grandson of Emir Abd-el-Kader, el Djezairi el Hassan (whom he called "my honoured brother"), accuses him of having treacherously slain the Emir. In an article I have read in an English newspaper it is said that Sherif Hussein is working in Mecca with English money. Those who know the nature of the soil and the climate in the Hedjaz can have no doubt that this will always be so. The result is that, thanks to Sherif Hussein's revolt, the "Hadem el Haremein el Sherifein" (Protector of the two Holy Cities) is, in my opinion, none other than His Majesty King George V. of England.

It is obvious that England is making Sherif Faisal Emir of an Arab state to be formed from the cities of Damascus, Hama, Homs, and Aleppo, and in this way attempting to lay hands on this region, comprising all the important towns of the Islam world.

This is a true picture of the disaster which has overtaken the Mohammedan world as the result of Sherif Hussein's rebellion. Compared with the injury done to the Khalifate by Sherif Hussein, the blows dealt at Mohammedan power by the Moorish leaders

when they allied themselves with Christian states are simply insignificant.

And if—which God forbid—Constantinople, described by the sacred Hadiss as “Lefe tachtahane Kostantiniéti,” the natural centre of the Mohammedan Khalifate, is governed by the League of Nations (as the Europeans intend), Sherif Hussein’s treacherous work will have been completed. To those who say to us: “If you had not entered the World War things would not have come to such a pass,” our reply is that if we had not entered the World War the result would have been just the same, as the French, English, and Russian lust of conquest is not a thing of yesterday, but has existed for centuries. After emerging victorious from the war these three nations would inevitably have carved up our country. The property of the weak and helpless usually is divided up. We should then have had to bear the shame and humiliation of seeing ourselves deprived without a struggle of what God had entrusted to our care.

If God pleases, the Turks will succeed in saving proud Stamboul and beautiful Smyrna for their country, thanks to the recent national rising under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, and if they take proper measures they will assure the welfare of their nation and the prosperity of their country within its natural frontiers.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION

CHAPTER IX.

THE ARMENIAN QUESTION.

AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

WE Young Turks unquestionably prefer the Armenians, and particularly the Armenian revolutionaries, to the Greeks and Bulgarians. They are a finer and braver race than the two other nations, open and candid, constant in their friendships, constant in their hatreds. We are absolutely convinced that the policy of Russia was alone responsible for the enmity between Turkish and Armenian elements. Sixty years ago, or, to speak more accurately, until ten years before the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, there was no question whatever of any religious conflict between the two races, *i.e.*, religious differences between Mohammedans and Christians. In Anatolia, Rumelia, Constantinople, indeed throughout the Turkish Empire, the Armenians and Turks lived together in such harmony that Ottoman histories of that period do not even mention such a thing as an Armenian question. In family affairs there was no limit to Turco-Armenian friendship. When a Turk left his village in Asia Minor for some business journey he left his Armenian neighbours in full charge of his family, honours and rights, and the Armenians on their side showed equal confidence in their Turkish neighbours.

In the whole of Anatolia and Rumelia, and even in Constantinople there was not an Armenian who could speak Armenian. Turkish—in Armenian characters—was taught in all the schools, and in the churches Mass was said in Turkish. The highest offices of State were open to the Armenians, and they were regarded as the most loyal subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

When the Beys of Kurdistan were overthrown by the Turks the Armenians who lived under their sway did not form an independent State. Under Kurdish domination they had suffered terrible oppression. Mr. Ambassador Morgenthau may say what he likes and take endless pains, as he does, to suppress the historical evidence. The fact is that just as justice and tolerance alone can explain the formation of the Turkish Empire and the rapid extension of Turkish dominion, so the magnanimity and friendship shown the Armenians won their gratitude. The result was that for five hundred years there was no sort of conflict between the two peoples and there was not a single Armenian who had not made the Turkish tongue and national customs his own.

When Sultan Fatih Mehmed Han allowed the Orthodox patriarchate to remain in existence after the capture of Constantinople and granted the Greeks (not as a result of any external pressure, but purely out of generosity and nobility of mind) a number of rights known as "religious privileges," he also founded an Armenian Patriarchate in the capital of his Empire, so that the rights of the Armenian nation, who were a national minority among the Mohammedans of Anatolia, should be the more worthily upheld. He also gave the Armenians the same rights and privileges he had granted to the Greeks.

On page 190 of his work Mandelstamm relies on the observations of a historian who, notwithstanding incontrovertible historical facts, is shameless enough to ascribe the tolerant generosity of the Turks solely to their contempt for all things Christian, which, in their eyes, were from the religious point of view impure!

In the year 1462 of the Christian era, at a time when throughout Europe the notion of the "rights of minorities" was utterly undeveloped, a Mohammedan Sultan at the height of his power allowed the Greek Patriarchate to continue in Constantinople. He granted the Greeks as "religious privileges" a whole series of special rights as to marriage, inheritance, and education. In his own capital he founded another Patriarchate for another nation which had lived under the yoke of Kurdish tyranny, and granted it the same rights and privileges. Yet shameless individuals of Mandelstamm's kidney do not shrink from ascribing this

generosity to a feeling of contempt for everything Christian! What an injustice!

Were not these rights granted by a great Turkish Sultan in the fifteenth century the highest application of those principles of the "Rights of Minorities" which President Wilson has endeavoured to get recognised by the civilised world?

Has this principle received the same recognition and extension in the recent peace treaty with Austria at Saint Germain (which the Jugo-Slav and Rumanian Governments refused to accept) as it did in those rights granted by the Conqueror to the Christian nationalities?

The Armenians know well enough that to these privileges alone they owe the fact that they have preserved their religion and nationality. Instead of the oppression they endured under the thralldom of the Kurds they have been able to live on the best of terms with the Turks, and especially with the Turkish Government. Why does Herr Mandelstamm, who gets his information from the works of men like Zarzeski and others, turn for proof to the sufferings and wrongs to which the Armenians were exposed before the nineteenth century under the feudal tyranny of the Kurdish Beys? Why does he not think of the feudal tyranny in which the French nation lived before the Great Revolution? It is not even necessary to go as far afield as that. Was the existence of the Russian mujiks more tolerable than that of the Armenians in Turkey?

Herr Mandelstamm does not shrink from confessing himself an enthusiastic partisan of the Russian Revolution. Does he not know that we, too, know something about the Russian revolutionary writings and something about the oppression of the Russian peasants by their landlords, and not so long ago? If Herr Mandelstamm has the audacity to maintain that those writings exaggerated we can assure him without hesitation that he is not speaking the truth.

I repeat once again that until after the Crimean War of 1856 the Turks and Armenians lived together on the best of terms and the former were never guilty of any wrongs against their Armenian neighbours.

When the Russians turned greedy eyes on the Ottoman Empire they began to think it would be politically effective if they

could make the Christian elements in Rumelia tools in their designs.

It produces a remarkable impression to find Herr Mandelstamm, after saying on page 300 of his book that the Russian Revolutionary Government thoroughly approved of the steps taken by Czarist Russia to support the Christian nations against Turkish oppression, and adding that "the mujik, who himself is a victim of the greatest oppression, has always gone to war to save the Greeks, Bulgars, and Serbs."

All this was the result of that famous policy which aroused fear and aversion throughout the world. For the sake of mankind we cannot but hope it will be doomed to eternal extinction along with Czarism.

It must, of course, be admitted that the nationalist tendencies which began to develop and spread about the middle of the nineteenth century was the direct explanation of the fact that the young Armenians who had gone to Europe and America to gain knowledge or a living absorbed that mental atmosphere which drove them to strive for an easier private life for their people and more independent political activities. This development was regarded by the Russian diplomats as a gift from God, and from that moment they left no stone unturned to excite the Armenians against their Government.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Sultan Mahmud II. had taken extreme steps to restore order in his Empire and suppress the administrative and military anarchy which had been the result of two hundred years of misgovernment. He abolished the janissaries, restricted the powers of the Beys of Anatolia and Rumelia until they had hardly any authority left, and also curbed the power of the Beys of Kurdistan.

But while this unfortunate sovereign was endeavouring to restore order in his country he found himself faced with difficulties innumerable. The Greeks were egged on through the intrigues of the "Ethniki Heteria," an organisation founded by Russian capital, and he had all the trouble in the world to pacify them. He saw himself attacked by the French, English and Russians, lost his entire fleet at Navarino, and was at length compelled to recognise the independence of Greece. Mehmed Ali Pasha, the Governor-General of Egypt, rose against him as the result of

French inspiration. He wanted to secure the Turkish crown for himself, and succeeded in taking the whole country as far as Kutahia.

Who can reproach a Government faced with such enormous internal and external difficulties with not having taken all the steps possible to promote the welfare not merely of its Armenian subjects, but of all its subjects?

The Government of Sultan Abdul Medjid granted the Armenians such extensive privileges that even Mandelstamm mentions the fact with admiration. On page 90 of his book he writes :

In the year 1863 the Armenians received a real constitution. That constitution gave them the right to elect a Supreme Council, with its seat at Constantinople. The Supreme Council consisted of four hundred members, of which one hundred and twenty were elected by the people themselves.

Could President Wilson think of any better method of safeguarding the rights of national minorities?

The Ottoman Government granted the Armenians this constitution without any pressure from outside. The loyalty they had displayed hitherto had gained the sympathies of the Government to such an extent that the latter did not hesitate for a moment to give the " faithful Armenian nation " a constitution. It was to be the beginning of a new and happy era. The Russians, however, used this constitution to interfere in Armenian affairs.

Even as early as the Russo-Turkish War of 1856 a few Armenian rebels had given assistance to the Russians. Thereafter the Russians maintained relations with Armenia, and lost no opportunity of encouraging the Armenian revolutionaries. The effect made itself felt so quickly that within four years of the grant of the constitution (1867) the first Armenian revolt broke out at Zeitun.

This first armed revolt on the part of the Armenians naturally made a considerable impression on the Government. The Russian and Anatolian Armenians made things extremely difficult for the Turkish armies during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8.

Nercess Effendi, the Armenian Patriarch, who at that time went to San Stefano to secure the Czar's support for the cause of Armenian independence, was thereby largely responsible for the fact that the Armenians had entirely lost their old name of the " loyal nation " (millet-i-Sadika).

The Russian politicians realised well enough that after the declaration of Bulgarian independence any chance of interfering in the internal affairs of the Empire had gone. But the Imperial Russian Government desired to preserve that right, and therefore secured the insertion in the Treaty of San Stefano of a special article for the benefit of the Armenians. This article was reproduced in another form in the Treaty of Berlin.

In this way relations between the Armenians, Kurds and Turks had become very strained. Throughout the Ottoman Empire, in large towns as in the smaller villages, the Armenian Revolutionary Committee had established secret associations, very well organised. These secret associations worked tirelessly to rouse the Armenians against the Kurds and Turks, and demanded nothing less than the establishment of a privileged Armenian province consisting of six vilayets in eastern Anatolia. The Government and the Turk and Kurdish population were, of course, well aware of these intrigues.

As the Armenians were bent on founding an independent State in which they could impose their will on the Kurds and Turks, who greatly outnumbered them, the latter naturally tried to frustrate this plan. To speak more plainly, the Kurds and Turks realised only too well that the whole scheme was only a pretext on the part of Russia for snatching a very large part of Anatolia, which was inhabited exclusively by Turks and Kurds. They naturally regarded Armenia, so to speak, as a snake let loose by Russia against them.

In January, 1880, as a result of continuous pressure by Russia, and in view of the various Armenian revolts, the States of Europe issued a Note on the subject of Armenian Reforms to the Sublime Porte. It was just then that the Bulgarians were trying to annex Eastern Rumelia. Every time the Government had to settle some very important domestic or foreign problem the Russians brought up the Armenian question again. Abdul Hamid II. settled the matter by giving way on certain points.

The Armenian troubles reached their height in the years 1894-1896, and there were risings, more or less, everywhere. The Armenian disorders now resulted in such intense hatreds between the three nations, which had lived peacefully side by side for five to six hundred years, that they were ready to fall upon one another

and stain the soil of Anatolia, and even Constantinople itself, with their blood.

Even men like Mandelstamm who thoroughly detest the Turks cannot deny that during the events of those years the Turks felt no sort of hatred towards the Armenians. Many Turks vied with one another in protecting the Armenians, and in Constantinople a number of Turkish families showed the greatest friendliness to their Armenian neighbours by hiding them in their houses to save them from death. Many dignitaries of the Empire were horror-struck, and condemned the Armenian massacres in Constantinople, which were started by the porters at the Custom House. They did everything in their power to stop them.

The whole world knows what strong steps Marshal Fuad Pasha took to protect the Armenians at Kadikoi. Mandelstamm says that it was just because of Fuad Pasha's friendship for the Armenians that he afterwards fell into disfavour, but there is not a human being in Constantinople who does not know that the statement is untrue.

During the two or three years in which these massacres were in progress a very large number of Kurds and Turks were killed by the Armenians, and the two sides vied with each other in thinking out every possible form of torture. But as the Armenians were, of course, in a minority, the Turks and Kurds had the upper hand. If the Armenians had had a numerical majority the number of murdered Turks and Kurds would have exceeded that of the Armenians. The best proof is the number of Turks massacred by the Greeks in the Morea. But as those poor unfortunates were only Turks and Mohammedans there was no poet like Lord Byron or Chateaubriand to sing their hard lot, and those bloody events left no memories behind them but a record in the annals of Ottoman history.

Consistently with my views on political administration I have an absolute horror of such methods. I condemn the practice of using the masses to suppress revolutionary movements and organise massacres. Such practices do a nation the utmost harm and cast a stain on their history.

This view is shared by all the patriots who banded together as the "Young Turk" revolutionaries. They condemned the happenings of 1894-1896 in Armenia as a grave political blunder of

Sultan Abdul Hamid II., who hoped to maintain his own despotic authority in that cruel way. It was thus that Ahmed Riza Bey and his companions who were in Europe at the time gave the revolting Armenians effective assistance. The other revolutionaries who, like myself, were at home and shared the same views, did not hesitate to condemn Abdul Hamid because of the injury done to the Turkish, and more especially the Ottoman, cause by the Armenian massacres.

Some of the most high-minded of the Armenian revolutionaries then began to see the situation in a true light. They saw that while on the one hand the Russians were stopping at nothing to secure independence for the Armenians of Turkey, the Armenians of the Caucasus were suffering under the greatest despotism. In return for the promise that no railways would be constructed in Eastern Anatolia the Czar actually promised the Sultan Abdul Hamid II. to forbid the return to Turkey of the Armenians who had fled into the Caucasus after the revolution of 1896.

There could not be clearer proof of Russia's intentions towards Turkey and the Armenians. It is incontestable that culture and material well-being are the most essential elements in the prosperity of a nation. But well-being begins with the establishment of suitable communications such as railways and roads. The Russians were demanding reforms for the welfare and security of the vilayets inhabited by Armenians and simultaneously insisting that we should refrain from the construction of railways, which would have promoted those objects.

What is Herr Mandelstamm's explanation of these facts? He confines himself simply to reviling a European writer who drew attention to this matter. But insults are not proof.

The double game played by Russian politicians made the honourable Armenians reflect. They could not help putting to themselves the following question: If Armenia gained autonomy would she not fall under the Russian yoke, which was a thousand times worse than the Turkish? The Turkish revolutionary committees therefore made great efforts to get the "Dachnakzutiun Committee," the most reasonable and best conducted of the Armenian committees, to recognise the reforms for the benefit of *all* the nationalities of the Ottoman Empire for which they were working.

Herr Mandelstamm cannot say that my statements are invented because the "Dachnakzutiun," which participated in the general congress of the Committee of Unity and Progress in Paris in 1907 and their published programme, closely approached the reforms at which we aimed. They also promised to work in co-operation with the Committee of Unity and Progress. Malumian Effendi (Agnoni), one of the leaders of the "Dachnakzutiun Committee," whom I met in Constantinople in 1908, frequently spoke to me of the Russian danger which was hanging over the Armenians' heads.

But among the Armenian revolutionary committees were some like the "Hinjakists" and "Reformed Hinjakists," most of whose leaders had been bought by the Russians, who sought no *rapprochement* with the Turkish committees and were aiming at an Armenian State under Russian protection.

Thanks to the representatives of these Russian committees and the Russian money distributed by all the Russian Consulates which took an active part in the revolutionary organisations, even the ecclesiastical party began to say that the protection of the Russian Czar was preferable to that of the Mohammedan Khalif.

Such was the position of the Armenian and Turkish revolutionaries when the revolution of 1908 began. The secret "Committee of Unity and Progress" which was formed at Salonica had accepted as its 'domestic programme the establishment of the "Midhat Pasha" constitution. The basis of this constitution was the recognition of Ottomanism and simultaneous decentralisation of administration. On the other hand, the system of "political decentralisation" without recognition of Ottomanism was the goal aimed at by the Macedonian Bulgarian Committees, the Macedonian Greek Committees under the leadership of the Ethniki Heteria, the Macedonian National War Committee, and the revolutionary Albanian, Armenian, and Arab Committees.

"Decentralisation of the Administration" meant administrative local autonomy in a single "Ottoman Empire" for the various parts inhabited by the different national elements. If the Committee of Unity and Progress had held the same views as our external enemies, who desired nothing so much as the dismemberment of the Empire and left nothing undone in the way of plots and intrigues, it would not have hesitated for a moment to accept that principle of "political or legal autonomy," the greatest cham-

pion of which was Prince Sabaheddin. But France coveted Syria, the English hoped to make themselves masters of Mesopotamia and the whole Arabian Peninsula, the Russians were only waiting for a favourable opportunity to seize the eastern provinces of Anatolia, the Bulgarians and Serbs wanted to carve up Macedonia, the Italians and Austrians wished to lay hands on Albania, and the Greeks hoped to incorporate the islands of the Archipelago in their kingdom. If all these regions had been created provinces on the principle of "political decentralisation," would those nations have had the slightest difficulty in swallowing them up one after the other? Would our decentralisation principle have stood the test of time any better than the decentralisation principle of Austria? Did it make the Czecho-Slovaks, Croats, and Slovenes lose hope of breaking away altogether from Austria? Would the authority and power of our central Government have proved more effective than those of the Austrian Government to protect the independent provinces against the intrigues of our even more numerous and covetous enemies? No region enjoyed a larger measure of administrative autonomy than the island of Crete. But did we succeed in compelling the Cretans to abandon their hope of uniting with Greece? The Island of Cyprus had a privileged position before the English occupation, but did we not hear the same story every year—the age-old desire for incorporation with Greece?

Were we able to prevent the Bulgarians from taking Eastern Rumelia, though Rumelia enjoyed a generous administrative autonomy? Did England have any difficulty in occupying Egypt, which was among the most highly privileged of our provinces? Have the English hesitated to lay hands on Kuveit, a dependency of the Ottoman Khalifate for centuries, after announcing that the Sheik Mubarek el Sabah had accepted English protection? Did the English find any difficulty in treating Mesopotamia as their sphere of influence on the pretext that the local population were longing for English protection? Could not the same be said of the French with regard to Syria? And can we regard Macedonia or Albania in a different light to Eastern Rumelia and Bosnia-Herzegovina?

I do not think the advocates of "political decentralisation" can give a logical and satisfactory answer to all these problems. To those who reproach us with having pursued a "purely Turkish

policy," I reply emphatically that our policy was not a " Turkish " policy, but the policy of Ottoman unity. If we had accepted the decentralisation principle, the Committee would, indeed, have had to pursue a " Turkish " policy, for we should have had to demand the same local autonomy for vilayets inhabited solely by Turks as for the other provinces. So those who confess themselves " Turks " only are really advocates of " decentralisation," for in effect they are simply following a purely Turkish policy. We, on the other hand, whose policy was Ottoman unity, had accepted as a fundamental principle that the influence of the Central Government on the vilayets should not be diminished, though the local administration should be granted the most extensive powers, always provided that the unity of army organisation should not be prejudiced.

Young Turkey realised that among the various Ottoman elements which were struggling for the advancement of their respective nationalities the Turks alone were isolated and without leaders, and so they, too, began to work for a great national revival in knowledge, education and virtue. The Committee of Unity and Progress had no right to put any obstacles in their way, and I cannot imagine that the advocates of decentralisation would have wished to oppose their endeavours.

Can it be said that the " Turkification " of the nations was involved in the demand that the Turkish language should be the official tongue in the Ottoman Empire? Were we engaged in the " Turkification " of the other nations when we said that public education in the Ottoman Empire must be under the supervision of the Government and well conducted?

Just after the inauguration of the constitution a number of national committees were established in Constantinople, committees such as the " Arab Union," the " Cherkess Mutual Help Society," the " Kurdish Club," the " Albanian Club," and many others. Then why is it said that the foundation of the " Ottoman Home " proves that the Unionist Government had " Turkification " designs?

Speaking for myself, I am primarily an Ottoman, but I do not forget that I am a Turk, and nothing can shake my belief that the Turkish race is the foundation-stone of the Ottoman Empire. The educational and civilising influence of the Turks cements Ottoman

unity and strengthens the Empire, for in its origins the Ottoman Empire is a Turkish creation.

If any evidence is required, look at the tragic situation in which we find ourselves to-day. Look at the Arabs, who rose against us in the hope of gaining their independence. Where are they to-day? I have referred to this point before.

Immediately after Egypt deserted the Ottoman Union it fell under English domination. The moment Young Egypt protested against that domination England's heavy fist descended upon them. The coast region of Syria and Lebanon are not enough for France. She wants to occupy the interior as well.

Does anyone in those countries ever speak of Ottomanism? On the contrary, the cry, "By the grace of God we are freed from Ottomanism," is ever on the lips of a crowd of traitors who have lived on the favour of the Government. But the voice raised in Anatolia—that sacred land to the Turks—proclaims that the "Ottoman Empire" still exists, and her noble sons who dwell in Western Thrace—that little Turkish corner—have never ceased to strive for their union with the Empire. In short, all Turks—wherever they are—endeavour to assert themselves and seek refuge in the glorious Ottoman name. We appeal to all who wish to preserve the cause of Ottoman unity to realise their holy duty of encouraging the Turks, increasing their number, and giving them their place in the sun.

I hope my little diversion, for the purpose of making my personal views widely known, may not be regarded as superfluous.

In accordance with the Act of the Constitution, the Central Committee of "Unity and Progress" expressed a desire to form the various revolutionary political committees in the country into one "Political Committee of Ottoman Unity." With that end in view it first of all got into touch with the various Bulgarian revolutionary committees. We opened negotiations with the celebrated Sandansky, Chernopexiff, and their friends. But, whereas we regarded the principle of Ottomanism as the basis of the negotiations, they refused to make the slightest concession, and demanded the autonomy of Macedonia. God alone knows what we had to put up with at those conferences in which Talaat Bey and I participated as delegates. I shall never forget the painful day I spent

with Sandansky in the Bulgarian villages of Menlik, Petric, and Osmanje Djuma-i-Bala at the time of the first elections. Yet we got on better with them than with any of the other revolutionary committees, for the Macedonian Bulgarian Committee absolutely refused to abandon its own programme.

A Greek, who had come to Salonika to negotiate in the name of the Ethniki Heteria, proposed that Crete and Samos should be annexed by Greece, that the other islands should be granted administrative autonomy, and so-called Greek Macedonia the most far-reaching privileges. As compensation there was to be an alliance between Greece and Turkey. We rejected these proposals as, of course, what we wanted was not a Turco-Greek alliance, but that the Greeks of Turkey should join our Committee of Unity and Progress so that Ottoman unity could become a reality.

In August, 1908, the Central Committee was provisionally transferred to Constantinople, where we opened negotiations on the same principles with Prince Sabaheddin and the Armenian Committee. Our party was represented by Talaat Bey, Behaeddin Shakir Bey and myself. Dr. Reschad Nihad represented Prince Sabaheddin, while Malumian and Shahirikian Effendi acted on behalf of the Armenians. We demonstrated to them in turn all the drawbacks the principle of decentralisation involved for the Ottoman Empire. Prince Sabaheddin's views were more or less those of the Dachnakzutium Committee. They both replied to us in the same sense.

It was curious that Dr. Reschad Nihad asked us to grant privileges even more extensive than those claimed by the Armenian Revolutionary Committee and refused to consider the disadvantages those privileges involved. At length Malumian Effendi, speaking in the name of the Dachnakzutium Committee, made the following proposal:

The Dachnakzutium Committee will work hand in hand with the Committee of Unity and Progress to safeguard the constitution in the Ottoman Empire, but otherwise each Committee retains full freedom of action both as to the realisation of its main programme and the choice of means. This means that the Dachnakzutium Committee will maintain its revolutionary organisation in the country with the single difference that the organisation, which has hitherto been secret, will now come forward openly as a political committee and its members will work in public.

Of course we had no alternative but to accept this proposal. To put it shortly, after all our sacrifices and three or four months

of unceasing labour, we had not succeeded in incorporating the revolutionary committees of the other nationalities in our "Unity and Progress" Association because our aims and theirs diverged too greatly. They wanted to carry on in public their propaganda in favour of autonomy and independence, propaganda which had hitherto been secret and exposed to great perils. They hoped in that way to reach their goal all the sooner. We, on the other hand, wanted to give the Committee of Unity and Progress the prestige of a joint association of all revolutionary committees of the Ottoman nationalities, just as the Empire itself had come into being by the joint association of all those nationalities. We wanted the necessity of Ottoman unity to be realised and recognised by all the elements so that the constitution should be safe from any danger.

Just as all Republicans in France at once unite against the aggressor the moment they consider the Republic in danger, the "Unity and Progress" Association, composed of all the old revolutionary committees, was to call upon its members to rise as one against the slightest attack on the constitution. Just as the Republicans in France comprise men of the most varying political views and adherents of different parties, our "Unity and Progress" Association was to comprise men of different political views and parties, without prejudice to their national and religious convictions.

None of the political parties whose aims were exclusively nationalist were willing to accept this super-national programme, for in reality they were receiving their directions from abroad, and as far as we were concerned they were simply puppets.

Thus the Dachnakzutium Committee, which was the most favourably inclined to us and had a very real fear of seeing Armenia fall under the Russian yoke, maintained its own organisation, and publicly announced its intention of continuing its work for the realisation of its political aims. The Armenian Hinjakists and Reformed Hinjakists absolutely refused to enter into negotiations with us and their leaders in Constantinople or entered into open relations with the Russian Embassy.

In 1909, at the instigation of the Committee of Unity and Progress, Hussein Hilmi Pasha's Cabinet decided to send a commission of enquiry to the eastern vilayets to settle the agrarian disputes

which had broken out in those vilayets between the Armenians, Turks, and Kurds. Ghalib Bey, Member of the Senate and Supreme Administrative Court, was appointed chairman of the commission, which, in addition to him, was composed of two Turkish and two Armenian members. One of the Turkish members was Major Zeki Bey, of the General Staff, who had been on the best of terms with the Dachnakzutiun Committee when he was in Europe. I was the other member. Once more it was the leaders of the Dachnakzutiun who asked that I should be a member of this committee. In the previous negotiations they had realised that my views were just and impartial, and they assumed that as I was a member of the Central Committee, my decisions would be less exposed to attack by the committee.

Glad to fall in with the suggestion, I left Salonica for Constantinople. Yet this proposal of the Government was most violently attacked in the Chamber by the deputies for the eastern vilayets, who maintained that to send a commission of enquiry was to encroach upon the constitutional authority of the Governor-General.

As Ferid Pasha, then Minister of the Interior, proved incompetent to defend the Government's views to the Chamber, I had to wait idly in Constantinople until the events of March 31st (April 13th), 1909.

After those events the scheme was entirely dropped, and at the end of May, 1909, I was appointed Governor of Skutari.

THE ADANA AFFAIR AND AFTER.

Just at the time when the revolt of March 31st began with the avowed object of finishing with the leaders of the Committee of Unity and Progress and their followers there was a Turco-Armenian massacre in Adana.

As I was appointed Governor of Adana about the middle of August, 1909, four months after this occurrence, I may maintain that no one was better qualified than I to enquire into the psychological causes of this massacre, one of the most painful events in the history of our constitution.

After the constitution was proclaimed the civil population in every part of the Ottoman Empire had become so unruly that no

one, from the lowest gendarme to the mighty Governor-General, had any influence with them. The word "freedom" was interpreted both by Press and public in a very erroneous sense, and every man thought he could do exactly what he liked without penalty. Several valis and many civil police and legal officials who had oppressed the people during the Absolutist regime were now subjected to very ugly and illegal attacks. Men who had never even heard the name of "Unity and Progress" before the promulgation of the constitution often paraded as "heroes of liberation," and went so far as to interfere with Government officials in the execution of their duty. My memories of the early days of the constitution, when I was a member of the Central Committee, are full of occurrences of that kind.

The Central Committee did everything in its power to check such excesses and to protect everyone, whether guilty or innocent, against illegal attacks. With a view to imbuing the public with the essential principles of the committee's programme special deputies were sent out with the task of founding sections in all places where the committee had not yet established local organisations. Unfortunately, generally speaking, these deputies were not well chosen. Some of them allowed themselves to be carried away by the spirit of indiscipline prevailing among the people, and forgot that the main purpose of our regulations was to maintain the prestige of the Government in the country.

Later on several politicians who came forward as opponents of "Unity and Progress" used the harmful and peculiar interpretation put upon the word "freedom" in the Press to make attacks upon the committee and plunge the country into a perfectly hopeless anarchy. As the Government was deprived of all prestige and power in the capital of the Empire, it is easy to imagine the state of affairs in the provinces. Many men who failed to secure important positions in the local Unity and Progress Committees which we established founded branches of the various political committees which were gradually formed in Constantinople and took their revenge that way.

The Mohammedan and Turkish population was thus at sixes and sevens, while the Christian population through their own committees worked hard for the realisation of their programme.

In the vilayet of Adana the Turkish population is in a majority. After it come the Armenians, then the Arabs (known by the name of "Arab Uschagi"), and finally the Greeks. The vilayet has a population of five hundred and fifty thousand. There are about sixty thousand Armenians, between twenty and twenty-five thousand Arab Uschagi, and ten to fifteen thousand Greeks. All the rest are Turks. For centuries these people, who are mostly engaged in agriculture, have lived together in the greatest peace and harmony.

It is an incontestable fact that long before the Ottomans came the vilayet of Adana was Turkish, for the Ottomans seized it from a Turkish ruling family known under the name of "Ramazun Oghullari." Although history tells us that at the time of the Crusades there was an Armenian kingdom called Cicilia in this region, it is equally true that a large number had settled in the country at that time, and the Turkish feudal Beys did not like that kingdom.

The majority of the Armenians now dwelling in the vilayet of Adana had their original home in Diabekir, Sivas and Mamuret-ul-Asis. They migrated during the nineteenth century in the hope of seeking their fortune. The real Adana-born Armenians are to be found in the town of Hadjin, on the northern border of the vilayet, in a few villages in the neighbourhood of Sis, chief town of the Sandjak of Kozan, and in Dort Yol, on the shores of the Gulf of Alexandretta, and some villages in its vicinity.

The Arab-Uschagi are part of the population which was transplanted from the Sandjak of Lazkié, under the government of Sultan Abdul Aziz, in order to cultivate the plain of Adana, which was very fertile, but at that time sparsely populated.

As I have already said, the Turks and Armenians, as, indeed, the rest of the population, had previously lived together on the very best of terms, and there was no reason to anticipate any sort of strife between them. At the time of the disorders and massacres of 1894-1896 nothing at all had happened in the vilayet of Adana, and Turks and Armenians had worked together to prevent the spread of disorder into their district. Their efforts had not been without success.

After the promulgation of the constitution the Armenians of Adana founded local branches of the Dachnakzutium, Hinjakists

and Reformed Hinjakists in opposition to the Turkish political committees which were being formed, or rather—to speak more accurately—they continued openly those activities of their organisation which they had hitherto carried on in secret.

At this time the Armenian vicar in Adana was a young and ambitious priest named Muscheg Effendi, who was also leader of the Reformed Hinjakists. The Armenians could not say enough about the licentiousness of this man. If all the stories told about him by the Armenians are true, it may be stated without exaggeration that he was the incarnation of all the evil instincts.

After the promulgation of the constitution Monsignor Muscheg regarded himself as the religious and political head of Adana. I was told that this priest, shamelessly taking advantage of the weakness of the Government, adopted a most insulting attitude towards the Governor-General at a meeting of the Administrative Council, and left the assembly in a furious rage after threatening to box the ears of the Colonel of Gendarmerie for the vilayet. I was also told by Armenians that at this time a considerable number of young Armenians—acolytes of Monsignor Muscheg—carried their effrontery so far as to proclaim publicly at various meetings that it would not be long before the Armenians were liberated from the Turkish yoke.

To be fair, I should add that the delegate of the Dachnakzutiun had no part in Monsignor Muscheg's excesses, and did not fail to draw the attention of the Dachnakzutiun deputies in Constantinople to the very evil results of his conduct.

But Monsignor Muscheg was not content with all this. He sent to Europe for rifles and revolvers with which to arm the Armenians. At this time the Government was permitting everything, even traffic in arms and their importation. Monsignor Muscheg let it be known publicly in all quarters that, "as the Armenians are armed at last, they no longer fear a repetition of the massacres of 1894, and that if anything happened to any Armenians ten Turks would pay for it with their lives." These declarations and Monsignor Muscheg's acts compelled the Turks of Adana to take similar steps.

It is at this point that the heavy responsibility of the then Government of Adana begins, for an admission of weakness can

never be a permissible excuse for the authorities. When Monsignor Muscheg's unruly agitation began to have its evil influence on the local population the safest course would have been at once to arrest him and his adherents, and also any Turks who seemed likely to promote disorder, hold a legal investigation without delay, and, if necessary, threaten the vilayet with martial law. But at that time the Grand Vizier himself, Hussein Hilmi Pasha, did not dare to adopt energetic measures in Constantinople. It was he who had been insulted by members of the Mohammedie Committee in the avenue leading to the Sublime Porte on the occasion of the funeral of the journalist, Hassan Felimi Bey. The first duty of a Government is to make it clear to the nation that freedom and anarchy are not the same thing. Unhappily, we had no such Government in the Turkish Empire at the end of 1908 and the beginning of 1909.

At this period the Governor-General of Adana was Djevad Bey. He may certainly be regarded as a model of uprightness, but, unfortunately, he was also a model of administrative incapacity. He was in no way equal to the demands made upon a vali of Adana. An old soldier, General Mustafa Renizi Pasha, commanded the division. In his youth he had come to the front through his great energy, and he always maintained the traditions of honourable patriotism. But it cannot be said that this officer, who was both old and without any police powers, possessed the qualifications required by the military commander of Adana.

In the Sandjak of Bjebel Bereket the *mutesarrif* was Assaf Bey, who was so timid that he was afraid of his own shadow. I have never been able to understand how such an individual came to be appointed Vice-Governor.

At the beginning of the year 1909 a rumour was going round that the Armenians would rise and destroy the Turks in the immediate future. They would use the opportunity to let the vilayet be occupied by contingents from the fleets of European Powers, and then proceed to form an Armenian State. The Turks were so convinced of the truth of these rumours that many reputable people took their families to a place of safety.

I was told that certain members of the Mohammedie Committee had been sent from Constantinople to Adana to warn the people

of the Armenian rising, but I have never succeeded in ascertaining the truth of that rumour.

At the beginning of April, 1909, the situation on both sides was so strained that every day it was expected that the two parties among the local population would fall upon each other.

At length, on April 14th, the "Adana affair" began, on Monsignor Muscheg's orders, with attacks started by the Armenians. At Adana, Tarsus, Hamidie, Mismis, Erzine, Dört Yol and Azirli, in fact, in all places inhabited by Armenians, a massacre began, the details of which are too loathsome to describe. The Government showed itself utterly powerless even in the chief town of the vilayet, and in its utter bewilderment went so far as to order a rising *en masse* in these districts to prevent the Armenian attacks on the Turks.

On hearing the news that the Armenians of Dört Yol were approaching Erzine, the chief town of the Sandjak of Djebel Bereket, in arms, the *mutessarif* Assaf Bey did not dare even to leave his room. He scattered all over the villages of the Liwa telegrams in which he wrote :

The Mohammedans here are in danger of being wiped out, and it is the duty of every man who loves his country and nation to fly to arms and hurry to the Sandjak of Djebel Bereket.

It was certainly true that the Armenians of Dört Yol were approaching Erzine with the intention of massacring the Turks in the Sandjak of Djebel Bereket. But it is an utterly unpardonable error for a *mutessarif* to shut himself up in his room and tell the inhabitants to do what they liked, for people who find themselves in danger will not only attack aggressors, but even the unarmed and helpless, such as women, old men, and children, and end by looting and burning towns, villages, and country houses. And all this is exactly what happened.

Such were the causes of the first events in Adana. The subsequent occurrences, which were confined to the town of Adana, followed ten days later in consequence of shots fired by young Armenians into the camp of the troops. The Adana massacre became even worse after that.

My personal opinion is that Monsignor Muscheg is the real culprit, the real author of the Sicilian Vespers, but his responsibility is almost shared by the Governor, who must have realised

what a danger this man represented and yet did not take the necessary steps to avert it. It was quite unpardonable of him to let the reins of authority slip from his grasp at such a time and to be guilty of such deplorably feeble conduct when dealing with a looting and murderous rabble.

What is absolutely certain is that two or three months before these events the Turks and Mohammedans of all public and official circles in the vilayet of Adana were firmly convinced that the Armenians were procuring fresh arms every day for the purposes of a general massacre, and that they were really in great danger. The unbridled and provocative language of Monsignor Muscheg only confirmed that opinion.

The psychological causes I have discussed are not merely my own opinion. The English Major Doughty Wyllie, who was then English Consul at Adana, also shared my view. I much regret that this honourable gentleman, who showed high courage in the Dardanelles actions and gave his life for his country, is no longer alive to confirm what I say.

The American missionary, Mr. Chambers, and the Director of the American College at Tarsus, Mr. Christine, told me of the horrible cruelties perpetrated by the Turks and Arab Uschaks during the massacres, but also assured me that Monsignor Muscheg was the prime instigator of the massacre.

Seventeen thousand Armenians and one thousand eight hundred and fifty Turks were killed in Adana in this massacre. The figures show that if the Armenians had been in a majority the reverse would have been the case and the Turks would have been massacred by the Armenians. There was nothing to choose between the two sides as regards cruelties. The Armenians never stopped attacking Turkish women and children, the Turks did the same, and the two infuriated races proved that there was no difference between them.

When I was appointed Governor-General of Adana the Government placed a credit of £200,000 (Turkish) at my disposal. One hundred thousand were for rebuilding the Armenian and Turkish houses in the towns and villages which had been burnt; the other half was to be lent to the Armenian traders, artisans, and farmers to enable them to resume business. The loans were not to be paid back for ten years.

I established a building committee in Adana and took the chairmanship myself. The committee consisted of several foreigners, such as the American missionary, Mr. Chambers, and a large number of natives, the majority being Armenians.

Thanks to the steps I took, four months after my arrival all the Armenian houses in the vilayet had been rebuilt and in the provisional capital there was not a single small family house which had not been finished. In brief, within five or six months the Armenians had freely resumed their trade, agriculture, and industry, and between Turks and Armenians there was no trace, at any rate superficially, of the previous hatreds.

When Herr Mandelstamm, on the authority of the work of a Greek named Adossides, says on page 205 of his book that of the guilty Mohammedans only nine of the most insignificant were killed, he does not speak the truth. Nor does Adossides, who is well known for his spiteful writings against the Turks.

Four months after my arrival at Adana I had not less than thirty Mohammedans executed who had been convicted by court martial. Two days later I had seventeen executed at Erzine. Among them were members of the oldest and highest families in Adana, such as the Mufti of the *Kaza* of Bagjce, who was extremely popular with the Turks of his district.

Monsignor Muscheg succeeded in escaping to Alexandretta on board a foreign steamer two days after these events, and I greatly regret that he did not fall into my hands. He was very properly condemned to death *in contumaciam*. If I had caught him I should have had him hanged opposite the Mufti of Bagjce.

The Armenians themselves have fully recognised all the efforts I made in their behalf, and the restoration of their property while I was Governor-General of Adana. Many foreigners—French, English, Americans, and Russians—who came to Adana were witnesses of my work, and congratulated me upon it. The great orphanage I had built for the reception and bringing up of the children orphaned in the Adana affair is still in existence.

THE REFORMS.

In August, 1912, when I left the administration of Bagdad (where I was sent on from Adana) and returned to Constantinople,

the Ottoman Empire was passing through one of the most dangerous crises of its existence. (1) We were in the throes of war with Italy. (2) Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece had formed an alliance and were searching for some excuse for making war on us. (3) The Albanians were in revolt. (4) The whole Syrian Press was vomiting flames against the Government and demanding reforms for the Arabian provinces. (5) The Armenian Patriarch was addressing note after note to the Sublime Porte and insisting upon reforms in Armenia. (6) Perhaps the greatest danger of all—a number of officers had banded together under the name of the “Officer Liberators Group” (Halaskiaran) and were promoting deadly anarchy in the army. It could be said with perfect truth that the troops at the Dardanelles and in Smyrna and Albania were completely out of hand.

At the head of the Government was Ghazi Muhtar Pasha's Cabinet.

During all these troubles the Balkan War began. The politicians of Russia and France took advantage of our various military failures to get to work. The French egged on the Arabs to demand reforms in Syria, and the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, Baron von Giers, raised the Armenian question once more and handed the Minister of the Interior the following note on November 26th, 1912:

Since the memorable events of 1894-1896, when Asia Minor and Constantinople were bleeding from the barbarous Armenian massacres, the position has in no way improved. Effect has not been given to the reforms decreed by Sultan Abdul Hamid on October 20th, 1895, as a result of Russian, French, and English pressure. The agrarian question is becoming more and more acute from day to day. Most of the landed estates have been or are being seized by the Kurds, and instead of forbidding this illegal confiscation, the authorities are protecting and assisting the usurpers. The reports of all our consulates agree as to the acts of brigandage perpetrated by the Kurds, the unprecedented exactions, the murder of Armenians, and forced conversion of Armenian women. The miscreants are hardly ever dealt with according to law. The memoir presented by the Armenian Patriarch in Constantinople to the Sublime Porte and the Minister of the Interior gives a true picture of the miseries and persecution to which the Armenian subjects of the Sultan are exposed.

This state of things (continued Baron von Giers) sufficiently accounts for the fact that the Armenian nation is looking more and more to Russia. The Russian consulates in Armenia all bear witness to the state of public feeling there. The Armenians are demanding the introduction of reforms under Russian supervision or even a Russian occupation. The Armenians professing the Catholic faith are imploring Russia, the “ancient protectress of the Christians of the East,” in the name of the Almighty to take the wretched Armenian population

in Turkish Armenia under her protection. The Ambassador is of opinion that the Armenian question is of the highest importance to Russia, and desires the Government will do what is necessary to remedy matters. He regards an occupation as premature and advocates reforms. But in doing so he does not forget the tragic fate of the decree of 1895, and insists upon the necessity of the reforms being effectively supervised by Russian or European officials. In view of the state of anarchy in which Turkey is plunged at the moment, the possibility must be reckoned with that the reforms will not have the calming effect desired and that it may be necessary for our troops to enter this region.

As early as the beginning of 1912 the Catholicos of Etschmiazin in Russia had sent the Boghos Nubar Pasha, to the Cabinets of Europe with a commission to demand administrative autonomy for Turkish Armenia. This proceeding was nothing but a step in Russian policy.

What a strong resemblance there was between the course taken by the Russians (which was designed to conceal their real intentions with regard to Armenia) and the policy pursued by France in Syria!

A Mohammedan of Beirut, member of the Arab Congress which met in Paris at the beginning of 1913, said to Monsieur Pichon, the French Foreign Minister :

Although we have called our congress in Paris, our only object is to obtain reforms for the Arab provinces from the Ottoman Government. We want neither a French occupation of Syria nor a French protectorate.

To prove that France had no *arrière pensée* with regard to Syria Herr Pichon reported this conversation to Herr Bompard, the French Ambassador in Constantinople. Almost at the same moment, on March 15th, 1913, the Russians said the same thing, possibly in the same words, to the Boghos Nubar Pasha.

What I say is confirmed by the following letter of February 28th (March 13th) from M. Isvolsky, the Russian Minister in Paris, to H. Sasonov, the Russian Foreign Minister.

Boghos Nubar Pasha (the Ambassador writes) repeatedly asserts that the Armenians of Turkey in no way desire to bring up the question of independence or constitutional changes. Their sole aim is to secure the reforms drawn up by Russia, France and England and provided for in the Treaty of Berlin, reforms which have remained a dead letter hitherto.

I think this remarkable coincidence in the views of the Arab and Armenian reformers is sufficient proof of the policy pursued by Russia and France with the object of dismembering Turkey.

On March 22nd, 1913, the Russian Foreign Minister at length

took the first step in the matter of the Armenian reforms. In a telegram of that date to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin M. Sassonoff called on Germany to associate herself with an international appeal to the Sublime Porte. The date coincides with the time when the Ottoman Government, utterly helpless, saw itself compelled to sign the preliminary peace in London and recognise the Enos-Midia line as the Turco-Bulgarian frontier.

At this time, too, the national demonstrations of the Armenians in Constantinople began to take unusual forms. They organised great celebrations in memory of the anniversary (I do not know which anniversary) of the discovery of the Armenian alphabet. They carried their audacity to the point of throwing confetti in the Armenian national colours about the streets. We bore all this with unshakable patience, and took the necessary steps to prevent ugly incidents. I was then Military Governor of Constantinople, and on an invitation from the Armenians went to the Tascion Garden and made a speech, speaking in the highest terms of the Armenian nation.

The course taken by the Russian Foreign Minister was to hand the representatives of the Great Powers in Constantinople a new scheme of reforms based upon the draft issued by the Ottoman Government in 1895. England and France at once fell in with their proposal. Germany alone suggested that plenipotentiaries of the Sublime Porte should be invited to join the committee to be formed by representatives of the Ambassadors. This suggestion was rejected out of hand by Russia, and Germany's consent was ultimately obtained to the establishment of a committee consisting of the Dragomans of the Embassies, which was to study the Armenian question. The only Government really concerned in the matter was calmly excluded.

Before the committee started on its work Russia had already had a scheme of reform prepared by Mandelstamm, the First Dragoman of the Embassy in Constantinople. I leave it to the conscience of the author to decide whether, under the pretext of preserving the rights of a national minority in a great empire, he can reconcile his sense of shame and the presentation of such a scheme of reforms to an independent State. In view of its great importance, I give the exact text of the Russian scheme :

THE RUSSIAN PROJECT (Orange Book No. 50).

Constantinople, June 8th, 1913.

Scheme for the reforms for Armenia, drawn up by M. A. Mandelstamm, First Dragoman of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople.

Based on the following :

- (1) The Memoir in Armenian reforms of the French, Russian and English Ambassadors in Constantinople (March and April, 1895);
- (2) The scheme for administrative reforms for the province of Armenia drawn up by the French, Russian and English Ambassadors (March and April, 1895);
- (3) The Armenian reform decree issued by His Majesty the Sultan on October 20th, 1895;
- (4) The draft for a vilayet law for European Turkey of August 11th to 23rd, 1880, drawn up by the European Commission;
- (5) The vilayet law of 1913;
- (6) Orders and negotiations with regard to Syria.

I.

§1. *One* province to be formed from the following six vilayets : Erzerum, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, Kharpout and Sivas, excepting certain frontier districts, i.e., Hekkiari, the southern part of Surts, Bicheriks, Malatias and the districts north-east of Sivas.

§2. The administrative division of the province is to be as follows : 1, Sandjak (district); 2, Kaza (department); 3, Nahie (commune).

§3. The parishes are to be arranged in such a way that, from the ethnographical point of view, homogenous national groups are to be formed.

Compare Point I. of the Three Ambassadors' Memorandum of 1895 and Art. 7 of the Ambassadors' scheme of 1895.

II.

The Governor-General (Vali Umumi) of the Armenian province is to be a Christian Ottoman subject, or, better still, a European appointed by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan for five years and approved by the Powers.

(Cf. Art. 17 of the Treaty of Berlin; Art. I. of the Cretan Regulations of 1896; Orders and negotiations with regard to the Lebanon; Arts. II. and VI. of the Three Ambassadors' Memorandum of 1895; Introduction to the Reform Decree in Armenia of October 20th, 1895, Point I.)

III.

The Governor-General is the head of the executive in the province. He has full authority to appoint and replace all the provincial administrative authorities. He also appoints all the judges of the province.

2. The police and gendarmerie are to be under the orders of the Governor-General.

3. If the Governor-General so desires, the military forces are to be at his disposal to maintain order in the province.

(Cf. Art. I. of the Lebanon Orders, 1864; Arts. 27, 32 and 44 of the Scheme of the European Commission, 1884; Arts. 20, 25 and 26 of the Vilayet Administration Decree of 1913.)

IV.

The Governor-General of the province is to be assisted by an Administrative Council with full advisory powers, and consisting of :

- (a) The heads of the different administrative parishes of the province;
 - (b) The spiritual heads of the religious associations;
 - (c) The European technical advisers in the service of the Imperial Government appointed to assist the heads of the administrative parishes;
 - (d) Six legal advisers (three Mohammedans and three Christians) chosen from the members of the Provincial Assembly.
- (Cf. Art. 49 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Art. 62 of the Vilayet Administration Decree of 1913; Art. 6 of the Decree of October, 1895.)

V.

1. The Provincial Assembly is to consist of Mohammedans and Christians in equal numbers.
 2. The members of the Provincial Assembly are to be elected by secret ballot in the department by the electoral colleges to be formed there.
 3. The number of seats to be assigned to the Mohammedan and Christian nationalities of the province is to be specially fixed for each department. So far as is compatible with the principle laid down in the first paragraph of this article, this number is to be in proportion to the population of the department.
- (Cf. Art. II. of the Negotiations and Orders with reference to the Reorganisation of the Lebanon, 1861; Art. 3, §5, of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 69 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Art. 103 of the Decree of 1913.)

VI.

1. The Provincial Assembly will be elected for five years, and meet once a year for a regular sitting of two months. The sitting may be extended by the Governor-General.
 2. The Provincial Assembly may be summoned for an extraordinary sitting either by the Governor-General on his own initiative or on the demand of two-thirds of the members of the Assembly.
 3. The Governor-General may dissolve the Assembly. In this case the elections must be held in two months, and the new Assembly meet within four months of the dissolution decree.
 4. The decrees summoning or dissolving the Assembly must be issued in the name of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.
- (Cf. Arts. 73-75 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Arts. 111-115 and Art. 125 of the Provincial Decree of 1913.)

VII.

1. The Provincial Assembly is the legislative authority for provincial interests.
 2. The powers of the Provincial Assembly in respect of legislation and finance are to be at least co-extensive with those provided for in Arts. 82-93 of the scheme drawn up in 1880 by the European Commission.
 3. The laws passed by the Provincial Assembly are to be sent up for the consent of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. That consent must be given or refused within two months and after the expiry of that period the silence of the Government is to be taken as consent.
- (Cf. Arts. 82-93 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Arts. 123, 124, 128-135 of the Vilayet Administration Decree of 1913.)

VIII.

1. The Mutessarif is to be president of the Administrative Council of the Sandjak; the Administrative Council is to consist of the administrative heads of the Sandjak, the spiritual heads of the religious societies, and six members (three Mohammedans and three Christians) to be chosen from the administrative councils of the *Kazas*.

2. The Kaimakam is to be the president of the Administrative Council of the *Kaza*; the Administrative Council is to consist of the administrative heads of the *Kaza*, the spiritual heads of the religious societies, and four members (two Mohammedans and two Christians) to be elected by the council of the commune.

3. The powers of these councils will be fixed in accordance with Arts. 115 and 116, 139, and 140 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880.

(Cf. Arts. 114, 115, 116, 138, 139, 140 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Art. 6 of the Decree of October 20th, 1895; Arts. 62, 63, 64, and 65 of the Decree of 1913.)

IX.

1. The boundaries of each commune (*Nahié*) are to be fixed in such a way that as far as possible villages inhabited by one nationality are to form *one* commune.

2. Each commune is to be administered by a Mudir, assisted by a council of not less than four and not more than eight members elected by the people. The council is to elect the Mudir and his assistant as members. The Mudir is to be a member of the national group which ethnologically forms a majority, his assistant to belong to the other group.

3. In communes where the population is mixed the minority is to be represented according to its numbers, provided that it comprises not less than twenty-five houses.

4. The powers of the communes are to be fixed in accordance with Arts. 163-168 of the Scheme drawn up by the European Commission of 1880.

(Cf. Arts. 167, 168 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Arts. 7, 8, and 9 of the Three Ambassadors' Reform Scheme of 1895; Arts. 7, 8, and 9 of the Decree of October 20th, 1895.)

X.

1. In every commune there will be a *juge de paix*, appointed by the Governor-General and of the same religion as the majority of the commune.

2. The *juge de paix* will decide :

(a) in criminal cases (without appeal) in offences punishable by simple police penalties, with a right of appeal in offences punishable by fine not exceeding 500 piastres or by not more than three months' imprisonment.

(b) in civil actions (without appeal) in all civil and commercial cases where the claim does not exceed 1000 piastres, with a right of appeal in similar actions where the claim does not exceed 5000 piastres.

3. The Court of the *juge de paix* is to be also a court of arbitration. On demand by the parties it may appoint arbitrators who shall decide even in disputes over 5000 piastres. In case of the award of an arbitrator there shall be no right of appeal.

4. The Sandjak Courts are to have only one civil court, consisting of a president and two paid judges (one Mohammedan and one Christian), to be

appointed by the Governor-General. The Sandjak Courts are to function as (a) a court of first instance in civil and commercial matters where the amount involved exceeds 5000 piastres, and (b) a court of appeal from the decisions of the *juges de paix* in civil and commercial actions.

5. The criminal section of the Sandjak Courts is to be replaced by mobile courts of assize. These are to consist of a president (to be selected from the members of the next higher appeal court to which the Sandjak Court is attached) and two members (one a Mohammedan and one a Christian) selected by the same Court of Appeal from among the *juges de paix* of the Sandjak.

6. The assizes will be held in succession in all *Kazas* where the presence of these courts is considered necessary.

7. There will be a *juge d'instruction* in every *Kaza*. On the arrival of the president of the Assize Court in a *Kaza* the *juge d'instruction* will put before him the documents relating to cases prepared by the *juge d'instruction* and already ripe for action, and also the documents relating to pending cases and cases not yet complete. If the latter reveal irregularities or unjustifiable delay he must immediately report the matter to the President of the Court of Appeal.

8. The Assize Court is to decide, subject to appeal, upon the sentences passed by the *juges de paix* in criminal causes. As a court of first and last instance it is to decide in cases of crime or misdemeanour punishable by fine of more than 500 piastres or imprisonment for more than three months.

9. There are to be at least six Courts of Appeal. Each Court of Appeal is to be composed of a president, a trained lawyer appointed by the Governor-General, and a sufficient number of members to deal with the civil business brought before it and provide the Courts of Assize with presidents. The Court of Appeal is competent to decide when a quorum of a president and two members is present.

10. Commercial Courts will be established wherever required. Where these are functioning the civil courts shall have no jurisdiction in commercial actions.

11. The powers of the *shariat* courts shall be strictly defined, and it shall be the business of the Governor-General to see that the functions of the other judicial authorities of the province are not encroached upon. The judges of the *shariat* courts may not simultaneously be presidents of the other provincial courts.

(*Cf.* Arts. 29-39 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Arts. 125-263 of the scheme of the European Commission of 1880.)

XI.

1. A corps of police and a corps of gendarmerie will be formed in the province. Half of these corps will be recruited from the Mohammedan and Christian population of the province.

2. The organisation and command of these forces will be in the hands of the European officers in the Turkish service.

3. A constabulary is to be formed in the communes. The constables are to be appointed by the Governor-General and be under the orders of the Mudir.

(*Cf.* Arts. 18-21 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 24 of the Decree of October 20th, 1895.)

XII.

Recruits who are natives of the province shall perform their military service in peace-time in the province. The regiments of Kurdish light cavalry (Ex-Hamidie) will be disbanded.

(*Cf.* Art. 25 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 28 of the Decree of October 20th, 1895.)

XIII.

1. The administrative officials and provincial judges are to be selected in equal numbers from the Mohammedan and Christian population.

2. In appointing the governors of the Sandjaks (Mutessarif) and the *Kazas* (Kaimakam) regard is to be had to the national populations and their economic interests.

(*Cf.* Art. 5 of the Decree of October 20th, 1895.)

XIV.

1. Only domiciled inhabitants are to have the electoral franchise and to be eligible for election.

(*Cf.* Art. 24 of §8 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 27 of the Decree of October 20th, 1895.)

XV.

1. All laws, orders, regulations, official circulars and announcements are to be published in the three languages of the province (Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish).

2. All petitions and requests, and all documents addressed to the judicial or administrative authorities, are to be in one of the three provincial languages, according to the unfettered choice of the parties.

3. Parties may defend themselves in the courts in their own language.

4. Judgment is to be given in Turkish, and will be drawn up with a translation in the language of the party concerned.

(*Cf.* Art. 40 of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 22 of the Scheme of the European Commission of 1880; Circular from the Ministry of the Interior to the vilayets, *re* Arabic, of April 6th, 1913.)

XVI.

1. Each nation in the province has the right to establish and maintain private schools of all kinds.

2. They may raise taxes for the benefit of these schools among their own nationals.

3. Teaching in these schools will be given in the national language.

4. The supervision of these schools will be in the hands of the Governor-General, in accordance with the regulations laid down in the provincial laws.

5. Turkish is to be compulsory in all private schools.

(*Cf.* Clause XIV. of the Scheme of the Commission of 1880.)

XVII.

A Special Commission, presided over by the Governor-General, will prescribe the conditions upon which Armenians illegally deprived of their lands will have them restored, or receive compensation in the shape of other lands or money.

(*Cf.* Art. 26 of the Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895; Art. 29 of the Decree of October 20th, 1895.)

XVIII.

The rights and privileges of the Armenian nation derived from the *Sahmanatrutium* (Fundamental Decree) of 1868 and the *bérats* issued by the Sultan are expressly recognised as inviolable.

(*Cf.* Point XI. of the Three Ambassadors' Scheme of 1895.)

XIX.

No Mohadjvis (Mohammedan immigrants) may settle within the boundaries of the province.

XX.

Special regulations in the spirit of the above principles shall be issued for the benefit of Armenians residing outside the province, particularly in Cilicia.

(*Cf.* Art. 12 of the Ambassadors' Memorandum of 1895; Art. 4 of the Introduction to the Decree of October, 1895.)

XXI.

A Special Commission, consisting of representatives of the Ottoman Government and the Great Powers will draw up the Organisation Decree of the province and the special regulations referred to in Article XX. hereof.

XXII.

The Great Powers will see that all the regulations are carried out.

(*Cf.* Art. VIII. of the Memorandum of 1895; Art. 32 of the Decree of October 20th, 1895; Art. 14 of the Cretan Decrees of 1896.)

I do not think anyone can have the slightest doubt that within a year of the acceptance of these proposals the vilayets of Erzerum, Vovas, Van, Bitlis, Diarbekir, and Mamure-el-Aziz would have become a Russian protectorate or, at any rate, have been occupied by the Russians.

During the negotiations the German delegate had always endeavoured to preserve and advance the rights of the Ottoman Government, while the Russian representative did his utmost to undermine them.

The delegates of England and France supported Russia, while the Austrian and Italian representatives appeared to take the same view as their German colleague.

The Commission, which first met on July 3rd, 1913, broke up on July 23rd. In spite of several sittings it had done nothing, as Russia's object was to carry out this scheme without any modifications, while Germany wanted to protect the Ottoman Government as much as possible. At length, in September, 1913, Baron von Giers succeeded in persuading Baron von Wangenheim, the German Ambassador at Constantinople, to accept a basic programme of six points. Then began negotiations between Said Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the two diplomatists.

After we knew of the six fundamental points, we saw that it

would be possible for the Ottoman Government to give effect to them itself and without any external pressure. We thereupon worked out a very comprehensive programme for the whole Empire and communicated it to the great Powers through our Ambassadors.

In accordance with this programme the whole Empire was to be divided into six General-Inspectorates, two of which were to be formed of the vilayets of eastern Anatolia.

With a view to foiling Russian intrigues, we wanted to let the English supervise these two districts. Tewfik Pasha, our Ambassador in London, was asked to enquire of Sir Edward Grey whether two English officials would be sent, and he replied that the English seemed inclined to favour this plan. The Grand Vizier immediately put forward the request officially. The moment England accepted this proposal the doom of Russia's designs would be sealed. A fortnight later, when the news came through that England could not undertake the appointment of the officials for eastern Anatolia without Russian consent, we had to abandon all our hopes and realise that England had once and for all sacrificed us to Russian ambition.

We were compelled to continue the negotiations between the German and Russian Ambassadors, and on February 8th, 1914, the resulting agreement was signed by M. Gulkievitch, the *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Russian Embassy, and Said Halim Pasha.

THE TURCO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 26TH (FEBRUARY 8TH), 1914.

(Orange Book, No. 147.)

His Excellency M. Constantine Gulkievitch, Russian *Chargé d'Affaires*, and his Highness Prince Said Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs, are agreed that, simultaneously with the appointment of the two Inspectors for the provinces of Eastern Anatolia, the Sublime Porte will issue the following Note to the Great Powers :

Two foreign Inspectors will be put in charge of the provinces to be formed in Eastern Anatolia : Monsieur A. will have the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, and Sivas, and Monsieur B. the vilayets of Van, Bitlis, Kharput, and Diarbekir.

The Inspectors will supervise the civil administration and the administration of justice, the police, and the gendarmerie of the two districts. If the police force is insufficient to maintain order, military forces will be at the disposal of the Inspector, if required by him, to enable him to carry out the duties of his office.

If necessary the Inspectors may dismiss officials who prove unsuitable through inefficiency or bad behaviour, and hand over to justice officials who have been guilty of crimes. They have the right to propose the higher officials

for appointment by his Majesty. In such cases of dismissal they are to send an immediate telegraphic report, with a summary of their reasons, to the Ministers concerned, and a more detailed report, with the documents, must be forwarded within a week. In important cases which require immediate action the Inspectors have the right to suspend judicial officers, who cannot be dismissed, on condition that they immediately refer the matter to the Department of Justice.

Should any actions for which the Vali has made himself responsible call for energetic measures, the Inspectors will inform the Minister of the Interior by telegram. The latter will immediately bring the case to the notice of the Cabinet, which will come to a decision within four days at most after the receipt of the telegram.

Agricultural disputes will be decided under the personal supervision of the Inspector.

After the appointment of the Inspectors, detailed memoranda will be drawn up, with their co-operation, on the subject of their duties and rights.

Should the post of Inspector remain vacant during a period of ten years, the Sublime Porte will avail itself of the benevolent assistance of the Great Powers in making the new appointment. Laws, edicts, and public proclamations are to be in the language of each district respectively. In so far as the Inspector may deem it possible, each party has the right to use its own language before a court of justice or an administrative authority. Judgment is to be given in the Turkish language, accompanied, when possible, by a translation in the language of the party concerned.

The contribution to the schools budget of the vilayet payable by the different native elements will be fixed in accordance with the rate of the school tax originally in force. The Imperial Government will place no difficulties in the way of the religious orders sharing in the maintenance of their schools.

Every Ottoman must, in peace time, perform his military service within the military Inspectorate in which his home is situated. The Sublime Porte will, however, until further notice, detail contingents of the military forces from all parts of the Empire for service in the outlying regions of the Yemen, Assir, and Nedjd in proportion to the population of these regions; it will, moreover, relegate to the Navy recruits from all parts of the Empire.

The Hamidie regiments will be converted into Cavalry Reserves. Their arms are to remain in the military dépôts, and will only be issued in case of mobilisation and manœuvres. They will be under the command of the Corps Commander in whose district they are. In peace time, regimental, squadron, and platoon commanders will be selected from officers on the active list of the Imperial Ottoman Army. The men of these regiments will perform one year's military service. They must bring to the regiment their own horses and complete saddlery equipment. Every man, without distinction of race or faith, who comes within this recruiting area and fulfils the required conditions, may be drafted into the aforesaid regiments. In case of war and during manœuvres they will be subject to the same disciplinary regulations as the regular troops.

The authority of the Inspectors of the vilayets will be in accordance with the provisions of the Act of March 13th, 1329 (1913).

A census will be taken under the direction of the Inspectors at the earliest opportunity—if at all possible, not later than a year hence—in order to ascertain the exact conditions as to religion, nationality, and language in the two districts. Until then the elected members of the "General Council" (Medjlissi Umumi) and the "Vilayet Committees" (Endjumen) of Van and Bitlis will consist of equal numbers of Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans. In the vilayet of Erzerum the members of the General Council, in the event of the final census

not being completed within the year, will be elected on the same basis as those of the other two vilayets. In the vilayets of Sivas, Kharpout, and Diarbekir members will be elected immediately in proportion to the population. To facilitate the carrying through of these measures, the number of Mohammedan electors will, until the new census is made, be fixed according to the old lists, and the number of non-Mohammedans according to the parish lists. Meanwhile, should material difficulties prevent the adoption of this provisional system of election, the Inspectors have authority to propose for the vilayets of Sivas, Kharpout, and Diarbekir a division of the electorate for the General Councils which may be more suitable to the present needs and conditions of the vilayets in question. In all vilayets in which the General Councils are elected by proportional suffrage, the minority of the population will be accorded representation on the Committees (Endjumen).

The members of the Administrative Council will, as heretofore, consist of Mohammedans and non-Mohammedans in equal numbers. It is left to the discretion of the Inspector to undertake recruiting for the police and gendarmerie in the districts in a similar ratio. The principle of proportion will also be observed as far as possible in filling the other official posts.

In witness of which we, the undersigned, hereto append our signatures and affix our seals.

(Signed) GULKIEVITCH. (Signed) SAID HALIM.

Dated, Constantinople, January 26th (February 8th), 1914.

The Russians had acclaimed this agreement as a substantial political success. To appreciate its significance, it is sufficient to read the following passages from Gulkievitch's telegram to Sassonoff, the Foreign Minister:

Thus the Act of January 22nd, 1914, signifies without doubt the opening of a new and happier era in the history of the Armenian people. In political significance it is comparable with the *Firman* of 1870, in which the Bulgarian Exarchate was founded and the Bulgars were freed from Greek guardianship. The Armenians must feel that the first step has been taken towards releasing them from the Turkish yoke.

The agreement of January 26th, 1914, has, at the same time, great significance for the international status of Russia. It has been signed personally by the Grand Vizier and Russia's representative, and pledges the Turks to hand to the Powers a note, the contents of which have been precisely set forth. The outstanding rôle of Russia in the Armenian question is thus officially emphasised, and Art. 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano to some extent ratified. This circumstance will certainly not fail to exert a most favourable influence on the international status of Russia, and to place a halo on the head of her sovereign in the eyes of the Christians of the Near East. In reaching an agreement with the Porte on the Armenian question the Imperial Ambassador has had to overcome extraordinary difficulties. It was necessary to reckon, on the one hand, with the natural desire of the Armenians to introduce the most far-reaching reforms possible; on the other, with the stubborn resistance of the Porte, which did its utmost to defeat the proposed reforms, and opposed all the important points of the scheme. As far as Germany is concerned, the understanding with us serves a double purpose; first, by convincing the Porte that in consenting to these moderate reforms, fraught with little danger to her, Germany had shielded the Turkish Government from more drastic reforms; secondly, by winning over the sympathy of the Armenians, which is of great

importance because of Cilicia, which they regard as coming within their sphere of influence. Germany's conduct, therefore, was lacking in candour; her support was merely bluff as far as the Armenians were concerned. In reality the German diplomatists were the loyal advisers of the Turk.

(Signed) GULKIEVITCH.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires regards the Armenian plan for reform merely as the first step towards the Russian occupation of Armenia, and in this is completely justified. I cannot avoid expressing my astonishment that these lines, which so openly reveal Russia's political aim with regard to Armenia, could be published in the Orange Book; I can justly say: "God has brought the guilty to an acknowledgment of their guilt."

Of late the Russians have considerably altered their policy with regard to the Armenians of the Caucasus. Seeing that the oppression which the Armenians there have had to suffer at their hands had awakened the mistrust of the genuine Armenian revolutionaries against Russia, they at once abandoned their malevolent policy, they returned the confiscated property to the Monastery of Etchmiazin, issued a general pardon for all Armenian political criminals, and proclaimed the greatest friendliness towards the Armenians. This new policy won over even those revolutionary Armenians who hitherto had detested Russia.

After the activity which Boghos Nubar Pasha had displayed in Europe, particularly towards the middle of 1913, we repeatedly suggested to the leaders of the Dachnakzutiun that they should support us in resisting the Russian efforts for reform in Armenia; as the Balkan War was over, it would now have been easier for us to subject the Kurds to more stringent discipline and secure peace for the Armenians. The answer we received was somewhat after this fashion: "As the Great Powers are intervening in this matter, we can no longer stand aside."

Painful for us and satisfactory for Russia as was the agreement of the 8th February, 1914, the Ottoman Government nevertheless intended meticulously to enforce all the conditions. But is Russian policy ever at a loss to find new impediments? Was not her real aim never to permit peace in East Anatolia? For this she had first to establish a protectorate over Armenia, further to awaken the sympathy of Europe for the Armenians, and also to stir up the Kurdish Beys and, more important still, the influential sheiks to resistance against the Government and the Armenians.

In accordance with this carefully planned scheme the Russian Government at home supported the famous Abdul Rezak Bey Bederhani, furnished him with lavish supplies of money on the pretext of restoring Kurdish rule in Sinai, and on the other hand, through the agency of the Consul at Bitlis, provoked Sheik N. N. to rise against the Government.

However hard M. Mandelstamm may try he cannot conceal the truth.

While the question of the Armenian reforms was developing in this way the Great War broke out. The Ottoman Government saw that sooner or later they would be drawn into the War by the German alliance. As they foresaw the impossibility of occupying themselves with internal reforms during the long trying years of war they considered it unnecessary to prolong the mandate of the two foreign Inspectors whom they had appointed to the East Anatolian Provinces.

Of course it was our one hope to free ourselves through the World War from all conventions, which meant so many attacks on our independence, and to be able to live in future as an independent and free nation, which in its own territory, of its own initiative introduces the reforms which local necessities have made imperative. Just as it was our chief aim to annul the Capitulations and the Lebanon statute, so in the matter of Armenian reform we desired to release ourselves from the Agreement which Russian pressure had imposed upon us.

As has already been discussed in detail in a special chapter, we entered the World War in the hope of being able in future to lead a free and independent existence as a self-respecting Nation.

This was our intention, and so the treaty dealing with the reforms for the vilayets inhabited by Armenians, wrung out of us by our hereditary enemies (the Russians), had no further significance. That is not to say, however, that we had not the earnest intention of introducing reform in our country. On the contrary, we had determined on radical reform, as we were inspired by the conviction that otherwise we could not continue to exist.

But we approached the question of reform from the standpoint that Czardom, which for two centuries had hovered over our heads like a scourge, must be destroyed, so that the eternal intrigue smouldering within our country might be finally quenched. And

this aim was only to be realised by throwing into the World War the fullest strength of our military resources. And so we decided to defer tackling the internal reforms until the end of the War, first devoting all the forces of our nation to the War itself. We have not failed to communicate this point of view to the leaders of the Dachnakzutiun.

Finally we became actively involved in the World War. A few days after the declaration of War I was appointed to the Command of the 4th Army and left Constantinople to proceed to Syria. From that time I have learnt nothing further of the conditions in the vilayets of East Anatolia, nor on what grounds the Government saw itself called upon to deport all Armenians. I neither took part in the negotiations at Constantinople nor was I consulted. It was through the Government Proclamation to the vilayets that I first learned that all Armenians were provisionally to be deported to Mesopotamia, where they were to remain until the end of the War.

The Commander-in-Chief at home also informed me that I was to take the necessary measures to protect the Armenians against any attack while passing through my command; their deportation was in the hands of the civil authorities. That was all I learned. At that time I was busy with the organisation of the line of communications between Bozanti and Aleppo; it was the only route by which the military forces which were to be sent to Syria towards the end of the autumn of 1915 to take part in the second Canal Expedition could pass; I was to provide for the necessary supplies.

I was furious when I learned that the exiled Armenians were to come to Bozanti on their way over the Taurus and Adana to Aleppo; for any interference with the line of communications might have the gravest consequences for the Canal Expedition.

My correspondence with the Commander-in-Chief is preserved in the Army records; later, when these records are published, it will be possible to show that I considered it more expedient to settle the Armenians in the interior of the provinces of Konia, Angora, and Kastamuni than to send them to Mesopotamia.

But as I could not oppose a Government measure based on an Act of Parliament, and had, moreover, received a specific order not to hinder the progress of the Armenian emigrant columns which

were passing Adana and Aleppo on their way to Mesopotamia, I saw myself compelled to yield.

I heard from time to time of deeds of violence against the emigrating Armenians in the vilayets of Mamuret-ul-Asis and Diarbekir. The organisation of the emigrants was exclusively the concern of the civil authorities, the Army had nothing to do with it. As, however, I could not allow attacks on the emigrants to take place in my Army zone, as had occurred in the other Army zones, I thought it my duty to issue stringent orders to this effect. As I was continually hearing complaints that the civil authorities in the sector between Bozanti and Aleppo were unable to provide the emigrant columns with adequate supplies, and that the people in consequence were being found in a condition of the greatest distress along the route. I made a journey from Aleppo to Bozanti to view the situation personally, issued an order that bread was to be provided for the emigrants from the Army dépôts, and ordered the doctors on the lines of communication to look after the sick Armenians.

I thus did everything possible during the whole period of their deportation to give help to the Armenians, as has been confirmed by the Armenians themselves and by all impartial foreigners. For the moment I will refer only to some orders and negotiations recorded in the book of Lepsius, which contains official reports of the German Foreign Office in connection with the Armenian question. All my telegrams which I sent to Constantinople, to the District Commandants, and to the vilayets are collected in the Army War Records; on the day when this is published the public will know more of the humane intentions upon which my measures were based.

When, after the deportations of the Armenians of Anatolia, the civil authorities received the command to deport all Armenians from Adana and Aleppo, I repeatedly opposed this measure. I wrote a detailed report on this subject to Constantinople, explaining that I could see no necessity for such a measure, and that, in my opinion, such action was bound to have the worst possible influence on the economic, and especially on the agricultural situation in the territory of the 4th Army. But as I was told that it was not my business to meddle with the concerns

of the civil authorities, but merely to give them assistance, I was unable to prevent these orders being carried out.

However, as I was convinced that the deportation of all Armenian emigrants to Mesopotamia was bound to cause them great distress, I thought it better to bring a large number of them into the Syrian vilayets of Beirut and Aleppo; I succeeded in obtaining the desired permission after I had made vigorous representations to Constantinople. In this way I was actually able to bring nearly 150,000 Armenians to these vilayets.

I have a fundamental aversion to telling of the help I rendered to these widows and orphans. It seems to me as though in doing so I am reflecting on the moral value of these actions which were prompted only by feelings of humanity. As, however, in spite of all the help given, our foreign enemies point to me as morally responsible for these occurrences, and that caricature of a Government which has been set up at Constantinople since the Armistice even went so far as to condemn me to death on an accusation of moral guilt for these banishments and butcheries, I regard it as a just means of self-defence to give some explanation in accordance with the truth. Public opinion will recognise that I had nothing to do with the deportations and Armenian massacres. Just as I had nothing to do with the aforementioned negotiations about the deportation of the Armenians, I am equally innocent of ordering any massacres; I have even prevented them and caused all possible help to be given to all emigrants at the time of the deportations.

If I had been in Constantinople at the time and taken part in the discussions, knowing what was happening in the rear of the Army in East Anatolia, should I not have supported the deportations? This question I cannot now answer. But I assume that my friends, in reaching such a drastic decision as this wholesale deportation which roused the indignation of the whole civilised world, must have been actuated by weighty reasons. I have no doubt that in the publications which are shortly to appear they will satisfy our doubts and curiosity.

I am certainly firmly convinced that the Armenians planned insurrections which endangered the rear of our Army in the Caucasus and which might under certain circumstances have completely destroyed it. Consequently my friends held it more

expedient to transfer the whole Armenian nation to another region where they could do no harm, than to expose the whole Ottoman Empire to a catastrophe which would have involved Russian occupation of the whole of Asia Minor.

As to the occurrences which took place during the deportations these must be ascribed to seventy years of accumulated hatred between Turks, Kurds, and Armenians. The responsibility must lie with Muscovite policy which made mortal enemies of three nations who for centuries had lived together in peace. The crimes perpetrated during the deportations of 1915 justly roused the deepest horror, but those committed by the Armenians during their rising against the Turks and Kurds do not in any way fall short of them in cruelty and treachery. But whatever may have been the causes that gave rise to these crimes, they ought to have been prevented by every possible means. The Government regarded deportation as the most effective and speedy means of ensuring the safety of the Kurdish and Turkish population, the Army and the whole political existence of the Ottoman States. Yet, on the other hand, by these measures they opened the way for the crimes perpetrated by the Kurds and Turks. Could not the question have been solved in another way? Or, would it not have been possible to protect the exiles from attacks *en route*? We can only deal with these questions after seeing the explanation of those who organised the deportations and those who carried them out. In any event, I am able to prove that in the territory occupied by my Army no outrages on the emigrants were permitted, and, apart from a few exceptional cases, none occurred.

As to the bad impression created, a no less lamentable impression was given by the spectacle of the Turks fleeing from Diarbekir, via Aleppo and Adana, to Konia, and from Erzerum and Erzindjan to Sivas, before the Russians, and the horrors and outrages committed by Armenians. But these unfortunate wretches were only Mohammedans; so there was no German or American missionary available to send reports or to feel called upon to devote his eloquence to describing their woes.

Let us assume that the Ottoman Government deported a million and a half Armenians from the East Anatolian Provinces, and that 600,000 of them died, some murdered, some collapsing on the way from hunger and distress. But does anyone know how many

Kurdish and Turkish inhabitants of the vilayets of Trebizond, Erzerum, Van, and Bitlis were done to death in circumstances of the greatest cruelty by the Armenians when the Russians marched into these provinces? Then let it be stated that the number of Turks and Kurds killed on this occasion far exceeded one and a half millions. If the Turks are to be made responsible for the Armenian massacres, why not the Armenians for the massacres of the Turks? Or are the Turks and Kurds of no more value in the eyes of humanity, or of such politicians as Mandelstamm and Morgenthau and their like, than flies?

I ask my readers to examine the two following Russian reports with care, for they give an idea of the hatred fostered by the Armenians against the Turks, and the excesses in which they have indulged:

RUSSIAN OFFICIAL MEMORANDUM.

The Retreat of the Russian Army.

Memorandum of Lt.-Col. Twerdokhleboff concerning the Armenian attacks on the Turkish population of Erzerum and its neighbourhood, from the beginning of the Russian Revolution to the reoccupation of the town by the Turkish troops on February 27th, 1918.

INTRODUCTION.

The enmity known throughout Europe to have existed for a long time between Turks and Armenians has revealed itself during the War in a manner that passes all description. It is a commonly recognised fact that the Armenians cannot stand the Turks; in spite of this they have always managed to pose as martyrs, and to convince the world that on account of their high state of civilisation and their faith they have been the object of the most ghastly cruelties.

The Russians, who of all Europeans have necessarily been in closest touch with the Armenians, have a different conception of the manner in which this nation understands civilisation and morality. They have learnt to know them as miserly, avaricious, parasitical, only able to exist by preying on others. The Russian peasant has seen into this nation's soul. I have often heard from Russian soldiers such expressions as: "The Turks have used the Armenians badly, but they should have done it in quite a different way and left not one of them alive."

From a military point of view the Armenians are worthless. The Armenian soldiers of the Russian Army play a very insignificant rôle; they always prefer service in the rear of the Army, however menial, to the firing line. The persistent desertions and cases of self-wounding confirm the opinion which has been given of the bravery of the Armenians.

But the course of events, from the beginning of the Russian Revolution to the reoccupation of Erzerum by the Turkish troops, surpasses anything that could have been expected from this nation. I have witnessed some of these occurrences partly with my own eyes; others I have heard of from eye-witnesses.

When, in 1916, Erzerum was taken by the Russians, not a single Armenian

was allowed to enter the town or its neighbourhood. So long as General Kalikin was at the head of the 1st Army Corps, which occupied the town and surroundings of Erzerum, not a single unit which contained Armenian elements was sent there. After the Russian Revolution these measures were discontinued, and the Armenians took advantage of this to attack Erzerum and its neighbourhood, and then the plundering of houses and villages and the massacres began.

During the Russian occupation the Armenians did not dare to indulge openly in deeds of violence; the looting and murder was committed in secret. In 1917 the Armenian Revolutionary Committee, which consisted chiefly of soldiers, instigated general house-searchings on the pretext of disarming the population. But, as they were conducted without any control, they soon developed into systematic lootings which were carried on by the soldiers on an even more extensive scale. The worst looters among the Armenian soldiers were usually those who had shown themselves the most cowardly in face of the enemy.

One day, as I was riding through the streets of the town, I saw a group of Russian soldiers who, egged on by an Armenian soldier, were dragging along two old Turks of seventy. The Armenian soldier seemed to be in a state of frenzy and lashed the poor devils with a wire whip. I tried, without success, to induce the soldiers to treat the old men a little more humanely. The Armenian stepped up to me, threatened me with his riding-whip, and shouted: "You dare to protect our murderers?" Other Armenians who came up took his part, of course, and my position with regard to the Russian soldiers, who would seize any opportunity to beat and, if possible, kill their officers, began to look critical. The appearance of an officers' patrol, however, changed the situation: the Armenians vanished into thin air and the soldiers led off the two old men without further violence.

With the return home of the Russian front-line troops, the danger arose that the Armenians remaining at the front, or flocking to Erzerum, would take the opportunity, before the arrival of units of other nationalities, to commit outrages on the Turkish population. The influential Armenians, of course, gave assurances that nothing of the kind would happen; they asserted their anxiety to bring about a reconciliation of the two peoples, and their conviction that the adoption of suitable measures would ensure success.

At first events seemed, indeed, to justify these assertions. The mosques, which had been converted into barracks, were cleared and cleaned out and no longer used as military quarters. Militia units were formed, comprising Turks and Armenians, and the Armenians even clamoured loudly for the setting up of a court martial to deal with the crimes that had been committed against the Turks.

Not until later did it become known that all these manœuvres were nothing but bluff and cunningly concealed treachery. The Turks who joined the militia soon had enough of it when they observed that the majority of those who were told off for night patrol did not return, and no news of their fate could be obtained. The Turks who were taken to work in the fields disappeared in like manner without a trace. Also, the members of the court martial, when they finally met, dared not enforce any penalties for fear of their own lives. Murder and looting multiplied; between January and February Bekir Hadji Effendi, one of the most respected notables of Erzerum, was murdered in his own house. General Odichelidze thereupon issued an order to the officers in command of the troops that the murderer must be found within three days. This order produced no result.

The Commander-in-Chief sent severe reprimands to the headquarters of the Armenian detachments on the intolerable lack of discipline among their men.

He also appealed to the Armenian notables, pointing out the atrocities that had been committed by the troops—*e.g.*, that of the Turkish land workers who had been ordered to the fields less than half had returned—and explained to them that if the Armenians desired to obtain control of the occupied territory they would have to prove themselves worthy of it. He added that these crimes were a blot on the fame of the Armenian nation. The war is not yet over, he said, and the Peace Congress has not yet assigned this territory to the Armenians; it behoved them, therefore, to conduct themselves thenceforward as a nation worthy of freedom.

The answer of the Armenian leaders was to the effect that the honour of a whole people could not be prejudiced by the crimes of an insignificant minority; they gave assurance that the reasonably-minded Armenians were doing their utmost to put a stop to these acts of vengeance for the Turkish tyranny of the past; they observed, further, that they were engaged in framing the sternest measures, which they would enforce without delay, justly and equitably. Shortly after the receipt of these oft-repeated assurances we learned of the massacre of Turks at Erzindjan. The following details I heard from the mouth of the Commander-in-Chief, Odichelidze. The massacre was not instigated by bands, but by the doctor of the town and the army contractor. As I do not know the exact names of these Armenians I cannot give them.

The report runs :

"More than 800 unarmed, defenceless Turks were murdered. The Armenians had dug gigantic trenches into which the poor Turks were thrown after being slaughtered like a herd of cattle. An Armenian who directed the execution counted the unhappy victims. 'That's seventy,' he roared, 'there's still room for ten more; hack away!' And another ten wretches were slaughtered to fill up the gap, which was then filled in with a little earth. The army contractor wanted to provide a little diversion for his own benefit. He locked into a house eighty wretched victims, and then had them let out one after another while he smashed in their skulls with his own hand."

After the massacre at Erzindjan the Armenians, well armed, made their way to Erzerum. A Russian officer who, with the aid of a few guns, was protecting the line of communication of the retreating force from the attacks of the Kurds, one day attempted to lead an Armenian detachment into the firing line. The men, however, had no stomach for real fighting; instead, they set fire to the house in which the Russian officers were and tried to get rid of them in this way. The officers narrowly escaped death and lost all their possessions.

The Armenian bands, swarming from Erzindjan to Erzerum, destroyed on their way all Mohammedan villages and annihilated the inhabitants.

During the retreat of the Russian troops to Erzerum Kurds and other peaceable inhabitants of the district were recruited as drivers of ammunition transport. Not a man of these possessed a weapon. As they approached Erzerum the Armenians seized the moment when the Russian officers had turned in to rest to kill the drivers. The Russian officers, brought up by the shrieks of the unhappy wretches, were received by the Armenians, arms in their hands, and threatened with a similar fate if they dared to interfere. These murders were carried out with the direst cruelty.

In the Officers' Club at Erzerum a Russian artillery officer, Lieutenant Medivani, publicly stated that he had witnessed the following scene :

"One of the Armenians had mortally wounded a Kurdish driver; he had fallen on his back in a dying condition. The Armenian then tried to drive the stick he held in his hand into his victim's mouth, but the poor fellow's teeth were so tightly clenched in his death agony that the murderer could not carry out his horrible design, and in his fury he despatched the dying man with kicks in the stomach."

Odichelidze has himself told me that in the village of Ilidja all Turks who were unable to escape were massacred; he saw numbers of corpses of children whose heads had been hacked off with blunt axes.

Lieutenant-Colonel Griaznoff, who returned from Ilidja on the 28th February, three weeks after the slaughter, related to me what he had seen.

"In the courtyard of the mosque the corpses lay heaped to a depth of two lance-lengths. There were bodies of men, women, children, old people, people of every age. Lieutenant-Colonel Griaznoff told a couple of young Armenian girls, who were employed with the Armenian troops to serve the telephones, to accompany him to the courtyard. He showed them the atrocities committed by their countrymen, and said bitterly they had something to be proud of. Griaznoff was both astonished and enraged at being forced to realise that the spectacle, far from rousing the disgust of the young women, merely moved them to loud laughter. Overcome by his anger, he began to abuse them, telling them that the Armenians, the women included, were the most cowardly and barbarous of all the nations, and the fact that educated, well brought-up young girls could laugh at a spectacle that even made the hair of an officer stand on end was proof of the barbarity of the race. At these words the girls thought it advisable to appear impressed, and said that their laughter was hysterical; but the witness was not deceived."

An Armenian contractor to the line-of-communication forces at Aladja told me the following :

"On the 27th February the Armenians crucified a Turkish woman—still alive—on a wall after tearing out her heart; she was hung head downwards."

On the 7th February the great massacre at Erzerum began. Armenian artillery soldiers had captured 270 people in the street and, after stripping them of all their clothing, shut them into a bath to sate their perverse lusts upon them. After superhuman efforts I succeeded in saving a hundred of these unhappy wretches who were still alive; they are alleged to have been released by the soldiers. The ringleader of these horrors was an Armenian non-commissioned infantry officer named Karabedoff, serving with the artillery. On the same evening several Turks were done to death in the streets of the town. On the 12th February the Armenians shot ten peaceful, unarmed peasants at Erzerum station; the officers, who tried to interfere, were threatened with death.

At this time I had under arrest an Armenian who had killed a Turk without any plausible pretext; the Commander-in-Chief had ordered him to be brought before the court martial. According to an old-established law murderers are executed. An Armenian officer informed the murderer that he would be hanged for his crime. "What!" exclaimed the man, amazed. "Hanging an Armenian for a Turk! Who ever heard of such a thing!"

In Erzerum the Armenians had set fire to the Turkish bazaar. On the 17th February I heard that the inhabitants of the village of Tepe Köj, in the district of the artillery regiment, had been completely exterminated—men, women, and children. The same day I met Andranik, who had been sent to Erzerum by the Caucasus Government to restore order. I informed him of the butchery, and urged him to find out who was responsible. I have never heard the result of my request. In the casino of the artillery officers Andranik publicly promised the restoration of order, but in spite of the two envoys of the Caucasus Government, Andranik and Dr. Zawrieff, this promise has never been fulfilled.

In the town the disturbances have, comparatively speaking, died down; in the villages where all the inhabitants had been slain complete quiet reigned of course. The imprisonment of Turkish inhabitants in Erzerum began afresh when the military movements of the Turks proclaimed their approach from Ilidja; these arrests were particularly numerous on the 26th and 27th February.

In the night of the 26th-27th the Armenians eluded the vigilance of the Russian officers and perpetrated another massacre, but at once took to their heels at the first approach of the Turks. This massacre was no impromptu affair—it had been planned beforehand; all captured Turks were collected and put to death one by one. The Armenians reported with pride that the night's toll reached a total of 3,000.

The Armenians who had to defend the town were numerically so weak that they fled before a Turkish army of 1,500 men with two guns. Nevertheless, the number of murders committed by them on the night of the massacre was very great.

As the educated classes of the Armenian population could very well have prevented the massacre, it is to be concluded that these classes played a greater part in the crime than the bands, and that, in any case, the chief responsibility rests with them. The humble people are very sensitive to the influence of the higher classes. My regiment, which is officered exclusively by Russians, consisted entirely of Armenian soldiers; although we had no means at hand of using force against them, we were able to make them obey all our orders; they have never ventured to indulge in open looting. On the night of the massacre not one of the Kurdish grooms was murdered in the barracks, where several detachments of the regiment were quartered, although only one Russian officer was on duty and forty Kurdish grooms were amongst hundreds of Armenians.

I do not, of course, wish to maintain that the *élite* of the Armenian nation without exception had a hand in the crimes. I have met Armenians who deeply deplore these crimes; others who have protested not only in words, but by action. Yet I must confess that these are a very small minority and are in ill-odour with their compatriots; they are accused of treason against the national ideal. Others, again, posed as enemies of these bestialities, but condoned them in secret. Some Armenians maintained an attitude of silence in face of all reproach, but the majority had the same answer ready on their lips: "You are Russians. You cannot understand the ideal of the Armenian nation." Sometimes they tried to defend themselves in such speeches as: "Have the Turks behaved otherwise towards the Armenians? What we are doing is merely revenge." These incidents prove how bloodthirsty this ideal of the Armenian people and upper classes is.

It lay in no man's power to prevent these lamentable happenings. The Armenians have sown the wind without taking thought that they would reap a storm.

ERZERUM, 16th April, 1918.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TWERDOKHLEROFF, Commandant *ad interim* of the garrison of Erzerum and Neveboyun, O.C. 2nd Engineer and Artillery Regiment.

OFFICIAL DIARY OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN GARRISON ARTILLERY REGIMENT IN ERZERUM.

The Russian Army of the Caucasus evacuated the stations they had previously occupied towards the middle of December, 1917, and, without having received orders from G.H.Q. or any of the Army Commanders, began their withdrawal. The Garrison Artillery Regiment brought up the rear of the Army. Of the detachments from the Deve-Boinu fortresses and the Artillery Regiment from Erzerum only 40 officers remained behind. Deserted by their men, they remained by the guns from a feeling of duty. In the fortresses were more than 400 guns, left behind for lack of means of transport. The officers, inspired by feelings of honour and duty, waited permission from G.H.Q. to leave the guns or for

reinforcements to carry on the defence. With the officers of the first Regiment the cadre of the second Artillery Regiment was formed.

After the withdrawal of the Russian Army an Armenian Revolutionary Committee was set up in Erzerum, calling itself "The Armenian Military Union." At the same time the Army Commander sent to the Second Garrison Artillery Regiment 400 untrained Armenians, of whom the majority deserted and the remainder could only be used to guard the batteries of the fortresses.

Shortly before the withdrawal of the Army, when touch had been lost between Russia and the Trans-Caucasus, a provisional Government had been formed in Tiflis, which was called "The Trans-Caucasian Commission." This Commission announced that there was no intention of instituting an independent Trans-Caucasian Government, as before Trans-Caucasia belonged absolutely to Russia, but until the restoration of order the Commission would undertake to represent the central administration.

On the 18th December, 1917, the Commission issued a proclamation that in place of the scattered Russian Army, a new Army would be raised on a national basis, consisting of three Army Corps—one Russian, one Georgian, one Mohammedan—and some detachments of smaller nationalities, such as Cherkesses, Ossets, etc. Only the artillery in the fortresses of Erzerum and Deve-Boinu retained their old character (i.e., comprised troops of various nationalities) until a decision should be arrived at as to the nationality of this unit, consisting of Russian officers and Armenian men. It was clear that this unit, whose cadres and leading were in Russian hands, could not be claimed as Armenian. Moreover, we had received no orders with regard to the Armenian character of the formation, which was still regarded as Russian, being led by Russian officers who had actually served in the Russian Army and drew their pay from the Russian Treasury. The fact that the Army possessed no Armenian, but only a Russian church, conducted by Russian priests, was a further proof of the complete Muscovite character of the unit.

Since the withdrawal of the Army, begun some two months before, order could not be re-established among the soldiers, who deserted, looted, and threatened their officers, and were in a state of complete mutiny. Colonel Torkum, alleged to be an Armenian Bulgar, was appointed Commandant of Erzerum.

Towards the middle of January, 1918, some Armenians of the infantry detachment murdered a Turkish notable of Erzerum in his dwelling and looted the house. Commander-in-Chief Odichelidze mustered all detachment commanders and summoned them to discover the perpetrator of this horrible crime within three days at most. He then turned to the Armenian officers and told them that the honour of the Armenian nation was at stake in this matter; it was therefore their duty to leave no stone unturned to discover the guilty person if they were to clear their reputation in the eyes of the world.

"If these outrages of which the Armenians are guilty do not cease, I shall find myself compelled to distribute arms to the Mohammedan population so that they can defend their lives and property," he added. To these accusations Colonel Torkum retorted in an injured tone that it was unjust to lay the crimes of a few individuals at the door of a whole nation. The detachment commanders proposed the setting up of a court martial, which by military law could punish murder with death. Odichelidze replied that he had already taken the necessary measures.

Colonel Torkum, if I am not mistaken, organised on 25th January a review of the troops and had twenty-one guns fired to impress the population with his military power. On this occasion he made a speech in Armenian. In this speech, which is directed against General Odichelidze, he asserted Armenian independence, and mentioned that he was taking over the reins of authority as

head of the new State. After hearing this grotesque statement the General had the new head of the State, Colonel Torkum, removed from Erzerum.

This measure was sufficient to show that the Russian Government intended to prevent at all costs the founding of an independent Armenian State. I have learnt that the Russian General Staff has reminded the Armenians repeatedly that all arms, ammunition, and other war stores, partly from the dépôts at Erzerum, partly from other dépôts, had only been handed over to them provisionally because no other troops were available. These arms, therefore, were only loaned to the Armenians, and had to be handed back at any time on request.

In these days the Armenians were perpetrating indescribably cruel murders among the poor Turkish inhabitants of the neighbourhood of Erzindjan; the Turks were unarmed and without any means of self-defence. On hearing that the Turkish troops were approaching, the Armenians, committing fresh crimes, fled in the direction of Erzerum.

According to the reports of the Commander-in-Chief, confirmed by officers who were actually present at the scene of the crime, the Armenians slew more than 800 Turks in Erzindjan, and so avenged one of their miserable accomplices who had been killed by a Turk in justified self-defence. Furthermore, the Armenians massacred the unhappy Mohammedan population of Ilidja, in the neighbourhood of Erzerum, without sparing the women and children.

On February 7th the following incident came to my notice: I ascertained that the Militia and the Armenian soldiers of the town were carrying off some hundreds of Mohammedans to an unknown destination. When I inquired into the reasons for this, I received the answer that these men were being recruited to clear the railway of snow. I expressed myself satisfied with this explanation. The following story will prove how unsatisfactory it was:

About three o'clock 2nd Lieut. Lipsky, an officer of my regiment, reported to me over the telephone that some Armenian soldiers had attacked five Turks in the streets; they had driven them into a corner of the barrack yard, beaten them mercilessly, and would certainly kill them. The intervention of the Russian officer in favour of the unfortunate men was met with threats, whereupon an Armenian officer, who was also present at the scene, took the part of the bandits and joined in preventing Lipsky from intervening. On hearing this I hurried, accompanied by three officers, to the scene of the outrage. On the way I met the officer who had telephoned to me and the Mayor of Erzerum, Stawrosky, looking for one of their Turkish friends who had been captured by the Armenians. Lipsky told me that the soldiers were holding the entrance to the barracks by force of arms. I went on my way. As I came near the barracks I saw twelve Turks leaving; they were running away, obviously panic-stricken. I stopped one of them, but, as I did not understand his speech, it was impossible to know what he said. Finally, with great difficulty, I entered the barracks. I immediately inquired about the Turks who had been captured in the street. The soldiers affirmed that there was no civilian of the town in the barracks. I began a personal search of every nook and corner of the barracks, and finally discovered in the bathroom seventy Mohammedans, victims of the most ghastly horrors. I immediately instituted an inquiry and had six Armenians who were responsible for this crime arrested. I also learned in the course of the inquiry that an Armenian, whose identity I could not establish, had shot an unfortunate Mohammedan who had shown himself on the roof of a house near the barracks.

Naturally I at once set at liberty the unfortunate victim of this horrible outrage. The minutes of this inquiry, together with my own records, including the list of the Mohammedans whom I had succeeded in rescuing, were lost during the reoccupation of Erzerum by the Ottoman troops on February 27th.

But the incident can be confirmed by questioning the Turks, who, whenever we meet, are profuse in their gratitude. In addition, Ali Bey Pepeoff, the Secretary of Mayor Stawrosky, who drew up the list and the protocol, would certainly recognise the parties concerned.

The inquiry revealed that Karaguedoff, an Armenian cadet of the artillery regiment, was the instigator of the outrage. In the course of ruthless house-searchings in Turkish homes, which he had conducted in the company of Armenian soldiers accustomed to such methods, he had appropriated furniture and other domestic property. Karaguedoff was arrested, together with other Armenian soldiers. The incidents were reported the same evening to the Commander-in-Chief in the presence of Government Commissioner Zetaloff and his assistant. On the same day the Armenians murdered other Turks and set fire to the Turkish bazaar. It was generally known that during these days several murders were committed in Erzerum and its neighbourhood. I personally arrested an Armenian who had killed Turks in the neighbourhood of Tafta and handed him over to the Commandant. It was said in the town that the Turks who had been told off to work in the fields never returned from their work, and that nothing could be learnt as to their whereabouts. The magistrates reported the disappearance of these men to the Commander-in-Chief.

In a report which we handed to the Commander-in-Chief on the occasion of an officers' conference we requested his permission to leave the fortress of Erzerum in view of our complete uselessness and the impossibility of preventing the Armenian crimes. We were afraid of besmirching our reputation. Odischelidze told us of the arrival of a wireless message which he had received from General Wehib Pasha, in command of the Ottoman troops. The General informed him that his troops had received orders to garrison Erzindjan and to advance until they had established touch with the Russian troops. Wehib Pasha further remarked that this was the only means of paving the way for the suppression of the barbarous cruelties practised by the Armenians upon the Turkish population.

After this the Trans-Caucasian Commission made offers of peace to the Ottoman Government. In the telegram of reply the Commandant of the Ottoman troops expressed his readiness to accept the proposal, and added that he had communicated the proposal of the Trans-Caucasian Commission to his Government, recommending its acceptance. In accordance with a petition from us, General Odichelidze got into communication with Gueguetschkoni, the President of the Trans-Caucasian Commission, and General Lebedinsky, the Commander-in-Chief.

The reply contained the announcement that an ultimatum had been despatched to the Armenian National Assembly, demanding the immediate cessation of all Armenian atrocities in order to put an end finally to these lamentable occurrences, and that Dr. Zavrieff and Andranik had been sent as delegates to Erzerum. As to the request of the officers, the advice of the Commissaries was that they should remain at their posts until the expected answer to the peace overtures had been received from the Ottoman Government. The Council expressed their thanks to the officers for the service they had rendered, and declared that if Russia were faced with any fresh danger they were sure that the officers would be found at their posts to the last minute.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Army also issued an order of the day in which he recommended officers not to leave their posts, adding that to shield their honour and protect their lives he would enforce the most stringent measures against the Armenian criminals. On these conditions we remained at Erzerum with the sole object of safeguarding the interests of Russia, and under the sole command of the Commander-in-Chief. We learned that the Ottoman Government had received the proposal of the Trans-Caucasian Commis-

sion with favour and replied to this effect, and that peace negotiations would be opened on February 17th in Trebizond.

Our Army Commander informed all officers that there was no intention of stirring up enmity against the Ottoman troops in Erzerum and the neighbourhood and that accordingly they were to remain in Erzerum until the conclusion of peace, when arms and other war material, according to the peace conditions, would either be transported to Russia or handed over finally to the Ottoman Government. In case of any attempt on the part of the Ottoman troops to occupy Erzerum before the signing of peace, all guns were to be put out of action and the troops and officers withdrawn to Russia, definite orders for which would be promulgated at least seven days in advance.

The necessity for defending ourselves against the attacks of the Kurds until the final decision as to our remaining grew more and more obvious, for during the Armistice the Ottoman Government had declared that the Kurds were subject to no orders and would act on their own initiative. The Army Commander had, therefore, decided as early as the end of January to strengthen the Erzerum-Erzindjan line-of-communication by an appropriate number of guns to keep off the attacks of the Kurds, who were trying to loot our line-of-communication depôts. An officer and two guns were ordered to each strategic point. On the withdrawal of the Armenians from Erzindjan and Erzerum the guns were withdrawn with them. On February 10th two guns were placed in all the positions from Buyuk-Kiremidli along the road from Trebizond as far as Erep-Michan, as at all other important strategic points of the town, with the same object in view. In view of the probability of a Kurdish attack from the direction of Palan-Dongno, guns were to be placed also between the Kars and Charput gates. These guns, which were only to be used against a possible attack by the Kurds, and were scarcely adequate for this object, would have been useless against a regular army with artillery: a few shots would suffice to put them out of action. Towards the middle of February the sights of the guns in the outlying positions were collected and delivered to the central depôt; the same measure was now to be carried out also in the case of the guns in the nearer positions. This order was also given for the guns in Palan-Dongno, but was never carried out. Only the guns which remained in the positions to be used against the Kurds retained their sights. However, no immediate offensive on the part of the Ottoman troops was expected, as the Turks were regarded as demoralised and not in a position to undertake any movements before the summer. On February 12th some Armenian bandits, armed to the teeth, had openly shot ten or twelve Turks in the neighbourhood of the station. Two Russian officers, infuriated by these impudent outrages, had tried to interfere, but had been compelled to give way before armed threats and to leave the victims to their fate.

On February 13th the Commander-in-Chief proclaimed a state of siege and convened a court martial, which was to enforce the death penalty according to the old regulations. Colonel Morel was appointed Commandant of the fortress of Erzerum, and an Armenian as president of the court martial. On the same day the Commander-in-Chief and General Gerassimoff left the town: they wished to fix a rendezvous in case the artillery had to withdraw. I remained in Erzerum in command of the Garrison Artillery. Colonel Morel's staff consisted exclusively of Russian officers, and the Adjutant of the regiment was Staff-Captain Schnauer.

After the departure of the Commander-in-Chief, Colonel Morel at once changed his attitude. He declared that Erzerum was to be defended to the last moment, and forbade all officers and inhabitants capable of bearing arms to leave the town. When I submitted to the court martial the wishes of some of the officers to avail themselves of this permission, one member, an Armenian

named Sokhonnyan, replied brutally that he would himself cut down all who showed any intention of quitting the town, and would have any man who should dare to attempt flight seized by the Armenian forces in Kopri-Koj and Hassan-Kale, and taken before the court martial unless they were provided with permits. These permits, however, were issued solely by him. I realised that we were in a trap, escape from which would be extremely difficult, and that the court martial and the state of siege were directed less against the bandits than against the Russian officers.

The outrages continued in the town, and the unhappy Turkish population, unarmed and defenceless, were continually attacked by the Armenians. Their only refuge was the Russian officers, who, however, could only offer them very limited protection. A few officers under my command had been obliged to use force to save the lives of a couple of Turks who were being robbed in the street. A military engineer, Karaieff, shot down with his rifle an Armenian who was taking to his heels after robbing a Turk in the street in the middle of the day. The promise to punish the bandits who murdered peaceful, unarmed Mohammedans remained, as usual, a dead letter.

From fear of Armenian revenge, the court martial did not dare to sentence one single Armenian, in spite of the fact that it had been set up chiefly at Armenian request. The Turks, moreover, had prophesied that a court martial of Armenians would not condemn a single one of their compatriots. We could now see the truth of the proverb that the wolves do not prey on one another. All fit Armenians immediately escaped with their wives on the pretext of being obliged to protect them.

I learned that a non-commissioned officer, Karaguedoff, had been freed from prison without my permission. I made inquiries of Colonel Morel as to the reason for this, and was told in reply that Karaguedoff's innocence had been established at a new inquiry. In spite of the fact that two of my officers and I had been the principal witnesses on this occasion, neither of us had been summoned to this very extraordinary inquiry. I expressed my dissatisfaction with the reply received from Colonel Morel, reported the matter again, and handed over the minutes to Colonel Alexandroff. The murderer I had captured in Tafta likewise went unpunished.

Colonel Morel feared a mutiny of the Turkish troops in Erzerum. On February 17th Andranik arrived in Erzerum, accompanied by Dr. Zavrieff, Assistant Commissioner for the occupied area. As we had not been instructed on Armenian questions, we did not know that Andranik was one of the criminals condemned to death by the Ottoman Government. I first learned these details on March 7th, in a conversation with the Turkish Army Commander. Andranik appeared in the uniform of a Russian brigadier-general. He was wearing the Order of Vladimir, Fourth Class, and the Cross of St. George, Second Class, as well as the Military Cross of St. George, Second Class. He was accompanied by his Chief-of-Staff, the Russian colonel, Zinkewitsch. In the evening before his arrival Colonel Morel informed us that, according to a telegram received from Andranik at Kopri-Koj, machine-guns were to be employed to shoot down all cowards who attempted to escape from Erzerum. Immediately after his arrival Andranik took over the command of the fortress; Colonel Morel was subordinate to him, and we to Morel.

On the day of Andranik's arrival the whole of the inhabitants of Tepe-Koj, which belonged to my command, were massacred—men, women, and children. The officer on duty in this section communicated the tragic news to me, and I immediately reported it to Andranik in our first conversation. In my presence he gave orders for twenty horsemen to be despatched to Tepe-Koj to bring back at least one of the criminals. Up to the present day I have never heard the result of this step.

Colonel Torkum turned up again in the town, and at the same time the Armenian artillery colonel, Dolukhanoff, made his reappearance in Erzerum. His first announcement was that he, an Inspector of Artillery, would henceforward rank as my superior officer. I replied that I held the rank of a Divisional Commander and did not require a superior officer; otherwise, I added, I should leave the service. It was thereupon announced that Colonel Dolukhanoff would carry on the administrative work of the Garrison Artillery, and that consequently his instructions to me would not be issued under his own name, but, as before, under that of Andranik. One day the Armenian lieutenant, Djanbuladion, who commanded the artillery battalion under my orders, also made an attempt to interfere with my affairs. When I directed that all guns, searchlights, and dynamos were to be transported towards the rear, he replied that he would not allow any withdrawal of material, as the Armenians intended to take all the administrative posts in the command into their own hands, and might only use the Russian officers as executives; they also wished to use them, without their realising it, in establishing Armenian independence. Had the Russian officers grasped the purpose they were intended to serve the majority of them would have resigned, and the Armenians would have been left with an inadequate number of officers. The following statements of Captain Peliat, temporary O.C. of the 7th Battalion of Caucasian Mountain Artillery, show how gravely the Armenians feared the resignation of the artillery officers. When the Armenians learned that the 7th Battalion Mountain Artillery were holding themselves in readiness to withdraw to San Kamisch on February 7th, they seized the commanding officer on the 5th of that month; and although at the orders of the Army H.Q. they were obliged to set him at liberty, they repeated the attempt three times.

The Armenians of Erzerum threatened H.Q. to drown the town in blood if the guns were withdrawn. The Army Commander was consequently forced to cancel the order for the withdrawal of the artillery. An attempt had to be made to come to an understanding with the officer commanding the 7th Artillery Battalion. We agreed secretly that, in case the Armenians should attempt to force the hands of the Russian artillery officers and officially propose that they should ally themselves with the Armenian cause, we would help one another mutually. We possessed considerable war material, guns, machine-guns, and officers. The officers of the Mountain Artillery tried to find billets as near as possible to one another in the town, and we of the Garrison Artillery collected as far as possible in the Turkish quarter, where our headquarters had been situated since the occupation of the town.

Since Andranik's arrival at Colonel Morel's side the fears of a rising of the inhabitants of Erzerum had greatly increased. The Colonel ordered that an efficient Russian officer should be put in command of Fort Medjedie to direct the bombardment in the event of a rising, which might follow the arrest of the instigator of the unrest. We all received the order to leave the Turkish quarter and transfer ourselves to the Armenian quarter. As we had lived in this quarter for two years, and were always in sympathy with the Mohammedan population, we thought this suggestion, to say the least of it, remarkable.

The Russian artillery officers unanimously declared that they had remained in the service to fight a worthy foe, and would never agree to fire on women and children, for it was quite clear that the Armenians would use a threatened Turkish rising as a pretext to open a bombardment of the Turkish quarter. As to the transfer to the Armenian quarter, it was impracticable for three reasons: Firstly, it was impossible to effect the removal in the time given; secondly, the withdrawal of the Russian officers from the Mohammedan quarter would, of course, be followed by a fresh massacre; and thirdly, in view of the strained relations that had existed for some time between them and the

Armenians, it would have been risky for the Russian officers to venture into their midst.

The officers of the Mountain Artillery Battalion who did not belong to the cadre of the Garrison Artillery also rejected the proposal. Finally the Armenians, who were left with no choice but to do their own dirty work, began to arrest some alleged agitators.

As Colonel Morel's proposal to bombard the town was very significant, I considered it necessary to call together all the officers under my command. We met twice in the course of three days. The first meeting was attended by all artillery officers in Erzerum, as well as by two English officers who had arrived a few days before; also by Colonels Morel, Zinkewitsch, Dolukhanoff and Torkum, Andranik and Dr. Zavrieff. Our object in inviting the English officers was to let them see the relations existing between the Russian officers and the Armenian Command. It would also give them an opportunity of finding out what resources the Russians had at their disposal to prevent Armenian atrocities, so that on their return they might support their observations by tangible proofs. As I had no telephonic or telegraphic connections under my personal control, I was convinced that telegrams sent by me would never reach their destination. I therefore seized the opportunity of this meeting to describe in the greatest detail all that I had myself observed and heard from reliable sources as to the atrocities and horrors perpetrated by the Armenians. I described to my hearers the degree of insubordination that prevailed among the Armenian troops, and cited examples I had heard from the lips of General Odischlidze himself. I concluded with the words: "We Russian officers who have remained in Erzerum have not done so with the object of placing our uniforms at the service of the Armenians as a cloak to conceal their ghastly crimes, but simply and solely in obedience to our superiors and to protect Russia. Unless the Armenian atrocities are suspended during our stay in Erzerum," I added, "every Russian officer will insist on leaving the town and resigning his post." Some other officers, speaking after me, emphatically confirmed what I had said.

In his reply Andranik intimated that the Armenians would be eternally grateful to Russia, that the Armenians formed an integral part of the population of Greater Russia, and that they had no other end in view than that of serving Russian interests. As to the so-called massacres committed by the Armenians, they were the result of the enmity existing between Armenians and Turks. He added that the principal object of his mission in Erzerum was to put down such crimes, and, should he fail to bring the Armenians to reason, he would be the first to leave the town. The business of the meeting was carried on through the medium of an interpreter. Questioned as to his views on allowing officers who wished to do so to leave the town, Andranik replied that he considered it desirable that all those who were not too confident of their own courage should leave the town, and he would himself assist their departure as far as possible. Colonel Zinkewitsch declared before the whole meeting that, once convinced that the continued presence of the Russian officers in Erzerum would serve the interests of Russia, he would remain solely for that reason. In the end all officers decided to remain ten days longer and to regulate their conduct by the future course of events, according as these might confirm or refute Andranik's pledges.

The meeting had been held on February 20th or 21st. Shortly afterwards Colonel Dolukhanoff expressed to me and other Russian officers his astonishment at the contempt and even horror with which the Russian officers regarded the Armenians. On the next day Andranik proclaimed, on large wall-posters written in Turkish, that any man who killed either Armenians or Mohammedans would be arrested and punished by death; further, that the Turks might resume

their occupations without fear, and that, in the event of any one of the Mohammedans engaged in labour in the fields failing to return from his work, he would hold the entire detachment in charge of the supervision of the work responsible. As I was riding through the streets the following day, accompanied by the Armenian captain, Djanbuladian, we noticed many people reading the posters. Djanbuladian assured them in Turkish that, provided the Mohammedan population refrained from revolt, they would have nothing to fear from the Armenians. The reply was that for two years the Mohammedans had committed no crimes, and that there was no intention of doing so in the future; all they asked was that the Mohammedans, who were unarmed and without any means of defence, should not be killed without reason. I asked the captain to tell the people that I was the Russian artillery commander, and to state that I and my Russian comrades were sympathetic towards the Mohammedan population, and would continue, as before, to look after these poor people. Some of the Turks present, two or three especially, confirmed my words, saying that I had with my own hand saved their lives during the massacre of February 7th. Djanbuladian, who acted as interpreter, was himself a member of the Armenian Committee.

At the second meeting Russian officers were present, the only foreigner admitted being Dr. Zavrieff. The following points were discussed: That an attempt should be made to define clearly the status of the 2nd Garrison Artillery Regiment of Erzerum, in the sense that this regiment was not, as the Armenians imagined, an Armenian artillery regiment, but a Russian regiment; not one of its officers had voluntarily enlisted in Armenian service, not one of us had made any agreement to do so. If the regiment was Russian we insisted on preserving Russian status; if Armenian, we desired the right to leave the town at will in order to serve with the Russian Army. The state of siege had only served to prevent the departure of those officers who wished to leave in order to serve on another than the Caucasus front. If, on the other hand, the current rumour materialised and the Trans-Caucasus had split off from Russia, it would certainly be necessary to grant leave of absence to the Russian officers if we were not to find ourselves strangers in a foreign land.

After prolonged discussion we reached the conviction that, according to the circular we had received, every officer had the right to apply for transfer to a Russian Army Corps or to be placed at the disposal of the War Ministry. I therefore consented to forward all such applications to the proper authorities.

During the meeting the experience of Lieutenant Yermoloff, of the 7th Battalion Caucasus Mountain Artillery, was brought up as a striking example. He had asked to be transferred from the new Armenian battalion to which he had been assigned. Colonel Morel had first tried to dissuade him, then, in face of this officer's fixed determination, he had added to the written form of application that the officer in question had shown himself incompetent for his duties, that he would therefore be placed at the disposal of the General Staff of the Front, and would receive orders to leave Erzerum within twenty-four hours. Thus was the honour of an efficient officer attacked, for the sole reason that he refused to serve Armenian interests and had been indiscreet enough to declare that Colonel Morel had allied himself to the Armenian cause.

Dr. Zavrieff repeated word for word Andranik's statement given above. He said that by remaining in Erzerum until the conclusion of peace we should be serving Russian interests. Officers belonging to a civilised nation had no right to adopt such a line of reasoning as, for example: "Let the Armenians and Turks settle their own quarrel! Let them cut each others' throats! Why should we Russians interfere with their affairs? Let them go to the devil!"

At the conclusion of his speech, which had not made the desired impression,

Dr. Zavrieff said that if we wished to serve humanity it was our duty to remain in Erzerum to prevent butchery of the Turks.

Andranik's promises were not fulfilled, nor had the Mohammedan population ever placed any faith in them. Shops remained closed and terror continued to reign. Not a living soul showed himself in the Mohammedan quarters. Only a few shops in the neighbourhood of the Town Hall opened their shutters, and there a few Mohammedans collected during the day.

Not a single Armenian was punished. To keep up the pretence of Armenian innocence the question was asked whether the innocent were to be punished for the sake of Andranik's promise. But when the Russian officers replied that they had themselves handed over various Armenian offenders and accused them before the authorities, this irrefutable argument was received in silence. Murder still went on and was merely concealed. It was practised in the more remote villages, no longer before the eyes of the Russian officers. The Turkish inhabitants of the villages round Erzerum disappeared, and nothing was heard as to their fate.

Arrests in the town increased in number on the excuse of a possible rising. To my ironical question, what happened to the prisoners, and whether they all ran the risk of being slaughtered, Colonel Morel replied that some would be taken to Tiflis under adequate escort, others would be kept in Erzerum as hostages. In the streets Armenian bands, formed of Armenian deserters, murdered the passers-by—partly from fear, partly to rob them of their possessions; in any case, robbery was the chief motive. Before Andranik's arrival the companies refused to go into the front line. Afterwards they obeyed the order, but only to desert in the most craven fashion. Andranik, on horseback, tried to drive them back with his sword and fists. To have him at their head was the dearest wish of all Armenians of the Russian artillery. They were apparently incapable of grasping that the Garrison Artillery required the services of trained artillerymen and an adequate number of infantry. But it was easy to guess their secret thought: when the moment came for withdrawal, to escape under cover of the guns. Subsequent events have proved the truth of this.

The opening of peace negotiations at Trebizond was delayed. We learned through the General Staff at Erzerum that the negotiations fixed for February 17th had been postponed until the 20th or 25th. As my Staff was separated in opposite ends of the town, and the telephonic communication was in an inefficient state, I was compelled to make the journey twice a day.

According to information I received from Colonel Morel and his Staff in the course of an official visit, there were no regular Ottoman troops in the neighbourhood of Erzerum; we were fighting Kurdish bands and villagers, together with a few regulars, relics of the Turkish Army of 1916. It was understood that these bands had been raised by some Ottoman officers who had come to the neighbourhood to protect the population. These troops had only two mountain guns, which had been left in Erzindjan by the Armenians. They could advance by the Erzindjan-Olti-Jeni road, or from the other side from Kars and Palan-Dogno. Colonel Morel, on what grounds I do not know, assumed that the attack would be made from Olti. The intelligence service was conducted by the Armenians most inefficiently. They were chiefly occupied in murder in the villages and driving off any herds of cattle they came across. Their reports were lies from beginning to end. If they reported that the patrol had been attacked by an enemy force of 2,000 men, one could be sure that there had actually been 200 at most. They were not ashamed to admit having fled before an attack by 300-400 men, in which their sole loss was one killed and one wounded. One day an Armenian officer reported over the telephone that his detachment had been attacked by 400 of the enemy; it transpired that two

unarmed men had emerged from a neighbouring village and immediately withdrawn into their houses. From the evacuation of Erzerum until the Turkish occupation the Armenian scout patrols only once succeeded in making a capture—a single Turkish horseman. He was probably suffering from frozen feet, or was prevented by some other reason from escaping.

After our second officers' meeting some officers had applied for transfer to other posts. When these applications were submitted to Colonel Morel he was very angry, and said that he would refuse to permit their departure on the grounds of a court martial decision. When I pointed out that the guns were still in the hands of the Russian officers, who could reply to such unjustified severity with artillery fire, and, moreover, that as the applications were absolutely legal and could not be stigmatised as an attempt at desertion, it was necessary to comply, he retorted that, if the officers insisted, he would give them, as he had done in the case of Captain Yermoloff, papers which would compromise their records. I replied to Colonel Morel that, as Colonel Dolukhanoff had justly declared in Tiflis and Batum, officers who were forced to remain at their posts against their will could not be expected to give good service. He replied that for this reason he had asked for sixty English officers to be sent to Erzerum, and had already received formal consent. On this occasion I also heard of another incident: a Russian or Polish soldier who was acting as station-master in Erzerum had refused to continue his duties. He had been at once arrested and forced to carry on. Under the pretext of facilitating a more rapid circulation of orders I ordered my officers to billet themselves as near to one another as possible; in reality my object was that we might be in a better position to help one another in case of need.

Captain Yermoloff had departed on February 25th. I had asked him to break his journey at Sarı-Kamieko to inform Generals Wischinsky and Gerassimoff, artillery commanders, of the serious position in which we were placed in relation to the Armenians, and to urge him to free us as quickly as possible from this cul-de-sac.

On February 24th I sighted a Turkish aeroplane reconnoitring, and concluded that the enemy was at Erzindjan or even Mama-Khatum. The same day Colonel Morel informed me that he had received the Turkish proposal regarding the evacuation of Erzerum. After the Turkish occupation I learned from Corps Commander Krazim Bey that this proposal had not been a worthless scrap of paper, but an official document bearing his own signature, whereas Colonel Morel had deliberately led me to believe that this official ultimatum, signed by the Officer Commanding the Army Corps, was mere bluff. The General Staff of the fortress announced on February 24th and 25th that no danger was imminent. Only a band of Kurds had been seen in the neighbourhood of Teke-Deressi, and their advance had been checked by a detachment sent out against them. It was also stated that a detachment sent out from Erzerum had thrown back the enemy a few kilometres beyond Ilidja. Meanwhile we heard that on February 26th the Armenian detachment at Teke-Deressi had been attacked, and that those who had been able to escape had fled like the wind to Erzerum; the Ilidja detachment, completely broken up, was also running away in the same direction.

I had received from Colonel Morel verbal orders to open artillery fire on the attacking enemy, but I could see no target. On the Charput road only fleeing Armenian soldiers were visible, and on the Trebizond road Armenian detachments retreating on Erzerum in close formation, as if on the parade ground. In the course of the afternoon it became known, also, that an enemy detachment was halted close to Guoz-Koj. I estimated it at 1,500 men; it did not look like Kurdish bands, but a properly-led regiment.

Andranik attempted to muster the fugitives and send them against the

enemy, but these cowards took to their heels as soon as they came into touch with the foe. The artillery fire, however, was maintained until midnight. Immediately the Kurd offensive was opened and we had got to work, no more was heard of departure from the Russian officers, who carried out their assigned duties honourably.

I could not induce the Armenian infantry attached to my batteries at Buyuk-Kiremidli to attack; instead they deserted the batteries and withdrew persistently towards the Charput gate. The Armenians who had fled at Teke-Deressi even carried off in their flight the herds of cattle and slew the defenceless isolated peasants they encountered on their way. The Turkish advance on Erzerum came as a complete surprise to the Russian General Staff; no battle orders had been issued, or, if they had, I, at any rate, had heard nothing of them. My task was very simple: it consisted of keeping the enemy under fire to prevent him from piercing the belt of forts which surrounded the town. In the advanced positions were also infantry and mountain artillery, which were not under my command.

On the same day the Armenian militia busied themselves in the town until evening in seizing all male Mohammedans, including old men and sick. When questioned as to the object of these measures, the reply was that men were being collected to clear the railway of snow. In the evening I learned that an Armenian student, with his band, had forced an entry into my house, in spite of my name on the door, on the excuse of searching it. As my wife resisted this deliberate intrusion he did not succeed in his attempt, and was also prevented from carrying off the owner of the house, an old Turk, together with some Kurdish servants; he cursed roundly at this thwarting of his plan. The student declared that the searchings were being carried out at the order of Andranik. I at once had a communication door cut so that the old man could take refuge with us in case they came a second time to fetch him.

I had recently been in the habit, each time I visited Andranik and his Staff, of taking with me Captain Yulkewitsch, the chief of the Mobilisation Department, as a witness of my relations with these men. One evening he accompanied me to an officers' meeting. When we entered the meeting had already begun. Those present were Andranik, Dr. Zavrieff, Colonels Zinkewitsch and Dolukhanoff, and a few others. On my arrival Zinkewitsch began to read aloud the following telegram from the Commander-in-Chief, General Odichelidze: "I have received a wireless message from Wehib Pasha, commanding the Ottoman forces, in which he states that his troops have orders to occupy Erzerum. Destroy the guns of the fortress and withdraw with the troops. (Sgd.) Odichelidze."

This belated order left us no time to destroy the guns. After Andranik had given vent to his fury, he announced his decision to hold Erzerum two days longer, to enable the destruction to be carried out, and then to evacuate the fortress. When Dr. Zavrieff pointed out that nothing was being done to suppress the firebrands who infested the town, and that the Mohammedan aged and sick had been seized and despatched to an unknown destination, he replied that orders had already been given to put down this disorder. But, as with all the others, these fine promises were never carried out.

After discussing the best way of carrying out Andranik's decision we withdrew. As to the question of holding Erzerum for two more days, considering the strength of the troops and of the advanced position, the town could have held out for another forty-two days, not only against the Kurds, but even against a regular army.

As Ottoman H.Q. had officially stated in the course of the armistice negotiations that they could not be responsible for keeping the Kurds in order, it was our duty to take all necessary measures against a possible attack from them.

When I returned to my Headquarters I gave the necessary orders for the destruction of the guns, which in any case could have been rendered useless within two days. I learned from the reports of my officers that the infantry, under cover of darkness, had deserted the trenches and taken to flight. I communicated this news to Colonel Morel, who assured me that it would give rise to no danger at all, as reinforcements had been sent up. I returned home and went to bed about one o'clock.

Between one and three I heard isolated shots in the town, and soon after I could hear the voices of Armenians, the sound of doors being smashed in with axes, and the despairing cries of the poor unhappy Mohammedans, who had been attacked. Two thoughts gave me anxiety: In the first place, our honour was threatened, for anyone who had not witnessed personally the cowardly cruelty of the Armenians (fighting for freedom!) might assume that these inhuman brutalities were being perpetrated with the connivance of the Russian officers, and we should have to share the blame with these wild beasts; in the second place, as it was not in accordance with the views of G.H.Q. to engage the regular Turkish forces, the result might be that the orders of the Commander-in-Chief would not be obeyed if a misunderstanding should arise among the attackers. With regard to these two points I came to the following decision: To call on Colonel Morel first thing in the morning and suggest to him—first, that the Armenians must be prevented from perpetrating fresh outrages, even if the only method of doing so were to turn part of our guns upon them and so control them to heed our orders; secondly, envoys should be at once sent with a flag of truce to the Turkish troops to inform them that in two days the town would be ceded without bloodshed. Moreover, it would be necessary to raise detachments, excluding Armenians, in order to suppress the disturbances by force of arms and prevent the butchery of the Turks by the Armenians.

When, in the early morning, I went to see Colonel Morel, accompanied by Captain Yulkewitsch, I met, near the artillery munition dump, the Armenian second lieutenant, Bagratonian, who was on duty at this dépôt. He told me that when the order came to withdraw he would like to blow up the dump, but would wait for orders from me. This statement astounded me, for the ammunition dépôt was under the command of Colonel Dolukhanoff, and no orders had been received to blow it up. I gave him to understand that such an explosion might cause injury to the Russian officers as well as to the civilian population, advised him to abandon his project, and finally succeeded in convincing him. In this way I saved the ammunition.

As I approached Colonel Morel's quarters I saw that everyone was taking flight. The house of the American Consul, which stands opposite his quarters, was in flames. Colonel Morel and Colonel Torkum were mounted and ready for flight; their baggage had been loaded on to a motor-car and several carriages. It was seven o'clock in the morning. I inquired as to the situation. I was told that the order for withdrawal had been issued at 5 a.m., and astonishment was expressed that I had not received it. This is what I had feared: the Armenians succeeded in escaping under the protection of the Russian officers and the artillery. But while the Russian officers were working the guns single-handed and beating back the onslaught of the attackers, the Armenians were at full liberty to slaughter the Mohammedans and take to their heels. If I had not appeared no Russian officer would have known of the order for withdrawal. I thought for a moment of running to Fort Medjedie to send a farewell of shrapnel into the brave Armenians who, clad in bullet-proof tunics, were fleeing unhindered along the Kars road. But it occurred to me that there might be one or two innocent men among them, so I abandoned the idea.

It was also a result of the cunning and cowardice of the noble Armenian looters that the guns could not be put out of action. When I returned to my

quarters I heard in an obscure street cries of pain and the crackle of a terrific rifle volley. As I was at a street corner I could not see what was happening, but the bloodstains in the snow showed that a fight had taken place. I got down from my carriage to continue my journey on foot; but when I saw the Armenian Commanding Officer of the Militia on horseback, coming out of a side street, I could imagine the scene of horror that had been enacted.

When I was back in my quarters I gave orders to the batteries to sound the retreat at the same time as the infantry and to get the carriages ready for the artillery officers. I was told that the outriders had already escaped in the night. Armenian deserters, armed to the teeth, had taken the horses belonging to the carriages, and galloped off two on each horse. As my groom had put up a resistance they had not been able to take my horses, but they wounded one of them with a shot. Of the fifty carriages we were left with only three, which some of the officers used. Soon afterwards we learnt the Turkish army had entered the town, and were at last able to ascertain that they did not consist of bands of Kurds collected together haphazard, but regular troops. The brave Armenian infantry took advantage of the night to dash off with all speed along the Erzerum-Kars road. A hurricane could hardly have swept Erzerum so thoroughly of the Armenian dirt in so short a time.

Neither in the firing trenches nor in the town were there any wounded Armenians to be found. This proves afresh with what courage and audacity they had defended Erzerum. The only prisoners were Russian officers, so the Armenians can boast of having taken a negative part in the defence of the town.

After receiving news of the occupation of the town by the Turks I went with my adjutant to headquarters to report.

As I passed along the streets, the Turks I met expressed in most moving fashion their gratitude to me for saving their lives. This gratitude included all the Russian officers, for if the Russian officers had not been there, the Turkish troops reoccupying Erzerum would not have found a single Turk alive.

The Russian author Petronius says of the Armenians: "The Armenians are certainly human, but at home they go on all fours." The Russian poet Lermontoff sings their praises in the following words: "You are a slave, you are a coward, for you are an Armenian."

ERZERUM, April 29th, 1918.

(Signed) LT.-COL. TVERDOKHLEBOFF, Provisional Commandant of the Fortresses of Erzerum and Deveboyun, Commanding the 2nd Garrison Artillery Regiment, Erzerum.

Now, honoured readers, what do you think of the humanity of the Armenians?

No! no! don't judge the two peoples unjustly!

It was not their fault, but that of Muscovite policy which had hounded them on one against the other. The Muscovite, who had no other wish than to slay the Turk and, after destroying the thousand-year-old national glory, to usurp the inheritance of the Turk; the Muscovite, who delighted only in swimming in blood, and egged on the Armenian against the Turk. The result of this was to put into the mind of the Turk the definite conviction that "it is necessary to slay the Armenian if we would

have our own lives safe," while the Armenian said that in order to rise again and recover his majority he must strangle the Turk. This is what paved the way for the tragic events we have witnessed. 600,000 Armenians on the one side, 1,500,000 Turks and Kurds on the other are said to have met their death. And now it is Russian policy, which, like its imbecile confederates of the Morgenthau stamp, is impervious to all feelings of shame, to throw all the blame on to the Turks, whom they would like to annihilate, filling the Press of the whole world with their ravings.

Mandelstamm says that, except in Van, the Armenian nowhere made the slightest attempt at revolution. I have already said that I had no knowledge of the events which took place in the vilayets of East Anatolia and in the rear of our army in the Caucasus; on the other hand, I am perfectly acquainted with the condition of affairs within the sphere of my own army. The incidents which took place in Zeitun and Urfa, in the middle of 1915, were nothing more nor less than an armed rising of the Armenians. The rising at Mussa Baba is also a part of this organised revolution. A fact, in my opinion absolutely irrefutable, is that at the moment when the Dardanelles campaign was at its crisis, the Armenians were ordered by the French and English Commanders-in-Chief of the Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean to rise. They had certainly judged that an Armenian rising, beginning in Rein-ul-Hinzir, in the Gulf of Alexandretta and spreading over Dort Yol, Mussa Baba, Aleppo, Aintab, Ursa, and Zeitun, might well signify an operation ending in the severing of Syria from Asia Minor. Moreover, the Armenians, who had made their preparations in these places a long time beforehand, were only waiting the signal to begin.

Can the responsible authorities of the Governments in question maintain that my statements are untrue? Now that the war is over, I should regard it as a chivalrous act if the true facts with regard to this were placed before the public.

If Mandelstamm still insists on maintaining that these incidents, far from being a rising, were nothing more than an attempt at resistance, a resort to arms in justified self-defence, then I must point out to him that his Allies, the French and English officers who organised this rising, will think this ridiculous. This is my conviction and my opinion about the Armenian massacres. Now

that the war is over, and Syria, Mesopotamia, and the Arabian Peninsula, the brightest jewels in the Ottoman crown, are severed from the Mother country, Turkey is beginning afresh the struggle to prevent the loss of the sacred ground of Anatolia, which alone remains to the Turks. If there is anything left to console poor Turkey for having sacrificed over 3,000,000 men in the course of a world war, it is the fact that our hereditary enemy, Czardom, has been vanquished and destroyed.

Among the States which have been newly formed as a result of what has happened in the Caucasus we see to-day an Armenian Republic. But we can also be sure that the Turkish-Armenians, with Zaven Effendi, the Patriarch of Constantinople at their head, will stop at no intrigue to exasperate the Turks. The Turks are in no way opposed to the foundation of an Armenian republic, with Edjmiadzim and Erivan as centres; but they do most definitely desire that that republic should remain on the best of terms with the republics of Azerbaidjan and Georgia, which were formed from various national elements from the Southern Caucasus, as well as with the Ottoman Empire, the incontestable owner of Asia Minor, and not throw covetous glances at what is its property by undeniable rights.

Above all things, I advise the Ottoman Armenians, in the interest both of their own peace and happiness, and especially in the interests of the Turks, to give up their hare-brained dreams that Erzerum, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekir, Mamuret-ul-Asis shall ever become part of Armenia.

On the day when the Turkish Armenians definitely show that they have given up this impossible hope they will begin to live in honourable friendship with their Turkish and Kurdish compatriots. It is always open to those among them who wish to be Armenians and Armenians alone to settle in the republic of the Armenian Caucasus. But for those who wish to remain in Turkey, it is an absolute condition that they should show themselves true Ottomans and refrain from any activities which might throw suspicion on their loyalty. Henceforward, there will no longer be a place among the Armenians of Turkey for the Dachnakzutium, the Hintschak, and other parties, and I am convinced that such organisations can only do harm to the Armenians of the Caucasus.

At the present moment the task before the three Caucasian

Republics and the Ottoman Empire is to help one another mutually and to devote their powers to the restoration of their devastated countries, the organisation and establishment of their administration. There is yet another task before these four States: that of using every necessary measure to prevent the Russian torrent from breaking over the Caucasus mountains. To ensure this it is of the utmost importance for these four States to form a defensive alliance against the Muscovite invasion. Zaven Effendi, the present patriarch of the Armenians, knows better than anyone else the friendliness towards the Armenians with which I am inspired.

When I came to Constantinople in December, 1915, Zaven Effendi visited me in the Pera Palace Hotel and handed me a memorandum from the Patriarchate thanking me in the name of the whole Armenian nation.

As I hear that he is now being employed as a tool in the intrigues of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, I beg him, as a friend of the Armenians, to examine the advice I have given above. Consideration of the advantages which my view would offer to the Armenians might perhaps prevent him from becoming the plaything of the Greek Patriarch.

If, as I have said already, we four nations of the Near East do not conclude a formal alliance of defence against Russia, if we do not co-operate in the foundation of a republic of the North Caucasus and include it in our alliance, we cannot doubt that we shall fall victims to the power of Russia, who, for years, has yearned to bring us under her yoke.

Who knows, perhaps the day will come when the poor Arabs and Persians who have fallen under the influence of the French and English may slip out of the hands of their present masters and join our alliance?

The nations of the Near East can only live in freedom if they make themselves absolute masters of their fate.

I believe that this political ideal which I have sketched out for the Ottoman, Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaidjan politicians is calculated, in less than twenty years, to transform the Near East, hitherto regarded as a hot-bed of intrigue and unrest, into a paradise, and to give it a status which will make it independent of the foreigner.

For the Turks, who form an overwhelming majority of the Ottoman Empire, this ideal is of fundamental importance. If the Armenian minority desires to remain Ottoman, it has only to prove that, like the Armenians of seventy years ago, it is inspired with feelings of loyalty and true Ottoman ideals.

This, in my opinion, is the only method I can suggest for finally burying the blood-stained past and preparing the way for a rich and happy future. I and my compatriots are always ready for discussion with anyone who can produce a better solution.

THE END.

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